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The Biopolitics of Development

Reading Michel Foucault in the Postcolonial Present

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Reading Foucault in the Postcolonial Present

Sandro Mezzadra, Julian Reid, and Ranabir Samaddar

This book emerges from a fundamental discontent that the three of us share with the politics of Foucault-inspired scholarship. Foucault's works have had a massive influence on postcolonial literatures, particularly in political theory, literary criticism and historiography, in recent years, and many of the authors of this book have themselves made significant contributions to that influence. But while Foucault's thought has been inspirational for the interrogation of colonial biopolitics, as well as governmental rationalities concerned with development in the postcolonial era, his works have too often failed to inspire studies of the forms of political subjectivity that such regimes of power incite. Instead they have been used to stoke the myth of the inevitability of the decline of collective political subjects, often describing an increasingly limited horizon of political possibilities and provoking disenchantment with the political itself. Worse, they have been the target of a morose criticism for their apparent inabilities to have addressed spaces outside the Western world (Chaps. 2 and 3). And worse still, they have been used to displace our understanding and recognition of the brutality and exploitative nature of colonial and every other form of biopolitics: the war, killing and multiple forms of violence without which it would not have been possible (Chap. 3).

Nurturing this discontent with current Foucauldian scholarship, we came up with the plan for two consecutive symposia, the first in Calcutta in 2010 and the second in Bologna in 2011, where we would collectively and in collaboration with others

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excavate the importance of Foucault's work for our capacities to recognize how this degraded view of political subjectivity came about, particularly within the framework of the discourses and practices of 'development', and with particular attention to the predicaments of postcolonial peoples. As such, this book, the outcome of those symposia, is dedicated to exploring how we can use his ideas to recover the vital capacity to think and act politically in a time when fundamentally human capacities to think, to know and to act purposively in the world are being pathologized as expressions of the hubris and 'underdevelopment' of postcolonial peoples. Why and how it is that human life in postcolonial settings has been depoliticized to such dramatic effect?

The immediacy of these themes ought to be obvious to anyone actually living in the South. It is not by accident that, as Ranabir Samaddar explains in his individual contribution to this volume (Chap. 3), Foucault's thought was powerful and influential in India long before it achieved comparable influence and power within much of Europe. And for those who know and have experienced the governmental and biopolitical techniques that have long since shaped the exercise of power in India, this is not surprising. As Manish K. Jha, P. K. Shajahan and Mouleshri Vyas demonstrate in Chap. 4, concepts of biopolitics and governmentality are immensely helpful for understanding the manners by which the Indian government and affluent Indian elites ensure their security from the Indian urban poor especially. Biopolitical claims to 'improve the living condition of the poor' function paradoxically to legitimate the demolition of slum settlements, the very spaces of habitat that many of the Indian urban poor call 'home', displacing them for infrastructural development projects or other urban renewal programmes that serve the neoliberal economy (see Chap. 4). An international development apparatus of non-governmental organizations defined by humanitarian goals has proved indispensible for the task of convincing slum dwellers as to the 'benefits' of resettlement. In many ways, the neoliberalization of the Indian state is far in advance of its development in Europe and other parts of the so-considered Western world. But within the Western academy, these realities remain heavily under-addressed. In thinking about what it means to read Michel Foucault here in the postcolonial present, this book tackles some significant questions and problems – not simply that of how to explain the ways in which postcolonial regimes of governance have achieved the debasements of political subjectivity they have, nor that of how we might better equip them with the means to suborn postcolonial peoples more fully, but that of how such peoples, in their subjection to governance, can and do resist, subvert, escape and defy the imposition of modes of governance that seek to remove them of those very capacities for resistance, subversion, flight and defiance. As Jha, Shajahan and Vyas argue, the squatter is in many ways an exemplar in this regard; their hard work and ambition in creating homes out of radically insecure spaces, the love they show for their communities, their pride in creation and the fortitude demonstrated in their struggles with the government are lessons to all.

The question of how to understand the historical and contemporary function of development doctrine in the propagation and expansion of liberal regimes of governance is, by now, well rehearsed within critical and postcolonial literatures

(see, especially, Duffield 2008; Cowen and Shenton 1996; Escobar 1995). Less interrogated, however, is the question of how the strategic function of development has changed in the transition from liberal to neoliberal regimes of governance as well as how this change in function transverses diverse geographical scales, for the function of development is by no means limited to the so-called global South. What is the relevance of this shift, especially, from development to 'sustainable' and 'human' development for the increasingly global hegemony of neoliberalism? By and large, with some relevant exceptions (e.g. Sanyal 2007), scholarship on the relation between development and liberalism presents the picture of a seamless continuity between a more or less unchanging discourse of development and an essentialized liberalism driven by the same aims and ends that defined it at its birth in the 17th and 18th centuries. We don't disagree with the idea that there are underlying continuities in both doctrines of development and liberalism as well as in their strategic relation. We insist on that idea fully. But nevertheless we think both liberalism and development have to be recognized as complex and historical regimes of power relations that have mutated in ways that make it difficult to retain outmoded definitions. In effect, they are moving targets. But being moving targets, they are, nonetheless, targets of a kind, harder to hit but the more rewarding for it. Targeting the relation between development and liberalism accurately requires, we believe, using Foucault to re-examine the fundamental and complex correlations of economy with life in both doctrines, for it is that correlation which we think is the source of their consistency as well as profoundly mutative nature. In other words, we want to open up the question, once more, of what Foucault originally named the 'biopolitics' and 'biopower' of liberal modernity (Foucault 1990). The form of 'biopower' that Foucault alluded to without ever fully describing or explaining is one that assumes the development of life as its governing imperative – a form of power that 'exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations' (Foucault 1990: 137). That both liberalism and development are biopolitical doctrines in this sense of the term is obvious. It is the insistence on the need to develop 'life' which has permitted liberalism to proliferate, like the poison species it is, taking over entire states and societies as conditions for its spread, installing markets, commodifying anything it can lay its hands on, monetizing the value of everything, driving peoples from the countryside into cities and generating displacement, homelessness and deprivation. And that neoliberal condition so described is more or less coterminous with the postcolonial present, encompassing peoples regardless of ethnicity, origin or culture. Neoliberalism is by now well understood as a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can be best advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets and free trade (Harvey 2007). Less understood, however, is how its claims to be able to increase wealth and freedom became correlated with claims to develop life itself, moving beyond and blurring the very boundary between public and private established and so carefully policed by classical liberalism.

All of that is before we get to the thornier problem of how changes in the account of life at stake have altered under conditions of neoliberalism. Classically, we are taught to think of liberalism, following Foucault included, as a form of humanism. It is a form of humanism that in preaching the value of a particular account of human life denies elements of humanity the ability to claim inclusion within the human community. No doubt this game continues to be played today, but the rules, we think, have changed dramatically. Neoliberalism breaks from earlier liberalisms and traditions of political economy in so far as its claims to legitimacy depend less on its abilities to promote the prosperity of human life and more that of the life of the biosphere (Chap. 7). The correlations of economy, well-being, freedom, security and biospheric life in and among neoliberal regimes of practice and representation comprise the contemporary foundations of its biopolitics. We cannot understand how liberalism functions, most especially how it has gained the more or less global hegemony that it has, without addressing how systematically the category of life has organized the correlation of its various practices of governance. But we also have to recognize how important the shift in the very understanding of life, from the human to the biospheric, has been for changes in those practices and for determining the specificity of neoliberalism.

This argument will come as a surprise to many who still take the humanist elements of neoliberal doctrine seriously. As David Chandler shows in his contribution (Chap. 5), the concept of human agency is central to neoliberal development discourse. This centrality is often greeted as emancipatory when contrasted with more classical forms of liberalism which are said to have over-emphasized mere economic growth. With its chatter concerning 'human capabilities' and 'capacities', development is said to have 'developed' itself out of a macro socio-economic context into something more attentive to the needs of individual human beings. But as Chandler shows, when we look at the fine print of the account of 'the human' within neoliberal development discourse, we discover a highly biopoliticized and much degraded view of what it is to be human. In essence, neoliberal development discourse strips the human of the very properties that distinguish it from other living beings, by denying it, especially, any capacity for autonomy. As Chap. 5 argues, our freedom to autonomously decide is taken away at the same time as the constraints of our social relations appear as well as transformed as the internal barriers of the mind. Capitalism naturalizes and normalizes these constraints at the same time as human rationality is degraded and denied. The problem appears the human rather than the social relations in which the human is embedded.

Suvi Alt (Chap. 6) shows how the development of neoliberal peace demands the wholesale reshaping of human subjectivities in places said to be at risk of conflict and the promotion, especially, of the attributes of *homo oeconomicus*. Alt details how this plays out in terms of the demand made of people to 'become adaptable'. As she describes, 'becoming adaptable' implies an entrepreneurship of the self, a never-ending process of attempting to maximize one's utility in response to environments that are endlessly changing themselves. In essence, while the ideals espoused by development agencies recruited into the security apparatus of neoliberal governance may be of 'human security', the subjectivity they are aimed at developing is one that is stripped of any capacity to conceive an ability to achieve security.

Contestation of 'change' is effectively outlawed as voices articulating questions concerning the reasons for 'change' are stifled. To become adaptable, in other words, is to forgo human powers of resistance. The correlation of development with security at work here functions to feed and support the political imaginary of neoliberalism predicated as it is upon the belief that a global order of self-securing subjects is the first foundation of a more secure form of world order. But in essence what we are seeing imagined here is a world depopulated of human subjects amid the reduction of human life to the properties and capacities that define non-human living species: adaptation. Worse, subjects that, in their humanity, do not or cannot adapt are constructed as threats to peace, order and 'good governance'.

Julian Reid (Chap. 7) shows how a similarly neoliberal strategy of human degradation is being pursued by development agencies concerned with the construction of 'resilience'. The account of the world envisaged and constituted by development agencies concerned with building resilient subjects is one that presupposes the disastrousness of the world and likewise one which interpellates a subject that is permanently called upon to bear the disaster, a subject for whom bearing the disaster is a required practice without which he or she cannot grow and prosper in the world. The resilient subject is a subject that must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world, not a subject that can conceive of changing the world, its structure and conditions of possibility, but a subject that accepts the disastrousness of the world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world and which accepts the necessity of the injunction to change itself in correspondence with threats and dangers now presupposed as endemic. Building resilient subjects involves the deliberate disabling of the political habits, tendencies and capacities of peoples and replacing them with adaptive ones. Resilient subjects are subjects that have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the difficulties they are faced with but instead adapt to their enabling conditions via the embrace of neoliberalism. Resisting neoliberalism in the present thus requires, Reid argues, rejecting the seductive claims to 'alternative futures' offered by seemingly contrary doctrines of sustainable development and their political promises of resilience. A reinvestment in an account of political subjectivity is needed, and a re-articulation of the more classical concept of security may be useful, he argues, for such a purpose. Achieving that, though, requires a recognition of the deeply biopolitical nature of the project of so-called sustainable development.

As Paulo Tavares argues (Chap. 8), sustainable development has nothing to do with 'protecting the environment' but is better understood as dedicated to expanding the process of what he calls 'environmentalism' which proceeds by progressively including nature within a rationality of government. Foucault's *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) lectures are of fundamental importance for this insight and especially his account of the emergence of the concept of *milieu*. As Tavares describes, for Foucault, milieu appears as a new field of political intervention insofar as power starts to be exercised on the ecological relation between human populations and the natural entities and processes on which they depend for their survival in order to obtain direct effects in the socio-economic field. In this context, Tavares employs the verb, to *environ*, a productive process through which a relation between humans and the nature they rely on is brought within a field of governance.

These processes are to be contested and resisted. Describing the history of the 'Amazon Insurgency', Tavares shows not only how environing takes place contemporarily but how it is tied into a neoliberal strategy of economic expropriation, as well as how it is inciting popular resistance. As the sustainable development frontier has moved deeper into the Amazon, its geography has been converted into a vast terrain of struggle between dissident modes of appropriating and managing nature.

Once we recognize the deeply degraded nature of the representation of human subjectivity within these dominating discourses on resilience and biopolitical regimes of practices, it becomes apparent that it is not simply living species and habitats that are threatened with extinction, and for which we must mobilize our care, but the words and gestures of a truly human solidarity on which resistance to biopolitical regimes depends. A sense of responsibility for the survival of the life of the biosphere is not a sufficient condition for the development of a political subject capable of defeating neoliberalism, nor a mere sense of responsibility for the life of the human among other beings. What is required is a subject responsible for securing what Felix Guattari (1995) once named 'incorporeal species', chiefly that of the political, currently threatened with extinction, on account of the overwrought fascination with biological life that has colonized the developmental as well as every other biopoliticized imaginary of the modern age. This task of renovating the political requires a fundamental break from the dominant readings and utilizations of Foucault within political theory and science. But it does not require a break as such from Foucault. Rather, it requires that we revisit his work and attend more carefully to the directions his work and politics were moving in at the end of his career and life. It requires, beyond that, that we decide how we wish to *use* Foucault, without any apology for the instrumentalization of his work that term implies. As Judith Revel makes clear in her essay in this volume (Chap. 2), we do not do justice to Foucault by trying to follow in the footsteps he already tread but by utilizing his work such that we can open up new paths of traversal.

One such path may be that of what Michael Dillon (Chap. 9) calls 'the religio-political nexus'. As his essay describes, faith-based organizations are deeply implicated in the operations of the security-development complex of the 21st century. And this, as he also maintains, is not a novel but historical aspect of a religio-political nexus that Foucault's works were themselves alert to. Dillon argues, however, that such does not make such religious groups a mere dupe of the state, of biopower, of colonialism or any other apparatus of governance, historical or contemporary, even though Christian churches especially have often served the interests of colonization and imperial exploitation. Instead, we ought to explore how religion can and does operate as what Foucault called a 'surface of friction' within the security-development complex into which they have been so assiduously recruited by global liberal governance, especially since 9/11. Indeed, the point that Dillon makes is crucial, and the path it opens up deserves to be followed much further. The struggle with neoliberalism and regimes of biopower more generally requires us to free ourselves from the simplistically antireligious reflexes that have often informed discourses of critique and resistance. And Foucault's works remain very useful for that purpose in ways hitherto unexplored.

On 28 March 1984, less than 3 months before his death, Foucault gave his very last lecture at the College de France. On what did Foucault choose to talk about at that auspicious occasion? The lecture was on the subject of Christianity and described the fundamental conflict within Christianity that led to the establishment of the Christian Church (Foucault 2011: 325–42), a conflict which, as Foucault told his audience, was fought and decided between two very different kinds of subjects: the fearful, mistrustful subject of the Church versus the fearless and confident subject of the early pre-Church Christian era. Foucault's question, or that which he posed for his audience, was that not only of how to explain the victory of the former over the latter but how to do so with a view to being able to understand the nature of the power of and struggle against liberalism better. We know from many of his previous lectures, most especially the *Security, Territory, Population* lecture series of 1978–1979, that liberalism, on his account, was born from the 'archaic model of the Christian pastorate' (Foucault 2007: 110). The pastorate sketched out and was the prelude, he argued, to liberalism through its development 'of a specific subject … who is subjected in continuous networks of obedience and who is subjectified through the compulsory extraction of truth … a certain secret inner truth' which 'becomes the element through which the pastor's power is exercised, by which obedience is practiced' and by which a 'relationship of complete obedience is assured' (Foucault 2007: 183–185). That the truth of the pastoral subject was 'internal, secret and hidden' (2007: 184) was of essential importance for Foucault's explanation of the specificity of the pastorate as a form of power, the particularity of the pastoral subject and its continuities with the biopolitical subject of liberal modernity. Condemned never to be able to know its truth as such, form a 'relationship with a recognized truth', the pastoral subject was likewise condemned to live out a life of permanent obedience, humility and servitude to a form of spiritual development which was 'absolutely permanent…directed with regard to everything and for the whole of one's life' such that the entirety of his or her life became the object of continuous examination amid pastoral practices of involuntary extraction (Foucault 2007: 182). The claim as to the specificity of this form of subject called into being by the pastorate and its continuity with the biopolitical subject of liberal modernity was maintained by Foucault throughout his studies of liberalism right up until his death. It was central, certainly, to his explanation of the principle of self-limitation with which he went on to define liberalism in *The Birth of Biopolitics* lectures in 1978–1979 (Foucault 2008). No doubt liberal discourses of economy were central also to how it arrived at that principle. Foucault said, 'Economics steals away from the juridical form of the sovereign precisely that which is emerging as the essential element of a society's life, namely economic processes' (Foucault 2008: 282). But beneath its advocacy of the principle of self-limitation, Foucault shows us how liberalism rested not simply on a fundamental assumption as to the economic nature of the life of society but on fundamental assumptions as to the hidden nature of the truth of that life, the limits of what can be known of it and the consequent preoccupation with the permanent surveying and extracting of its forever mutative truths as well as growth from it. The fundamental truth of life understood as economy is, as he explores, 'the unknowability of the totality of the process … the

economic world is naturally opaque and naturally non-totalizable … originally and definitively constituted from a multiplicity of points of view' and 'liberalism acquired its modern shape precisely with the formulation of this essential incompatibility between the non-totalizable multiplicity' of society's life and 'the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign' (Foucault 2008: 282). Eschewing accounts of the supposed atheism of liberal political economy, Foucault shows how its assumptions as to the elusive nature of the economic life of the liberal subject and the inability of the subject to ever know and tell the truth of that life as such originated in the pastorate and its discourses on the elusive nature of the life of the pastoral subject.

'Truth' was also the concern of Foucault's very last lecture at the College de France, covering as it did the use of the term 'parrhesia' or 'truth telling' in early Christian texts. To his final audience, Foucault described 'the opposition between two major frameworks, two major cores of Christian experience': on the one hand, the experience specific to the very earliest forms of Christianity, of the 'parrhesiac', a being possessed with an openness of heart, immediate presence and direct communication of the soul with God, giving him the confidence, ability to speak the truth and to know the truth and courage to act, be careless with his life and risk his life, to the point of martyrdom (Foucault 2011: 332) (parrhesia, as such, was the courage to assert the truth that one is confident of knowing and to which one wishes to bear witness regardless of every danger), and, on the other hand, the experience of the fear of the parrhesiac in the subsequent and institutionalized forms of Christianity, which diagnosed parrhesia as a kind of disease, an excess and danger to be prevented and which sought and succeeded in regrounding Christianity in a completely other principle, that of trembling obedience, fear of God and recognition of the necessity to submit to His will and the will of those who represent him. This obedient subject did not, and could not, have confidence in himself. He had to operate on a principle of mistrust of oneself. He must not, it was understood within this other framework of Christian experience that Foucault described, believe, imagine or be so arrogant as to think that he can secure his own truth and find a way of opening to God by himself. He must be the object of his own mistrust, an attentive, scrupulous and suspicious vigilance. And only by renunciation of self and the putting of this general principle of obedience into practice would he be able to secure salvation. So you have, as Foucault demonstrated in that last lecture, two very different ways of conceiving how to fulfil the eschatological promise in Christianity: on the one hand, through obedience, renunciation of self, care for life and blind submission of the will and, on the other hand, through confidence, truth telling, risk of life and courage.

We, like Foucault, are not among those who simply dismiss Christianity or any other religion as stupid because to do so is also to dismiss as stupid the vast majority of people in the world and significantly the non-Western parts of the world. We do not think people are stupid generally, and there are good reasons why people are reverting right now to religion in an era of crisis in the political, both in Western and non-Western worlds. If Foucault's studies demonstrate anything, they tear apart the image of Christianity as simply either the origin or crux of a monolithically Western

tradition. Before we can reach the question and problem of Western and non-Western differences, we have to face the difference which permeates and circulates within that absurd concept of 'the West' itself. As Revel argues in this volume (Chap. 2), that move of Foucault's is crucial for the development of postcolonial thought itself and, yet, still not recognized or understood.

One important and understandable reason for the resurgence of religious belief and practice in recent years is that it is a refuge for eschatological reason. Eschatological reason takes many forms because eschatology, every bit as much as religion itself, exists in multiplicity. Liberalism itself has its own eschatology, peculiarly modern insofar as it offers its subject of enunciation no hope of a time beyond this present time of permanent adaptation to a world of endemic crisis. This is paradoxical because to think, reason and act eschatologically is to think, reason and act with a view to being able to bring an end to present times, with the confidence that these times will be succeeded by better times. It is fundamental to many of the world religions. It is also, however, fundamental to politics. Eschatology can take the form of the absolute right to revolt, to insurrection and to breaking all the bonds of obedience: the right to revolution itself on account of the confidence in the ability to end present time and create a new and better time. Within the West, the power of eschatological reason looks largely to have been lost. It is barely immanent within life as it is lived within the West. Regardless of how crisis-ridden and corrupted liberalism obviously is today, we struggle to conceive of a time without and beyond it, hence Foucault's insistence on the need to search for what he called 'possible difference', the difference between the present time in which we are living that makes us what we are and a future time we want to make happen (Chap. 2).

No surprise, then, that the right to revolt, to insurrection, to the breaking of all bonds of obedience – the right to revolution itself – is now much more evident and alive in the non-Western world and not only in the Arab world but the Islamic world. The presence of political Islam has not been incidental, in our view, to the development of revolt and revolution in North Africa and the Middle East. Regardless of how much energy the West has expended to explain the recent mass upsurges in the Arab world known as the 'Arab Spring' as an event of secular nature, Islam has been fundamental to its development. Of course, the nature and composition of the panoply of movements and struggles in the Maghreb and in the Mashreq[1] have been extraordinarily rich and diverse. But the materiality of those movements and struggles was lit within by the presence of religious languages and imaginaries from their inception. A realistic assessment of the Arab Spring would recognize these realities and come to terms with them, theoretically and politically. Instead the neglect of the power and presence of Islam has led to a disillusionment following the electoral victories of Islamic parties in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as to a revival of the 'clash of civilizations' discourse, especially since the killing of the U.S. ambassador in Benghazi and the wave of rage which has inspired the whole

[1] Originally, French names for two major regions of the Arab world, the Maghreb is made up of three North African countries, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and the Mashreq comprises four eastern Mediterranean states, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

Islamic world following the release of the film, *Innocence of Muslims*.[2] Once more, we see 'Islam' being reduced to an absurd monolith in contrast with the rich spectrum of tensions and conflicts that traversed and inspired it, theologically and politically, during the revolts of 2010–2011.

In this sense, the task which we believe Foucault's studies of the degraded subject developed by the liberal project sets for us is definitely *not* to return to religion but to recover that lost aspect to subjectivity, fundamental, among other sources, to early religious experience, which entails not the incapacity to know the truth on account of its elusive nature but the confidence of knowing and being able to tell and act on the truth, a subject very like that of the early Christian notion of being 'indifferent to the opinion of others and to the structures of power' (Foucault 2011: 318), a subject, also, for whom the term 'humanity' refers to everything soft and pathetic among the living and which regards itself and affirms itself as a kind of beast, and yet a subject open in heart, which tells the truth it knows, on account of a confidence and trust in itself which gives it the courage to do so 'regardless of every danger' (Foucault 2011: 331). As Foucault shows us, it was only with the subsequent 'stress on obedience in Christian life, in Christian practice and institutions, in relation to oneself as well as in relation to truth' that this confidence became obscured (2011: 333) and that Christians were taught, in place of confidence, to fear God, recognizing the necessity of submitting to His will and those who represent him. Likewise, it was only then that the confidence that gave the early Christian subject his courage to tell the truth in disregard of danger becomes diagnosed as 'a sort of arrogance and presumption', requiring disciplinary and governmental attention. We are not, then, it ought to be obvious by now, among those who, wanting to reify the archaeological Foucault, participate in the chorus that has damned political subjectivity by damning the subject itself (Chap. 3). If anything, we are writing to rescue and renovate the political subject from the degradations that a liberalized reading of Foucault, distinctive of the North American academy, is responsible for. Foucault's works are, we believe, indispensible for recovering and affirming an understanding of the precise preconditions for political subjectivity, historically, in the present and future.

There is of course another source in Foucault's studies of religious truth-telling practices that are of immense interest for us in this project, a source that puts into radical doubt the integrity of those critiques which lament his apparent failure to have shown interest in spaces and peoples outside the Western world, his journal writings from Iran in 1978 just prior to the Iranian Revolution, a revolution that he called 'the first great insurrection against global systems, the form of revolt that is the most modern and the most insane' (Foucault 2005a: 222). There he speculated on how Islam was working to transform the discontent, hatred, misery and despair of Iranians into what he described as 'a force', a way of being together, a way of speaking the truth and listening to the truth, something that allows one to be listened

[2] *Innocence of Muslims* (2012) is the title of an anti-Islamic movie trailer, written and produced by Nakoula Basseley. Anti-Islamic contents were added in post-production phase by dubbing, without the actors' knowledge. It was perceived as denigrating the prophet Muhammad and caused protests against the video throughout the Arab and Muslim world.

to by others and to yearn for something with them at the same time as they yearn for it (Foucault 2005b: 202–203). Islam was for Foucault the *spirit* which bound the Iranian people together, constituting a shared regime of truth more powerful than the simple biological fact of their being members of the same species, giving them the courage to risk their own lives in order to achieve the revolutionary change which they sought and dreamt about. He speculated on the major differences between the Islamic modernity being sought through revolutionary means in Iran and the liberal modernity that Iranian Muslims saw as archaic and were rising up to overthrow in 1978. While liberal modernity produces a subject preoccupied by a fear of its vulnerability and the death and damage that can be done to its biological life, for the Muslim, Foucault argued, death is what attaches him or her to life (Foucault 2005b): 201). And while for the liberal subject the fear of death and damage initiates an ethic of constant care for life to ensure its well-being for the finite time of which it is capable, death gives him or her the courage to fight and ultimately act without care for his or her life, not out of obedience to a law or authority but in renewal of a fidelity to the eventuality of a truth greater than life itself, a truth which cannot be coded by law, nor which simply belongs to a prophet, or other representatives, but to the people that truth inhabits, giving them the confidence and courage to risk their lives in preservation of it.

Foucault's studies of 20th century political Islam and early Christianity were written at different times, to entirely different audiences, and never conjoined thematically. But it is obvious that there is a massive resonance between the very earliest historical forms of Christianity he analysed and the political Islam of his and our present. Likewise, he saw in the later, more institutionalized forms of Christianity the seeds of liberal modernity, biopolitics and liberal subjectivity. And it seems to us that what Foucault is describing when he describes the experience of subjectivity in early Christianity and contemporary political Islam is a form of experience that can only posit itself in hostility to liberal modernity and its biopolitical subject, a form of experience which liberalism itself can only comprehend as threatening and fearful to its biopolitical project. So, if we want to found a politics beyond liberalism, the legacies of its colonial and imperial history, it is necessary that we learn something from these examples, themselves to be found within religious discourses and practices. Political subjects do not merely live in order to fit in with and adapt to existing times or desire the sustainability of the conditions for their living the lives they do. In contrast, they resist those conditions and, where successful, overcome them, transforming time into that which it was not – a new time in succession of an old and destroyed time. The task is to affirm the eschatological confidence of the subject which entails not its experience of vulnerability to injury and fear of death but the hubristic trust in itself and others with whom it decides what it wants, asserts what it possesses and celebrates what it is able to do, in accordance with truths which transcend its existence as a merely living entity. This task of reinvestment in hubris involves sourcing what we might call after another heretical Foucauldian, Peter Sloterdijk, the *psychopolitical subject* in contrast with the biopolitical subject of liberal modernity (Sloterdijk 2010). What is the psychopolitical subject and how does it contrast with the biopolitical subject of

liberal modernity? Biopolitics, as we know from Foucault and those who have followed in his wake, concerns itself with developing the life of the human in its species being, the biological powers that account for the evolution of its species life. Psychopolitics, on the other hand, is concerned with the powers that determine the life of the human psyche. These two forms of life, the species life and psychic life of the subject, are, we also venture, entirely different and hostile to one another. Such an emphasis does not mean for us an attempt to rehabilitate a dualism between the body and the mind. What it means is stressing the element of excess with regard to given conditions that are grounded in the absolute materiality of the affects and passions, reason, pain and joy, constitutive of even the most mundane human experiences.

'Psychic life' has, of course, had a life in mainstream political theoretical discourse at least ever since the publication of Judith Butler's *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997). Her account takes the psyche as the source of subjection and more specifically the 'peculiar turning of a subject against itself' through which we are said to come to desire the terms of our own subjection (Butler 1997: 18–19). Accordingly, vulnerability is the core property that Butler assigns to the psychic life of the subject on account of its being dependent on that which by necessity exploits it (1997: 20). However, more fundamental than vulnerability to the psychic life of the subject, we insist, are the powers of imagination through which we are able to escape power. The form of psychopolitics we believe in is therefore closer to William Blake than it is to Judith Butler, in its assumption that 'the imagination is not a state: it is the human existence itself' (Blake, quoted in Bachelard 2005: 19). It is committed to developing the capacity for imaginative action. Imaginative action does not entail human beings melancholically suffering conditions of victimhood or enable human beings to adapt to their environments à la biopolitical subject of liberal modernity, nor does it enable them à la 'neuropolitics' of William Connolly (2002) simply to cultivate a more cosmopolitan ethical sensibility, as if politics simply requires a kind of widening and deepening of present world conditions. In contrast, imaginative action is what enables human beings to forsake the current courses of their worlds in the constitution of a new one. Foucault's valorizations of early Christianity and contemporary Islam can provide us with some useful insights into how to develop it.

Yet, the struggles within postcolonial societies and their endeavours to make their own modernity, development, new life and democracy make it imperative for us to rigorously study the role the 'psychic element' plays in the making of the postcolonial political subject. On the one hand, there are several instances of movements (the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and Sudan, the RSS in India) which remind us of the dangers of fascism built upon a mobilization of this psychic element. Fascism always haunts the political and perhaps necessarily so. Yet, on the other hand, we know that this haunting cannot be in itself a reason to sacrifice the political and give in to the blackmail of liberalism. This is precisely what liberals have done to insurgent thought by citing Carl Schmitt (2005) and suggesting that opposition to the liberal way of life means, by necessity, fascism. Indeed, that has been one of the techniques by which liberalism feeds off the historical examples of revolutions 'gone wrong' or of psychopolitics 'unharnessed', as it were. In this sense, a

rereading of the anticolonial revolutions of the 19th century and early 20th century revolutions is still required to bury, finally, the false binary of liberalism/fascism and in a wider sense materiality/spirituality, which Foucault had dissected in imaginative ways and which happens to be one of the central concerns of the essays in the volume.

Therefore, unlike many critics of Foucault, we refuse to burden him with the trajectory that the Iranian Revolution took in its subsequent years. The psychic element, as the Iranian Revolution showed, always has an uncertain path to follow. In some cases, 'unharnessed' psychic power in politics leads to fascism or to the street power of the cafe goers and rag pickers that Walter Benjamin (2006) observed. Thus, we are faced with situations where alternative visions of development die out in face of the fierce winds of hopelessness, frenzy and destruction, and the 'political spirituality' envisioned by Foucault becomes a mere death dance. In short, what we are saying is that it is still possible to use Foucault's insights on subject formation in creative ways, such that we do not have to be bound by the binary of spirituality/materiality but can read Foucault's tracts on subject formation anew – in ways that admit of these paradoxes, yet suggest possibilities of coping with them. This then is to call not as so many other Foucault-inspired critiques of development have done for an end to, or the abandonment of, development. It is to call for a regrounding of the concept such that we can think and practise the development of political subjectivity. Contesting the biopoliticization of development achieved by the liberal project requires a counter-developmental imaginary. And that imaginary requires itself both an act of imagination as well as investment in imagination itself as a core property of political subjectivity. To quote Foucault again, the task is 'to construct another political thought, another political imagination, and teach anew the vision of a future' (2005c: 185).

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Chapter 2
Foucault and His 'Other': Subjectivation and Displacement

Judith Revel

That Foucault never directly confronted the colonial question – much less expressed himself on the kinds of analysis that postcolonial and subaltern studies later developed – is well known. Many commentators turn this evident absence into a clear sign of a blindness that they attribute to a supposed Eurocentrism that many of the great thinkers of the second half of the last century were afflicted by (without mentioning the thinkers of previous centuries). However, it is clear that such an absence should be questioned and problematized without falling into oversimplification. I would like to make it clear that I absolutely do not intend to defend Foucault or protect his work from the sometimes harsh criticism made against it. I belong to a generation – the one that keeps the Foucault Centre going and most of the research in and around it – that never knew Foucault directly, that never had any affective or personal tie to him, that doesn't owe him anything nor has the memory of any heredity and that often has developed its research not so much in the name of an orthodoxy or a Foucauldian philology as much as the possible uses, field and object applications that he himself never considered. Yet, in that claim of the dimension of 'use', we recognized – and we still recognize – the need to respect a few methodological elements without which referring to Foucault makes no sense. These are the elements that I would like to begin with – also because questioning Foucault's thought in our postcolonial present means less, I think, evaluating what Foucault was over his 30 years of research, perceptive and attentive to the world around him, as understanding the way that, today, subaltern studies, postcolonial studies or gender studies adapt Foucault to their necessities and their conceptual and practical needs.

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2.1 How Much Is a Biography Worth?

Let us clear the air right away of false obstacles. As one will remember, Foucault, who was 20 in 1946 at the beginning of the Indochina war, 28 when the Algerian war started in 1954 and 36 in 1962 when the French colonial empire, was finally dismantled with the Évian Accords,[1] never said anything about any of this. Some add that his only direct experience of postcolonial reality was his 2-year stay in Tunisia between October 1966 and June 1968 – during which he, working essentially in linguistics at the time but also on a piece concerning Manet and on what would later become (Foucault 2002) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, did not seem interested in the country he was in and which had become independent only 10 years before. These claims are at the same time legitimate and inconsistent. Legitimate because effectively there is no reference to what happened in his work at the time yet inconsistent for various reasons.

The first reason is simply biographical: from the end of his time at the École Normale Supérieure until the early 1960s, Foucault spent most of his time in northern Europe – in Sweden, Poland and Germany – and was probably concentrating more on the all-but-pleasant perception of the political weight of the near Soviet Union. Let us remember that Foucault was expelled from Poland after less than a year, in September 1959, by the Gomulka police; for this he was moved to Germany, in Hamburg. The second reason is that the lack of texts does not mean indifference; after 2 years in Tunisia, for example, there are no texts dedicated to it; yet it might be useful to remember that if, in June 1968, Foucault was forced to leave the country, it was for having tried to help Tunisian students after the Bourguiba government had strongly repressed the Marxist and anti-imperialist student movement. About this episode, Foucault would say later:

> In Tunisia, everyone laid claim to Marxism with a radical violence and intensity…. For these young people, Marxism represented not only a better way to analyze reality but it was at the same time a sort of moral energy, a completely remarkable existential act…. I felt myself overcome with bitterness and disappointment when I thought of the gap that existed between the way the Tunisian students had of being Marxist and what I knew of Marxism in Europe (France, Poland, or the Soviet Union). That is what Tunisia was for me: I had to enter into political debate. It wasn't May 68 in France, but March 68 in the Third World. (Foucault 1998, my translation)

In France, at the time, people often formulated a reprimand in the opposite sense: Foucault, too busy with the Tunisian situation, would have taken little interest in the Parisian May 1968 events, not judging them as greatly important, and would have discovered the passing of a decisive event only during the summer, once back home. The third reason is that the research for a 'figure of exteriority' in his system of thought is really a permanent element – but one that does not necessarily appear as we might expect it to. It is on this research for the *other than self* that I would like to talk about now.

[1] Signed on 18 March 1962, the Evian Accords have been approved by a referendum on 8 April 1962. Electors from Algerian administrative departments were not admitted to vote. The Évian Accords officially terminated seven years and 5 months of the 'Algerian war'.

2.2 Other to the Self, Other in Itself: Alterity Versus Difference

At the end of his last lesson at the Collège de France, on 28 March 1984, Foucault had planned to end like this:

> But the thing I'd like to insist on is the following: the instauration of the truth doesn't exist without an essential position of alterity; the truth is never the same; there can never be any truth if nor in the form of another world and another life. (Foucault 2009: 310–311)[2]

A difficult phrase, obviously, whose reach, which must certainly refer to his analysis of the cynics in the previous lessons (Foucault 2010, see especially the lectures starting on 29 February 1984), is much greater in reality. Foucault warns: it is always in the distance, the displacement, the gap and the search for difference that we make something a production of truth. Obviously it is not about getting to an absolute truth but permanently redefining a certain relationship with the truth, a system of veridiction, a game in which imbalance counts the most, disequilibrium introduced at the heart of the metaphysical conception of the truth intended as an absolute. Establishing the truth is this: not getting there, not discovering it or revealing it, bust constructing it, displacing it, taking it apart and reinventing it elsewhere. This constructivist conception of the truth that obviously has a great political weight is instead excluded from attitudes and modes of life, reflections and analyses that privilege the simple reconfirmation of what already is, the reproduction of the identical, passively assuming what is already there. The idea, now translated through the notion of *alterity*, elsewhere expressed through the notion of *déprise* ('detachment', see Foucault 1990) or through the concept (mostly borrowed from Gilles Deleuze at the end of the 1960s) of *difference* is not really that new: we already find it in *History of Madness* in 1961 (Foucault 2006).

What is at stake in the *History of Madness* is how, in any given moment, the construction of madness as an 'other', symmetric to reason, allowing the latter to claim an exorbitant power over what exceeds it since, precisely because it is 'other', the other *of itself* and *from itself*, the other *of the same*, the upside-down and inverted copy of its own figure, of its own reflection in the mirror. If madness were not the madness-of-reason, or the madness respect-of-reason; if it were not a genitive in a grammatical sense; if it were not at the same time the other-of-reason and the other-than-reason – Foucault still uses the term *déraison*, or *disreason*, in the first edition of *History of Madness* – the power of the modern ratio would not exist. In the 1960s, the attempt to make madness independent again, freeing it from what it was inevitably derived from before being excluded, is clearly expressed by Foucault. Thus, by making it valued as *difference* and no longer alterity, the unbridgeable gap between the two terms, to unhinge the little speculative game that identifies and labels madness as an absolute subjection. Difference becomes the name of an

[2] My translation from the French. This passage wasn't actually read by Foucault for lack of time ('But it's too late. So, thank you'). However, the recent publication of the course done at the Collège de France on 1984 (Foucault 2009) brings us the text.

irreducibility, an incommensurability, an untranslatable element. Difference becomes the name of an intransitive element. It could be easily demonstrated how much this research for a difference in itself – which, even if in other terms, was shared by other contemporary thinkers like Deleuze or Derrida – went through the next decade and gave life to a good part of the reflection on the production of subjectivity, but this would be another discussion. Certainly, it remains to be known why, at the end of his life, just when he had disqualified the figure of the *other* as a mere variant of the *same* turned over, Foucault seems to go back: in the last lines of the 1984 manuscript (Foucault 2009), he mentions a 'position of alterity' and an 'other life'. This may be because, in 1984, life itself precisely represented a *difference* for Foucault, something irreducible, incommensurable in respect to power: not in its natural or biological dimension, despite what certain philosophers are used to say about bare life (see Agamben 1998), but in its always already being political, social, productive, expansive and inventive. At this point, there is no longer the need to oppose alterity and difference. The idea according to which *the same* could totally subsume its other, without any possible remainder, is gone. The 'remainder' is always there, and this is precisely what the dismeasure between power and modes of life shows us that is a dismeasure between exploitation and processes of subjectivation in the very meshes of power itself, in other words, between the management of life and life's power (here, I use power as *potentia*, and not as *potestas*).[3] The concept of governmentality is right here in this paradox: governmentality consists in governing and at the same time internally comprehending powerful affirmations of liberty, resistance and torsions within governing practices. The two faces of governmentality cannot be separated, but that does not mean that they have to be equivalent. Power and subjectivation, governance and liberty are indissoluble and, at the same time, dissymmetrical. This dissymmetry is precisely the difference that I spoke about a moment ago. We are forced to venture into the Foucauldian conception of power and the analysis of subjectivation that is included in it. I will come back to this in a minute, but first I would like to talk about another essential element, the element of history.

2.3 History and Historicizing: The End of 'White Mythology'

In a recent issue of *Cahier de l'Herne* dedicated to Foucault, Sandro Mezzadra (2011: 352–357) reminds us with great relevance the interview with Foucault on geography published in the review *Hérodote* in 1976. Mezzadra says: 'You can't but be struck by the elusive way Foucault reacts to the observations of the review's editors, according to whom his spaces of reference ('Christianity, Western civilization, Northern Europe and France') are never "truly justified nor specified"'. He rightly

[3] I am using here the distinction between 'potestas' and 'potentia' elaborated by Antonio Negri in his reading of Spinoza: see Negri (1999).

comments: 'The radical questioning of the possibilities of assuming such a demanding space of reference without justifying or specifying it is, on the contrary, again, an honorable point of postcolonial criticism and of the research perspectives that it opened'. We could not agree more.

Yet, it seems to me that the problem is much more complicated than the way it is usually posed. For example, Saïd, in defining Foucault as a philosopher from the 'eminent spatial imaginary' (Saïd 1994: 239), sets the conditions of postcolonial thought based only on the construction of a diverse topography, infinitely more complex and rich. While at the same time attributing to Foucault the merit of having understood the centrality of space in contemporary reflection and the demerit of never having left the space of the Western world, Saïd comes to the conclusion of a regrettable political blindness. It is clear that at first Foucault does not see the necessity to reflect on new possible topographies, even if the Iranian episode, fundamental for Foucault's thought, demonstrates the contrary. We could say that before 1977–1978 Foucault did not see what was at stake in such a shift. Here are an explanation and two short comments on this.

It is important to remember how significant a political and philosophical operation concerning history was in postwar France. Foucault, at the beginning of his work, never stopped trying to break and smash an idea of history that at that time dominated French universities and public debate in general and which was essentially built on a Hegelian conception, sometimes vaguely coloured by Heideggerian accents. Foucault says it often, for example, in the long interview with Duccio Trombadori in 1978 (Foucault 1980), that the most urgent thing was to destroy the four assumptions on which the prevailing Hegelianism stood after 1945: unity, continuity, dialectic effectiveness and teleological coherence. I will not ponder over the tools used for such a deconstruction – there is Nietzsche first (think in particular of his second 'untimely meditation', *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*) and foremost, but also a certain historiography tied to the French Annales school, research on the epistemological *status* of discontinuity borrowed from Georges Canguilhem's work and Bachelard and Koyré before him, the fundamental importance of linguistics, etc. What I would like to stress is that if that operation on history was never done and if there was never a careful dismantling of the unitary, dominant and absolutely rational pretence of Western history, one of the conditions of possibility so that a real thought of difference could emerge (a spatial, historical, economic, subjective and obviously political difference) – those who suffered colonial oppression in that moment and those who would then develop postcolonial analysis – could have never been possible.

It has always struck me the way Derrida was essential for many postcolonial works. I am of course thinking of Spivak (1999), for example. Derrida never makes a fierce critique of history, probably because the tie to phenomenology is never totally cut for him, because in reality there is no trace of real, material history in Derrida (with messianic history being the only real reference). Yet, the awareness of the need to get out of the great, mystifying story of 'white mythology' is very strong (see, particularly, Derrida 1972). It seems to me that where Derrida, with extreme accuracy, poses the theme of difference and the urgency of other categories to think

the exteriority of our system of thought, Foucault goes to the root of the problem: if one does not deconstruct the Western pretence to make history the yardstick of all things, the unit of every event, the background to every difference, one will never get out. In other words, create, inside the West, a 'history of systems of thought' (to use Foucault's chair title at the Collège de France), playing with discontinuity, historicizing (i.e. 'localizing') and using periodization (see Revel 2010). And the situation is, for Foucault, from the very beginning, a way to dissolve the domination of the One. The One is Western metaphysics; the One is white mythology. Starting from this deconstruction rooted in historicizing, when does a given configuration of thought emerge, when does it disappear, starting from which conceptual grid does it work, and what elements does it construct as problems?

This is where the real political work of Foucault can begin: not only in recognizing differences in the past, between Greek ethics and Christian morals, for example, and not only in recognizing the differences between a past periodization and our present, between modern reason of state and the emergence of a political economy that is biopolitical, tied to the birth of liberalism and that we are still in a large part living in, but in recognizing what Foucault would call in his last years the 'possible difference' (this is the phrase used by Foucault in his two comments of Kant's *Was ist Aufklärung*?, in 1983 and 1984): the difference between the present in which we are living that makes us what we are and a future we want to build. The work of difference is shifting, *déprise* ('detachment' in terms explained in Foucault (1990)) and displacement in history; it introduces discontinuity. Obviously, it can be played out, it must be played out, in the space, introducing discontinuity to create other topographies. But it seems to me that the separation of these two aspects – space and history – is quite artificial. There is no exteriority – epistemological, geographical, historical and political – that does not imply discontinuity and vice versa. Reducing Foucault to a 'spatial thinker' (in the sense of Said), as it has been said, ignores the complementarity of these two dimensions.

In his chapter in this volume, Ranabir Samaddar shrewdly notes how much the postcolonial reading of Foucault was, at least at first, mediated by what we usually call cultural studies. It seems to me that cultural studies – and more generally of a kind of North American Foucault – played a pivotal role in producing a paradoxical de-historicizing of Foucauldian analysis. Foucault is generally reduced to two big sets: an investigation into the economy of discourse and the effects of power that it implies; a historical investigation into the forms of governmental rationality in modernity.

In the first case, which has partially produced some very rich research, for instance, Saïd's work, it is forgotten that Foucault's exclusively discursive interest disappears in the early 1970s (coinciding with his publication of *The Order of Discourse* 1970): not because discourse is no longer relevant to his work but because it is generally assumed as a specific case inside a larger whole, inside *practices*. The order of discourse exists as a specific case inside an infinity of 'practices of setting in order' (*pratiques de mise en ordre*) into the real, of objectification and hierarchization of the real that is not necessarily discursive; just like, mentioning it quickly, Foucault will state that a disorder in subjective language (*parole* is the well-known French word already used by F. de Saussure in his *Course de linguistique générale* 1916) exists that is undeniably

effective, but that only represents one possible strategy inside an extremely thick set of resistances to objectification, hierarchization and exploitation and that Foucault will call more generally 'processes of subjectivation'.

In the second case, we can find in Foucault that the complex play of periodization in modernity – and it is not an imprecision, incoherence or confusion but the work of discontinuity inside history itself – is specifically emptied. Foucault is asked to show a linearity, for example, a linear sequence of discipline-control-biopower ordered on a historical continuum, even if Foucault, on the contrary, builds his description through additions, overlaps, ruptures and shifts in an absolutely determined historical-geographical framework. It will be said: this is precisely why Foucault's work, blindly centred on Western civilization, does not see its own descriptive limits. I would like to answer on the contrary: it is the claim of the limits of that description, of its historical-geographical specificity, that allows for the mapping of a cartography of difference, as real or desired as they may be. Recently, during a lesson in Buenos Aires on biopolitics and power over bodies, I found myself facing the following objection: can we still talk about biopolitics when, like under the Argentinian dictatorship, bodies disappear, when power is exercised through the disappearance of bodies? I could give other examples of this shift, in particular some very interesting discussions in Bolivia: for example, what does it mean to comment on the text *The Birth of Biopolitics* (Foucault 2008) – i.e. the attempt to redefine the rationality of government with the economic criteria of productivity and cost reduction, the withdrawal of state control and the transition from a legal-sovereign paradigm to a normative-biopolitical one – in a country where the history of the state-form is radically different, in a country where the decline, evident to us, of the state-form has never happened and better yet in a country where democratic aspirations often pass through the desire for the state? The limit of Foucauldian description, for everyone trying to use his thought in other spaces, contexts and times, is also its force: it produces cartographies through differentiation – it is a *method*.

In reality, these are quite banal things. None of us would denounce the ineffectiveness of Marxist thought in the name of a narrowness of his class conception. This conception is of course outdated and situated; as such it is geographically unexportable and historically determined. But that does not matter because what we get from Marx is not a definition but a problematization, a method, a need for inquiry: the need to conceive the composition of class in the moment and in the context in which we, after a century and a half, live. What Foucault left us is the same: asking ourselves about difference – starting with the clear difference of living in the 21st century that is not commensurable with living in 1966 or 1984.

2.4 The Risk of Metaphysical Temptation

Paradoxically, readings of Foucault based on de-historicizing abound and some hold a great relevance in postcolonial and subaltern circles. Not to dwell over this, I will cite one example: the de-historicized construction of the concept of 'camp'

(*lager*) following the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2002). Often, we see a kind of primordial matrix of power emerge – the structure of the camp – which is seen everywhere, from the internment camps for the 'born criminals' in India at the end of the 1800s to the Soviet internment camps, Nazi extermination camps or the detention camps for holding clandestine migrants today in Europe. This is not about establishing a ranking of horrors nor claiming a presumed 'pureness' of atrocity for some and not others. All of these realities are horrible. It only means that when one wants to see the same matrix everywhere, the One that Western metaphysics has used to gain domination is surreptitiously reintroduced. Power becomes absolute; it is considered as an entity. And differences in the world are accessorily unified, recomposing the continuous and linear narrative of the great history of humanity. I don't think this can be a politically and philosophically acceptable strategy.

2.5 Discipline, Biopolitics, Governmentality and Subjectivation: What to Do with the Analysis of Power

So, here we are at the root of the problem, that is, the Foucauldian conception of power. It seems that, with the little time remaining, we can synthesize as follows:

Power does not exist as a unified object: instead, there are different realities of power relationships, periodized and localized, where different rationalities are articulated and overlapped in the name of different interests. In the West, investment in the sphere of life, long considered external to the political sphere and thus qualified as 'private', corresponds to a change in rationality, a rationality of putting life itself to work. This change does not exclude what came before it but integrates it and redefines it. Disciplines were corrective (and no longer suppressive) in order to obtain productive performance. They are still effective, but with a biopolitical twist, they assume a relative value: they represent one of the possible techniques for productive subjection inside the fundamental change that is represented by the irruption of the factory and mass labour structure between the first and second waves of industrialization. Disciplines remain, but they are remodelled. Things are never linear: they always imply shifts and twists. I think that it would be easy to make the same discourse on the way a few types of disciplinary and biopolitical knowledges were digested, integrated and reorganized in colonial governance: not only because they circulated in the space but because they were introduced into a reality – a colonial reality – where political determinations, power relations, social structures and hierarchies, etc. existed before in the autochthon reality. It is to this exciting hybridization, which fascinated Foucault in a merely Western horizon, recognizing it in historical discontinuity, that the investigation should be moved, even spatially speaking.

Power is in reality composed by an infinity of power relations, which not only do not exclude but also compose and form hybrids. In these multiple and compound power relations, no one is ever always on the 'good' side. One is always here and there: we are objects and subjects of power at the same time, oppressors and oppressed, objectifying and objectified. Politics is not a morality, politics is a diagnostic.

This does not mean that we do not have to recognize that the pain of some has been historically incommensurably greater than the pain of others. It means that there is no outside of/from power: immunity to power relations doesn't exist.

Power is, according to a well-known definition by Foucault, 'action on the action of others' (see Foucault 1982). This is precisely why it can never be saturated: it must be applied to at least partially free lives. Yet, as Foucault notes, this isn't power but domination. Power relations cannot be saturated: to be applied, they must have something to be applied to. This obviously means the end of all conceptions that are based on opposing power and liberty. Power and liberty, power and resistance, objectivation and subjectivation come irremediably together, always. The question thus becomes: are we forever closed here in a dialectic circle without a possible escape? Do we have to deduce that power and liberty are only two sides, sadly reversible, of the same reality? No, obviously not. Inseparability is not reversibility; above all, it is not equivalence in terms. This is where one can find the extreme innovation in the Foucauldian conception of governmentality. Dissymmetry exists and consists in the power (understood as *potentia*) of men and women to invent themselves, from inside the reign of power, and more generally inside the determinations to which they are subject. Power, as we stated, is applied; it evolves, integrating and defusing resistance, absorbing revolts, unifying differences, unifying the world in its image, recovering, appropriating, even hybridizing sometimes, to not lose control. Men and women do not simply manage what already exists: they create, invent and produce. If they hybridize, they always do it starting with what makes them what they are, adding innovation, hijacking, folding, reappropriation, betrayal and translation. The power (*potentia*) of invention subverts because it digs from within, affirming its force inside the state of things. It makes *what is already here* explode, working with *what can be*. The dissymmetry is clear; the excess is violent. Foucault calls these manifestations of creative production, inside the flesh of the world, *subjectivation*. It does not matter if this is individual or collective – we are never totally alone, we are never totally together: we are always ourselves through others and for others. Here, *self* is not the name of a *thing* but a *process* in becoming where the construction and articulation with others remain fundamental. It seems that this is the point of view that the works of many scholars – like Partha Chatterjee – are absolutely exemplary.

From here, maybe, we can get some of the strongest elements for Foucauldian reflection in his last years, from 1979 to 1984.

First, an ethics of the self is necessarily political because it means immediately moving a line of becoming, freeing it, retying it, elongating it, breaking it and attaching it somewhere else. An ethics of the self implies a government of the self and the others – that is, the production of oneself and others or of oneself through others – from within the governance that we are subject to: an invention inside the simple management, a resistance inside power relations and the opening of possibilities inside the affirmation of historical determinations.

Second, without processes of subjectivation, no resistance is possible; there is no radical political alternative. This means, for example, that if it is absolutely necessary and sacrosanct to fight for positive rights or for the recognition of different identities, neither a natural identity nor a legal identification is enough to assure the space for becoming. Very often, in fact, they block it.

Third, every time and every place has its own cartography. The heterogeneity of the infinite stories of the world is not reducible to a competition between them, something that centuries of ruthless colonialism would have us believe. Instead, it is a fabric of differences that, inasmuch as difference, in recognizing their incommensurability, must begin to dialogue. The cartography of difference is the prelude to the composition of a Harlequin's mantle or a chorus of different voices: variegated, polyphonic and sometimes shrill – but always powerful.

Historicizing, localizing and subjectivation are three methodological requisites that are indispensable for who, today, situates their work inside the 'uses of Foucault' (see, for instance, Artières and Potte-Bonneville 2007), three requisites that, I believe, many postcolonial and subaltern studies scholars have widely developed and profoundly enriched.

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Chapter 3
Michel Foucault and Our Postcolonial Time

Ranabir Samaddar

I owe this thought to three acquaintances: Frederic Gros, Partha Chatterjee and Julian Reid, not necessarily in that order in terms of my debt, but sequentially. Frederic Gros invited me some years ago to contribute to an anthology on Michel Foucault, a piece on the reception of Michel Foucault in India. I discussed the possibility of such a piece with Partha Chatterjee and discussed with him his own understanding of how Foucault's works reached India and in particular how he, as a creative thinker, had received with enthusiasm Foucault's ideas and concepts. While Frederic Gros' invitation to contribute an article was tempting, Partha Chatterjee's opinions and retrospective on Foucault's reception in India helped me get a sense of the attraction of the subaltern studies historians, cultural theorists and a section of the Indian social scientists towards the philosopher. However, it is to Julian Reid that I owe this particular idea of Michel Foucault and our time.

The immediate sense of this theme to anyone living in the South of the world is of course obvious, though it does not mean that the discussion in this sense has been sufficient. I am speaking of the postcolonial, our existence as postcolonial beings. Robert Young (2001) has written on Foucault and postcolonialism. That will be one sense. In this case, to speak of studies on Michel Foucault in India or those inspired by Michel Foucault in India is to appreciate the sense that the postcolonial makes of Michel Foucault's writings. But I gathered a further thought from that discussion with Julian Reid, though I must not make him responsible for this. It is the idea that receiving Foucault in India in the late years of the last century to this day is to receive him in our time, the postcolonial time. These two, the place and the time, are connected, and therefore in this note I want to explore how in reaching India Michel Foucault is mediated in both ways (also thus in the third way, which congeals the

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two, that is to say, the political way) of the postcolonial, namely, the postcolonial as place and postcolonial as a specific time, and of course Foucault cannot do anything about this.[1]

Young (2001) notes a paradox. While many of Foucault's ideas he finds extremely productive for postcolonial thinking, such as discipline, forms of authority and exclusion, and technologies of surveillance, in Foucault's own works, Young says there is almost a stunning silence on colonialism and race. Young made this comment perhaps before *Society Must Be Defended* (Foucault 2003) became accessible in the English edition to the English-speaking readership, but then we know that the theme of race vanishes from Foucault's thinking thereafter. We can add that there is an equal amount of silence in his writings on colonial ways of governing, on colonial state and on anticolonial resistance. Young says that Foucault's stay in the latter half of the 1960s in Tunisia, which was witnessing at that time an angry pro-Palestinian movement and student radicalism, helped a more militant Foucault to emerge. That may be the case, but his writings for the next 6–7 years were all on discourses, though to be true Foucault was never treating the issue as a matter of pure linguistics. Thus, postcolonial thought derived inspiration from Foucault's archaeological period (from the publication of *History of Madness* in 1961 to the publication of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* in 1969), too, because Young notes that he not only made new sense of the identity and difference making exercises in society through knowledge formations but also showed how discursive formations were made, how statements functioned as truth-making exercises in society, how discourses formed objects, how they were characterized by heterogeneity and finally how an analysis of the function of discourse in society helped in understanding the relation of knowledge and power. Young, in fact, profusely cites Homi Bhabha to argue that this is how the postcolonial has related to Foucault, because for Robert Young the postcolonial is a literary concept, it is a discourse and its function is to flag aesthetic and intellectual ideas and figure out how they have shaped in colonial conditions, which means shaping up in difference and proximity with colonial ideas. Thus, while Young notes in the concluding paragraph, and it seems to me he does it cursorily, that there was something called politics, etc., in the life of a colony, yet his main idea is, 'Colonialism as a practice operated at the interface of knowledge and material culture, its operations were highly dispersed, contradictory, and heterogeneous in historical and geographical terms' (Young 2001: 409). Young titles the section wherefrom I have taken this line as 'A Foucauldian model of colonial discourse'.

This idea of colonialism as discourse, etc., of course has less to do with the materiality of the colonial world and more to do with a notion called postcolonialism, which is heavily influenced by the North American university

[1] I am aware of the intonation that this line may evoke, namely, that 'Foucault is dead'. We also know the loss that Deleuze felt on Foucault's death and said that the void was very difficult to be filled in. Also, there are other senses that have been evoked in 'Foucault is dead'. However, in writing these words, '… Foucault cannot do anything about this', I am referring to Foucault as a social text predicated by the autonomy of the postcolonial milieu.

campus discussions of both Foucault and postcolonialism. Both Foucault as a thinker and our understanding of the reality of colonialism as a system of exploitation, domination and rule and the reality of the postcolonial existence have suffered as a consequence. Therefore, the early Foucauldian writings in India (as elsewhere in the South of the world – a clear instance would be Achille Mbembe's *On the Postcolony* 2001) picked on issues and were modelled along lines that resonated with the philosopher's influence of what is known today as cultural studies. Novels were dissected, discourse was the object of analysis, maladies and mentalities were investigated and in the case of India, the transfer of interest from Antonio Gramsci to Michel Foucault as the inspirational figure of radical writings produced, the least we can say, a queer result. Subaltern studies historiography, which took so much from Gramsci, took a turn towards cultural-anthropological explanations, thinking that it was taking the cue of going further with the help of Foucault in the sense of identifying how social realities were produced in the colonial age through classificatory and knowledge-producing exercises. One great example of this trend is Nicholas Dirks' grand work, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Dirks 2001). Readers can also place Bernard Cohn's *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge* (Cohn 1996) in the same group of writings, which had been inspired by Foucault's discussions on power/knowledge and his preceding works on discourses and orders.

It will serve no purpose to name individuals or make a list of all such writings here; all we can say is that these historians and anthropologists discovered power (and rightly so) in every cultural move, in every line written on this earth, but saw or wrote very little of the power of truncheons, jails, scaffolds, courts, laws, patterns of violence, mutinies, revolts, resistances and elementally the body – the basic instruments on which colonial rule thrived. There were exceptions: some of the new historical writings in the 1980s and 1990s carried the imprint of these issues and in doing so bore the philosopher's mark, but let us admit that these were few and far between. Of more interest was the theme of modernity than violence or Enlightenment than the dynamics of rule. In a deep way, the early Foucault (early in Indian reception) had failed to inspire studies on politics and the emergence of the political subject. The archaeological Foucault had damned political subjectivity by damning the subject. Hence, the great work, *Madness and Civilization* (1965) (the English translation of the full book, *History of Madness* [2006], was still unavailable then), was ineffective in terms of reorienting radical thought in India, though it is true that studies of exclusion were conducted, and other reasons were investigated as historians inquired into the persistence of community bonds among jute workers, violence in colonial India and cases of 'deviant' behaviour (we can refer to writings like Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Rethinking Working Class History, Bengal 1890 to 1940* [1989]). Notwithstanding these studies, there was little new light on the formation of the anticolonial subject. But then Foucault did not have this agenda of inquiry; in his archaeological period, the thinker had been busy with declaring the 'end of man' – a figure drawn on sand and hence only temporary. In battling theories of human essence, he had at least for some time given up the study of the emergence of rebels and rebellions.

But all that changed with globalization and the reappearance of terror in world politics from the mid-1990s, and it was in this milieu that the emphasis in Foucault's writings on the physicality of our conflictive existence came to the notice of the radical intellectuals in the Southern world. In this reconfigured world, *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1991; first English edition 1977) was the landmark, followed by the arrival of the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1990; first English edition 1978), though the latter was decidedly second to the former in terms of influencing postcolonial ideas and thinking. Our time, we can say with some exaggeration, begins from then.

That clearly means one more thing: again, this will not be music to the university Foucauldians, namely, that this time, which we claim as ours, is not Foucault's time. We can briefly take note of the differences: What seemed to be the overwhelming perspective against which Foucault wrote consisted of the apparent stability of bourgeois rule, the strong mechanics of capitalist production and the deep hold of liberal individualism over social life. It was also a time when the evidences of socialist decay were clear. Eurocommunism was a vulgar answer to the crisis of socialist thought in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. As a contrast to that time, today we think of neither capitalism nor bourgeois society to be stable, particularly against the background of repeated currency crises and the meltdowns, nor are societies deemed to be as individualistic as Foucault thought. In fact, studies of collective actions and contentious politics tell us other stories of how trust and collective actions build up in modern societies. Explaining stability of rule is not the concern of this time. Strengthening the encounter that makes sense of the contentious time of ours is the call of the day. Yet, this is not what I meant principally when I said that ours is not Foucault's time. I have two special reasons for this remark.

First, for Foucault, modernity was almost an undifferentiated epoch. Not that he made an explicit comment to this effect, but the effort he made in outlining the trajectory of the growth of modernity does not have a parallel in his writings in the sense of having a similar effort in understanding different phases either of modernity or of capitalism. Therefore, though he made a sustained effort to find an outside ground to critique modernity and bourgeois rule – an outside that he found sometimes in Nietzsche, sometimes but less in Marx, sometimes in Freud, sometimes in the recall of an earlier stoic tradition and sometimes in the deposits of counter-Enlightenment currents existing in society – in order to judge Europe by anti-Europe, philosophy by genealogy, soul by the body and establishment and power by critique, yet in terms of influence on critical thinking in the postcolonial milieu, Foucault's treatment of modernity did not carry the same resonance (as in the West) in the ex-colonies, where modernity was being reshaped in many different ways. In that sense, our time is different; it is a contentious modernity – people are making their own modernities and they refuse to take a single script of modernity or a single script of its critique as universally valid. Therefore, Foucault's thoughts are mediated by other strands of critical thinking. Gramsci, Fanon and contemporary thinkers such as Agamben and Negri mark the postcolonial milieu, not to mention the rekindled interest in the writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao, who simply refuse to vanish from the critical and radical minds in the South.

The second reason is more immanent to the question of 'time', but this reason, we shall see, is connected with the first one. As we know, Foucault in his famous essay, 'What is Enlightenment?' (Foucault 2007b; first English edition 1984), wrote in appreciation of Immanuel Kant that Kant had shown the possibility of a kind of 'philosophical interrogation', which 'problematizes man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of self as an autonomous human being' (Foucault 2007b: 109). This, Foucault suggested, was possible because of Enlightenment. Enlightenment was not 'faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our own historical era' (Foucault 2007b: 109).[2] By one stroke, we all had thus become the sons and daughters of Immanuel Kant. Foucault of course did not explain what exactly he meant by 'our own historical era'. Because of this explanation that *our time* was constituted by self-referential knowledge of time, Foucault not only thought that the concerned text of Kant was important, he went back to it again and again: indeed, Immanuel Kant more than Nietzsche became for him the point of departure for further epistemic inquiries. Therefore, even though he said in that article that while people took modernity to be an indicator of time, he preferred to take 'modernity as an attitude'[3] – a consciousness of one's own self as (i.e. the conscious being) constituted by the present – clearly attitude, like time, remained undifferentiated for him. Different attitudes to time, different attitudes to the same modern,[4] different attitudes to the making of the self and thus different ideas of modernity – these were never the principal point in the various lectures he gave on the theme of the Enlightenment. We all know Foucault's philosophical life began with an engagement with the anthropology of Kant. The preoccupation then surfaces in *The Order of Things* (Foucault 1997a). Overshadowed by his references to Nietzsche in the 1960s–1970s, Kant of course does not vanish. Some say that Foucault's examination of 'What is Enlightenment?' (Foucault 2007b) is the most American moment in his life, when he discovers that he has to respond at the level of philosophy to the inquiries by Walter Benjamin and, following him, Jurgen Habermas. Kant comes back in a pronounced way for the first time in his 1978 lecture, 'What is Critique?', to the French Society of Philosophy; then we have again in the first lecture in 1983 at the College de France reference to Kant's text when he has to discuss 'What is Revolution?' (Foucault 1997b). His lectures on subjectivity, truth, 'ethics of discomfort' (of the present) (Foucault 2007c) and, in general, on the theme of the present in that period are all marked with references to Kant and his text. From the postcolonial point of view, the result of this mode of engagement with the present and in general with philosophy will be immediately clear once we interrogate this preoccupation.

[2] 'What is Enlightenment?' is the text of a French manuscript by Michel Foucault first published in English in the *Foucault Reader* (Foucault 1984), subsequently published in other editions, including a collection of Foucault's writings titled, *The Politics of Truth* (Foucault 2007b).

[3] "What is Enlightenment?", p. 36.

[4] Thus, postcolonial investigations today speak of 'colonial modernity', 'early modernity', etc., just as in Foucault's lifetime some of his contemporaries spoke of 'late modernity' or 'post-modernity', a term Foucault of course did not agree to.

We can have arguably our reference point the moment in history that occurred midway in the nineteenth century (1845), when Marx declared that he was severing his ties with philosophy as a way of engaging with the reality of his time (published after his death, Marx 1888).[5] Anticolonial politics and today's postcolonial critique eternally draw inspiration from that moment, namely, that the route to understanding materiality is not through philosophy. What comes in its place? Position, critique, action – this is the route of change. But that is not all; it means that only through trying to change the obtaining conditions we are able to understand the irreducible character of the materiality around us. Thus, anticolonialism did not require a philosophical explanation of domination; it required position, critique and action. In any case, I am mentioning all this only in order to point out that radical thinking in India had a strange attraction for Foucault's ideas. This attraction had less to do with his desperate search to find out the historical-philosophical bottom of the mystery of subject formation but more to do with the 'physical' aspects of his ideas, of the 'microphysics of power' (as elaborated in *Discipline and Punish*) as he formulated the question once, of his numerous suggestions on the question of power and resistance and of course his eternal quarrel with Marx that the latter had not gone enough in his inquiry into the materiality of power, hence his ideas on government, governmental rationality, etc.

How did postcolonial thought find out its own terms of engagement with Foucault? First of all, in postcolonial thought, there was and is a strong emphasis on history, eternally going into the depths of history, not to make society the subject of history (the standard menu of social history), but in order to find out what we, as the once colonized subjects, are today. In this sense, the political history that came to be written in the last 10–15 years or so has proved to be fundamentally no different from political philosophy[6] but has proved to be capable of authoring political philosophy in a different way. From this emerged the suggestion of a new method, too, for which we remain beholden among others to the philosopher Michel Foucault whom we are discussing today in the context of our time: a method which is critical, genealogical and a unique combination of practicality and ethicality. To think of *politics as a discourse of actions* is now possible because the colonial past was never banal. In the colonial milieu, violently destructive each moment of the day for nearly 200 years, genealogy and history came together naturally, and philosophy was grounded in that shattering present. This was possible, for reason here showed itself from its first moment of appearance in split form (violence and liberal preaching combined from day one), which is its original form – and it needed, therefore, no Immanuel Kant to demonstrate its practical and pure aspects. Finally, this has been possible, for the ethics that this political subject has needed is of a practical kind or one might say of an applied kind, in the sense, that once again ethics has been asked here not as a matter of 'care of the self' and 'self-caring technologies' but as a matter

[5] The referred line is to the famous Eleventh Thesis.

[6] One of the well-known historians of our time, Pierre Rosanvallon, has expressed the same sentiment while remarking on the close relation between the two: 'I do not think there is a necessary gap between political history and political philosophy' (Sebastian 2007: 712).

of achieving the right mental and spiritual conditions to effect transformation of the conditions outside (the classic instance of such ethics would be Gandhi's relevant advices in *Hind Swaraj* (1909) or some of the advices that the nationalist novelist Bankim Chandra records in the process of retelling the story of the ancient mythical character Lord Krishna in *Krishnacharitra*).[7] In this ethics, caring for the country was the essential gradient of caring for the self. In any case, transformation was and still remains the great agenda of thinking, and this produces a particular kind of hermeneutics of the political subject. Anticolonial politics was never what Marx called 'contemplative materialism' in *Theses on Feuerbach*.

The way the attention of radical thinking in India transferred from Antonio Gramsci to Michel Foucault is a story of interest by itself. We shall need possibly longer time span to understand the significance of this displacement. It all began with the students and peasants upsurge in India in the second half of the 1960s. The ideas of the Communist Party in India with its factional quarrels did not radicalize the postcolonial thoughts. The marches by the Red Guards, the bombings of Vietnam and the resistance there in particular the Tet Offensive, the Palestinian movement, the idea of Tri-Continental solidarity and of Che Guevara and finally the writings of Frantz Fanon – all these mixed with peasant movements and students upsurge in the country have led to produce the attraction of the postcolonial radicals towards new ideas of the Left. The organized parties reaped the benefits of this radicalization to the extent that by 1977 India not only overcame the Emergency (1975–1977) but succeeded in removing for the first time the long-time ruling party from power. It was in this milieu that Gramsci reached India. *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith) came out in 1971 and reached India by the latter half of the 1970s. In 1978, Gramsci's *Selections from Political Writings (1921–1926)* was published. The early subaltern school writings on history (the first volume being published in 1982) bore marks of Gramsci's ideas on hegemony, passive revolution, war of position, national-popular formation, etc. Yet, we must not forget in this story there are two more figures – and they could not be less alike to each other. First, Mao's *Selected Writings* (in five volumes)[8], along with theme-wise selections of his writings, was sold widely throughout India in this period and translated in several Indian languages. Gramsci was also translated, though not in comparison to the extent of translations of Mao's writings. The clearest evidence of the impact of Mao's writings was in numerous pamphlets, booklets and books and in the intellectual world in writings on agrarian revolts, agrarian political economy, class analysis, the 'transition debate'[9] and, in general, on the issue of transformation of society and politics. Yet, in the intellectual world characteristic of it, direct political writings are never enough. The old, dialectical mode of analysis and an unambiguous stress on practice (for instance, Mao's two most influential

[7] *Hind Swaraj* (http://www.mkgandhi.org/swarajya/coverpage.htm – accessed on 3 July 2013); on *Krishnacharitra*, see, particularly, the 'Introduction' (Chattopadhyay 1886/1973: 707–723).

[8] The entire series is now available online – http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/ (accessed on 3 July 2013).

[9] For a summary of the debate on the transition to a capitalist agriculture in India, see Patnaik (1992).

writings – *On Practice*, July 1937, *and On Contradictions*, August 1937)[10] could not be enough. It was at this juncture that Althusser's writings and what came to be known as structuralism also came to the notice of Left intellectuals in India. We must note here in passing that postcolonial writings never got trapped in the doctrinal quarrels of the New Left in Europe. Althusser and E.P. Thompson were both studied avidly in the late 1970s and 1980s, notwithstanding Thompson's polemic against Althusser (*The Poverty of Theory* 1978). If Thompson's writings on history had enormous influence on labour studies here, also on studies on issues of time, law, constabulary, machines, moral economy, etc., Althusser's writings had an equal, if not more profound, impact, which continues till this day. In politics, social anthropology, political economy and history scholars avidly read Althusser. *For Marx* (English edition 1969), *Reading Capital* (English edition 1970) and *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (English edition 1971a) – these three volumes of Althusser (and his colleagues) arrived in succession (not necessarily in that order) to become huge attractions for radical intellectuals. We must remember that Michel Foucault as a philosopher and historian arrived in India in such a milieu.

What does this mean? Recalling those years, it is impossible not to find the essential philosophical task of this emerging time. Radical thinkers in India never contemplated complete comfort with any particular model of thinking or explaining or suggesting. In the background of the defeat of the revolution in the 1960s, the idea of historical certitude was gone. The present became extremely fragile, and as radical thinkers kept thinking of the present, suddenly the year of 1989 – the year of the miracle, the *annus mirabilis* – happened. With fall of socialism along with the model of one-party rule and the global victory of bourgeois ideology, we found ourselves in the midst of a period of restoration. In that fragile instant (and certainly for the next 10 years or so), as I shall explain now, Foucault's influence was significant as well as contradictory.

First, of course, he signified a different way to engage with the problematic of truth and falsehood; he also signified a new way of understanding capitalism, its ideology of freedom and its techniques of control. But then, and this is my second point, the way the discontent of the people in the ex-colonial countries surfaced even when the shine of victory of the West was still present – the first Gulf War had taken place to be followed within few years by U.S. bombings over Belgrade, the anti-globalization movements had just commenced and then while on one hand there was Rwanda, on the other hand the second *intifada* followed in Palestine within a decade of the first one – it was clear that the colonial problematic had returned, in the face of which Foucault's ideas were not enough. With globalization, what I have termed elsewhere as the 'postcolonial predicament' had emerged and was to characterize our time. This time, to say simply, is the time of postcolonial predicament.

[10] Both available online – for *On Practice*, see http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_16.htm (accessed on 28 June 2013); for *On Contradiction*, see http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm (accessed on 28 June 2013).

But before we go into the implications of this formulation and the paradox, we can see briefly how in the 1980s and 1990s some of the significant writings in India were shaped by Foucault's influence. As I said, the influence was evident first in the writings of the subaltern studies scholars.[11] Partha Chatterjee's 'More on the Modes of Power and the Peasantry' (1983) and David Arnold's 'Touching the Body: Perspectives on the Indian Plague, 1896–1900' (1988) clearly bore the mark of Foucault, and in the *Selected Subaltern Studies* (Guha and Chakravorty Spivak 1988), the section in which these two essays were included was explicitly titled, 'Developing Foucault' (pp. 351–426). We can also recall in this context Gyanendra Pandey's *Remembering Partition* (2003). Historical essays such as these, in particular on the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Partition of 1947 (e.g. Bhattacharya 2007; *EPW* 2008), were again marked with Foucault's ideas on the body, on violence, on minor and insurgent knowledges or on how a new type of power had emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from within the society, replacing the earlier monarchical model. There were also a number of writings that commented on the history of ideas and historiography in terms of analysing discourses. Partha Chatterjee's *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (1986) was a landmark in this respect. It was built on Edward Saïd's *Orientalism* (1995), one of the foundational works of postcolonial studies and known for starting the 'cultural critique' by postcolonial scholars worldwide in the 1980s. Both books became quite influential in understanding colonialism in a particular way. Saïd's own work, we have to remember, was heavily influenced by Foucault's analysis of formation of discourses and the ability of a discourse to form objects of analysis. Chatterjee followed up his earlier book with *Nation and Its Fragments* (1993). These two and some other books written at that time, for instance, Shahid Amin's *Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922–1992* (1995), were exercises in analysing discourses and showing how social texts form and relate to the issue of knowledge and power. They showed how discourses clashed and how disciplines represented the emergence of new knowledge and power mechanisms. They showed that with colonialism a new type of power had emerged from within society, whose origins lay in the encounters between colonial politics and nationalist engagement with the former. This trend culminated in several volumes authored in the 1990s as collections of essays, one of the prominent among them being *Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal* (Chatterjee 1996) where again Foucault's insights were explicitly mentioned. In all these writings, we find marked emphasis on the cultural signifiers of the new type of power that these authors claimed as emerging. Veena Das' *Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors* (1990) was one of the well-known anthropological works in the postcolonial milieu that exhibited the style of new social theory influenced by Foucault. In this context, we have to remember that Saïd (particularly, with his *Culture and Imperialism* (1994)) and

[11] In all, twelve volumes were published from 1982 to 2005, the first volume being published by the Oxford University Press, Delhi, and the last being published by the Permanent Black, Delhi. Detailed bibliographic information available at https://dl-web.dropbox.com/spa/zohkohb0i282t94/Area%20Studies/public/subaltern/ssmap.htm (accessed on 3 July 2013).

along with him some other thinkers remained throughout this period, and not by design, the conduit for the passage of the required skill and ideas for discourse analysis from Western university campuses to Indian shores. In India, the result was that while Foucault was less influential in philosophy or history, he seemed to have been securely lodged in literary studies in the universities.

Yet, it is worth noting what Edward Saïd states in his 'Foreword' to the *Selected Subaltern Studies* volume:

> In reading this selection one becomes aware that this group of scholars is a self-conscious part of the vast postcolonial cultural and critical effort that would also include novelists like Salman Rushdie, Garcia Marquez, George Lamming … poets like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Mahmud Darwish, Aime Cesaire, theoreticians and political philosophers like Fanon….
>
> Yet this extra-ordinary common effort is not … an exclusively non-European phenomenon…. None of the Subaltern Studies scholars is less than anything a critical student of Karl Marx, for example, and all of them have been influenced by many varieties of Western Marxism, Gramsci most eminently. In addition, the influence of structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers like Derrida, Foucault, Roland Barthes and Louis Althusser is evident, along with the influence of British and American thinkers like E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, and others…. (Saïd 1988: ix–x)

Significantly, the names of Lenin and Mao were absent from the list, which perhaps truthfully put on record the figures that had influenced the radical scholars of the 1970s and 1980s. Saïd, indeed, captured the milieu well. What he did not mention, or had no way of realizing in 1988 when he wrote those lines, is that this was too good a mix to last. While the Saïdian 'postcolonial' developed a distinct style out of this brew and the writings of Das, Chatterjee, Amin and others mentioned earlier carried that style and indeed had contributed greatly to the development of that style, in not too distant future, this style was to relapse into what I call, for lack of a better word, 'culturalism'. It means trying to understand the materiality of conflict through an over-emphasis on cultural signs and symbols, at times taking the latter to be the former and, at the end, losing grasp of the dynamics of the material world itself.[12] In the process, even when all the while our postcolonial scholars were speaking of power, there was less concrete analysis, less light on our time and more bad examples of the genealogical method, with many of them finally proving to be less Foucauldians and not more.

But the story of Foucault in India and in our time does not end with this enchantment with hybridity. A number of factors, possibly unintended, have proved responsible for his re-emergence in our time as a foundational thinker, notwithstanding his blind spots. First, of course, the deep hold of Marx and other Marxist thinkers (along with the new influence of other Left thinkers like Negri, Agamben and the rediscovered Frankfurt School[13]), combined with the curiosity towards new

[12] For a critique of such culturalism, see Samaddar (2006).

[13] The 'Frankfurt School' refers to a group of German theorists who analysed the changes in Western capitalist societies in post-Marx period. The name is derived from the Institut fur Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, Germany, where these theorists worked in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Some of the most well-known theorists were Max Horkheimer, T.W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. They along with others wrote some of the finest accounts within critical social theory of

approaches, keeps Foucault relevant and deeply studied. Second is the time brought in by globalization and therefore attention on the consequent political and social struggles and new interest in what democracy and liberalism are. Third, two of Foucault's specific ideas have proved enormously fertile today, again possibly not in the way he wanted them to be developed: his idea of biopolitics (who knows in their interpretations and applications whether Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose are right or Negri[14] – and judging this is not our task) and connected to this the idea of governmentality. Finally, two new developments have made some of his writings relevant: the phenomenon of terror with the beginning of the new century[15] and the developmental discourse that has made population groups specific targets of management in countries like India.

We can note now what these new factors have meant in the development of a new style and form of writing and analysis. If we take some of the remarkable feminist writings in the last decade on events such as the Partition,[16] or on borders, or, say, a theme like law and jurisprudence, we can already see the creativity of writers at work. Only in a small way indebted to Foucault, they have achieved the kind of criticality, rigour and scholarship of which Foucault would have been the first to appreciate. Their ideas and style make their expositions of the physicality of social conflicts much less metaphysical. Similarly, Dalit writings have achieved similar rigour in describing the physics of social conflicts (e.g. Ilaiah 2005). Oral narrative has been the most potent weapon in retrieving the contentious past.[17] In this new, critical style, which one may now term as a post-subaltern studies scholarship, we have a more rigorous and political way of understanding our existence and a new urgency to combat the postcolonial predicament – and this we should note is characteristic of not India alone but throughout the world – given that with globalization, invasions and renewed wars, we have a return to the colonial past and with that a warlike model of politics. We can say using the words of Charles Tilly that contentious politics is the stuff of our inquiry. This is not a slogan. We have to only think of the implication of what this means. For that, we have to first make a small digression.

Given Foucault's explanation of the appearance of rights,[18] it is instructive to see in this context how in the new writings radical scholars in India have tried to combine Foucauldian ideas with investigations of different kinds into the origin of rights.

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the changing nature of capitalism. They also generated a tradition of critical cultural studies on the basis of their analysis of the processes of cultural production and political economy. The leading figures of the School sought exile in the United States after the rise of Hitler in Germany.

[14] We can read with interest Rabinow and Rose (2003).

[15] For a general discussion on this theme, see Reid (2006) and also Morton and Bygrave (2008).

[16] I have in mind writers like Ritu Menon and Kamala Bhasin (1998), Urvashi Butalia (1998) and Ratna Kapur (1998, 2005), to name a few and very arbitrarily.

[17] One of the finest examples is an autobiography of a Dalit woman, Viramma, recorded, written and edited by Josiane Racine and Jean Luc Racine (1997).

[18] In this context, we can refer to three of his writings: two volumes based on his College de France lectures (Foucault 2007a, 2008) and an essay from the Tanner Lectures (Foucault 1979).

These new investigations remind us of some of the writings of the late Charles Tilly. In one of his classic writings, Tilly (1988) had argued that rights were claims, also entitlements. He said that entitlements were enforceable claims on the delivery of goods, services or protection by specific others. Tilly planned to understand wherefrom rights such as citizenship rights had originated. Following Barrington Moore (1966), he argued rights were historical products and outcomes of extremely acute contentions. Democracy meant collective claim making in the making of rights and that crucial rights come to fruition by means of rebellions and revolutions. Tilly doubted the centrality of feudalism in the account of genesis of rights; he argued that crucial events had occurred after the general dissolution of feudalism; also he did not give huge importance to the issue of ideas in this history and gave emphasis on grounding rights in specific histories of different regions. This was a classic essay, and this is how he posed the question, namely, there are several fundamental questions concerning how rights spread to larger populations and how they eventually become citizenship rights: Were the rights wrested from local authorities and spread to the larger population from there? Did benevolent despots grant these rights to a few, which were eventually passed down to the rest of the population? Or did the rights spread due to a struggle at a national scale? (Tilly 2002). Tilly supported the last perspective and argued that struggles at national scale had to do with the rise and spread of rights. Rights and duties were enlarged and enforced obligations – the result of bargaining between the two parties – states and peoples. Tilly was using here two planks in formulating the theory of contentious politics. First, he seemed to say that democracy as a process of transformation was perched on a national template. It was the national sphere in which collectives could emerge and make claims. Second, these claims often beginning in the form of claim-making actions settled finally in a series of bargaining. Bargaining, as we know, is a collective action; thus, there was again a twofold meaning in Tilly's usage here: struggles over demands made by the state on their subjects, by subjects on the state or by subjects on each other and struggles by specific groups of subjects to enter the polity, to help others to enter the polity, to defend certain polity membership or to exclude others from the polity. In this process, bargains and struggles of both kinds resulted in citizenship rights. Yet, while inquiring the origin of rights, he did not oversimplify the situation and argue that this meant a weakening of states. In a series of writings, he had explained how on the other hand in early modern Europe, which had no previous experience of large-scale bargaining, the state and its subjects witnessed two developments at the same time: bargaining between state and the subjects and, second, which actually caused the former, the passage from indirect rule to direct rule, as due to internal and external power struggle and competitions, states in Europe now required standing armies in place of the earlier practices of mercenary troops, rented foreigners. States found it necessary to create standing armies consisting of members of the domestic subject population. Indirect rule meant that the states till that time had to rule through a series of local power holders. Bargains over the supply of resources therefore were of different type. Direct rule, on the other hand, was centralization of power by means of which the states took charge of resources including human resources. The nature of bargaining

changed with that. Direct rule creates rights. Precisely at a time when Michel Foucault through a series of lectures (Foucault 2007a) was showing us the possible past of democracy involving securitization of life, politics, territory and the emergence of rights as guarantees of existence in a risk society, Charles Tilly was presenting a related but a different explanation. On this we shall have to read closely his arguments in *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Tilly 1990).

We can continue with this contrast in explanation (owing to a good measure to the contrast in the explanatory tools – for Foucault, it was mainly a survey of thinking; for Tilly, it was a survey of incidents, events, institutional measures, contentious legislations, actions, etc.). For Foucault, it was the overall emergence of biopower and biopolitical mechanisms within which rights and controls emerged. For Tilly, the explanation depended on a relational framework. Rights congealed the relation between the rulers and the subjects. He went on to explain how the creation of a national army consisting of its own subjects created also the obligation to concede the claims of the latter. Maintaining a standing army was costly; it required increased levels of taxation and, as Tilly argued in "Where Do Rights Come From" (1998), more opportunity cost for population. Bargaining was required from both sides, and rights and obligations of citizenship rose from this process. It also meant grant of national rights only to a minimum set of people. Tilly's main argument was that the creation of mass national armies created the rudiments of national citizenship in Europe. Rights eventually expanded. He pointed out that struggle for one kind of rights prepared claimants to struggle for the next kind. Or consider the way in which he compared nation states with protection rackets – levying money from the subjects in exchange of offering them protection. 'Consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction' as he wrote in a chapter ('War Making and State Making as Organised Crime') of the well-known volume on state and states, namely, *Bringing the State Back In* (Tilly 1985). Tilly admitted that this was just a theoretical sketch, but we can see the main elements of this model: (a) the claim-making agent or the claimant and the target of claim can reward or punish each other in a significant way, (b) the two are thus bargaining over those rewards and punishments, (c) both parties or one of them is also bargaining with third parties having interest in these claims and (d) in this relational process the parties to the claims constitute durable identities and stakes on each other. This was a fascinating explanation of the origin of modern power, distinct from Foucault's explanation, but as I said they are related. In all these researches, Tilly, like Foucault, never bothered with the explanatory mechanism or the heuristic device. If Foucault shifted from the structural to the archaeological to the genealogical method of inquiry, Charles Tilly also changed his methods frequently: from anthropological inquiry to handling large series data to event centric analysis to appreciation of stories to pure archival work. He at times stressed the structure of contention, at other times the process of contention and still at other times the pure relational dynamics.

I hope readers can now understand why I took this detour in order to convey how radical thinkers in India from the 1990s combined what they had learnt from Foucault with other ideas and models of contentious history, some of which got their first concrete expositions in other kinds of writings including those of Tilly.

I am not suggesting that there has been an intellectual agenda to combine Foucault and Tilly. But in several writings of ethnographic and historical nature, we can find the combination of the contentious approach of Tilly with Foucault's views on power. The work that immediately comes to mind is Nandini Sundar's *Subalterns and Sovereigns: An Anthropological History of Bastar 1854–2006* (Second edition 2007) or my own two books on contentious politics (Samaddar 2001, 2007).

All these, particularly the continuing relevance of Foucault (but relevant in a different way from the earlier phase), are of course possible today, because of a new understanding of Foucault in India with the arrival of some of his writings hitherto unpublished in English but now made available to wider readership. First came the three-volume *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984* (Foucault 1998–2001). Then his *College de France Lectures* (Foucault 2007a) became accessible, and these took radical readership by storm. Here was almost a new Foucault (at least to the English language audience), with new significance of his researches and writings. One day we shall probably say that the 'Foucault effect'[19] in India began really with these. The lucidity, directness, relative lack of restraint (needed for a book) that at times made those lectures take unexpected turns and the nature of these lectures as submissions to a continuous workshop of ideas – all these qualities make in some way the other Foucault: speaking, experimenting, admitting, gesturing to other views, reconciling and conceding; in short they make him more open and more dialogic to new interpretations and more capable of suggesting new research agenda than his published books would do. But this also means that in today's time there is greater scope of engaging with him, similarly, an increased scope to make post-colonial understanding more relevant to politics in the wake of globalization. This makes today's study of Foucault more meaningful and interactive or dialogic. It is possible to think today of rescuing him from the academic trap.

However, this possibility depends on the resolution of two questions. I shall end with brief discussions on them. First, what will happen to his thesis of governmentality, which Foucault adherents lapped up with enthusiasm and which gave birth to huge number of studies on population groups, governments, administration, public health, urban management, demography, etc., in fact a mushroom of micro-studies of management, and was put forward as the central concept linking his political and ethical views? Will this find a permanent place in terms of influencing postcolonial thought? Second, what will happen now to philosophy that is philosophy in the way Foucault wanted to practise it? Both these questions are difficult; also, we are not fortune-tellers of ideas. But a study of the present dynamics of the spread of certain ideas may itself be an interesting task, particularly since Foucault himself had advocated the idea of present as history and of pursuing investigations in the spirit of what he called political journalism.

Partha Chatterjee (2004) has in a series of articles used the Foucauldian concept of governmentality to argue that postcolonial democracy is shaped by modern governmental techniques to manage population and the consequent kind of politics

[19] I am referring to the book of Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (1992).

with which the governed population has responded. He has argued that the implication of this reality is that while disenfranchised people may not have formal rights, the sheer necessity to govern them means that the government has to allow the disenfranchised the scope to fashion their own politics of survival and subsistence. And this inaugurates an effective politics that refashions aspects of modernity and the state. It also means that resistance of the subalterns emerges out of, rather than operating outside of, the government. He terms the entire site of such struggles, bargaining and negotiations (these are, he says, combinations of legality, semi-legality and illegality) *political* society, as distinct from *civil* society, which Foucault too did not think as possessing any emancipative or empowering capacity for the disenfranchised. Chatterjee's ideas have been debated; his ideas have been referred to in some of the recent research in urban sociology and urban politics; he, too, has refined his idea on this further – but we can see the looming shadow of Foucault, who showed how rights in democracy operate under a broad canopy of governmental policies, restraints, disciplines and regulations and how liberalism as a practice and a science of government indicates predicated rights. The radical Left as we know in India as elsewhere disagrees with this interpretation, and in India it is difficult to visualize Chatterjee's thesis gaining approval of the radical scholarship in the present time[20] – because as of now this present is extremely contentious, violent and warlike, bearing all the evidences of an all-out social war – a milieu in which an explanation of popular politics in terms of the operation of governmentality (and the birth of the subject through governmental operations) may appear too soft and disregardful of the desire for autonomy in radical, democratic politics. Chatterjee has defended himself by saying that it is time that we study the noncoercive forms of power. Radical scholars will in turn ask which Foucault should be accepted: the Foucault of *Society Must be Defended* (2003) or the Foucault of *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008)?

But this question is linked to the way Foucault developed the idea of governmentality and biopolitics. We have to remember, however, that each time he approached the issue, he added a little to what he had argued earlier. There is no one, definitive text. Therefore, it is difficult to summarize his view for our present purpose – in order to see how much it is relevant for the postcolonial time. In brief, we may say that governmentality is the link between his explorations in two sets of relations: first, his exploration of the relation between political rationality (by which he would also mean the genealogy of government) and the techniques of domination and, second, his exploration of the relation between ethics (by which he would mean the genealogy of the subject) and the technologies of subjectivity. Governmentality links the formation of the modern politics and the formation of the subject. Foucault, through his lectures of two successive years (see Foucault 2008), tried to sketch a genealogy of governmentality from the classical Greeks and Romans through the Christian idea of pastoral guidance to the idea of state reason and the police in the eighteenth century. He investigated in this context liberal and neoliberal ideas

[20] See Chatterjee (2008a); criticisms of his views (John and Deshpande 2008; Shah 2008; Baviskar and Sundar 2008) and his reply (Chatterjee 2008b).

in order to show how neoliberalism works to govern or shape the conduct of populations through the deregulated market that considers the whole of society as its domain. If governmental rationality has produced neoliberalism, he wanted to say that neoliberalism, and liberalism in general, was a political project. We can even say that he was almost arguing that political economy was a part of this governmental rationality, and not an ideology of a particular form of production.

We can now see the difficulty of scholars in the postcolonial milieu in warmly welcoming such an inference. What happens to the body/power question that Foucault had raised in *Discipline and Punish* (1991)? What happens to his assertions that the relations of power are to be understood in terms of war, struggle and conflicts? We must, however, note in this connection that the seeds of Foucault's last turn were hidden in *Discipline and Punish* itself. Let us read him attentively: he commented in that absorbing book that the modern mind within the order of war began a fantasy of a society that was like a body machine, not an industrial machine but a socio-military machine, which would cover the whole territory of the nation and to which each individual would be occupied without interruption but in a different way: 'Disciplinary power as its correlative an individuality that is not only analytical and "cellular", but also natural and "organic"' (Foucault 1991: 156). And then he wrote in an extremely terse way in which only he could write:

> Politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile useful troop, of the regiment in the camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises.… If there is a politics-war series that passes through strategy, there is an army-politics series that passes through tactics. It is strategy that makes it possible to understand warfare as a way of conducting politics between states; it is tactics that makes it possible to understand the army as a principle for maintaining the absence of warfare in civil society. The classical age saw the birth of the great political and military strategy by which nations confronted each other's economic and demographic forces; but it also saw the birth of meticulous military and political tactics by which the control of bodies and individual forces was exercised within states. (Foucault 1991: 168)

We know that because Foucault did not explore the links between the two, and in his later research, he emphasized the individual body, leaving behind the other theme of strategy and masses behind, at times almost arguing that there was a disjunction between the two with no interface. But postcolonial researches, while benefiting from his writings, take a different line. They demonstrate the link between sovereignty and governmentality, juridical power and molecular power, mass and the body and normalcy and exceptionality.[21] Therefore, this new scholarship, while appreciating the insights of *Discipline and Punish*, does not accept his contention that law, legitimation, will and consensus, or what he described as the juridical model of power (1982), do not help us understand the emergence of modern disciplinary power. Therefore, this new scholarship has had extreme difficulty in accepting Foucault's last turn, whereby discipline had been relativized

[21] One of the detailed instances of this new approach is the collection of writings in Kannabiran and Singh (2008).

in the perspective of micro-political phenomena, which Foucault would now understand as biopolitics. For Foucault, the earlier model of power now had given way to a new model, termed 'governmentality'. That is to say, government does not operate as right or violence but as 'conduct of conducts'. It ensures the right conduct of population – self-regulated conduct – in a deregulated society and market, and ethics in this way connects up with politics, which is now biopolitics, and power, which is now biopower. First, Foucault had cut the head of the king or the sovereign; now, he was able to cut the head of politics.

As I have said, given the reality of pervasive conflict and the established legacy of anticolonial resistance, the postcolonial society is neither settled nor pacified, nor can it be left to self-regulation. International political managers are perpetually busy in teaching postcolonial societies to self-regulate, but passions still rule politics. So is the case in the international arena where the logic of war, interventions and recolonization cancels the prospect of any successful neoliberal management. In fact, after the crash and meltdown of 2008–2009 and the postcolonial predicament, which is global, it is extremely difficult to see the late works of Foucault gaining positive approval beyond the circle of Rose and few others who have nothing to offer for popular politics. In India, on the other hand, there is now an increasing amount of researches in the areas of law, extraordinary powers, nature of sovereignty, exceptions, etc., all of these in a creative way, which integrate Foucault's ideas with a kind of nonconformity and radicality that society is generating now. We cannot forget that already social inquiries into the body and the physical aspects of our political life have taken interesting new turns, but this is nothing new. The entire tradition of what Lenin had termed 'militant materialism' had begun with the body, and its attention never left the body in distress, in discipline, in power, in desire, as object of torture, as object of surveillance, as victim of hunger, etc., and even if its normalization makes us forget its significance, those who run the society will not allow us to forget – thus, every day, we hear slogans of the corporate body, nation as the 'geo-body', the woman as the body of desire and pleasure, legal body, 'king's two bodies', indeed, society as the body, etc.

In this postcolonial milieu, what will happen to philosophy that is philosophy in the way Foucault wanted to practise it? In any case, the boundary between philosophy, in this case political philosophy, and social theory has now almost vanished, and Foucault would have been least concerned with that prospect. He wanted philosophy to cross the line of grandeur and enter the place of immanence and become in that way endurable, workable and thinkable. In that sense, he remained a student of Louis Althusser. In that sense, he did what Althusser had termed 'philosophical practice', because 'philosophy is a certain continuation of politics' (Althusser 1971b). In that sense, Foucault taught us how to practise philosophy. History, a critical anthropological reflection, a rigour in logic, a devotion to reality and, to use the words of Marx in his preface to *The German Ideology* (Marx and Engels 1932), a determination, to settle accounts with our past 'philosophical consciousness' – all these marked his career as a thinker. Therefore, notwithstanding how he reached India, or precisely because of the way he reached India, radical postcolonial political thinking will keep Foucault as a resource. He will not be a

castaway, though to be sure his 'American moment' will not return here.[22] But that also means that the postcolonial engagement and dialogue with Foucault will continue. To rephrase the words of Althusser (1971c), namely, that it is better that Lenin read Hegel after he read Marx (Lenin said that this was the reason why he now understood Hegel better), similarly, it is good that we have come to appreciate Foucault and his legacy through the militant materialist experiences.

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Chapter 4
Biopolitics and Urban Governmentality in Mumbai

Manish K. Jha, P.K. Shajahan, and Mouleshri Vyas

The governance of urban space is an extremely contentious issue, and the trail of urbanization world over is testimony to these controversies, claims and counter-claims by different segments of society. Everyday spaces for urban poor, informal workers and less privileged minority communities, in a way, portray that right to the city is differentially constituted for different people and communities. The present chapter employs Foucault's notions of governmentality and biopolitics in order to elucidate the complex manner in which the government and affluent sections of the society ensure that the urban poor continue to provide services for them amidst persistent insecurity, informality and anxiety. According to Foucault, governmentality describes the evolution of government from a primitive legal-political entity based on force into one that wields influence by means of bureaucratic knowledge ('*savoir*'), governing apparatuses and notional classifications ('grids of intelligibility') that apply to every segment of society. As he explains in his essay 'Governmentality' (Foucault 1991), this more sophisticated approach impacts cultural, social, economic and even personal aspects of a nation or state at the level of the individual as well as the group. Foucault, through examples from Europe, shows how the art of government is made possible by converting people into disciplined populations. His concept of governmentality takes up this thread of argument by demonstrating how the sovereign/state turned notions of family, work and leisure to its own rationality (Baxstrom 2000).

The present chapter draws from three different, yet interlinked, cases to establish and demonstrate the exercise of biopower in the governing process in the city of Mumbai.

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The cases in point here have to do with the place of poor in urban space of Mumbai, every day experiences of the Muslim minority community in Mumbai and the condition of the urban poor in informal work. The chapter highlights the subtle as also overt mechanisms of converting these sections of society into disciplined populations by employing the approaches most suitably characterized as governmentality. Access, control, representation and participation of people in the urban space of Mumbai lend themselves to the understanding of the layered, hierarchical and differential stakes of people based on their class, caste, religious background, occupation, etc. In the parliamentary democratic polity of India with its secular nature as stated in the constitution, it is overtly proclaimed by the government that all segments of society are treated equally. However, the way poor slum dwellers, the minority Muslim community, as also the people engaged in informal unorganized work encounter government on an everyday basis, reveals the processes whereby control and domination are established through normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity. Biopolitical strategies, such as statistical enquiries, censuses and programmes for enhancement or curtailment of benefits and services, are premised on intelligence concerning those whose well-being the government is authorized to enhance. These strategies reveal a form of power that regulates social life from within, absorbs it and justifies it. The three cases in the present chapter briefly explicate these strategies and approaches through which social lives get regulated, disciplined and marginalized.

Mumbai, with its population over 20 million, is one of the most populated cities of the world. The governance processes in the city of Mumbai, known as financial capital of India, are an apt case for understanding and analysing the myriad ways through which the developmental state interacts with the population and creates a spectacle for ruly and unruly populations. On the face of it, the governance system and institutions in Mumbai present an impression of a disorganized, liberal approach towards different sections of the society where technologies of rule are not rigidly defined and put into operation. A more minute and deepened observation, engagements and policy analysis demonstrate governmentality in a different light. The political economy of the city depicts that urban governance in Mumbai is meticulously planned and carefully crafted based on very detailed information and knowledge about the inhabitants of the city, which includes high taxpaying citizens (including corporate houses, entrepreneurs, employees of corporate and government companies, etc.) and people living in *chawl*s,[1] slums, resettlement colonies and pavements and engaged in lowly paid employment avenues and involved in informal and unorganized sector. The government employs diverse apparatuses for generating information and knowledge about population and thereafter accordingly decides to render docile the unruly domains over which government is to be exercised. Governmentalities both extend the concerns of rulers to the ordering of the multitudinous affairs of territory and its population in order to ensure its well-being and simultaneously establish divisions between the proper spheres of action of different types of authority (Rose 2006: 147).

[1] *Chawl*s are multi-storeyed one-room tenements created initially for the habitation of the working class population in Mumbai.

The ordered-prescriptive democratic regime expects that the population would be law abiding, pliable and obedient to the state. Based on these assumptions, state-urban poor encounters are, more often than not, dictated by newer technologies of rule where the very existence of poor is being seen from the lens of illegality and therefore spaces and avenues of their participation disappear. The approach in which technologies of rule consolidate their authority depends on the method in which the technologies are construed and put into practice by actors of governance. It is also important to realize why and how they are seized upon, understood as also contested by differently placed people within 'the poor'. The policies and programmes under the governance regime are taking place in contexts in which the contracting and retreating neoliberal state is increasingly exclusionary and apathetic towards the poor.

4.1 The Urban Poor and Their Housing

Out of the total population of Mumbai, more than 60 % constitute its slum population, who occupy about 12.85 % of the city's total land area (Jha 2011: 2). The Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, defines slums as 'areas where buildings (a) are in any respect unfit for human habitation;(b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors are detrimental to safety, health or morale'. Greater portions of the lands on which slums are located today were previously uninhabitable, and it is through the efforts of the slum dwellers that these lands were 'reclaimed' and rendered habitable. Approximately 7–7.5 million live in slums in the most unhygienic and filthy conditions and another one million live on pavements (Jha 2011: 2–3). It is also estimated that nearly two million people live as tenants in rented premises, a large number of which are old and dilapidated structures, including *chawl*s (Das 2003). On the whole it is estimated that nearly ten million of the city's population lives in substandard or unsafe housing conditions under the continuous threat of displacement (Das 2003: 3). A vast majority of the people living in substandard housing and on pavements are migrant population from different parts of the country.

As the urban poor in the city, migrants need to prove through documentary evidence that they have been residing in Mumbai before 1995, so that they can claim alternative accommodation in case of eviction. Under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, if a person cannot prove that they have been residing in a slum structure prior to 1 January 1995, not only would their structure will be demolished, but they are liable to punishment with imprisonment and fine. Those who cannot furnish documentary proof would automatically move outside the purview of any consideration of accommodation. The 'cut-off' dates determine whether the state is going to tolerate the urban poor

within its limit. The entire enumeration process undertaken by agencies like the MMRDA[2] and the issuance of identity numbers are the proof of peculiar forms of classification and surveillance which keep the insecure poor always on tenterhooks. James Scott's highly influential book, *Seeing Like a State* (1998), attempts to understand statecraft as a process of rendering populations 'legible'. Scott argues that legibility is achieved through a series of disparate state practices of surveillance and control, including sedentarization,[3] the creation of permanent names, the establishment of cadastral surveys and population registers, the invention of freehold tenure, the standardization of language and legal discourse, and the design of cities and the organization of transportation. These practices function 'as attempts at legibility and simplification' (Robinson 2002: 680).

In the name of authority of government and responsibility of governance, the state sees evictions and demolitions as one of the major solutions to the 'problems' of slums. There has been a spurt of policies and programmes to tackle the 'problem' of slums in Mumbai since 1971, most of them by evicting people from their habitat (Jha 2013; Kumar 2005; Burra 2005). Such displacements happen to facilitate the projects (Sharma et al. 2008) that include urban infrastructural development, urban renewal and housing schemes and transport systems, etc. The Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project (MUIP) and Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) are cases in point. Through demolition of substandard slum settlements – a perceptible representation of poverty – the displacement of people for infrastructural development or other urban renewal programmes claims to improve the living condition of poor. All these happen through well-planned and organized policies and programmes so that the process of relocation can be smoothened and portrayed as state's concern for the 'well-being' of the poor. Those who are eligible for resettlement are allotted a house that has a built-in space of 225 sq. ft. Unfortunately, such displacement has resulted in enormous adverse consequences and heightened insecurities for the impoverished population. Since most areas affected by such projects are inhabited by daily wage labourers engaged in construction, waste management and other low-paid jobs, they are in a constant threat of losing their livelihood with displacement. In a relocated place, they face a situation of unemployment, police repression, social breakdown and loss of sense of belonging due to lack of collective identity. Most often, involuntary relocation increases people's inability to access education facilities, health services and livelihood opportunity, and therefore their everyday life is marred with insecurity and struggle for survival (Sharma et al. 2008).

Relocating the poor to provide space for the upper echelons of the society is widespread and at times remains invisible and unrecognized. This undermines communities' relentless effort to make their space habitable by their labour and resources, bereft of any government assistance. The hard work of 'squatters' in

[2] The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) is an apex body for the planning and coordination of development activities in Mumbai region.

[3] Sedentarization is the process of settling the nomadic population. James Scott in his book, '*Seeing Like a State*' (1998), elaborated upon the desire of the state to know more about its subjects and therefore make attempts to settle subjects and make them legible.

creating homes, their love for their communities, their pride in creation and their struggles with government to gain recognition allow us to conclude that squatters in fact give reality to Henri Lefebvre's concept of the 'right to the city' (cited in Neuwirth 2005). Once the poor enhance the marketability of the place of their habitation, the legality/illegality of their occupancy is ascertained through governmental technologies such as voter list, slum survey, PDS[4] cards, etc. Once these erstwhile low-priority lands are developed through the efforts of the residents, the importance of the space is realized and the discussion around eviction follows. The discussion and processes of eviction are being justified through the logic and assertion that the occupants do not have the legal right to occupy these areas. It was observed in the course of a study (Sharma et al. 2008) that those who failed to provide documentary proof to support their credentials were unable to get their entitlement of housing in the relocated site. When it comes to displacing and evicting the poor, the state and its actors couch the displacement in a language of guiding the 'ignorant' for their betterment. State agencies, unsure of their ability to persuade people, recruit non-government organizations (NGOs) to convince slum dwellers about the benefits of resettlement. Some social activists have been raising doubts about motives and ideology of NGOs that are involved in ensuring housing for the poor (Jha 2013: 181). It is observed that the services of some of the NGOs are taken to convince people to conform to governmental decisions. Harriss (2007) emphasizes that such practices constitute the governmentality of the post-liberalization state. It also depicts that governmental action by itself cannot attain its goal; it requires the willing cooperation of subjects participating in their own governance. The use of power as guidance signifies that coercion or consensus is reformulated as means of government among others. While discussing the concept of governmentality, Lemke (2000) refers to Foucault's view that governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarities and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by a person. It is interesting to understand, examine and analyse those processes and techniques that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individual and groups.

Contemporary societies continue to contain struggles against direct domination and against capitalist exploitation, but increasingly they manifest social struggles against the form of subjection themselves. They have totalizing moments, in which states group subjects together in order to rule them, and individualizing moments, in which subjects are separated as the objects of pastoral power.[5] The politics and practice of urban governance in Mumbai simultaneously play out individualization

[4] The cards issued for ensuring people's entitlement for subsidized food procurement under the public distribution system (PDS).

[5] Foucault explains pastoral power in the following way: first, it was exercised over a flock of people on the move rather than over a static territory; second, it was a fundamentally beneficent power according to which the duty of the pastor (to the point of self-sacrifice) was the salvation of the flock; and finally, it was an individualizing power, in that the pastor must care for each and

techniques and totalizing procedures as a nuanced strategy of state power. Techniques of individualization in the process of resettlement happen through individualized documentary proofs, justification of legality of habitation, ensuring individual rights, entitlement for compensatory relocation, etc. The process of individualization in the context of slum dwellers of Mumbai can be understood by the fact that as early as in the year 1976, a census of huts on public land was conducted and 'photopasses' were issued to those who met certain criteria, prepared by the state to decide 'eligibility' for resettlement. The 'photopass' became a certified document with the individuals to claim their eligibility for resettlement if the land on which their habitat existed was required by the state for a 'public purpose'. Invariably, these passes are considered as a document for security of residence. On the other hand, the totalization procedure happens through demolition, collective eviction and shifting in transit camps and from there to relocated sites and several other forms of relocation (Jha 2011: 6). In deciding the entitlement, each and everyone is considered as a project-affected person (PAP) and compensation is uniform and totalized, without recognizing the composition of families, the size of earlier tenements, etc.

Further, the insecurity of poor is exacerbated by the fact that large sections of poor urban migrants are threatened against their claim of citizenship in the city due to the polarization of people around the contentious issue of migrant versus native interests. Here, one has to deal with the question of who constitutes unruly population – migrants or those who contest the migrants' presence in the city space? The attitude of the political class as also of the urban governing authorities in Mumbai is representative of the ideas of propertied classes who identify the migrant poor as the perpetrators of growing urban overcrowding, insanitary conditions, appropriation of work opportunities, involvement in crime and threat to the fabric of traditional society (Jha 2013). This portrayal of 'unruly population' necessitates the need to discipline them and restrict their freedom. The rise and growth of right-wing political groups with stated claim to represent 'the interest of the native population' further restrict migrants' right to the city and therefore their fight for housing. To control, determine and limit the freedom of the migrant poor, these political groups use the instrument of threat and prejudice. These migrants are referred to as 'infiltrators' (*The Hindu* 2012) required to possess 'permit' (*Hindustan Times* 2012), made responsible for 'rising crime'[6] and 'responsible for crime against women'[7] (Jha 2013: 199). In the process, the capitalist project of the state unfolds itself in a manner which forces the dominated class to share the values and principles of the dominant. This has profound impact on the liberal traditions of freedom – freedom to reside, move, visit, work in a particular area, etc. The urban

every member of the flock singly. Using the metaphor of pastoral power, Foucault explains the strategies of government vis-à-vis the conduct of population.

[6] P. Chidambaram, the then Home Minister, blamed migrants for rising crimes in Delhi (*DNA* 2010).

[7] Sheila Dikshit, Chief Minister of Delhi, blamed migrants for increasing crime against women in Delhi (*India Today* 2012).

elite, in alliance with the state, act as quasi-sovereign vis-à-vis the migrant working class population of the city. Taking advantage of their insecurity and vulnerability by using the native-migrant divide, along with their geographic marginality, the elite possesses, as Foucault's own parlance might aptly characterize, the power to take 'things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself' (Foucault 1990: 136), from the migrant working poor.

The analytics of government not only concentrates on the mechanism of the legitimization of domination, beyond that it focuses on the knowledge that is part of the practices, the systematization and rationalization of a pragmatics of guidance. The conditions and constraints under which the poor negotiate with the state are the conditionality made as sacrosanct and given. The urban poor are frequently in a situation where the process of governance results in making them more insecure and deprived under the rubric of their 'illegality'. The logic and 'legality' of urban governance leaves the urban poor with no other choice but to rely on 'illegal' arrangements that the poor always have to make: illegal structure, illegal strategies, informal arrangements for basic civic services, etc., thereby making them a permanently vulnerable group at the hands of the agent of the state as also the slumlords. As a result, they are forced to operate in peculiar forms of temporality, and in the process, they are often branded as unruly. Their everyday life operates in the situation of insecurity, urgency and emergency. The approach of the judiciary and the delegitimization of the urban poor through juridical pronouncements have made matters worse as far as the struggle for housing is concerned. In the case of *Lawyers' Cooperative Group Housing Society* vs. *Union of India*,[8] Justice B.N. Kirpal remarked, 'It appears that the public exchequer has to be burdened with crores of rupees for providing alternative accommodation to *jhuggi* (slum) dwellers who are trespassers on public land'. In February 2000, the court observed, 'Rewarding an encroacher on public land with a free alternative site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket'.[9] This characterization of the poor as drawn by the court – the likening of a slum dweller to a pickpocket – is a definite departure from the acknowledgment of the fact that the poor too strive to survive and that their struggles deserve respect and support.

The class character of the state is quite apparent in deliberate attempts made to insulate, spatially and socially, the bourgeoisie from the undesirable others. The latter's lives exist in spaces, known as resettlement colonies, and become visible in the forms of bare life.[10] The right to the city becomes illusive to the poor. The right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: right to freedom, to individualization and socialization, to habitat and to inhabit (Lefebvre 1996). The right to the city legitimates the refusal to allow oneself to be removed from urban reality by a discriminatory and segregative organization (Lefebvre 1996). The central and peripheral/marginal zoning of the city space that takes place under

[8] CW No 267 and CM 464 of 1993, Delhi High Court.

[9] Almitra H. Patel & Anr. Vs Union of India: (2000) 2 SSC 679.

[10] Agamben (1998) differentiates bare life from qualified life of political citizens. Bare life is excluded from the higher aims of the state, yet is a subject of political control.

sovereign power demonstrates the governing of developmental democracy in a unique form. It, therefore, marks an excluded but included space within the topography of sovereign power and potentially opens this topography to an expansion of bare life to more sections of the underprivileged population.

Even though the visibility of these squatter settlements is constantly sought to be erased by moving them elsewhere, by bulldozing them and by evicting the inhabitants, squatter settlements are spatial forms that make assertions, which contest dominant relations, and which make the dialectic between the forces of domination and those of resistance starkly visible in a way no other medium can do. The production of space is an inherently political process, and it is symbolic of both power and resistance to these symbols of power. The political power of place also comes from its unique ability to link the experiential (phenomenal), social and symbolic dimensions of space. Transformative politics comes from separating, juxtaposing and recombining them. In order to challenge the dominant practice of society, there must be a space for subaltern resistance. Nancy Fraser argues that subaltern counterpublics can overcome the elitism and homogeneity that characterized the bourgeoisie public sphere in its golden age (Fraser 1992). Taking the argument forward, Kohn (2001: 507) explains:

> To be effective politically, a subaltern counter public must be a space where groups can develop the resources to present a consistent challenge to dominant practices.… It must provide, at least temporarily, a space protected from the dominant discourse in which an alternative can be imagined, lived, and articulated.

The spaces of subaltern counter publics, unfortunately, have been dubbed as conglomerations of unruly population that could be dangerous for the 'security' and therefore to be dealt with by several agencies of the government and through a variety of nuanced governmental technologies.

4.2 Biopolitics of Marginality: The Case of Muslims in Mumbai

With the biopolitics of development assuming considerable significance within the context of the modern state, populations are deemed to be controlled and fashioned with legal, social and moral techniques and practices in operation. The desire to control the conduct of others always meets with resistance (Lazzarato 2002) – a resistance to power that creates a new form-of-life, as explained by Agamben (2002). An exploration into the lives of Muslims in Mumbai and its suburbs using a prism of citizenship rights is expected to bring forth this multifaceted reality of marginality and new forms of life experienced by them. These resistances are not always revolutionary or socially transformative in its outcomes. In the case of stigmatized identity of Muslims, the resistances come in the form of submission to state power and gradually disconnecting from the varied apparatuses of the state as strategies of survival. An analysis of the 61st round of the National Sample Survey

(NSS)[11] data by the Sachar Committee (2005)[12] suggests that a relatively high proportion of Muslim workers is engaged in self-employment activity. The report elaborates that about 61 % of the total Muslim workforce as compared to about 55 % of the Hindu workers is engaged in self-employment activities. This is to be seen as one of the coping strategies of survival. The resistance also comes in the form of hopelessness and limited expectations from the state.

Here, the idea is to analyse the *biopolitics of otherness* as experienced by Muslims in Mumbai's urban space. A similarity can be drawn into the discussion on the biopolitics of otherness by Fassin (2001) in the case of undocumented foreigners in France. Here, the case of Muslims in general and those in urban spaces vividly presents a spectrum of processes aimed at control and domination through varied apparatuses of disciplinarity. The processes of disciplining can be meaningfully assessed by analysing the citizenship rights that the community enjoys. Enjoyment of citizenship rights is a factor of the relative position of the community in question, in the social and political hierarchy in any society, with regard to the nature of state, governance mechanisms, etc., in place. Muslims in India, in general, and those in urban spaces have remained at the receiving end of the intranational and extra-national biopolitics surrounding *development deficit, security* and *victimization*. One of the expressions of biopolitics is the governmental power imposed on members of the community stripping them of their rational and political agency and advocating the precariousness of their passivity.

One of the predominant factors that describes the biopolitics surrounding marginalized communities such as Muslims in India is the *development deficit* of the community in general and that of the nature of physical space they occupy particularly in cities. While approximately 60 % of the Mumbai's population lives in slums, these settlements become very important constituencies for political parties. The process of exclusion and inclusion operates at a not-so-subtle level in these settlements. In the slums, electoral politics is at play. There are certain pockets in most of the slums, where the political party in power has an assured vote base, and such pockets are well serviced as far as civic services are concerned, whereas pockets in which the members consistently vote other parties are reported to be perennially neglected. Such pockets of neglect are most often delineated based on

[11] A nationwide sample survey called the National Sample Survey was initiated by the Government of India in the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, in 1950 to collect statistical sampling comprehensive socioeconomic data relating to different sector of the economy of the country. The National Sample Survey is a continuing multi-subject integrated survey conducted in the form of successive rounds, each round covering some topic of current interest. Currently, the survey is conducted by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) in the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation of the Government of India.

[12] The Prime Minister of India in 2005 commissioned a High Level Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice Rajinder Sachar (retired) to prepare a report on the social, economic and educational condition of the Muslim community of India. The report is first of its kind revealing the backwardness of Indian Muslims. The report, widely known as Sachar Committee Report, has led to policy initiatives to address educational and occupational backwardness of the community since the report has been publicized.

either religion or caste. Thus, settlements with a high concentration of Muslims are neglected as far as the services of the local governments as well as the state departments are concerned.

Residents of Mumbra[13] with as many as 80–85 % Muslims have clear reasons to believe that the area is neglected by various arms of the state owing to its high Muslim population. Several participants of the study[14] conducted by one of the authors strongly believed that localities have their religio-communal connotations as the case of neglect and marginalization is strikingly visible in areas that are predominantly inhabited by Muslims. One of the most distressing spin-offs of marginalization in the daily life of slum dwellers is that they are compelled to negotiate with everyday *illegalities* as a survival strategy. Such illegalities range from taking illegal water and electricity connections to running *illegal enterprises*[15] and buying and occupying tenements in illegal buildings, thereby making themselves vulnerable to sustained risk of being exploited by builders, middlemen, slumlords, and more importantly, the police, officials of municipal corporation and the state departments (Jha and Shajahan 2010). In response to a building collapse in Mumbra in April 2013, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra in a statement admitted that almost 90 % of the buildings in Mumbra are either illegal or irregular. Such illegalities attract more actions to discipline and punish the transgressors and hence legitimize the need for increased surveillance. This presents us an interesting description of what Foucault (1984) called heterotopias,[16] which presupposes a system of opening and closing which both isolates it and makes it penetrable (Jha and Shajahan 2010). Such urban spaces inhabited by Muslims remain closed for several developmental interventions, civic services and a reasonable infrastructure. Insufficient water and electricity supply, absence of market places, congested and badly maintained roads, sewerage lines and public toilets are strikingly visible in such Muslim settlements. While these heterotopias are facing the closure of possibilities for dignified life, they remain widely open for close surveillance and ordering of lives, which significantly impacts upon the experience of a sense of security and a resultant feeling of victimization.

This becomes evident when one goes through the genealogy of communal violence and state responses towards it in postcolonial India. Despite having strong constitutional guarantees of liberty, equality and secularism, issues related to

[13] Mumbra is a small town approximately 40 km from Mumbai and falls under the neighbouring Thane Municipal Corporation. The high concentration of Muslims in this area is heavily influenced by the movement of a large number of Muslims from different locations in Mumbai during the 1992–1993 communal riots in the city.

[14] Study conducted by Shajahan between 2006 and 2009 on communal expressions and secular engagements in Mumbai and Thane.

[15] Enterprises that are not registered with appropriate authorities and do not possess proper licences.

[16] Foucault (1984) refers to heterotopia in contrast to utopia as a real space, which is simultaneously mythic and real. Foucault provides two categories of heterotopias such as heterotopia of crisis and deviation, respectively. The first refers to sacred and forbidden places and the second refers to places where people are placed when they do not conform to the norm. The author here tries to explain the neglected space of Muslim settlements as a heterotopia of deviation.

maintenance of the rule of law, exercise of state power and delivery of justice remain serious concerns for Muslims in India. Existing legal frameworks such as the Indian Penal Code (IPC) have repeatedly failed to be effective in handling the complex and vexed nature of communal violence in India, thus creating a sense of insecurity and developing a trust deficit among Muslims.

The art of governance as a strategy of exercising state power also includes the action of subjects, particularly the dominant groups, upon others, which in a way influences a process of increasing the marginality of the 'others'. In such circumstances, the state ceases to exist for those who constitute a very large section of population who live in constant fear of their personal safety and *security*. For them, the state ceases to exist not only because it fails to protect their lives and property, which is its constitutional obligation, but also because it allows extremist, fundamentalist groups to indulge in violent acts with impunity. According to several members of the community, the life of Muslims in the city has never been peaceful especially after the 1992–1993 communal riots.[17] Even though riots do not happen quite often, the city is living under the shadow of the gruesome riots in the past. The Muslim community in Mumbai thus suffers from insecurity. Even now, a protest demonstration by the Shiv Sena or even a religious procession organized by a local *mandal*[18] can send shockwaves among the minority community. In most cases, the local *mandal*s have their own political connections and local leader as the patron. The fear is not only at the hands of religious extremists but also at the hands of police as it looks at urban poor Muslims with suspicion. A Muslim *basti* (slum neighbourhood) located in a predominantly Hindu settlement of Sarvodaya Nagar in Jogeshwari is reported to be a Bangladeshi *basti*. There are several such *basti*s in the city of Mumbai, as may be the case with several other cities, which are declared as Bangladeshi *basti*s and are under close surveillance of the police during any untoward incidences. Illegal detention of people from Muslim *basti*s and torture in custody are reported to be very common (Shajahan 2009).

The state with its various power 'dispositifs'[19] plays a major role in the experience of *victimization* of the community in question. The police is the most important institution that plays a vital role in generating and maintaining a sense of persecution

[17] Large-scale violent riots broke out in the city of Mumbai following the demolition of a 400-year-old mosque in Ayodhya, called the Babri Masjid, in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh on 6 December 1992 by Hindu fundamentalist groups. The demolition was followed by widespread celebration of the event by Hindu nationalist groups and right-wing political parties such as the Shiv Sena and resultant responses from the Muslim community led to massive and targeted killings of Muslims apparently under the connivance of the state machinery, as reported by Justice B.N. Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry.

[18] *Mandal*s are collectives (usually unregistered and informal), in communities mostly formed for celebrating Hindu festivals.

[19] Foucault in an interview conducted by a round table of historians (Foucault 1977) defines *dispositif* as a heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements and philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements (see also Foucault ibid).

among Muslims. The utmost betrayal experienced at the hands of police during the riots of the 1990s has left a major impact on the psyche of Muslims in the city. Even after one and a half decade, incidents that occurred in 1992–1993 remain powerful markers of governmental betrayal. Residents of Mumbra have peculiar experiences of being Mumbraites as well as being Muslims. Mumbra's image of being an unruly urban space and more specifically as a terrorist den, along with the religious identity of being a Muslim space, makes the residents of this community a target of suspicion. Closely surveilled urban spaces such as Mumbra eerily resemble Jeremy Bentham's panopticon where lives are surveilled, monitored and ordered without the knowledge of the subjects about the apparatuses and processes of this ordering. Muslim participants of the study referred to above reported experiences of anti-Muslim bias of the police. Instances of verification of passports, searches and inspections after any incident of terrorist acts anywhere in the country are the most common situations where the bias operates explicitly. On approaching the police station for verification related to application for passports, they report that they are treated like criminals and are forced to make several visits to the police station, whereas members of other communities do not have to do so. One of the participants shared that if you have a surname *Khan* or *Shaikh,* the processes get longer and tedious. Moreover, the police come to Muslim-inhabited areas and make inquiries in the neighbourhood, openly asking whether a particular person has any terrorist or criminal connections, at times, without even referring to the purpose of inquiry, thereby leaving behind a lot of speculation among the neighbours. Illegal detention of people from Muslim *basti*s and torture in custody are reported to be quite common.

Apart from these biases against Muslims, the police are reported to be taking pride in presenting a Muslim petty criminal as a terrorist having connections with Pakistan or Bangladesh. The locality in which one lives, the language one speaks and one's physical presentation are all factors determining the way one experiences the power dispositifs. The respondents reported that if a Muslim is caught in a minor scuffle, it is very common to register a case against him, unlike in the case of Hindus who will be at the most warned and sent off. Having either a case registered or one's name in the books[20] endangers one's prospects in getting good jobs. The police also use these entries to wrongly implicate someone in some case or the other at their will. If a person who has his name in the books applies for a passport, it is almost sure that he will not get clearances unless he is willing to make several trips to the police station and shell out a good sum as bribe. On the other hand, employers display strong aversion to hire Muslim employees in their establishments. In cities, flat owners and cooperative housing societies refuse to give flats to Muslims either on rental or on outright sale. Builders in Mumbai are using the unwritten tag of 'no Muslims allowed' to market their flats as it has proved to fetch better prices (Shajahan 2009: 176).

The biopolitics of otherness experienced by Muslims in urban spaces of Mumbai discussed above is in a way a contravention of the equal citizenship enshrined in the

[20] Having a name in the books refers to the entry in the records at the police station about minor or petty offences against anybody in the locality.

constitution. Thus, the liberal conception of citizenship has failed to address the underlying discrimination against minorities. The intractable relationship between citizen and community which liberal democracies wish to resolve has, thus, resulted in more problems than solutions (Neyazi 2007). The increasing development deficit, overwhelming sense of insecurity and victimization lead Muslims in Mumbai to a situation of acute deficit of citizenship rights. Particularistic demands to deal with such problems of exclusion and denial of rights essentially based on religious identity are overtly presented as divisive by communal forces. The state machineries most often tread a cautious line of inaction and sometimes adopt aggressive steps to repress any resistance and indulge in disciplinary processes of state power.

4.3 The Biopolitics of Keeping the City Clean: Conflict and Informal Labour

The above sections highlight the unfolding of biopolitics with regard to shelter and identity and the multidimensional impact of these processes for those on the social and economic fringes of the city of Mumbai. As with shelter, the state-urban poor interface in the informal economy is a crucial arena where the biopolitics of marginalization plays out. It can confidently be assumed that what Mumbai demonstrates is likely to be the case in most of urban India. However, and this must be emphasized in the light of the above discussion, the emergent character of Mumbai city, with its undisguised hostility to the urban poor and to specific communities such as the Muslims, imbues the lives of informal labour with added struggles. Hierarchies within hierarchies in informal work, and the almost indifferent approach of the state towards the labouring poor, pose a host of challenges in the everyday interaction of certain categories of the urban population with the city.

As cities become global, the processes of keeping them clean are being redrawn through policy formulations with regard to housing, informal work, governance of city spaces and so on. Foreign investment needs a visible degree of development and adequately managed cities. In some shocking instances, these measures have in effect led to segregation of the urban poor and their physically being shifted into corners of the city where they do not catch the public eye. The irony is hard to miss for those sections of the poor who participate in the public service of keeping the city clean. The technologies and strategies of governance and governmentality define the character of the global city, while situating it within the global and regional web, as an actor and a point of application of unequal power relations. Within the city, the creation of classes, divisions among them and the class conflict reflects the larger designs of governmentality as well as its micro-politics.

From the 1990s, the discourse on the role of the state in providing services such as city and street cleaning, broadly understood as conservancy work,

underwent a shift.[21] The restructuring of the entire sector of Solid Waste Management (SWM) resulted in policy formulation at the national level, redefining the role of the arms of the state in actual provision of this service and adding to labour segmentation and reorganization at the city level. This, on one hand, and the burgeoning spending power and visible consumerism of the middle classes, on the other, have contributed to reshaping the role of the arms of the state, of the citizen-consumer and of the citizen-labour in enacting the biopolitics of city management. It is paradoxical and yet inevitable that those who keep the city clean are the ones who work and live with its waste and filth for the most part of the day. In the Mumbai metropolitan region, with its rapidly increasing population currently pegged at 22.7 million (2011 census) and urban lifestyles, figures show that more than 7,500 metric tonnes of waste are generated each day; not all of it is cleared from the more than 3,000 collection points (Sen 2011).[22] The 27,000 strong labour force that works for the Solid Waste Management of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai comprises standard as well as nonstandard workers, the latter working as casual and contract labour.[23]

While performing its key function of maintaining the cleanliness of the cities, one that is discharged through performance of various tasks each day throughout the year, the state, through its arms such as the SWM Department of the Urban Local Body, the office of the Labour Commissioner and so on, while remaining indispensable, still remains at the margins of the practice of full citizenship. The selection of strategies of segregation, definition and control are evident in decisions of reducing recruitment of workers in the SWM departments on a permanent basis as standard workers, in the creation of the category of contract and casual labour, in inviting global tenders and privatization of this sector and in the very multilayered and intricate set of relations that obfuscate lines of communication and accountability and, above all, of the responsibility that the state has towards its citizens. The simultaneity with which neoliberal policies have increased the spending power of certain classes and built cities where social and economic contrasts and conflicts are visible and heightened is illustrated by the fact that the quantum of solid waste

[21] Report of Solid Waste Management in Class I Cities in India. This eight-member committee was set up by the Supreme Court of India in 1998. It comprised senior bureaucrats and other experts; there was no representation of labour. Among the key recommendations in the report was that solid waste management in cities would improve with privatization.

[22] The article refers to the zero garbage targets that the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) had set for itself for 3 months beginning from 1 October 2011. The collection of garbage improved only marginally since the drive. The article mentions the quantum collected and not the amount generated each day. With the collection not being 100 %, the figures that we have mentioned are at best estimates.

[23] Standard and non-standard workers are broad categories of workers; the terms are also used interchangeably with formal and informal workers, respectively. The former are those who have job security and employment-based social security, while the latter category of workers, employed on contractual basis or on a casual (including daily wage) basis, are in precarious employment. In India, with more than 92 % of the workforce in the informal economy – as wage earners or self employed – the absence of work and of employment-based social security is responsible for an uneven and conflictual relationship of these citizens with the state.

generated in the cities has increased manifold, while the machinery and systems to deal with it have not kept pace. The character of the official systems in this arena has led to a demarcation of the SWM as a sector, a function of a particular department, with the state at the centre; the critical nature of this responsibility of the agency of the state is indisputable as a single day of its failure to do so would alter the appearance of the city and comfort of the residents and give rise to health concerns, bringing tensions into the state and citizen interface. However, the governmentality leading to the manner in which privatization has taken place has ensured that the centrality of the state is only notional and that this notional aspect is experienced only by those on the margins of this arena – the informal labour.

Taking a page from Hilsdon's study of plantation labour in colonial Malaya (cited in Baxstrom 2000: 53), one finds that with the SWM in urban India, there are three 'unstable discursive spaces' where the practices of law, labour and conflict come together: the first, in the policy arena, largely at the national level, where privatization has been brought in through strategies of creation, definition, categorization and managing of unruly populations; the second, in the practice and implementation of the policies at the city level, where the employer-employee and worker-worker conflicts unfold; and the third, at the individual worker level, where the body of the worker becomes a site for discourse.

The two sides of governmentality (Lemke 2000: 51) – the first, of *representation,* where government defines a discursive field in which exercising power is 'rationalized' through the delineation of concepts, subjects and borders, the provision of arguments and justifications, etc., and the second, of structuring *specific forms of intervention*, including agencies, procedures, institutions and legal forms – are enacted at these three levels in solid waste management and effectively demonstrate the political rationality that creates the objects and subjects that it then proceeds to govern.

The wave of privatization that swept through the SWM sector from the beginning of the 21st century was introduced through the predictable arguments of efficiency and effectiveness in the discharge of civic functions by urban local bodies (ULBs). It was legitimized by the loud and visible pro-privatization lobby and policy amendments that allowed for a range of private agencies including global firms to enter the arena (SWM in Class 1 Cities in India 1999: 14–15). In the process of engineering this shift away from ULBs to private agencies, labour has not had a voice. Task forces and committees that have studied the situation and made recommendations for improvement of SWM have comprised high-level bureaucrats and industrialists who were selected or nominated by the authorities. Bureaucrats as government functionaries occupy an official space in the governance of the city, although their knowledge and specific experience may be more generic; industrialists represent economic and political power and find a place in these decision-making bodies through processes of governmentality that are presented to the public as rational. Representatives of labour have been conspicuous by their absence. The 'internalization' and 'normalization' of such a practice of committee formulation are not yet complete in the Indian context; resistance and protest from labour do take place, even as the strategies of manufacturing consent and presenting it to the public gain prominence. The logic of enhanced efficiency and potential for improved

supervision through private firms, both of which are stated as absent from the permanent employment system, are articulated in the report (SWM in Class 1 Cities in India 1999). The subtext of these developments is the expansion in the ranks of nonstandard workers and consequent marginalization of more citizens.

Privatization implies that ULBs are now able to invite tenders from local and global firms bidding for contracts for city cleaning, indicating a change from the service to the business mode. Local labour now interacts with the global arena and locally, with non-state agencies, in a situation where the official governance of labour remains within the same framework as earlier. Regulations such as the amount of time constituting a workday shift, quantum of solid waste to be collected per vehicle, length of street to be swept by a specific number of workers and so on are laid out for the contractors and for the workers. These speak of the power of the state agencies and contractors in disciplining these citizens and transforming them into a population of contract labourers.

At the city level, the space in which standard and nonstandard labour interact with each other on a regular basis is a site of conflict and competition and one where the numbers and anxiety of the latter category are on the rise. With permanent, contracted and casual workers all working on the same jobs, the differential terms of employment actually give rise to and exacerbate the conflict between them. The latter two sections live and work with a strong sense of being exploited as wages and working conditions are starkly different for the same work. Organized informality is evident in the way that work within the sector is organized and operates at the level of each of the municipal wards or administrative divisions. The pattern of relationships and its tensions that emerge are therefore replicated across numerous physical spaces. The micro-politics shows that socially, economically and politically, the site of connect between the state and workers has transferred base. The contractor and supervisor are now the entities with whom regular negotiations about daily work, wages, etc. take place as standard and nonstandard workers operate with different terms of bargaining. The ground is skewed against the labour that can be hired and fired at will, since the labour surplus situation allows the contractor to do so.

Ideas of social transformation through privatization of this service seem to be illusory. The employer role of the state machinery has been problematic; the challenge is how it would take on a regulatory role. It is ironic that with the advent of privatization, the critics of the state have become advocates of its active participation in management, regulation and control of the informal work arena and, therefore, of the workforce. It is desirable that the state intervene through its agencies and functionaries in ensuring better implementation of the existing legislations. The concomitants of this rapidly advancing privatization are silently destructive and strangely conflicting from the workers' perspective: whether it is a global or local firm, the workers belong to the same pool. Almost all of them belong to the Scheduled Castes;[24] they are the socially and economically marginalized in the city

[24] Article 341 of the Constitution of India provides for the public notification and listing of castes, races or tribes or parts/groups within them to be deemed as Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union Territory.

where they live and work. Conservancy work across the country is mediated by caste and by gender, the latter visible more in types of work such as waste-picking where women are noticeably dominant and street sweeping where they are visible. The transport and collection work in Mumbai has men in the labour force and seems to be marked by a certain everyday aggression and struggle at the ward office and on the job.

Worker spaces for staking claim to permanency or even decent work have actually shrunk as the framework within which the work is now organized has been altered. Years of this work in the absence of social security lead to high morbidity due to accidents and illness with deaths of workers that take place at regular intervals going unnoticed and unregistered. Governmentality vis-à-vis labour is evident in the differential conditions of both categories of workers. Contractual workers are denied basic entitlements such as a minimum wage, protective gear, paid leave and social security, while the lot of the permanent workers with SWM departments of the ULBs is much better in terms of wages, work conditions and social security. Both these worker constituencies are difficult to collectivize under one banner as the contractual workers are seen to affect the scope of permanent ones to secure these jobs for their family members. The strategy is divisive and cohesion can only be arrived at after navigating competing interests of both sets.

In the third site of the discourse, the body of the worker, there is a conflict and everyday struggle that manifests itself through a denial of this work and distancing oneself from it in sensory terms, as well others distancing themselves from the physical space of the worker. Conservancy workers on contract work in the same clothes that they wear and come from home. They are not provided a uniform that they can change into. Access to water for washing is still difficult for some. This situation is changing in some of the cities with the employer firms providing these facilities, but this is not a common practice yet. These workers have many experiences of not being permitted to use public transport due to the visual and olfactory discomfort to others. Many of them do not attempt to get on to buses and local trains in any case, walking several kilometres each way, since they cannot afford a ticket. The everyday drudgery of sweeping, collecting and transporting of solid waste is as embedded in their lives as is the stench that emanates from them while at work. Issues of alcohol, domestic violence and health concerns such as tuberculosis are very common; in fact, there is such a strong rationalization around alcohol consumption by the male workers and, at times, their wives too, that it is a challenge to problematize it and work towards addressing it. There are many engaged in cleaning work, who withhold this information from their immediate or extended family members, feeling a sense of shame with the job and perhaps of failure that they could not land anything better in the city. As the urban poor, they live on the fringes of the city in low-income settlements at times in abysmal conditions; the struggle for basic amenities at work extends seamlessly into their homes as well as neighbourhoods (Vyas 2009).

Cities are spatially challenging to formations of collectives. With contractual labour, the multiple hurdles in forging class consciousness come in the form of the present political and legal framework that limits the scope for claim making; the

threat of losing the job, which is important to retain, no matter what one's opinion and experience with it is; and the differences in regional identity and areas of residence. When labour finds it difficult to own up its work and has an internal conflict with the identity of conservancy or cleaning worker, connecting across spaces to build links with others is also fraught with unease, as it leads to a reaffirmation of the very facts that one is seeking to deny.

There are several undesirable and hazardous jobs that are performed by large numbers of the working poor who remain invisible for the governors and other citizens and perhaps would like to be so even to themselves. As larger and global business interests enter the SWM arena, the work space at times assumes a new and cleaner look – clean uniforms, better equipment and a worker whistling while sweeping the streets; the policy governing the management of solid waste, the rules and terms of employment within specific contractor domains may appear more acceptable. The workers may be younger and their caste unknown. While such spaces are few and absorb a small section of labour, not many of them would want to do this work all their lives. There are hierarchies among different types of work in the informal economy; conflict and redefinition modify the subjectivities of workers' lives. Structural factors still ensure that this work is almost completely confined to certain castes, and the biopolitics that plays out in this arena retains and reinforces existing social and economic relations.

In this context of governmentalized poverty, there are some concerns about the longer term implications of these changes that now must be raised: as the various components of the work are depoliticized and seen and carried out as mere tasks, is re-politicization possible? Labour surplus in this sector may render mechanization difficult in the Indian context; also the fact that this work is mediated by caste may lead to differential situations in urban centres, adding to complexities that need to be understood and addressed. How will these intersectionalities with environmental and other aspects play out in the years to come? How will claims and counterclaims shape them? While creating these subjects, treating them as unruly and governing them as if they were invisible, the state reflects the governmentality of its institutions and that of its citizens.

4.4 Conclusion

Through the elaboration and analyses of three different cases, i.e., the urban poor and their housing, the marginality of Muslims and of SWM workers, the chapter highlights various aspects of governmentality and marginality in the city of Mumbai. The facets of biopower in the process of disciplining segments of the urban poor in general and workers engaged in informal work in particular are obvious. The development agenda on one hand increases governmental power to reconfigure the space continually, and on the other hand, it decreases the liberal space of freedom. By changing the contours of juridical-administrative arrangements and evolving governmental technology in an era of globalization-influenced market-driven

development, politics is increasingly becoming biopolitical, whereby political stakes in welfare, development and overall life of people are more direct and unambiguous. What one is witnessing is a shift in the meaning of development from a situation where the people were subject of care and concerns to governmental projects geared towards totally governmentalized poverty and marginality. This has implications for management of the poor vis-à-vis the visual representation of the city. Visibility and invisibility of poor are built around the idea of what Roy calls the 'aestheticization of poverty' (Roy 2004). She explains 'aestheticization' as a simplification that changes the relationship between the 'viewer and the viewed' to one of 'aesthetics rather than politics'. However, one observes that the view of aesthetics is organized and managed through political processes of governance. The population are subjected through the prism of legality and illegality and are continuously reconfigured and rearranged to make governing processes neat and orderly. Everyday experiences of the urban poor in general, and the Muslim minority community and workers engaged in conservancy work in particular, lend themselves to a nuanced understanding and analysis of urban governmentality which on one hand shows augmentation in the governmental power to reconfigure spaces and work and on the other hand confirms shrinking of liberal space of freedom and dignity.

While elucidating the experiences of urban poor in the city of Delhi, Bhan (2009) explains the processes of reducing the impoverishment of the poor to the aesthetics of their built environment which leads to a singular representation both of 'the poor' and 'the slum'; the city where this slum is located is itself being turned into an image, a commodity called a 'world-class city'. Similar processes of image construction that result in pushing the poorer and vulnerable communities to the margins are clearly discerned in Mumbai through the cases elaborated above. Besides, the erosion of the claim of the working poor and minority communities over legitimate and dignified citizenship in the city space is manufactured and justified by making their presence seem like a burden on the city's economy, construing them as contributing to the insecurity of the 'native' population, and as 'criminal'. The limits of citizenship rights have been crafted as essential for making the city 'world class'. Achieving the visible and financially appealing imagery of the cities of the future without these 'unruly' populations is impossible, but will the cities have space for them?

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Chapter 5
Where Is the Human in Human-Centred Approaches to Development? A Critique of Amartya Sen's 'Development as Freedom'

David Chandler

5.1 Introduction

In today's framings, human agency is at the heart of development discourse. This centrality of the human is often greeted as liberating and emancipatory in contrast to framings of liberal modernity, which are alleged to see economic growth as a matter of material richness. The work of Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen has been central in establishing the conceptual foundations of the human development discourse underpinning, today's dominant understanding of development and to the establishment of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) annual human development reports and the Human Development Index. Here it is the growth of human capabilities and capacities which are central: the empowerment or freedom of the individual. Development is taken out of a macro socio-economic context and seen as a question of individual inclusion and choice-making capabilities. The first annual United Nations *Human Development Report* (1990) opens with these paragraphs:

> This Report is about people – and about how development enlarges their *choices*. It is about more than GNP growth, more than income and wealth and more than producing commodities and accumulating capital. A person's access to income may be one of the *choices*, but it is not the sum total of human endeavour.
>
> Human development is a process of enlarging people's *choices*. The most critical of these wide-ranging *choices* are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional *choices* include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect.
>
> Development enables people to have these *choices*. No one can guarantee human happiness, and the *choices* people make are their own concern. But the process of development should at least create a conducive environment for people, individually and collectively, to develop their full potential and to have a reasonable chance of leading productive and creative lives in accord with their needs and interests.

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> Human development thus concerns more than the formation of human capabilities, such as improved health or knowledge. It also concerns the use of these capabilities, be it for work, leisure or political and cultural activities. And if the scales of human development fail to balance the formation and use of human capabilities, much human potential will be frustrated. (UNDP 1990: 1, emphasis added)

The seven instances in which the word 'choices' is used in the first three paragraphs have been italicized in order to emphasize that human development is inextricably tied to the extension of choice-making capabilities. The key point to note is that these capabilities are disconnected from the level of material social and economic development; as the third and fourth paragraphs emphasize, choice-making capability is thereby disconnected from the external environment seen as providing inputs or resources for capabilities. There is a large internal or subjective element to the capability approach – the concern is with 'the use of these capabilities' and with the 'conducive environment' in which good choice-making can take place.

There has been a lot of academic and technical discussion over the merits and applicability of Sen's approach, which has generally sought to expand Sen's framework rather than to critically engage with it (for a good summary, see Clark 2005). When Sen has been the subject of criticism, this has generally focused on the need for collective political struggle to constitute development and freedom for the post-colonial subject or for paying too little attention to the structural constraints of the world market and capitalist social relations (see, e.g., Navarro 2000; Samaddar 2006; Chimni 2008). The human development approach has also been substantially critiqued from a traditional development perspective for the shift away from material definitions of development to a more subjective measurement (see, e.g., Pender 2001; Ben-Ami 2006; Duffield 2007; Pupavac 2007). Mark Duffield usefully highlights the problematic in his critical exploration of human development as a technology of governance *Development, Security and Unending War* (2007):

> Sustainable development is about creating diversity and choice, enabling people to manage the risks and contingencies of their existence better and, through regulatory and disciplinary interventions, helping surplus population to maintain a homeostatic condition of self-reliance. (Duffield 2007: 115)

This chapter seeks to mount a different engagement with Sen's work, instead taking seriously the claim of 'development as freedom' to explore Sen's reading of the human subject. While Duffield describes well the implications of reinterpreting development in subjective rather than material terms, in shifting to self-reliance, this chapter is less concerned with critiquing human-centred development primarily from the viewpoint of it as an economically driven policy discourse of intervention, policing, regulation and control. It seeks instead to consider Sen's work in a broader context of the understanding of the human subject itself, particularly as it is articulated at the limits of liberalism and helps to construct and shape these limits – in the problematization of the colonial and postcolonial subject. In this respect, Foucault's work on shifting liberal governing rationalities and the birth of biopolitics enables us to highlight how Sen's work poses fundamental questions in this area.

It will be suggested that Foucault, following Marx, powerfully theorizes the problematic of the shifts and transformations within liberal thought as the liberal project increasingly exhausts the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment;[1] these shifts are incrementally reflected in the shrinking of the liberal world and in the reduction of the liberal understanding of the subject, as barriers and limits are increasingly introduced, at first as external to the liberal subject and finally, as internal to the liberal subject. For Foucault, the shifting understanding of the liberal subject was of crucial importance: his work on biopolitics and the governance of the self can be read as a critical engagement with understanding the reshaping of liberal aspirations from a concern with the knowledge of and transformation of the external world to the management of the inner world of subjects, articulated clearly in the shift from government, based upon liberal frames of representation, to biopolitical governance, the regulation of ways or modes of individual being. In this shift, our understanding of what it means to be human and of what being human means for our engagement with the world we live in has been fundamentally altered.

Foucault deals with this problematic on several occasions, most notably in his work on *The Birth of Biopolitics* (Foucault 2008) but also through analogy in his study of the decay of Greek democratic thought, especially as reflected in the work of Plato (Foucault 2010). While Foucault engaged critically with this shift, I want to suggest that in the work of Amartya Sen, this shift can be seen in its most fully articulated form: the conception of 'development as freedom' inverts classical or traditional framings of both these terms as Sen shifts the emphasis of both problematics to the inner world of the subject. For Sen, development is no longer a question of material transformation: development is no longer about the external world. In fact, development disappears – it has no external material measurement – it is deontologized, or rather assumes the ontology of the human subject itself. At the same time, freedom is also dissolved as a meaningful way of understanding the political or legal status of the subject: freedom also loses its materiality as it loses its external universalist moorings and instead becomes relocated to the interior life of the individual.

What is at stake here is no small matter and I further want to suggest that the postcolonial critique of liberal modernity needs to engage with this problematic, clearly established in the late work of Foucault, to avoid being articulated within dominant frameworks of 'late', 'advanced' or 'post-liberal' understandings and

[1] For Marx, 1830 marked the turning point, from which point onwards the science of political economy, which reached its highpoint with Ricardo, could only degenerate and become vulgarized:

> In France and England the bourgeoisie had conquered political power. Thenceforth, the class struggle, practically as well as theoretically, took on more and more outspoken and threatening forms. It sounded the knell of scientific bourgeois economy. It was thenceforth no longer a question, whether this theorem or that was true, but whether it was useful to capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient, politically dangerous or not. In place of disinterested inquirers, there were hired prize-fighters; in place of genuine scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil intent of apologetic. (Marx 1954: 24–25)

policy practices.[2] If this reading of Foucault is relevant to today, then perhaps it is most relevant for postcolonial critical frameworks. Perhaps the introduction of difference into the discourses of freedom and development – and their removal from liberal universalist conceptions of the liberal subject, enframed within sovereign states and the formal rights of citizenship, and from liberal teleologies of progress as linear material development – may lead us to other and more problematic traps, from which it will be more difficult to extricate ourselves. Rather than take the route suggested by Duffield and others, of understanding 'development' or 'freedom' themselves as universalizing, liberal or problematic concepts, which need to be avoided, maybe we should be thinking of how to escape the metaphysics of the Enlightenment, not through the rejection of its universalist legacy but through the struggle to ground our own historically specific understandings of what the human subject is and could be.[3]

5.2 Foucault's Work on the Genealogy of the Subject

In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault drew out the implications of post-liberalism, in his terminology, 'neoliberalism', or biopolitical governmentality. He was very keen to draw out the limitation of the Left or Marxist thinking of his day, which saw in neoliberalism merely the rolling back of the state and the expansion of market forces, with the increased emphasis on the self-reliance and the responsibilization of the subject (Foucault 2008: 129–50). Foucault's focus is upon why it would be problematic to see this discourse as purely an economic discourse which assumed that its only affects were economic ones and that its contestation could be easily understood in terms of Left versus Right/state versus market. He argued that the discourses of biopolitical governmentality reflected a major shift in how politics could be understood or contested and that this shift was entirely missed in traditional Left/Right polemics (2008: 116–117).

Foucault highlighted major shifts and transformations within liberal discourse, which made this transformation in the relationship between the subject and the state very different (2008: 118). Essentially, he argued that 'neoliberalism' shrinks the understanding of human subjectivity, removing the foundational sphere of rational autonomy. In so doing, Foucault suggested that, with biopolitical approaches, the binaries of liberal thought are dissolved: that there was no longer a conceptual

[2] I prefer the term post-liberal to highlight the shrinking of the liberal world, analysed here, and to suggest that the shift from transforming the external world to work on the inner world, represents the end of the liberal problematic and the final stage of the Enlightenment project which gave birth to the human subject (see, further, Chandler 2010).

[3] Foucault argued that this was a practical as much as an intellectual project of constructing a 'critical ontology of ourselves, of present reality' (2010: 21): 'I shall thus characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings' (Foucault 1984: 8).

distinction between the external world and the inner world, between subject and object, between public and private, between the formal sphere of politics and law and the informal sphere of social and economic relations (Foucault 2008: 267–86). There was no longer the universal starting position of the Enlightenment subject – capable of knowing and transforming the external world: of self-realization, of self-emancipation. There was no longer a liberal teleology of progress.

Foucault suggested that these shifts inverted our understanding of the human subject, at the same time making the internal life of the subject the subject of governance. Power and agency are reduced to the level of individual decision-taking. Individual decisions construct the world which we live in and shape the context for further decisions which individuals make. This world is continually being made and remade by the human subject. But the human subject is not the classical subject of the Enlightenment: there is no assumption of growth in knowledge or understanding or progress. Effective governance can only be seen after the event on the basis of the outcomes of decisions; right or wrong choices cannot be established at the time. Government constantly needs to intervene to adapt institutions to enable better individual decisions, to work on the empowerment of the decision-making individual. This is a continual process of preventive management of society based upon the indirect shaping of the capacities and conduct of its individual members (Foucault 2008: 159–179).

Foucault spent his life working and reworking a genealogy of understanding the shifts in governmentalities and the shrinking of the human subject through the reduction of the world to the inner life of the subject. The creation and the death or decline of the human subject and its relationship to the crisis of liberalism and the forms of governing is a rich and engaging one. In *The Birth of Biopolitics* he considered whether the subjection of the subject – precisely through its capacity for subjective will – as a subject of individual choices which are both irreducible and non-transferable, was already necessarily implied in the Enlightenment understanding of the subject or whether it was a contingent product of its economic and political development (Foucault 2008: 271–273). This, of course, is a vital question for those of us interested in political alternatives which necessarily depend on a revitalized understanding of the Enlightenment subject, or at least of how Enlightenment conceptions might have led to the subjective understandings of late liberalism.

It seems to me that in *The Governance of the Self and Others*, Foucault similarly addresses this question. In going back to Immanuel Kant's *What is Enlightenment,* he suggested that despite the framework of self-emancipation, the Kantian project had an ambiguous approach to internal agency which facilitates and legitimizes the need for an external or outside agency which acts to 'free' the subject, in this case the Enlightened monarch or, later, the French revolution (Foucault 2010: 37–39). The call for self-emancipation thereby implicitly allows for the possibility that those who have not emancipated themselves can be understood to lack their own agential capacity for choosing freedom and to require development through external agency to enable them to make better choices. Of most importance for this study is that Foucault emphasizes, that for Kant, the external agency does not 'free' the subject merely by removing external barriers to freedom.

The barrier to Enlightenment is an internal one – the flaw of the subject is a matter of 'will' (Foucault 2010: 29). The lack of freedom or autonomy is not due to external oppression or material deprivation, but 'a sort of deficit in the relationship of autonomy to oneself' (2010: 33). The King of Prussia or the Revolution does not 'free' the subject in the formal terms of liberation or self-government, but in enabling the subject to act according to reason and through enabling reason to guide government. The fact that this is an inner problem means that subjugation or lack of freedom is not a natural or inevitable product but also that the subject cannot be freed merely by the action of others – of liberators (Foucault 2010: 34). Enlightenment as transformation/development is a matter of enabling the subject to free itself – to govern itself through reason – to use its faculties for reason in the correct way.

Therefore, for Foucault, the Enlightenment subject was always one which was a potential subject of/for development understood as 'freedom' in similar terms to those articulated by Sen and human development agencies today. Implicit within Enlightenment assumptions – hidden behind the autonomous subject – was a potential subject in need of governance: a subject which could establish the need for government and which could set the limits to government in its own (lack of) development, understood as internal capacities for self-governance, will or adequate choice-making.[4] This framing is of vital importance to understand the discourse of 'development as freedom', as much as of other dominant discourses, which talk of the development of autonomy, of self-realization, of empowerment and of vulnerability and resilience.

Foucault argued that while the liberal problematic always centred around the problematic of human reason and its limits, the ontology of the human subject was one which could only be understood as a historical product of human struggle, rather than as a metaphysical construct (whereby, we can stand outside or 'escape' the Enlightenment problematic, or embrace or oppose it):

> We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings, who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment. Such an analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively toward the 'essential kernel of rationality' that can be found in the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented towards the 'contemporary limits of the necessary', that is, towards what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects. (Foucault 1984: 6)

Following this reading of Foucault, I suggest that this project becomes more important under today's exhaustion and turning inwards of liberal framings of the subject. As we shall discuss, using Sen as a leading example, post-liberal approaches

[4] For Marx and Engels, the idealism of the Enlightenment perspective, which Foucault so correctly highlights, was perceived to have been overcome through the materialist analysis of social relations and the emergence of a universal class, which needed to transform these relations in order to emancipate itself: the industrial proletariat. Of course, if this collective agent of self-transformation were not to appear or if it was to suffer a historical class defeat rather than achieve its ultimate aims, then it would appear that it was the Enlightenment which both gave birth to and foretold the death of the 'human' as a self-realizing subject. The inability of humanity to give meaning to the world through the Enlightenment and therefore the shift to conceiving of itself and its meaning-creating subjectivity as the problem in need of resolution is, of course, acutely articulated by Nietzsche (see, in particular, 'Our Note of Interrogation' 2006: 159–160).

still focus on the subject, but this is a subject deemed unable to know or to transform: thus, the subject becomes the object of transformative practices of governance as development rather than the subject of development as external transformation. In the concluding section, emphasizing the stakes in this discussion, I will draw on Arendt and Althusser to suggest ways in which we can reassert the need for an understanding of the autonomous subject, without necessarily falling into the trap of Enlightenment metaphysics. If neoliberal or biopolitical approaches are to be challenged, it is vital to rescue or to reassert an understanding of the human as a transformative and emancipatory subject.

It is important to note that the post-liberal understanding of governance in terms of development as empowerment and capacity-building is very different from classical liberal attempts to 'alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals', for example, through Bentham's Panopticon methods of disciplinary surveillance over rational subjects (Foucault 1991: 203). As Foucault states, in juxtaposing sovereign power vis-à-vis biopower in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1* (Foucault 1990: 135–45; see also Foucault 2003: 239–263) sovereign power, operating coercively from the top-down through disciplinary mechanisms of control differs fundamentally from what could be construed as a biopolitical or 'society-centred' approach, which constitutes 'the population as a political problem' and, within this, focused on the real lives or the everyday of individuals and communities 'and their environment, the milieu in which they live… to the extent that it is not a natural environment, that it has been created by the population and therefore has effects on that population' (Foucault 2003: 245). It is this intersubjective 'milieu' which is understood to shape social and individual behavioural choices and to account 'for action at a distance of one body on another' and thereby 'appears as a field of intervention' for governance policy-making (Foucault 2007: 20–21).

In this framework, governance operates on society indirectly, through shaping the intersubjective processes of societal life itself, rather than through the direct or formal framework of disciplinary controls. In this shift, liberal understandings of both the state (as standing above the societal sphere) and the subject (as universal, rational and autonomous) are fundamentally altered. Sen's work fits squarely into this analysis. Sen critiques both the market-based liberal/neoliberal conception of the rational autonomous individual capable of assuming responsibility for its own development but also the state-based, top-down liberal/socialist conception of the subject as passive and the object of social engineering projects of modernization. For Sen, the individual is the only agent of development but the individual is a vulnerable subject needing the enabling or empowering of external agency: the individual is thereby both the ends and the means of 'development as freedom'.

5.3 Development After the Colonial/Postcolonial Problematic

At the centre of the shift from development as material progress to development as inner progress is the problematization of the inner world of the subject. Rather than the assumption of *homo oeconomicus*, the rational decision-maker, there is an emphasis on the importance of differentiated subjectivity, on superstition, culture,

ethics and irrationality to decision-making. As Sen argues, there is no evidence for the view that individuals engage in rational choice-making on the basis of the pursuit of rational self-interest. In his view, the liberal understanding that 'we live in a world of reasonably well-informed people acting intelligently in pursuit of their self-interests' is misplaced in a world where our social relations and affectivities mean that ethics need to be introduced into the analysis (Sen 1987: 17). Once there is no universal rational subject, but different rationalities, choice-making begins to open up as a sphere for understanding difference and for intervening on the basis of overcoming or ameliorating difference. As Sen notes:

> …to attach importance to the agency aspect of each person does not entail accepting whatever a person happens to value as being valuable…. Respecting the agency aspect points to the appropriateness of going beyond a person's well-being into his or her valuations, commitments, etc. but the necessity of assessing these valuations…is not eliminated.… [E]ven though 'the use of one's agency is, in an important sense, a matter for oneself to judge', the need for careful assessment of aims, objectives, allegiances, etc., and of the conception of the good, may be important and exacting. (Sen 1987: 42)

Where, for classical liberal framings of *homo œconomicus*, the inside of the human head was as out of bounds as the inside of the sovereign state in international relations theory, the apologetic critique of liberal rationalist economic assumptions, necessarily focuses on the internal life or inner life of the liberal subject. The understanding of irrational outcomes of market competition is transferred from the study of capitalist social relations to the study of irrational (non-universalist) human motivations and understandings.

The crucial facet of this approach in economic theorizing, often called 'new institutionalism' (see, e.g., North 1990, 2005), is that differences in outcomes can be understood as conscious, subjective choices, rather than as structurally imposed outcomes. The important research focus is then the individual making the decisions or choices and the subjectively created institutional frameworks (formal and informal) determining or structuring these choices. This is a social perspective which starts from the individual as a decision-maker and then works outwards to understand why 'wrong' choices are made, rather than equipping the individual with a set of universal rational capacities and understanding the differences in outcomes as products of social and economic contexts and relationships. This perspective is much more individual-focused, but the individual subject is understood in isolation from their social and economic context. 'Wrong' choices are understood firstly in terms of institutional blockages at the level of custom, ideology and ideas and then in terms of the formal institutional blockages – the incentives and opportunities available to enable other choices. This problematization of the individual shares much with therapeutic approaches, which also work at the level of the individual (attempting to remove psychological blockages to making better choices) rather than at the level of social or economic relations.

As Foucault noted, the work of these neoliberal or new institutionalist theorists was not narrowly concerned with economic theory; the institutionalist approach was closely tied to psychological and sociological framings and drew on legal and historical problematics, raising 'a whole series of problems that are more historical

and institutional than specifically economic, but which opened the way for very interesting research on the political-institutional framework of the development of capitalism, and from which the American neoliberals benefited' (Foucault 2008: 135). Of particular importance, for this chapter, is the impact of these ideas on United Nations development programmes and World Bank policy-making frameworks in the 1990s, which can be clearly traced in the influence of writers such as Douglass North and, of course, Amartya Sen.

I want to suggest that while institutionalist approaches only became dominant after the end of the Cold War, their appearance, especially in the field of international relations, can be genealogically traced through the discourse of development as a defensive understanding of the gap between the promise of freedom and economic progress under the universalist teleological framing of liberal modernity and the limits to this telos in the lack of economic, social and political progress and the failure to generalize liberal modes of government in the colonial and postcolonial world.

Colonialism was substantially politically challenged and put on the defensive only with the First World War, which led to the rise of the discourses of universal rights of self-determination, articulated both by Lenin, with the birth of the revolutionary Soviet Union, and by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, with America's rise to world power and aspiration to weaken the European colonial powers. Once brought into the universalist liberal framework of understanding, the discourse of development was used both to legitimize and to negotiate the maintenance of colonial power. Given its clearest intellectual articulation in Lord Lugard's *Dual Mandate* (1923), British colonial domination was justified on the basis that the difference between the Western subject and the colonial subject was a question of culture and values – a problem of the inner world of the subject – preventing the colonial subject from transforming the external world, from economic and social development. Lugard was the first to articulate an institutionalist understanding of development, concerned as much with the inculcation of values and understanding through the export of political institutions of integration, as through economic progress itself. Development was conceived as the barrier to self-determination as much as the achievement of development was conceived as a justification for external rule, for it was through Western 'enlightened' knowledge and experience of transforming the external world that the colonial subject could be emancipated.

The discourse of development, of the 'dual mandate' of serving both British imperial interests and the self-interest of the colonial subject, could be construed as a discourse of 'development as freedom', but one very different to that articulated three quarters of a century later by Sen. For the colonial mind, the cultural and moral incapacities of the colonial subject prevented development, and therefore it was a civilizational task of transforming the subject to create the conditions for autonomy, for the emergence of the liberal subject – for freedom as self-determination. In Lugard's own words:

> As Roman imperialism laid the foundation of modern civilisation, and led the wild barbarians of these islands [Britain] along the path of progress, so in Africa today we are repaying the debt and bringing to the dark places of the earth, the abode of barbarism and cruelty, the torch of culture and progress.… If there is unrest, and a desire for independence, as in India and Egypt, it is because we have taught the values of liberty and freedom.… Their very discontent is a measure of their progress. (1923: 618)

As Foucault reflected on Kant's 'What is Enlightenment?', the Enlightenment project of civilizing those not enlightened enough to civilize themselves was seen to be the work of external agency. In order to be freed, the subject first had to be subjected – just as the civilized Romans had to subject the barbarian Britons. Of course, it was not surprising that the denial of liberal universalist understandings of the subject – explicit in colonial rule and the denial of formal liberal freedoms of self-rule and sovereign independence – should take a civilizational focus. Social and economic difference was used to justify the denial of political and legal equality and at the same time subordinated to universality through the assumption that the colonial power was capable of assisting the colonial subject in their journey towards 'development' understood as a higher and more enlightened, 'modern' or 'liberal' existence.

The discourse of development can, of course, be critically engaged with in the manner of Edward Saïd's ground-breaking framework of *Orientalism* (1995), as presupposing 'Western superiority and Oriental inferiority' (1995: 42). There can be little doubt that the birth of the Enlightenment brought with it a Eurocentric view of the world that was universalistic in its assumptions that differences would be progressively overcome through 'development' (see also, Wolff 1994; Todorova 1997; Burgess 1997). This understanding of progress or civilization as a universal teleology demarcating those states and societies, which were more and less 'advanced', was based on the presupposition that the Enlightenment brought economic and social progress to the West and demonstrated a path which could be universally replicated through the Enlightenment of the colonial subject through the external agency of colonial power.

However, what is missing in this framework, and in many traditional postcolonial critiques of development, is the distinct difference in the discourse of development under colonialism (and in much of the early postcolonial era) and the understanding of development under today's late liberalism (e.g. Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; Ziai 2007). The colonial subject was not interpellated as a liberal subject, but a subject understood as lacking autonomy – the liberal subject had to be created in the case of the colonial 'exception', on the assumption that the subject could become a liberal and thereby an autonomous and self-governing subject. Here 'development' was separated temporally and spatially from 'freedom'. In the classical liberal modernist teleology, the liberal world would expand spatially as the external world progressed temporally towards 'freedom'. There was a liberal teleology of progress, which was expressed in both spatial and temporal terms; in terms of a liberal 'inside' and a non-liberal 'outside', seen as shrinking with the progress of development. Development was the mechanism through which the world would be universalized, through which the gap between the liberal vision of the future and the realities of the present would be bridged.

The discourse of 'the West and the Rest' (Hall 2007), of the liberal and the colonial/postcolonial world, articulated the limits of liberalism as external, thereby giving an ontological content to development in terms of both spatiality and temporality. There could only be discourses of spatial and temporal differentiation with the understanding that the limits to liberal universalist frameworks of understanding were external ones. The key point to understand with regard to today's articulation

of 'development as freedom' is that the bifurcation – both in spatial and temporal terms – between the West and the Rest, has been overcome through a universalizing framework which internalizes rather than externalizes the limits of liberalism.[5]

The internalizing of the understanding of limits, alleged to be a condition of our globalized and interconnected world, starts from the basis that we are all liberal autonomous, self-determining subjects – that the world is a liberal world – but that differences are internally generated through our internal differentiation: through the fact that individuals make decisions and choices in complex, embedded and often irrational ways. Rather than the lack of 'will' – of subjective choice-making capacity – being the exception, explaining the contingent nature of spatial and temporal limits to universalizing progress, the lack or differentiated nature of capacity is the norm, explaining the necessary or inevitable existence of difference and inequality. Here we have a very different post-liberal universalism, one which universalizes the understanding of the vulnerable subject, in need of development. In this respect, development becomes a permanent project of self-development, of freeing the subject from their inner limitations. This project is necessarily inclusive because there is no longer any 'outside'.

5.4 Sen's Framework

In Amartya Sen's 'agent-centred' world, there are no external universals and therefore there is no framework or yardstick for an external measurement of development. The transformative project of development is reduced down to that of enlarging individual agency understood as choice-making capacity. Freedom now becomes an internal process of empowerment, one with no fixed measure of comparison and no fixed end or goal. Where the colonial subject needed development for the fixed and universal goal of self-government as freedom, Sen's subject has an ongoing struggle for 'freedom' in which the inner life of the individual is both the means for freedom and the measure of freedom:

> Expansion of freedom is viewed, in this approach, both as the primary end and as the principal means of development. Development consists in the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency. (Sen 1999: xii)

Individuals have to be freed from 'unfreedoms', which can take both material and immaterial or ideological forms. Freedom here is not articulated in a classical liberal framing of the constitution of an autonomous subject. Where Sen goes

[5] Foucault has been perceived somewhat negatively by some postcolonial theorists for having neglected non-Western social arrangements and the political problematics of colonialism and Eurocentrism (see, e.g. Spivak 1999; Shani 2010; Pasha 2010). This chapter suggests that these critiques, in their focus upon the 'spatialized character of the liberal world' (Pasha 2010: 214), can miss what is new and specific about the shift from universalist teleologies, which necessarily externalize the contradictions of liberalism, to post-liberal approaches which, lacking a *telos* or assumptions of universal progress, internalize these limits.

beyond the framings of liberal modernity is that development and freedom can only be understood in relation to the inner world of the individual.

It is not so much that development is degraded to a subjective level of the material resources which are considered necessary or desirable for the sustainability of poverty, maintaining the 'bare life' of the 'uninsured' (Duffield 2007) but that the subject and object of development is entirely internalized. Development is judged on the basis of the individual's use of 'reasoned agency'. Development is the project of giving the individual the choice-making capacity necessary to adapt efficiently in today's globalized world. Development is the task of all stakeholders but can only be measured in the individual's inner achievement of 'freedom'. Freedom is thereby not autonomy, self-government, democracy – 'freedom' is no longer conceptualized in the formal liberal sense of either one is free or one is oppressed. Here, freedom is a continuum, the goal of which is never reached as barriers or 'unfreedoms' to 'reasoned agency' can always reappear and can only be known post hoc. Both development – the process of achieving freedom – and freedom itself are internal processes. This is why Sen talks of the 'expansion of freedom' never of the achievement of freedom.

The individual's 'freedom' is conceptually crucial for Sen and becomes both the starting point, the means, and the end point for understanding development:

> Societal arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, the market, the legal system, political parties, the media, public interest groups and public discussion forums, among others) are investigated in terms of their contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of change, rather than as passive recipients of dispensed benefits. (Sen 1999: xii–xiii)

If people are not exercising 'reasoned choice-making', then there is something wrong with the institutions of society and the inner world of opinions and beliefs. If choice-making is limited or unreasoned, then people lack freedom and development is necessary to act on the institutions which are blocking this process of free and reasoned choice-making.

We begin to see here that Sen's framework is doing a lot more than merely downplaying the need for material development or taking the social struggle out of the process of freeing individuals from oppression. Sen's framing takes the understanding of socio-economic and political processes out of the framing of liberal modernity. There is no teleology of progress, there is no universalist framing, and there is no longer the understanding of the liberal subject – as either a rights- or an interest-bearing rational and autonomous actor.

Here the subject is autonomous but not free. The subject is autonomous as a choice-making actor, but never truly capable of making a 'free and reasoned' choice. Freedom – choice-making capacity – has always to be expanded. This need for the expansion of freedom is as necessary for Western subjects as for postcolonial subjects. For Sen, there is no divide between the West and the Rest, no sphere of liberalism and sphere of non-liberal or a-liberalism. This is as inclusive an analysis as can be imagined and in this way completes or overcomes the immanent contradiction between the Enlightenment's metaphysical conception of the rational and reasoning transformative universal subject and the limits posed by the social relations of capitalist modernity. The contradictions of liberalism are not overcome externally – through the transformation of social relations – but internally through understanding

material difference as a product of the universal metaphysical subject, universalized precisely upon the basis of the differentiation of individuals as the irreducible choice-making agents/subjects of late liberalism.

Sen, in his work, uses this metaphysical view of the differentiated subject as irreducible agent to transform and overcome all liberal binaries based on the construction of legal or political collectivities. The starting point of the freedom of individual agency is at the centre of all his wide-ranging studies: whether it is deconstructing the idea of material equality (judged by an external measure of equal opportunities or resources or of equal outcomes) (Sen 1992); deconstructing the idea of collective identities (Sen 2006); deconstructing ideas of justice (on the basis that formal frameworks of politics and law cannot measure how individuals grow as choice-makers) (Sen 2009); or deconstructing material measures of development (Sen 1999). For Sen, there is no divide between the West and the non-West, as there are no exclusive social or economic collectivities – the level of development in terms of GDP is no longer relevant, nor is the type of political regime in itself. There is no universal external yardstick available to give content to freedom in either the economic and social or the political and legal realms. The lack of freedom can exist as much in a wealthy liberal democracy as under any other society as the concern is not with an 'exclusionary' liberal modernist understanding of freedom. Any individual can become unfree if Sen's conception of 'the more inclusive idea of capability deprivation' is taken up (1999: 20).

In this conception, political freedom and market economic competition are to be valued because they help facilitate individual choice-making capacities and enable their expression. The assumption is that without 'development' individuals will not be free, in the sense of no longer lacking the capabilities necessary to pursue their reasoned goals. Here none of us are free from the need for development. Development is the process of altering the institutions which shape our capacities and capabilities for free choices. In this understanding of freedom, there can be no assumption of originatory or universal autonomy and rationality, such as that underpinning social contract theorizing: the mainstay of the political and legal subject of liberal modernity. To this *arrangement-focused* view, Sen counterposits a '*realization-focused* understanding of justice' (2009: 10). For Sen, justice, like development, cannot be universal but only understood in terms of individual empowerment and capacity-building.

> The question to ask, then, is this: If the justice of what happens in a society depends on a combination of institutional features and actual behavioural characteristics, along with other influences that determine the social realizations, then is it possible to identify 'just' institutions for a society without making them contingent on actual behaviour? Indeed, we have good reason for recognizing that the pursuit of *justice is partly a matter of the gradual formation of behaviour patterns*… (Sen 2009: 68, emphasis added).

Justice is not a matter of liberal institutional arrangements but about empowering or capability-building individuals; there is no abstract universalism but rather the recognition that 'realization' comes first. On the basis of injustice, or 'unfreedoms', then justice (like development) becomes a process of realization 'aimed at guiding social choice towards social justice' (Sen 2009: 69). Justice aims at enlarging justice as freedom, in the same way, as development aims at enlarging development as freedom. Justice is a continuous process not a fixed and externally measurable end or goal.

5.4.1 Sen's Displacement of the External World with the Inner World

For Sen, there are no external frames of reference. It is not liberal institutions or economic development which serves to gauge the problematic of the subject but the 'realization of the individual's capabilities' – this as an ongoing process not a measurement against a fixed point. Sen, in his work on *Justice*, is keen to highlight the importance of difference over universality – the embeddedness of the human subject – and in doing so he is happy quoting Gramsci:

> In acquiring one's conception of the world one always belongs to a particular grouping which is that of all the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and acting. We are all conformists of some conformism or other, always man-in-the-mass or collective man. (Sen 2009: 119)

Sen suggests that it is our social embeddedness which restricts our capacities for transition. That we need an 'anthropological way' (2009: 120, 121) of understanding the ways in which our subjectivities may constitute a barrier to the development of public reason. He expands on how our 'local conventions of thought' (2009: 125) may limit our ability to reflect and to adapt, that individual and collective world views and understandings may be partial and one-sided. However, this is not just a call for more information or greater material equality. The key to Sen's perspective of development as freedom is capabilities. It is not instrumental outcomes per se, nor resource inputs, but the individual's 'capability to choose' (2009: 235).

It is vital to draw out that 'capability to choose' is very different from the 'freedom to choose'. The later conception is that of classical liberalism, which assumes that freedom is all that is required for the rational autonomous subject. The former is the key to understanding Sen's perspective. Sen disagrees with the liberal perspective, which assumes autonomy is freedom. For Sen, freedom is an ongoing process of empowering the individual; this empowerment is not measured in external outputs but internal processes of valuation and decision-making. It is not an outcome, not even a nonmaterial outcome, such as 'well-being' or 'happiness' (Sen 2009: 271). It is an internal outcome – it is a 'way of living' (2009: 273).

Sen's work, in fact, recaptures some of the elitist theorizing of Plato in focusing on the inner world rather than the outer world. Sen, in a footnote, states (2009: 301):

> In seeing freedom in terms of the power to bring about the outcome one wants with reasoned assessment, there is, of course, the underlying question whether the person has had an adequate opportunity to reason about what she really wants. Indeed the opportunity of *reasoned assessment* cannot but be an important part of any substantive understanding of freedom.

Sen is essentially seeking to measure the internal or moral life of the subject and arguing that this should be the actual object of policy-making and also the indirect means of measuring the extent of 'freedom'. This very much follows the pre-liberal framing of Plato in *Gorgias*, when Socrates famously argued with Polus that tyrants lacked power because they lacked a true understanding of their ends, of what would do them good (Plato 1960: 35–39). In other words, the late liberal subjects of development are not able to autonomously or rationally judge what is in their

own interests. For Sen, the subject of development is one who lacks the capacity to answer the Socratic question: 'How should one live?' (Sen 1987: 2). For Sen, development – the task of good governance – is to enable individuals to answer this question correctly. In fact, Sen turns back on Plato his assumption that there is no such thing as evil, merely ignorance, suggesting with regard to the parochial understanding of the Greeks, in their practice of infanticide, that even Plato suffered from a limited and narrow 'local' understanding of the world (Sen 2009: 404–407). People choosing to live badly – the limits of human reason – constitute the demand for and limit of governance, for 'development as freedom'.

Where does this leave the human subject in Sen? On one level the human subject is all that there is. The goal of policy-making is the enabling and the empowering of this subject – of fulfilling its capabilities and capacities. There is no goal beyond the human subject and no agent beyond the human subject and no measurement beyond the human subject. But the human subject does not set goals; the human subject has no agency and no measuring capacity itself. In capability-building the subject – the subject is denied its own capability as a subject. The human subject is the end to be achieved, through the process of development, justice, democracy, etc. – the project of humanizing is the human. For Sen, as for Plato, the project is an internal one rather than an external one. As Foucault suggests, this focus on the inner life connects Platonic thought with Christian thought, similarly denying transformative agency (Foucault 2010: 359).

This shift to work on the inner self rather than external enables us to understand development as a process of freedom. Those who most need to be freed are the poor and marginal who need 'enabling': those who lack the means to adapt; those who are vulnerable need to be empowered, capability-built and secured through resilience (WRI 2008). Wherever there is a decision to be made, this is the nexus for interventionist/regulatory nexus of 'development': How can this decision or this choice be better made? How can the institutions of governance help enable a better 'choice environment'? What capabilities do the poor and marginalized need to enable this choice? The human-centred logic of late liberalism, so well articulated by Sen, sets out a framework of understanding and of policy-making, which focuses on the internal life of individuals as shaped by the immediate context of family and child-rearing, especially the transition to the decision-making subject. The 2007 World Development Report, *Development and the Next Generation*, articulates the consequences:

> Decisions during the five youth transitions have the biggest long-term impacts on how human capital is kept safe, developed, and deployed: continuing to learn, starting to work, developing a family, and exercising citizenship… Young people and their families make the decisions – but policies and institutions also affect the risks, the opportunities, and ultimately the outcomes. (The World Bank 2006: 2)

Development as freedom means capability-building starts with the young as a way of transforming society through reshaping their internal worlds. The Report's discussion of how decision-making can be altered is quoted below:

> If death rates are the benchmark, young people are a healthy group: the average 10 year-old has a 97 percent chance to reach the age of 25. Mortality is a misleading measure of youth health, however, because it does not reflect the behaviour that puts their health at risk later

> on. Youth is when people begin smoking, consuming alcohol and drugs, engaging in sex, and having more control over their diet and physical activity – behaviours that persist and affect their future health…Because the (sometimes catastrophic) health consequences of these behaviours show up only later in life, they are much more difficult and expensive to treat than to prevent. But for many young people, the search for a stable identity, combined with short time horizons and limited information, encourages them to experiment with activities that put their health at risk.… Reducing risk-taking among youth requires that they have the information and the capacity to make and act on decisions. Policies can do much to help young people manage these risks, especially if they make young people more aware of the long-term consequences of their actions today… (The World Bank 2006: 8)

The logic of the argument is that social and economic problems are the result of poor choice-making by people who lack the capacities for good choice-making. Development no longer takes the form of economic and social transformation but of capability-building: empowering the poor and marginal to make better choices and thereby to become more resilient to external threats and pressures. The problem is not the material circumstances, but the postcolonial subject's lack of freedom: their lack of capability to respond efficiently to their circumstances.

The postcolonial subject may be at the centre of development discourse, but it is their lack of capability which is highlighted. This human-centred approach replicates that of Kant's call for Enlightenment. The lack of material development is read as evidence of the lack of the postcolonial subject's capabilities. In a globalized world, with access to information and resources, it appears that the postcolonial subject is exercising agency in choosing poorly and, in effect, is the object of its own subjection and lack of self-realization. The subject's difference or Otherness is understood and confirmed by the economic and social inequalities. The fact that we accept the universal understanding of the autonomous liberal subject now becomes an apologia for difference rather than a call for its transcendence. The source of this difference is then located in the postcolonial subject itself, in the inner world of the subject. The problems of development or the barriers to the eradication of difference are then searched for in terms of the difficulty of changing the postcolonial mind.

5.4.2 Choice and the Human Subject

The exclusion of the external world, in the subject- or agent-centred world of Sen, results in and reflects the removal of development from a transformative or 'human' project. Hannah Arendt acutely warned of just a shift to the private realm, where the emphasis is on the transformation of behaviour rather than a focus on the active transformation of the external world. She argued that this perspective would abolish the world of political contestation and reduce the state and government purely to administration (Arendt 1958: 45). Perhaps more importantly, Arendt, like Nietzsche and Althusser, powerfully challenged the ideological implication of choice-based theorization, that economic and social outcomes can be understood by reducing them to individual choices:

> Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human world through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In other words, the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author

> or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the word, namely, its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author. (1958: 184)

In the transition away from the external to the inner world, what humanity has in common is no longer the external world (which we can individually and collectively subordinate to our conscious will) but the inner world, the structure of our minds (Arendt 1958: 283). For Arendt, the essence of new institutionalist or choice-based approaches is their reduction of the public or social world to the inner world of the psychological processes. The social, collective, plural mediation of the world (as human artefact) no longer acts as a 'table', relating and separating us, enabling us to constitute the human as a collective, plural, active and transformative subject (Arendt 1958: 52–3).

The key point for a critique informed from a Foucauldian perspective is that 'freedom' and 'choice' are entirely degraded once the world is reduced to the inner life of the individual. In making choice- and decision-making the moment of understanding and of policy-intervention, that moment – the moment of decision – is taken away: its subjective sovereign freedom is denied. When Amartya Sen or human development programmes talk of 'choices', they are not referring to choices as human freedoms. They are not referring to choices as freely willed by the sovereign subject. Genuine sovereign choices are free from external judgement. Here, choice – freedom, or autonomy – is reduced to responsibility. There is no genuine freedom, merely the allocation of blame, on the basis that as we have universal inner lives, our choices are thereby open to external judgement and intervention. In this framing, it is alleged that Western subjects can understand postcolonial subjects on the basis of 'our' higher developed inner capacities compared to 'their' lower developed capacities for 'choice'. This discourse however is universal, as the same framing enables us to understand the 'poor choice-making' of our fellow citizens and neighbours, if they happen to be unemployed, to smoke, to be teenage mothers, eat fatty food, drop litter, fail to take up higher education opportunities or to properly handle their emotions. The reduction of social, economic, political and environmental questions to ones of individual choice-making capacities is so pervasive we often do not give this a second thought.

As much as Sen is happy to dismiss or minimalize the limited freedoms and choices of liberal modernity – the understanding of freedom or choice-making as superficial and limited by consumption choices or passive electoral voting – these choices are, in fact, freely made and not open to external judgement. It is only when one argues that individually and collectively humans author their own lives or their own world that the capacity for freedom or for choice disappears – as then their choices need to be reflective of their boundless and unintended consequences – choice needs to become resilient, judged on outcomes. The *telos* of tracing authorship of the world to individual choice-making removes the freedom to make choices: every point of choice-making becomes a point of potential judgement, a point of explanation and a point of governance intervention. What, for Arendt, made the human creative and transformative: the fact that our actions are unbounded as other autonomous humans react to them and others to their acts becomes an argument of apologia, an argument to explain and rationalize difference and to justify the imposition of regulatory control. For Althusser, as for Arendt:

> That human, i.e. social individuals are active in history – as agents… – that is a fact. But, considered as agents, human individuals are not 'free' and 'constitutive subjects in the philosophical sense of these terms. They work in and through the determinations of the forms of historical existence of the social relations of production and reproduction (labour process, division and organization of labour, process of production and reproduction, class struggle, etc.). (Althusser 2008: 134)

We struggle to constitute ourselves as legal and political subjects, with equal rights under the law or at the ballot box, but this does not make us sovereigns of our economic and social lives. The subject-form of the agent-individual is a constitutive feature of liberal modernity and is not problematic per se. We are held responsible for our acts in the political and legal sphere – we can be put in jail for crimes or judged by others ethically – but these judgements are based on our intentionality, in legal terms, our *mens rea*. Without intention there is no crime, in the former world of the modern liberal subject.

In essence, Sen seeks to extend the responsibility of individuals to the consequences of their unbounded actions, to the social relations in which they act and decide. Here the subject is no longer located in the external world. Althusser makes a vital point in this suggestion that for the purposes of apologia, 'the legal-ideational notion of the subject' is transformed into a 'philosophical category' which is then posed questions in relations to '*the* Subject of knowledge' and '*the* Subject of History':

> To be dialectical-materialist, Marxist philosophy must break with the idealist category of the 'Subject' as Origin, Essence and Cause, responsible in its internality for all the determinations of the external 'Object', of which it is said to be the internal 'Subject'. For Marxist philosophy there can be no Subject as Absolute-Centre, as a Radical Origin, as a Unique Cause. (Althusser 2008: 135)

It is human interaction – social relations, class struggle – which provides the context in which the action or decision of individuals becomes unbounded, but that does not mean that humans individually or collectively are the subjects (or authors) of history: How those social relations are constructed enables us to understand how social relations provide the dynamic or 'motor' of what we retrospectively narrate as history (Althusser 2008: 139). The only human author of history is the biographer or historian, someone who comes after the fact, rather than being active in it, like the chorus in a Greek tragedy (Arendt 1958: 187).

5.5 Conclusion

Sen, in describing 'development as freedom', in fact, defers freedom to the impossible future through asserting that our limited 'free choices' are constrained by our incapacities and incapabilities. His programme is based on the transformation of the inner life of the subject to facilitate better choice-making, but this denies the autonomy of the subject (within the constraints of social relations). Our freedom to autonomously decide is taken away at the same time as the constraints of our social relations become essentialized as the internal barriers of the mind. Capitalism is naturalized and normalized at the same time as human rationality is degraded and

denied. The problem is the human rather than the social relations in which the human is embedded.

While, for many critical theorists, this inversion of the human subject can be politically described or understood as apologia or an ideological discourse of power, Foucault seeks to get away from a purely contingent economic or politically opportunist understanding of the inversion of the classical liberal understanding of the human subject. For Sen, the task of governance is to transform the inner world of the subject through the indirect shaping of the context in which choices are made. Foucault, more than any other author, sought to explore this shift – to the active production of the subject as the sphere of governance. For liberal modernity, there was always an ambiguous relationship between the Enlightenment framework of the human subject as a rational creative subject and the need for apologia and discourses of individual responsibility. In his work on the *Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault suggests that the disappearance of the external world today undermines the very basis upon which liberal modernity was constructed. Once the individual as choice-maker becomes all that there is, then all the binaries upon which the liberal assumptions of the human subject enabled the subjection of the subject begin to dissolve.

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Chapter 6
Beyond Bricks and Mortar: Peace-Building in a Permanent State of Adaptation

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The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlined in his address to the Peace-building Commission in January 2008 that peace-building is not just about bricks and mortar: it is a transformative process involving changing attitudes about how to manage conflict. Building peace is not simply a question of the restoration of security and stability but instead calls for tackling various longer-term challenges. It is now often stated that no country can enjoy development without security, security without development, and neither without respect for human rights. Consequently, peace-building is being rethought so as to reflect the interdependency between security, rights, and development. When human underdevelopment and lack of human security are framed as the root causes of conflict, peace-building missions become engaged in the production of certain types of subjectivities that are seen as being capable of peaceful living. Hence, post-conflict reconstruction is not only directed at countries affected by war. With human security and development as their core, peace-building missions are directed at reconstructing the *people* living in those countries. This chapter addresses the role of contemporary peace-building in postcolonial societies by examining the biopolitics of development that these projects entail. It draws upon Michel Foucault's engagement with liberal governmentality in *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008) as well as expanding this engagement through a discussion of the role of adaptation in shaping contemporary subjects.

Foucault's concepts have been a crucial theoretical reference point in postcolonial analysis. Although influential in informing contemporary scholarship on the ways in which power produces subjects, Foucault has been critiqued for neglecting colonialism in his analyses of power, appearing to be scrupulously Eurocentric (Young 2001: 395), and thus failing to account for both the modes of governance

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and practices of resistance that colonialism engendered.[1] Foucault did not acknowledge that the emergence of biopower in the 17th and 18th centuries was secured by imperialism (Spivak 1999: 279). Ann Stoler (1995: vii–viii) criticizes Foucault for dismissing colonial bodies as sites of the articulation of European sexuality and thus for his categorical effacement of colonialism. Barry Hindess (2001) extends this critique to Foucault's treatment of liberal governmentality in general. Indeed, Foucault ignored both the constitutive role of colonialism in the institution of Western modernity and the ways in which imperial governmentality implanted the administrative, legal, pedagogical, medical, and scientific features of modernity in the colonies (Venn 2006: 64; Doty 1996: 62).

Furthermore, postcolonial analysis is crucially concerned with questions of resistance, and the Foucauldian privileging of the individual subject and the technologies of the self has not been seen to provide for collective political agency or for the emergence of such a collective political subject envisioned by Frantz Fanon (1967), for example. Edward Saïd (2002: 9) argues that Foucault writes always from the point of view of power; there is never any doubt in your mind when you pick up one of his books that power is going to win out in the end. The whole idea of resistance is therefore essentially defeated from the start. This chapter argues – contra Saïd – that there are ways in which Foucault's work can inform contemporary thinking on both governance and resistance in postcolonial contexts. Even if Foucault does not explore the specific forms that a political subjectivity may take – far from closing off the possibility of resistance – he provides us with the conditions of possibility for political subjectivity.

Through a critical examination of the ways in which the human security approach to peace-building calls into being two different subjectivities, homo juridicus, human being as a legal subject, and homo oeconomicus, human being as an economic subject, this chapter shows how this approach functions as a developmental biopolitics. Furthermore, as opposed to traditional top-down strategies of building peace, contemporary peace-building relies more and more on the language of adaptation and self-reliance, thus changing the ways in which homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus are conceptualized. With the aim of building sustainable peace, peace-building in postcolonial societies pairs adaptation with what are perceived as 'indigenous practices'. The following sections discuss the integration of human security and development into peace-building, the calling into being of homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus as subjects of that peace-building, and the changing conceptualizations of right and utility entailed by the discourse of adaptation. The final section addresses the possibility of resistance in what is here called 'the permanent state of adaptation'.

[1] Foucault's writings on the Iranian revolution may be considered an exception to his lacking reference to sites of colonial power and resistance to it. See Foucault (2012 [1979]), 2005a, b) and also Jabri (2007). Robert Young (2001: 397) argues, furthermore, that even though Foucault did not explicitly address colonialism in his academic work, his residence in postcolonial Tunisia in the late 1960s was crucial both for his development of an account of alterity that does not reduce the other to silence or separated existence and for his more politically engaged writings that were to follow.

6.1 Integrating Human Security into Peace-Building

While traditional approaches have considered peace-building as being essentially synonymous with state-building, more critical liberals have associated peace-building with human emancipation (Richmond 2010: 15). Since the state-building approach has come up against increasing critique in recent years, the latter is now being proposed – in the form of human security – as a solution to the problems that contemporary peace-building is facing. Human security has been proposed as the most promising strategy that could encompass human rights, governance and justice systems, local security capabilities as well as poverty reduction, education, and health in peace-building (Beebe and Kaldor 2010: 196). While it has been claimed that human security is exactly the paradigm needed for the South today (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009: 37), this chapter argues that instead of challenging the fundamentals of liberal peace-building – which is essentially a colonial undertaking (Darby 2009: 709) – it underwrites them.

The rise to prominence of the human security discourse after the end of the Cold War is by now well rehearsed and will not be repeated here.[2] The supporters of human security are most often divided by whether human security ought to be conceived of as 'freedom from fear' or as 'freedom from fear, want, and indignity'. While the narrow approach emphasizes people's physical security, broader conceptions of human security are based on the view that health as well as social and economic welfare are as important to people's security as physical and political integrity. Despite differences, all understandings of human security shift the referent object of security from states to individuals, or to people collectively. Although it is the narrow 'responsibility to protect' approach to human security that has traditionally focused on individuals in violent conflicts, contemporary advocates of human security in peace-building promote a broader conceptualization of human security that would address the development needs of postcolonial post-conflict societies and thus better contribute to a sustainable peace.

The links between security, development, and peace-building have long been established in the UN and are now gaining increased attention in the European Union as well, particularly through the concept of human security. In the 2008 implementation report on the European Security Strategy, the EU referred for the first time to human security as key to its strategic goals in, for example, its peace-building interventions (Martin and Owen 2010: 216). Following the increased attention awarded to the nexus between human security and peace-building in the EU, the Finnish Crisis Management Centre (CMC), operating under the Finnish Ministry of Interior and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, has launched a training programme on human security and adopted human security as the leading theme of

[2] An overview of the dominant human security debates can be found in Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2009). More critical perspectives are presented in Chandler and Hynek (2010).

its work for the years to come.[3] This chapter examines a publication by the CMC entitled *Training Manual: Human Security in Peace-building* (2010). In the training manual, the CMC uses principles developed by the Human Security Study Group of the London School of Economics, led by Mary Kaldor, and its trainings are at maximum conformity with the requirements of the UN, the EU, and the OSCE (CMC 2010a: 7). Due to its active involvement in UN peacekeeping, Finland has become known as a peacekeeping superpower (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2012; Vesa 2007). The legitimacy of Finland's active involvement in international peacekeeping and peace-building is often credited to the fact that Finland has never been a colonial power and it has a long history of political neutrality. Therefore, supposedly its engagement in post-conflict areas – most of which are postcolonial states – ought to be less controversial than that of many other Western states. Despite the relative lack of historical baggage concerning engagement in postcolonial countries, this chapter argues that through liberal peace-building, Finland participates in a developmental biopolitics that is part of a colonial history of improving peoples far off.

Nevertheless, the CMC (2010a: 6) argues that there has been a paramount shift in the development of peace-building, resulting from the rise of the human security discourse during the past 20 years. Human security's added value is said to be the way in which it brings a moral philosophical aspect to peace-building (CMC 2010b). It is said to combine the human elements of security, rights, and development (CMC 2010a: 24). As with most other literature on human security, the CMC (2010a: 27) considers human security to represent universal moral values and sees human security to be interlinked with national and international security in such a way that an advancement of one type of security can lead to advancements in other types and vice versa. Much in the way that human security has been presented as a paradigm shift in security studies (see Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009: 20 and Glasius 2008: 35–37), so also the CMC (2010a: 7) presents it as a paradigm shift in peace-building. As a result, peace-building is now meant to set the foundations for development to take off (CMC 2010a: 37).

Critics, however, argue that instead of having been able to challenge existing policy frameworks, human security has been integrated into the mainstream and into existing power structures. The pervasive global governance that surrounds various population-related issues such as health, reproduction, food, and welfare has given rise to critiques that see human security as contributing to the disciplining and socialization of peoples in postcolonial countries.[4] This chapter joins these critical voices in examining the ways in which the human security approach to peace-building contributes to the production of certain types of subjectivities. However,

[3] Currently, Finnish officials participate in civilian crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic and the Palestinian territories (CMC 2011).

[4] See Alt (2010), Duffield (2005, 2007, 2010), Grayson (2010), Hynek (2010), De Larrinaga and Doucet (2008), Duffield and Waddell (2006).

instead of examining how human security projects aim to discipline the peoples of post-conflict countries, this chapter is interested in the current demand to be flexible, adaptive, and ready to change according to the demands of a complex and uncontrollable environment.

6.2 Homo Juridicus: Rearranging Society and the Political System

For the past decades, peace-building has effectively meant building a liberal democratic market state. The countries that have failed in this have been identified as risks for peace and security both in the affected region and internationally. Hence, peace-building has dealt with 'failing states' and the necessity of reshaping them according to the liberal model. There has been an implicit agreement between the UN, international financial institutions, and most NGOs that peace-building should aim at constructing a liberal peace that entails focusing on democratization, human rights, the rule of law, and economic reform (Richmond 2010: 22–23). The UN Secretary-General contends that essential to addressing security threats are healthy political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together reduce the likelihood of conflicts, help overcome obstacles to development, and promote human freedom for all (Ki-moon 2010: 4). Likewise, the Commission on Human Security, Survival, Livelihood, and Dignity (CHS) proposes in its *Human Security Now* (2003) report that post-conflict situations are to be seen as possibilities for restructuring the social, political, and economic structures of affected countries. This would result in the establishment of a democratic political order and an economic system that promotes growth (CHS 2003: 58). Humanitarian emergencies become perceived as opportunities for societies to reshape themselves and to transform their systems of governance (Reid 2010: 404).

Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor (2010: 62) note that one of the fundamental aims of peace-building is the establishment of democratic governance and effective institutions of law and order. According to Vivienne Jabri (2010: 45), the human in the context of this kind of a liberal peace project is defined through a juridical understanding of human rights: to be human is to possess human rights. She also argues that the vehicle for transformation is distinctly institutional, so that the liberal peace is one of design, or put more accurately redesign, of entire social formations so that they are indeed transformed into 'liberal' societies (Jabri 2010: 41). In this perspective, the subject of peace-building is homo juridicus: the subject of right. Following Foucault (1990: 136, 2008: 274), homo juridicus is the subject of a sovereign power, the power of life and death, which in its modern form has become limited in such a way that the sovereign has a responsibility to protect the rights of homo juridicus. In return, homo juridicus accepts the power of the sovereign and agrees to the limitation of his or her rights within the system of law (Foucault 2008: 274).

According to the CMC (2010a: 26–27), human rights should be recognized in contemporary peace-building as exhibiting common moral values and the universality and primacy of a set of rights and freedoms. However, conceiving of the human as a homo juridicus who takes advantage of his or her rights in a democratic system and whose rights the legal system strives to protect is now considered somewhat outdated. Such a liberal institutionalist approach to peace-building is regarded as, at best, falling short of what is needed and, at worst, resulting in large segments of the population becoming alienated and engaging in reactionary practices against the peace-building process (Futamura et al. 2010: 3). Although human rights are central to the contemporary peace-building discourse, the human security approach to peace-building is not limited to what is considered an essentially legalistic human rights approach. Instead, human security is seen as enabling more flexible measures and involving a wider range of actors on local, national, and international levels (CMC 2010a: 27). The CMC notes that whereas human rights do not entail any particular duties to the subjects of those rights, human security extends the responsibility for the safeguarding of one's rights to people themselves (CMC 2010a).

While the power that governs homo juridicus is sovereign, the form of power that figures more prominently in modern societies is a different modality of power, a power that works on and through life. According to Foucault (1990: 139–140), this power over life works by using continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms that subject individual bodies through discipline and control mass population through biopolitics. In biopolitics, the field of application of power is species life and the processes such as birth, death, production, and illness that characterize it (Foucault 2004: 242–243). With biopower, 'population' becomes an economic and a political problem that cannot be accounted for through a juridico-discursive representation of power that is based on rights and law (Foucault 1990: 82).

In *The Birth of Biopolitics,* Foucault shows how this shift in the rationality of government affects subjectification. The most central subject that arises out of his discussion of liberal governmentality is homo oeconomicus. According to Foucault (2008: 274–283), homo oeconomicus and homo juridicus are not governed by the same logic and they do not have the same relationship to political power. Whereas homo juridicus is a subject in a positive system of law where the sovereign has a responsibility to respect his rights, homo oeconomicus is not a subject of the sovereign. When it comes to homo oeconomicus, the sovereign is powerless (Foucault 2008). Homo oeconomicus is not concerned with his or her rights being respected by the sovereign. Instead, he or she is interested in the usefulness of his or her actions. Although democratic governance and human rights are being repeated over and over in any material concerning peace-building, homo juridicus appears to be marginalized as homo oeconomicus takes centre stage in discourses on peace-building. The next section turns to a discussion of efforts to build peace by eradicating poverty through entrepreneurial activity.

6.3 Homo Oeconomicus: Eradicating Poverty Through Entrepreneurialism and Human Capital

Liberal peace-building entails not only the rearrangement of society according to democratic principles but also the establishment of a market economy. Lifting societies out of poverty is necessary because poverty itself is being framed as a danger. Poverty is not only a problem with regard to the well-being of the people, but it is essentially a security question as there is a chain from poverty and deprivation to violent conflict (CHS 2003: 7). Human security, therefore, is a critical element in achieving both national security and international stability (Ki-moon 2010: 7). Beebe and Kaldor (2010: 202) warn that inability to respond to the challenges of underdevelopment means that we are creating our enemies for the future.

Because of the rationalization that violence is more prevalent among the poor and poverty creates a possible breeding ground for terrorism and future violence, peace-building becomes a project of poverty eradication. According to the CMC (2010a: 58), efforts to alleviate poverty start from the diversification of agriculture, clarification of property rights, dismantling of illegal economic networks, provision of microfinance, and the (re)establishment of market economy. This kind of development is considered safe and appropriate as opposed to forms of survival that exist outside or in opposition to the legal economic framework of established property rights and microfinanced entrepreneurship (see Duffield 2010: 68). Property rights, microfinance loans, and the marketization of agriculture work together to secure people as economic subjects, as 'free', self-interested individuals capable of functioning in the global economy. Beebe and Kaldor (2010: 185), for example, commend that contrary to popular Western beliefs, Africans are quite resourceful and entrepreneurial when given the slightest opportunity.

Although the basic condition of reconstruction is the establishment of a macro-level system of market economy, the CMC (2010a: 48) emphasizes that the most important reconstruction is done at the individual and community level. People in post-conflict areas are seen to suffer from diminished human capital which should be addressed in order to enable sustainable peace (CMC 2010a: 56). Likewise, the UN Secretary-General demands that instead of focusing on macro-level economic development, urgent attention must be paid to rebuilding human capital (Ki-moon 2008). Foucault (2008: 232) too points out how the problems of the developing world can be thought of from the perspective of insufficient investment in human capital. When understood through the concept of human capital, the human appears as a sort of enterprise for himself (Foucault 2008: 225). This entails a change in the way homo oeconomicus is conceptualized. Whereas in the classical conception homo oeconomicus is a partner of exchange, in neoliberalism he becomes an entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital (Foucault 2008: 225–226).

Correspondingly, while in classical liberalism the market was primarily about exchange, in neoliberalism it is about competition (Foucault 2008: 118). Therefore, a neoliberal homo oeconomicus will be most interested in such activity that will give him or her an advantage over others in the competition on the market. To ensure

the success of one's enterprise, one is to make such investments that will make one's enterprise well equipped to handle the competition. The enterprise being the 'self', the object of investment will be 'human capital'. Failure to function in the competitive market becomes framed as a problem of insufficient human capital. Thus, neoliberalism puts the onus of utility and justice on the individual's capacity to perform in the market (Prasad 2009: 3). Placing human capital at the core of the life of homo oeconomicus enables the extension of economic analysis into new domains which, in turn, results in the inversion of social relationships to economic relationships (Foucault 2008: 219–240). Whereas classical liberalism looked for a free space for the market within a political society, neoliberalism is interested in the modelling of the exercise of political power on the principles of the market (Foucault 2008: 131). Both the 'rights' and the 'utility' of people become dependent upon the market (Prasad 2009: 17). Indeed, one of the consequences of a human security perspective to peace-building has been that the basic needs of people in post-conflict regions have been privatized according to the neoliberal model of enterprise (Richmond 2010: 28).

Neoliberal economy is in a constant state of emergency which it does not even try to escape. Instead of trying to shelter itself from the emergency, neoliberal economy spontaneously organizes itself in it (Massumi 2009: 176). To survive in this emergency environment, individuals need to assume the functioning logic of the economy and to turn towards the environment and the economy instead of trying to protect themselves from them. Instead of being seen as single destructive events, disasters are now understood as vital for the development of populations (Reid 2010: 403). Self-organization is not seen to arise *despite* but *because of* chaotic post-conflict circumstances. In such situations homo oeconomicus accepts reality and adjusts to the modifications in his or her life environment (Foucault 2008: 270).

The advocation of 'sustainability' and 'development' following from this rationality is often such that the underdeveloped are being given new responsibilities to ensure their resilience in the face of various adversities. 'Poverty' entails new responsibilities for the poor to undertake certain types of behaviour. As such the divide between development and underdevelopment is maintained and reproduced rather than overcome through the advocation of sustainability (Duffield 2010: 66). Promising development no longer means aiming to ensure that all parts of the world might enjoy the same level of economic well-being as developed countries. This aim is not only considered unrealistic but also undesirable because it is now recognized that the environment would not endure the extension of Western levels of consumption to the rest of the world (Rist 2008: 226). Poverty is a problem for neoliberal politics only so far as it prevents individuals from taking part in competition (Lazzarato 2009: 128). Ultimately, development has always been about changing the people so that they can be brought into the system instead of changing the system itself (Darby 2009: 705).

Roland Paris (2009: 102) argues that while 19th-century colonialism was based on extracting resources from the colonized society and thus benefited the imperial states, in contemporary peace-building, the flow of resources is the other way around. This view disregards the many benefits developed countries get from the

integration of new regions into the global economy.[5] Contemporary neoliberalism cannot, however, be reduced to a tool that developed countries may use according to their preference. Rather than a political programme generated by Western states or a dominant class, neoliberalism ought to be examined as a specific understanding of human nature, subjectivity, and social existence (Read 2009: 26). Human security in peace-building promotes the kind of conception of the human that is crucial to neoliberal rationality. When seen not only through the lens of a discourse of rights, the discourse of human security can be read as producing the kind of humans that are capable of taking part in the international economy. While the CMC (2010a: 12) notes that it is important to examine the global processes and structures that create, promote, and endanger security, to understand how they impact each other, and to propose frameworks that can manage their complexity, it does not attempt to advocate any serious systemic change. At the same time as the neoliberal homo oeconomicus has gained ground as the subject of contemporary peace-building, so also discussions of the uncontrollable and constantly evolving environment have given rise to a new discourse within peace-building that draws attention to the 'adaptive capacities' of both individuals and social systems. The next section explores this concept and its relationship to the reinvention of 'indigenous practices'.

6.4 Security Through Adaptive Capacity and Indigenous Practices

'Adaptation' is a concept informed by both natural and social sciences. It refers to a change in structure, function, or behaviour by which a species or individual improves its chance of survival in a specific environment (*American Heritage Science Dictionary* 2005). Into the everyday vocabulary of international relations, the concept of adaptation has found its way through the increasing recognition of the necessity to 'adapt' to climate change. The demand for adaptation is not limited to climate change, however, but includes various other phenomena such as environmental degradation, poverty, and conflict.

Although institutional and economic capacities are considered important for any peace-building mission, greater recognition of 'non-technical capacities' is now being called for. The CMC (2010a: 37) notes that in addition to security, rule of law, human rights, and socio-economic recovery, the human security approach goes further to addressing the psychosocial dimension of peace-building. It emphasizes reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation at the individual/community level (CMC 2010a: 48). The capabilities that are seen to promote peaceful coexistence include 'collaborative capacity' and, especially, 'adaptive capacity' meaning capacity to handle change and the ability to adapt to a rapidly changing sociopolitical

[5] Based on its expertise and contacts, the Finnish Crisis Management Centre, for example, provides matchmaking services for Finnish companies to invest and market products and services in post-conflict areas (CMC 2010b).

environment, the flexibility to reinvent and reinvest in cultural and traditional resources in new ways (Wiuff Moe 2010: 35). A people approach to peace-building does not entail the protection and preservation of a fixed object. Rather, its object is understood to be constantly transforming and changing. Furthermore, change and transformation are not simply phenomena to be regulated but, in fact, to be *required* of subjects. The key question to be asked today is how people can best change the way they live (Smith and Vivekananda 2007: 32).

Karen O'Brien et al. (2008: 26) call for understanding human security as being closely linked to the development of human capabilities in the face of change and uncertainty. Individuals and communities faced with both rapid change and increasing uncertainty are challenged to respond in new ways that protect their social, environmental, and human rights. Instead of holding on to a notion of the necessity to build institutions to protect subjects, it is now considered more important to start focusing on *what is there* rather than clinging on to a notion of *what ought to be there* (Wiuff Moe 2010: 7; emphasis in the original). Therefore, flexible adaptation, resilience, and the capacity for self-organization are the capacities that ought to be at the focus of security and peace-building measures (Wiuff Moe 2010: 11). Top-down strategies are recognized as outdated and it is the target community's self-organization that becomes key. It becomes more important, therefore, to begin looking at the capabilities for development that can be located within post-conflict societies.

The CMC (2010a: 70) recognizes that peace-building initiatives have a weak record with regard to adequately capitalizing on the immense knowledge, cultural practices, and existing local capacities of target communities and populations. Top-down approaches to peace-building have often resulted in a lack of understanding of local needs, resulting in value-free and apolitical forms of peace-building (Futamura et al. 2010: 2). Therefore, peace-building processes should aim at better capacity building among local communities. This means identifying the skills, resources, and knowledge that exist within the community, utilizing those skills, resources, and knowledge when undertaking an intervention or programme and building new skills in areas where they are not easily found locally (CMC 2010a: 70). Successful peace-building 'gives expression to something that is *there* … and advances an idea, or a potential *to be realised*' (Wiuff Moe 2010: 28; emphasis in the original). The positive capacities that the CMC (2010a: 56–57) locates within target communities include self-sufficiency, community networks, existing human capital, indigenous practices, local ethical standards, and adaptive strategies. Contemporary peace-building thus recognizes that there are potentially positive capacities and practices within local populations but they will need guidance in utilizing and capitalizing on those capacities.

For the CMC (2010a: 48), human security is the lens through which one can identify the local capacities and resources that can be mobilized for development and security. This means both mapping the untapped potential and strengthening of the resilience of target communities and individuals (CMC 2010a: 51–52). For many communities, resilience against daily insecurities and risks depends on social networks and informal care arrangements, the CHS (2003: 89) notes. Economic

security that is based on informal social networks and self-reliance enables the kind of privatized social policy that Foucault (2008: 145) connects to neoliberalism. In that, people come to be understood as social entrepreneurs who need to embrace and manage the risks and contingencies of life. According to the UNDP (1994: 24), human security aims at making people better able to master their lives themselves, instead of them 'becom[ing] a burden on society'. Social risks such as unemployment, poverty, and illness are to be understood as problems of 'self-care' (Lemke 2002: 59).

When 'self-reliance' entered the development discourse in the 1960s, it was a strategy of 'delinking' from the system (Rist 2008: 130). To the contrary, contemporary self-reliance assumes integration into the global economic system but demands self-reliance in case of economic downturns. Duffield (2010: 55) formulates the kind of conceptions of development that are based on household and community self-reliance and adaptation as the liberal way of development. Informal care arrangements such as the local community or the extended family are seen as the 'natural' social protection systems for underdeveloped peoples (Duffield 2010: 65). For Foucault (2008: 148), a neoliberal politics of life is a matter of

> … constructing a social fabric in which precisely the basic units would have the form of the enterprise … This multiplication of the enterprise form within the social body is what is at stake in neoliberal policy. It is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society.

Hence, the promotion of self-reliance is not to be taken to mean that a regulatory biopolitics is absent (Duffield 2005: 147–152).

Whereas in Western countries the spread of the logic of the enterprise society is often seen to fragment collective values of care and obligation to the other (McNay 2009: 65), in developing countries it is exactly those traditional relationships and values that are considered vital for individuals and communities (CMC 2010a: 57). While these 'traditional relationships and values' could be taken as a countertendency to the individualism of the enterprise society, they can equally well be susceptible to being used and incorporated by the neoliberal economy. This should not be taken to undervalue the significance of extended families, social groups, or communities for people's welfare. Neither does this mean arguing that all countries should have the same kind of state-based welfare systems as some Western countries have (had). However, taking care of one another should not become a necessity inflicted by the neoliberal economy, a necessity that takes advantage of empathy and care only to enable the integration of people into markets that demand them to ultimately compete against one another in every aspect of life.

When the uncontrollable nature of the contemporary environment is used as the rationalization for the necessity to adapt and change, what mode of power are we dealing with? Discourses on the adaptability of individuals and communities do not aim to discipline them. Instead, neoliberalism is linked to techniques that affect the rules of the game rather than the players, implying an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals (Foucault 2008: 259–260). It is therefore distinct from both disciplinary society and normalizing society.

Neoliberal peace-building and developmental practices arguably do not deny difference or wish to homogenize their objects. Instead they embrace difference and claim to recognize the multiplicity of cultural, historical, and contextual specificities of any given country or community that they set out to secure and develop (CMC 2010a: 64). Furthermore, the CMC (2010a: 57) notes that there are indigenous (often unexploited) coping mechanisms that can be mobilized and further developed. Hence, what is characteristic of the subject of the enterprise society is not its docility or uniformity with others but its active participation in the remaking of the self. A neoliberal enterprise society does not aim to create uniform subjects but instead to differentiate and to organize individual difference (McNay 2009: 56).

References to 'local needs' or 'social capital' in the rhetoric of peace-building agents do not necessarily guarantee a meaningful engagement with the local (Viktorova Milne 2010: 75–76). In practice, as Roger MacGinty (2010) shows, indigenous traditions are made use of by modifying them so as to meet the requirements of liberal systems. Similarly, the CMC (2010a: 64) recognizes that cultural and contextual specificities may in some cases affect the peace-building project negatively. Where 'local particularity' involves human rights violations or the perpetuation of gender inequality, it becomes presented as the source of conflict (Viktorova Milne 2010: 78). The toleration that global liberal governance extends towards cultural diversity is limited by the parameters of its own economic and political requirements, thus reducing actually existing diversity to requisite diversity (Dillon and Reid 2009: 94). 'Custom' and 'tradition' should, therefore, be seen as being remarkably dynamic and adaptable (Brown et al. 2010: 102). The task is, therefore, to further develop indigenous practices in such a way that they contribute to neoliberal peace-building.

The shift from 'top-down' to 'bottom-up' development strategies means building upon the capacities of affected community(ies) to act on behalf of themselves and their community so as to cope with the identified threats and to strengthen their resilience to withstand future shocks (CMC 2010a: 62). Participation of target populations is required, firstly, because it provides opportunities for better data gathering and in-depth analysis of a particular issue, group, or area; secondly, because it allows for the building upon and building of local capacities and resources; and, finally, because it provides opportunities for building longer-term sustainability (CMC 2010a: 65). The CMC (2010a: 88) continues to advise future peace-builders that knowing the local population is also a precondition in order to communicate efficiently to prevent any misunderstandings or negative perceptions of your activities. The interest in 'local ownership', 'sustainability', and 'indigenous practices' has risen as an attempt to stave off the critique peace-building has faced during the past decade. More often than not, indigenous practices are modified so as to suit Western norms of peace-building (MacGinty 2010: 352–355). In this way indigenous practices too are *adapted* to neoliberal peace-building. Despite the recent focus on joining peace-building with indigenous practices, the phenomenon itself is hardly novel as it has been the form of operation of imperial governmentality since the 19th century that it combines Western technologies of the social with

pre-existing strategies so as to constitute hybrid regimes that reflect local specificities (Venn 2006: 66).

Although biopolitics – understood as the attempt to rationalize and govern phenomena such as reproduction, health, hygiene, and life expectancy – is central to discourses of human security, more recently, especially with regard to the pairing up of human security with peace-building, the focus has shifted towards adaptability and 'indigenous' knowledge and practices as aiding development and security. In its peace-building training manual, the CMC (2010a), for example, is not simply concerned with conflict, violence, and instability but also includes drug use, poor mental health, and obesity on its list of obstacles to sustainable peace. Combating such phenomena can easily be seen from the perspective of a normalizing society, but, compared to, for example, the CHS's approach, the CMC places more emphasis on the variety of indigenous practices as potential capacities to cope with social, health, and environmental problems. Since its inception in the 1994 *Human Development Report* (UNDP), human security has participated in making individuals and communities responsible to prepare against various social risks. This is still very much the case, but now it is more explicitly recognized that there is a *multiplicity of pathways for change* (Wiuff Moe 2010: 18; emphasis in the original).

6.5 Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Juridicus in a Permanent State of Adaptation

For Foucault (2008: 150), the enterprise society and the judicial society are two faces of a single phenomenon. Although sovereign power precedes biopower and is analytically distinct from it, sovereign power is not replaced or erased by biopower but rather becomes penetrated and complemented by it (Foucault 2004: 241). Often it is in the interest of the economic subject too that certain rights are respected. In the context of peace-building, the call for the clarification of property rights is a case in point. Although homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus intersect, the conceptions of subjectivity, freedom, and social existence related to them are fundamentally different. Traditionally the freedom of homo juridicus has been the freedom to demand the recognition of his or her rights within the legal system. To be secured as a subject of right has meant that one does not venture outside of the legal framework in looking for one's freedom. Clearly, the discourse of adaptation is somewhat alien to the subject of right. Human rights discourse tends to view its object as having something inherent and unchanging that needs to be protected.

Yet, as the different 'generations' of human rights show, new rights can be conjured up and demanded to be respected. In this way homo juridicus can adapt to its changing environment and attempt to broaden the scope of 'right'. Utilizing the discourse of rights as a strategy of resistance may indeed bring tangible benefits to marginalized groups. Resistance should not, however, be allowed to be limited by what can be done within the framework provided by 'rights'. Louiza Odysseos

(2010: 18) shows how – instead of countering the power of neoliberal technologies of government – homo juridicus is complicit with neoliberal governmentality because human rights provide a framework in which to claim and exercise minimal and often abstract legal entitlements, rather than offering or even approximating radical societal and international change. The expanding framework of rights can have the effect of subsuming social discontent in such a way that it will only be expressed within the confines of that framework (Odysseos 2010: 17).

Correspondingly, the freedom of homo oeconomicus has essentially been the freedom to choose between different lifestyles, economic opportunities, and goods and services (Odysseos 2010: 7). Being secured as such means that the subject settles for the freedom to choose what to buy. It seems, however, that when understood through the concept of adaptive capacity, the freedom of homo oeconomicus becomes instead the freedom to modify oneself indefinitely. This modification can, and often does, take the form of consumption. In its essence, however, the neoliberal homo oeconomicus is not the man of exchange or man of the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production (Foucault 2008: 147). Being secured as the subject of enterprise means accepting that the environment in which one lives is in permanent crisis and therefore requires constant reshaping of the self. Not only is the subject changing but it *has to* change.

Whereas an enterprise is by definition an activity that involves willingness to undertake new ventures and risks to achieve the greatest possible profit, utility refers to a measure that is to be maximized in situations involving choice. Homo oeconomicus directs his or her activity in such a way that the choices he or she makes will maximize his or her utility. In neoliberalism, homo oeconomicus' utility increases when he or she acquires capacities that give him or her an advantage over others in the competition on the market. Doing business is always surrounded by the necessity of adapting to changes in the market environment. When adaptation is not only conceived of as a successful way of conducting one's business but also becomes the definitive feature of being human, it means that one's relation to oneself, and to others, succumbs to the logic of the market. Being in a permanent state of adaptation[6] means that one is to be nothing but to have the potential for everything. When individuals adopt this rationality in relation to themselves, they become secured as subjects of the enterprise society.

What the necessity of constant adaptation entails is that it becomes impossible for homo oeconomicus to determine a fixed utility. As opposed to homo juridicus

[6] This formulation echoes but is crucially distinct from Giorgio Agamben's (1998) account of biopolitical power being modelled as a permanent state of exception. While Agamben's 'bare life' is continuously subjected to the possibility of sovereign violence, life in a permanent state of adaptation is rather subjected to the necessity of being infinitely malleable, yet active in regard to one's own adaptation. Whereas bare life is included in the political system through its exclusion, through being refused political status but thereby also exposing the violence of the sovereign, subjects in a permanent state of adaptation are included in the – more or less meaningless – political system so long as they conform to the continuous need to adapt. Those who refuse to adapt may, however, risk becoming bare life. Yet that refusal is necessary for political subjectivity to emerge within the permanent state of adaptation.

who agrees to the limitation of his or her rights by the sovereign, homo oeconomicus is never called upon to relinquish his interest but instead to maximize it (Foucault 2008: 275). There is no social contract that would define homo oeconomicus' relationship to power. Whereas rights may be limited, interest is irreducible and inalienable (Read 2009: 29). Yet, when constant adaptability and remaking of the self are demanded, it becomes increasingly difficult for homo oeconomicus to locate the interest he or she ought to be pursuing. In a sense, interest ceases to be irreducible and inalienable. Following this, utility too becomes increasingly vague and difficult to reach. Furthermore, when focusing on adaptation and self-reliance, human security channels social and political discontent in such a way that it is not threatening to the contemporary neoliberal political economy. As a result, adaptation implies a political passivity that accepts and takes for granted the inability to challenge that which demands adaptation.

Following Foucault, Jabri (2010: 49) suggests understanding the liberal peace project as one of security rather than peace. When the liberal peace project is recognized as a security project, its ultimate remit is to build a security apparatus through the direction of power at the shaping and reshaping of populations, she (Jabri 2010: 52) argues. But what happens to security when 'adaptive capacity' is what is to be secured? Paradoxically, according to the CMC (2010a: 24), stability is one of the core values of human security. Stability and adaptation are, however, fundamentally incompatible. Thus, when taking adaptation as a key principle, human security changes too. While human security once claimed to be fighting against the inability of people to control their own destiny, with adaptation as a necessity this inability is, to the contrary, taken for granted. Contemporary peace-building widely recognizes the futility of top-down approaches to making peace. Nevertheless, its 'people-centredness' does not simply imply discipline and normalization because they cannot be used to govern subjects that *have to* change. Governing the peoples of postcolonial post-conflict reconstruction is therefore not so much a question of normalization as it is of self-organization in an uncontrollable environment.

6.6 Conclusion: Resistance in a Permanent State of Adaptation

Both homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus are changing as a result of increased reliance on the discourse of adaptation. The legal-institutional framework is no longer regarded as sufficient for safeguarding the rights of homo juridicus. Instead, people are called upon to be creative in finding new ways to protect their rights and freedoms. For homo oeconomicus, becoming adaptable implies an entrepreneurship of the self, a never-ending process of attempting to maximize one's utility in an environment where utility becomes increasingly elusive. Unlike sometimes suggested, the subjects of this kind of a human security project are by no means passive

objects. They are not allowed to be such. Surviving in the emergency environment demands the active participation of every person.

When the need for change becomes perceived as something that the environment necessitates, there is less need to govern the subjects per se. The focus on adjustment in the face of change reverts attention from the possibility of acting in ways that contest the ways in which one's life environment is changing. Moreover, in demanding its subjects to be constantly adaptable and willing to reshape themselves according to the requirements of the political-economic environment, human security in fact demands that people accept their being in a constant state of insecurity. In the context of such a permanent state of adaptation, where are we to look for practices of resistance that are able to challenge the forms of subjectification entailed by contemporary peace-building in postcolonial societies?

As far as discourse – the discourse of human security in peace-building, or any other – is understood as always enacting its own destabilization, for Foucault, the subaltern cannot but speak (Young 2001: 407). Yet this is not a matter of reviving the voice of a unified colonized other against an equally unified colonial discourse. The subalterns and the discourses within which they do or do not operate are many. Therefore, the popular call to use traditional or precolonial practices as means of resistance to the forms of subjectification implied by liberal peace-building (see Darby 2009: 710) deserves neither romanticization nor blatant dismissal for fear of romanticization. The extent to which these practices can function as resistance will always depend on the context at hand. Practices of resistance will inevitably take on different forms in different places but there may be resonance in the ways in which the political can be conceptualized so as to challenge liberal peace-building.

Phillip Darby (2009: 709) suggests that an alternative to liberal peace-building is to be found in an approach that conceptualizes resistance as self-securing in everyday life. According to Darby, such practices of self-securing can often be located in parts of the world that have undergone natural disasters or economic collapse. Darby resorts to 'self-reliance' and complexity theory's understanding of networks as sources of resistance to liberal peace-building. As discussed above, however, self-reliance does not challenge the rationality of neoliberal governance and, in the worst case, it simply augments it. Where a conception of a subject's capacity to secure itself may nevertheless prove effective as a means of resistance is in its securing itself from the permanence of adaptation. Resistance, then, involves a refusal to be infinitely malleable and capable of being absorbed into a logic that depoliticizes change.

Subjective resistance through living strategies and ways of saying 'no' to which colonial practices do not know how to respond is neither reducible nor contrary to more open forms of resistance such as social militancy or insurgency (see Ashcroft 2001: 20–21). While a Foucauldian framework of analysis focuses on the formation of subjects, it does not preclude the idea that alongside the subject transforming itself, the world needs to be transformed also. Yet, to the extent that contemporary colonizing practices are *neoliberal* practices, resistance has to involve challenging the limited ways in which these practices allow subjectivity and social existence to find their expression. Whereas postcolonial critique previously drew attention,

among other things, to the modern state being an alien construct in most parts of the world and thus directed its energies at undermining the state as a colonial construct, contemporary peace-building is not primarily interested in building state institutions. Therefore, resisting the manifestations of contemporary colonialism within the context of human security in peace-building requires challenging the ways in which (under)development is conceptualized as a specifically *human* category. Hence, this chapter has gestured towards an examination of the subjectification entailed by the discourse of adaptation when transformed from an ecological concept to a social and a political one. Envisioning political subjectivity in the context of liberal peace-building requires countering the tendency to submit everything to adaptation. A subject capable of locating within itself and in its world that which cannot be made to conform, and of relating to others who are capable of the same, is a subject capable of countering the permanent state of adaptation on which the contemporary biopolitics of development relies.

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Chapter 7
Interrogating the Neoliberal Biopolitics of the Sustainable Development-Resilience Nexus

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Theories and analyses of the biopolitics of development have long since established and revealed the ways in which development has functioned historically as a technique of liberal governance. Not only has it functioned to create a globally racialized and militarized division between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' populations (Duffield 2007: 16), so it has also functioned to reduce the life of the 'underdeveloped' to an economized form by viewing their development as an issue merely of their economic improvement (Shani 2012). Over the last couple of decades, however, a new doctrine of development has emerged which has sought to contest this classically liberal, economized and deeply Eurocentric way of conceiving development itself through the articulation of 'sustainable development'. The argument of proponents of this doctrine is that traditional models of development, insofar as they have privileged macroeconomic growth, have also served to harm the environments which human beings rely on in order to 'live well'. Proponents of the equally new concept of 'human development' who seek to free the lives of human populations from economic imperatives and promote a wider account of human well-being also argue that this is necessary to ensure 'environmental preservation' (Sen 1999: 61). In both cases, development has effectively been taken out of a macro-socio-economic context and seen as a question of freeing the life of the human subject from economic imperatives.

In the more acute case of 'sustainable development', proponents have been concerned with the problematic of shifting the focus of development not simply from the economy to a wider understanding of human well-being but from the development of *human life* to the non-human *'life-support systems'* which peoples are said to depend on in order to live well and prosper (Khagram et al. 2003; Gladwin et al. 1991, 1995; Barbier and Markandya 1990; Folke and Kautsky 1989). In this sense, the life at stake in the practice of governing doctrines of development has changed

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significantly over the last two decades. The classical biopolitical critique of development that it functions to subject peoples to a liberal model of society and subjectivity, one that economizes the life of the subject and its society, is harder to prove, in context of these profound shifts in thinking concerning the nature of the life at stake for proponents of 'sustainable development'. In a certain sense, one might even venture to say that through the elaboration of such a different regime of development, life itself is being offered as a kind of obstacle to economy. Theorists and practitioners of sustainable development are arguing that we must privilege the well-being of the life of the biosphere over and against the traditional imperative to develop the economies of human populations. Life is being reconceptualized as a property of the non-human biosphere such that it can be deployed as the foundation for a critique of economy-centred models of development.

My argument, to be explicated in this chapter, is that this alternative and relatively new model of development was always going to be vulnerable to appropriation by the economic rationalities of liberalism, because of the interface between its 'alternative' rationality of security and that of specifically neoliberal doctrines of economy. While sustainable development deploys ecological reason to argue for the need to secure the life of the biosphere, neoliberalism prescribes economy as the very means of that security. Economic reason is conceived within neoliberalism as a servant of ecological reason, claiming paradoxically to secure life from economy through a promotion of the capacities of life for economy. This is the paradoxical foundation on which neoliberalism constructs its appropriation of sustainable development. Sustainable development and neoliberalism are not the same, nor is the former simply a proxy of the latter, but they do come into contact powerfully on the terrains of their rationalities of security. This surface of contact ought to make for a tense and political field of contestation but has instead made largely for a strategically manipulative relation between the two doctrines.

In recent years, we can see, at the very least, how vulnerable the *ecological* reasoning that underpins sustainable development has been to the *economic* reasoning of neoliberalism. Indeed, I argue that the ongoing disarticulation of the concept of security in development doctrine and correlate emergence of the concept of *resilience* is an expression of this. Neoliberalism is able to appropriate the doctrine of sustainable development on account of its claims not to the 'security' but 'resilience' of specifically neoliberal institutions (significantly markets), systems of governance and conditions of subjectivity. Resilience is defined by the United Nations as 'the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazard, to adapt by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure' (UN 2004: Chap. 1, S.1,17). Academics concerned with correlating the promotion of 'sustainable development' with that of resilience define it as 'the capacity to buffer change, learn and develop – as a framework for understanding how to sustain and enhance adaptive capacity in a complex world of rapid transformations' (Folke et al. 2002: 437). The concept of resilience arose not as a direct product of neoliberal doctrines but as an element of the critique of neoliberalism which sustainable development itself pertained to be at its origin. This should not surprise us. Neoliberalism is not a homogeneous doctrine, nor are its particular

forms of dogmatism homeostatic. Its powers of persuasion and discursive prosperity depend on its own capacity to adapt to the hazards of critique. It is, you might well say, a paragon of the resilience that sustainable development demands of its subjects. The current prosperity of the doctrine of sustainable development is also a vexed expression of the resilience of neoliberalism. It is on account of this power to absorb and align itself with the very sources of its critique that what I call the 'sustainable development-resilience nexus' is becoming to 21st century liberal governance what the development-security nexus was to its earlier post–Cold War forms. If 'security' has functioned during the first two decades of post–Cold War international relations as a rationality for the subjection of development to Western states, their governance practices, institutions and conditions for subjectivity, then the rationality which governs that subjection is increasingly going to be 'resilience'. Voices from within international relations calling for the dismantling of the sign of security because it is 'the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism' (Neocleous 2008: 186) miss the point. Calling for a new politics to take us 'beyond security' does little to solve the problem; indeed, it obfuscates the very nature of the problem, which is that liberalism itself is outgrowing its long-standing correlation with security and locating new discursive foundations, principally that of resilience.

Beyond showing how the discourse of resilience legitimates neoliberal systems of governance and institutions, it is also necessary to attend to the forms of subjectivity it attempts to bring into being. The account of the world envisaged and constituted by development agencies concerned with building resilient subjects is one that presupposes the disastrousness of the world and likewise one which interpellates a subject that is permanently called upon to bear the disaster, a subject for whom bearing the disaster is a required practice without which he or she cannot grow and prosper in the world. This may be what is most at stake politically in the discourse of resilience. The resilient subject is a subject which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world, not a political subject which can conceive of changing the world, its structure and conditions of possibility, but a subject that accepts the disastrousness of the world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world and which accepts the necessity of the injunction to change itself in correspondence with threats and dangers now presupposed as endemic. Building resilient subjects involves the deliberate disabling of the political habits, tendencies and capacities of peoples and replacing them with adaptive ones. Resilient subjects are subjects that have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the difficulties they are faced with but instead adapt to its enabling conditions via the embrace of neoliberalism. Resisting neoliberalism in the present may thus require rejecting the seductive claims to 'alternative futures' offered by seemingly contrary doctrines of sustainable development and their political promises of resilience. A reinvestment in an account of political subjectivity is needed, and a rearticulation of the more classical concept of security may be useful for such a purpose.

To make its case, this chapter is structured in the following way. In Sect. 7.1, it provides a schematic political genealogy of sustainable development, demonstrating

the complex intertwinement of the doctrine with neoliberalism. While recognizing the salience of the sparse but existing biopolitical critiques of sustainable development, it also takes them to task for failing to interrogate the importance of the shift in the account of life at stake in sustainable development, whereupon liberalism's classical concern for the security of human populations has been displaced by that of a concern with the resilience of the biosphere. In Sect. 7.2, it provides a close analysis of the ways in which the discourse of resilience grew in sustainable development doctrine and how it shifted to incorporate the life of the human in the era inaugurated by the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit. In Sect. 7.3, the idea that the life of the human can be understood in terms of its relative capacity for resilience is subject to critique on account of its implications for political subjectivity, as the chapter culminates (Sect. 7.4) by showing the fundamental antinomy between the resilient subject of neoliberalism and the political subject of resistance.

7.1 The Political Genealogy of Sustainable Development

The ideas that shaped the doctrine of 'sustainable development' became influential in the 1970s, but they only took concrete form with the 1987 publication of the Brundtland Commission Report, *Our Common Future* (WCED 1987). On the surface of things, sustainable development appeared to operate as the foundation for a powerful indictment of hitherto dominant theories and practices of development. Development policies were classically aimed at increasing the production, consumption and wealth of societies. What 'sustainable development' did was to pose the problem of the implications of such economy-centred policies for the 'life-support systems' on which societies otherwise depend for their welfare (Khagram et al. 2003: 296–297). The doctrine of sustainable development that emerged from *Our Common Future* and which culminated in the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg was based upon the seemingly contrary axiom that economic development had to be suborned to the need to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources, healthy environments, ecosystems and biodiversity. Here, the utility and value of 'life' in all of its complexities was offered by the doctrine of sustainable development as an obstacle to economy. Committed to securing life from the dangers posed at it by unfettered economic reason, the doctrine of sustainable development appeared to emerge in direct conflict with the governmental doctrine of neoliberalism which, during the 1980s, had become increasingly hegemonic and which would have the opportunity to go global with the end of the Cold War in 1989. The kinds of 'pure liberalism' championed by Thatcherites and Reaganites, said to reify the economy at all costs as both means and ends of development, were subject to an apparently new line of questioning, not on account of its equally questionable implications for the economic welfare of peoples but on account of the threats it posed to something outside of the order of economy: life. Proponents of sustainable development did not claim to question the value of economic development in and of itself, but they did aspire to offer

a framework for the reregulation of the economy in alignment with the needs and interests of the biosphere. And indeed its effects were palpable during the 1990s, a decade in which a Senior Vice President of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, was to be heard making savage indictments of the implications of liberal policy prescriptions and in which the advice of environmentalists was increasingly taken into account by governments and international economic institutions (O'Brien et al. 2000: 109–158).

But the relationship between the emergence of sustainable development and the crisis in liberal reason which began to trouble governments in the 1980s and 1990s is highly complex. Mark Duffield has shown how much sustainable development owed to the neoliberal critique of the state (Duffield 2008: 67). Preaching that sustainable development will only happen when people abandon the idea of state-led modernization strategies and practice 'community-based self-reliance' instead, so sustainable development serves the neoliberal aim to shift the burden of security from states to people (Duffield 2008: 69). Sustainable development functions in extension of neoliberal principles of economy, Duffield argues, by disciplining poor and underdeveloped peoples to give up on states as sources for the protection and improvement of their well-being and instead learn to take responsibility for themselves. Thus does sustainable development engage in the active promotion of a neoliberal model of society and subjectivity in which everyone is demanded to 'prove themselves by bettering their individual and collective self reliance' (Duffield 2008: 69). Following in the wake of Duffield's critique, Carl Death has also shown how the shift from strategies of development preaching modernization to sustainable development owed much to a specifically neoliberal framing of the problematic of both development and environmental degradation (Death 2010: 41–44). As Death details and renders explicit, critical to the ambitions of *Our Common Future* was the revival of economic growth (Death 2010: 43). The Report demanded 'overall national income growth of around 5 % a year in the developing countries of Asia, 5.5 % in Latin America, and 6 % in Africa and West Asia' (Brundtland 1987: 49). And beyond that, throughout *Our Common Future* and related publications, one encounters recommendations as to 'the need to remove trade distortions and protectionist policies, liberalize trade, and increase the exports of developing countries' (Death 2010: 43). The irony of placing faith in economic solutions to predicaments which have themselves been produced by a prior faith in economic growth is, as Death observes, rarely if ever made explicit in sustainable development literatures.

Revealing the convergences between sustainable development and the neoliberal critique of the state, the model of society and subjectivity it proposes as solutions to the problem of the state and the economic pay-offs that follow, both Death and Duffield have offered powerful ripostes to those narrative accounts of sustainable development as arising simply from the empowerment of ecological over economic reason. But how then should we understand the nature of the relation between sustainable development and neoliberalism? Is ecological reason just a proxy of the neoliberal rationalities that both Death and Duffield argue has shaped the agenda of sustainable development? If we understand sustainable development as a servant of neoliberalism, then what should we make of those voices arising from environmental movements and the many other ways in which ecological reason has been mobilized,

to critique economy-based strategies of development in the interests of sustaining life? Answering these questions requires grappling further with the fundamental and complex correlations of economy, politics and security with life in neoliberal doctrine, what both Death and Duffield rightly name its biopolitics without fully interrogating the salience of (Death 2010: 55; Duffield 2008: 4–8). Neoliberalism is widely understood as a 'theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade' (Harvey 2007: 22). Less understood, however, is how its claims to be able to increase wealth and freedom are correlated with ways to increase the prosperity and security of life itself. And yet its capacities to correlate practices for the increase of economic profit and prosperity with those dedicated to increasing the profitability and prosperity of the biosphere are why, I argue, the doctrine of sustainable development is so compatible with it.

To some extent, this is a problem of the neglect of the complexities of economic doctrines per se, for it is a fact that economics was from its earliest usage conceptualized as a domain of knowledge concerned with the prosperity not just of human communities, families and subjects but a knowledge which seeks to increase that prosperity in alignment with the needs of nature in its entirety. For Aristotle, economics, it was said, 'must conform to nature…in as much as nature has already distributed roles and duties within the species themselves' (Mondzain 2005: 19). 'Implicit', therefore, 'within the economy is the notion of an organic objective and functional harmony … a providential and natural order to be respected while acting in the service of the greatest cohesion of utility and well-being' (Mondzain 2005: 19). As Giorgio Agamben has detailed more recently and to much acclaim, it is not incidental that the Stoics deployed the concept of economy 'to express the idea of a force that regulates and governs the whole from the inside' and that it was thus that the verb *oikonomein* acquired the meaning of 'providing for the needs of life, nourishing' (Agamben 2011: 19). Notoriously, of course, Agamben situates his analysis of the relations between economy and life as a completion of Michel Foucault's 'failed' attempt to understand the reasons why 'power in the West has assumed the form of an *oikonomia* (Agamben 2011: xi). And yet he argues his case without any reference to Foucault's historical analyses of the biopolitics of modern political economy to be found in *The Order of Things*. There Foucault argued that it was with the birth of the modern discipline of political economy that 'nature' lost its foundational status as the major correlate of economy and that 'life' began to play that role (Foucault 1997). For political economists of the modern age, however, the life which economy had to respect was specifically that of the human species; the question of the prosperity and security of human populations became conceived as limiting conditions for the exercise of economic reason and practices. Neoliberalism breaks from earlier liberalisms and traditions of political economy insofar as its legitimacy rests on its capacities to correlate practices for the increase of economic profitability and prosperity not just with practices for the securing of the human species but with the life of the biosphere. These correlations of economy, well-being, freedom, security and biospheric life in and among neoliberal regimes of

practice and representation comprise, I argue, the foundations of its biopolitics in ways that are utterly elided by Agamben's analysis, fascinated as it is by the theological origins of economy. And if there is anything 'fundamental' to neoliberalism, then it is this; one cannot understand how liberalism functions, most especially how it has gained the global hegemony that it has, not only without addressing how systematically the category of life has organized the correlation of its various practices of governance but how important the shift in the very understanding of life, from the human to the biospheric, has been for changes in those practices.

Examining neoliberalism biopolitically means we can understand better not just how it is but why it is that ecological reasoning has enabled the growth of strategies for the promotion of market-based entrepreneurial capitalism in and among developing societies. Of particular importance here are the ways in which the very account of security deployed by neoliberal states and their development agencies has altered through its correlation with ecological reason. Crucial to this story is the relatively recent emergence of the discourse of resilience (Reid 2012). And this is an element of the explanation for the neoliberalization of sustainable development which both the analyses of Death and Duffield are missing. When neoliberals preach the necessity of peoples becoming 'resilient', they are, as I will show, arguing in effect for the entrepreneurial practices of self and subjectivity which Duffield calls 'self-reliance'. 'Resilient' peoples do not look to states or other entities to secure and improve their well-being because they have been disciplined into believing in the necessity to secure and improve it for themselves. Indeed, so convinced are they of the worth of such capabilities that they proclaim it to be a fundamental 'freedom' (UNEP 2004). But the emergence of this discourse of resilience within the doctrine of neoliberalism owes massively, I argue, to the power of ecological reason in shaping the very rationality of security which otherwise defines it. In other words, comprehending how neoliberal rationalities function in shaping the agenda of sustainable development requires us to examine the constitutive function of ecological reason in shaping the discourse of resilience which both sustainable development and neoliberalism share. Far from being a proxy of the neoliberal rationalities shaping sustainable development, ecological reason has been formative of them.

7.2 From Security to Resilience

The strategic function of sustainable development in the global expansion of neoliberalism has been to naturalize neoliberal frameworks of governance; the institutions, practices and forms of subjectivity it demands are brought into being on account of the desire for increase of the economic profitability and prosperity of human communities. But how is it that neoliberal ways of governing came to be conceived as an answer to the problem of sustainability? Much of the answer to this question can be found by examining the emergence and discursive expansion of the concept of 'resilience', because that is the concept against which all such institutions, practices and subjectivities are increasingly legitimized. It is no accident that the

concept of resilience derives directly from ecology, referring to the 'buffer capacities' of living systems, their ability to 'absorb perturbations' or the 'magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a living system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behaviour' (Adger 2000: 349; see also Walker and Cooper 2011). Living systems are said by ecologists to develop not on account of their ability to secure themselves prophylactically from threats but through their adaptation to them. Exposure to threats is a constitutive process in the development of living systems, and thus the problem for them is never simply how to secure themselves but how to adapt to them. Such capacities for adaptation to threats are precisely what ecologists argue determines the 'resilience' of any living system. Sustainable development started out by preaching that the economic development of societies must be regulated so that it contributes not just to the security of states and their human populations but so that it increases the resilience of all living systems, shifting the object of concern from that of human life to that of the biosphere, incorporating every known species, as well as habitats of all kinds, vulnerable to the destructions wrought by economic development. Life, not economy, it said, must provide the rationalities according to which peoples are entitled to increasing their prosperity. The emergence of such a doctrine had to have significant implications for the ways in which not only the problem but the very nature of security was conceived in developmental circles. Once the referent object of development became the life of the biosphere rather than simply states and their human populations, the account of security to which development is allied was required to transform. Security, with its connotations of state and governmental reason, territoriality, military capacities, economic prosperity, human resources and population assets, became less fashionable and gradually gave way to the new concept and value of 'resilience'. Resilience is a useful concept, the proponents of sustainable development argued, precisely because it is not a capacity of states, nor merely of human populations and their various political, social and economic practices, but a capacity of life itself. Thus, resilience emerged within the doctrine of sustainable development as a way of positing a different kind of policy problematic to those formulated in the security doctrines of neoliberal states and their more conventional development agencies, one which would privilege the life of the biosphere in all its dimensions over and against the human focus which shaped the 'development-security nexus'. If one aspect of the subordination of rationalities of economy to rationalities of life in developmental discourse has been the shift from doctrines of economic development to sustainable development, then a correlate shift has been that from security to resilience.

Allied to this shift, then, the doctrine of sustainable development brought into being a new guiding axiom, one which created a surface of friction with the rationalities of economic development pursued by Western states and development agencies up until the 1980s. And this in turn, during the 1990s, gradually brought into being a 'sustainable development-resilience nexus' to rival the development-security nexus woven by previous regimes. By the time of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, however, a summit which is widely recognized as the coming of age party of 'sustainable development', new ways of

thinking about resilience were coming into view. A major report prepared on behalf of the Environmental Advisory Council to the Swedish Government as input to the process of the World Summit described how resilience is a property associated not just with the diversity 'of species' but also 'of human opportunity' and especially 'of economic options – that maintain and encourage both adaptation and learning' among human populations (Folkes et al. 2002: 438). In an adroit reformulation of the problematic, neoliberal economic development, in which the function of markets as generators of economic diversity is basic, became itself a core constituent of the resilience which sustainable development had to be aimed at increasing. Thus was it that, post-Johannesburg, the correlation of sustainable development with resilience started to produce explicitly neoliberal prescriptions for institutional reform. 'Ecological ignorance' began to be conceptualized as a threat, not just to the resilience of the biosphere but to humanity (Folkes 2002: 438). Resilience began to be conceived not simply as an inherent property of the biosphere, in need of protection from the economic development of humanity, but a property within human populations that now needed promoting through the increase of their 'economic options'. As remarkably, the biosphere itself began to be conceived not as an extra-economic domain, distinct from and vulnerable to the economic practices of human populations, but an economy of 'services' which 'humanity receives' (Folkes et al. 2002: 437).

There is a double and correlated shift at work, here, and then in the elaboration of the sustainable development-resilience nexus post-Johannesburg. In one move, 'resilience' has shifted from being a property of the biosphere to being a property of humanity, while in a second move 'service' has shifted from being an element of economy to being a capacity of the biosphere. Crucified on the cross that this double shift carves are 'the poor', for they are the segment of population of which resilience is now demanded and simultaneously the population said to threaten the degradation of 'ecosystem services'. Increasing the 'resiliency' of the poor has become a defining goal, for example, of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the post-Johannesburg years (UNEP 2004: 39). Alleviating threats to the biosphere requires improving the resilience of the poor, especially, because it is precisely the poor that are most 'ecologically ignorant' and thus most prone to using 'ecosystem services' in non-sustainable ways. Thus does ensuring the resilience of the biosphere require making the poor into more resilient kinds of subjects, and making the poor into more resilient subjects requires relieving them of their ecological ignorance, and the means to that removal is argued to reside in building neoliberal frameworks of economy, governance and subjectivity. Developing the resilience of the poor is said to require, for example, a social context of 'flexible and open institutions and multi-level governance systems' (Folke et al. 2002: 439). 'The absence of markets and price signals' in ecological services is a major threat to resilience, UNEP argues, because it means that 'changes in their conditions have gone unnoticed' (UNEP 2004: 13). Property rights regimes have to be extended so that they incorporate ecosystem services and so that markets can function in them (UNEP 2004: 15). The poor, paradoxically, have to be made to accept the marketization of the natural resources they use and pay for the ecosystem services

on which they depend (Barbier 2010: 654). 'Markets' it is argued 'have proven to be among the most resilient institutions, being able to recover quickly and to function in the absence of government' (Pingali et al. 2005: S18). When and where the market fails to recover, development policies for increasing the resilience of both the poor and their environments have to be aimed at 'ensuring access to markets' (Pingali et al 2005: 518). Ensuring the resilience of the poor also requires the building of neoliberal systems of governance that will monitor their use of ecological services to ensure they are sustainably managed (UNEP 2004: 39). The poor, in order to be the agents of their own change, have to be subjectivized so that they are 'able to make sustainable management decisions that respect natural resources and enable the achievement of a sustainable income stream' (UNEP 2004: 5). 'Over-harvesting, over-use, misuse or excessive conversion of ecosystems into human or artificial systems damages the regulation service which in turn reduces the flow of the provisioning service provided by ecosystems' (UNEP 2004: 20). Within 'the poor' itself, women are the principal target population. 'I will transform my lifestyle in the way I farm and think' has become the mantra that poor women farmers in the Caribbean region are demanded, for example, to repeat like Orwellian farm animals, in order to receive European Union funding (Tandon 2007: 12–14).

This double shift is integral, I argue, to the strategy by which neoliberalism has absorbed the critique of sustainable development. Whereas resilience was originally conceived by proponents of sustainable development as a property that distinguishes the extra-economic 'life-support systems' which humans require to live well, it has become reconceived post-Johannesburg as a property, which humanity intrinsically possesses, is capable of developing further and can never have too much of. As a property of human populations, it is dependent moreover on their interpellation within markets, their diversity as economic subjects and their subjection to systems of governance able to ensure that they continue to use natural resources in sustainable ways. Thus did a doctrine which started out as a critique of neoliberal policy prescriptions for development transform into a doctrine which legitimates a neoliberal model of development based upon the constitution of markets and the interpellation of subjects within markets.

7.3 The Disastrous and Politically Debased Subject of Resilience

Having established how sustainable development, via its propagation of the concept of resilience, has served to naturalize neoliberal systems of governance and institutions, I want to consider how it functions to constitute subjects amenable to neoliberal governance. Every regime of governance works by invoking its own particular subject of governance. Producing subjects the liberal way has long since been a game of producing self-securing subjects. Subjects that are capable of securing themselves are less of a threat to themselves and, in being so, are neither a threat to

the governance capacities of their states nor to the governance of the global order. And in this sense the correlation of development with security feeds upon the political imaginary of liberalism predicated as it became upon the belief that a global order of self-securing subjects would in turn deliver a more secure form of world order (Rosenau 2008, 2002, 1991). What, then, does the shift in the correlation of development with security to resilience tell us about the nature of the subject which development is now aimed at producing? What differences are entailed in being a resilient subject as opposed to a merely secure subject? Is the emergence of this new object of development just an extension of the liberal rationalities of governance that feed upon what has otherwise been described as the development-security nexus?

There is, in fact, a considerable shift at work here, one that undercuts many of the traditional assumptions that critics of liberalism have made historically, for the major condition of possibility for the subject of sustainable development is that it does not believe that it can ever become secure but indeed that it sacrifices its capacity and desire for security. Security, here, is less that which liberalism demands of its subjects than what it forbids them. The resilient subject of sustainable development is, by definition, not a secure but an adaptive subject, adaptive insofar as it is capable of making those adjustments to itself which enable it to survive the hazards encountered in its exposure to the world without ever becoming fully secure. In this sense, the resilient subject is a subject that must live a life of continuous struggle to accommodate itself to the world, not a subject which can conceive of changing the world, its structure and conditions of possibility, with a view to securing itself from the threats and dangers it identifies in the world, but a subject that understands its world as a space of endemic disaster and that accepts the disastrousness of the world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world and which accepts the necessity of the injunction to change itself in correspondence with the threats and dangers now presupposed as necessary rather than contingent. One can see readily how this plays out in relation to debates, for example, over climate change. One enthusiast for resilience as an answer to the problem writes:

> What is vital to understand is not the degree of climate change that we should expect, nor necessarily the impact that we might anticipate on water resource management, coastal defence, food security, species survival, etc. What is important to grasp is that we do have the abilities to adapt and adjust to the changes that climate change will bring. (Tandon 2007: 12)

Sustainable development is no longer conceived, thus, as a process through which a human accrues the means by which to secure itself from the world and via which he or she becomes a subject in the world. Once development is said to follow ecological laws of change and transformation and thus once exposure to hazard becomes a condition of possibility for development, the question which sustainable development poses for the communities and individuals subject to it is: Can you survive in the world without securing yourself from the world? Indeed, the very idea of security itself in this context becomes reconceptualized as dangerous, for subjects which conceive of the possibility of becoming secure are precisely those subjects

which are at risk of failing to perform their adaptation to dangers, believing erroneously in the contingency of such dangers.

This is why resilience has become so intimately tied in the policy, practice and theory of sustainable development not just to neoliberalism but to disaster management. Indeed, the latter is also crucial in legitimating the former. The ability to manage exposure to hazard in and among developing societies is dependent, the UN says, on their maintenance of a healthy and diverse ecological system that is productive and life sustaining, but it also demands a healthy and diverse economy that adapts to change and recognizes social and ecological limits (UN 2004: Chap. 1, S.2,18). It requires 'capturing opportunities for social change during the "window of opportunity" following disasters, for example by utilizing the skills of women and men equally during reconstruction' (UN 2004: Chap. 1, S.2, 20), as fundamentally, it requires making societies 'aware of the importance of disaster reduction for their own well-being' (UN 2004: Chap. 3, S.4, 1), because 'it is crucial for people to understand that they have a responsibility towards their own survival and not simply wait for governments to find and provide solutions' (2004: Chap. 3, S.4, 20). Disasters, thus construed, are not threats to the development of human beings from which they might aspire to secure themselves. They are events of profound 'opportunity' for societies to transform themselves economically and politically. They are events which do not merely expose communities to dangers from which they must be saved in order that they might be set back onto the path of development, but, rather, where communities, in their exposure, are able to undergo novel processes of developmental change in reconstitution of themselves as neoliberal societies. Exposure to disaster, in this context, is conceptualized in positive terms as constitutive of the possibility for the development of neoliberal systems of governance. But the working of this rationality depends on a subject that will submit to it. Sustainable development requires subjects, the UN report insists in a remarkable passage, to grasp the ontological necessity of hazards. The passage of societies to such knowledge must in turn involve, it states, a consideration of almost every physical phenomenon on the planet. The slow movements in the earth's mantle – the convection cells that drive the movement of continents and the manufacture of ocean floors – are the starting and also the sticking point. They lift mountains and shape landscapes. They also build volcanoes and trigger potentially catastrophic earthquakes. Like those other invisible movements that take place on a vast scale through the atmospheric medium – the carbon cycle and the water cycle and the nitrogen cycle – volcanoes and earthquakes, along with technological advancements, provide the bedrock of strong nations, rich industries and great cities. They do, of course, also have the potential to destroy them (UN 2004: Chap. 2, S.1: 4).

The account of the world envisaged and constituted through such discourses is one that presupposes the disastrousness of the world and likewise one that interpellates a subject that is permanently called upon to bear the disaster, a subject for whom bearing the disaster is a required practice without which he or she cannot grow and prosper in the world. This is what is at stake in the discourse of resilience. The resilient subject is a subject which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world, not a political subject which can conceive of changing the world,

its structure and conditions of possibility, but a subject which accepts the disastrousness of the world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world, which will not question the reasons why he or she is exposed to disasters, but which accepts the necessity of the injunction to change itself in correspondence with disasters now presupposed as endemic.

The human here is conceived as resilient insofar as it adapts to rather than resists the conditions of its suffering in the world. To be resilient is to forego the very power of resistance and accept one's vulnerability to that which threatens (Reid 2011). 'The imperative of adaptation rather than resistance to change will increase inexorably' two ideologues of sustainable development claim (Handmer and Dovers 1996). In their enthusiasm for the 'inexorable increase' of this 'imperative', theorists of sustainable development engage in some vivid discursive representations of the human. 'As a species, humanity is immensely adaptable – a weed species. We are also capable of considerable adaptability as individuals, and also as households (variously defined)-the latter being the perennial and universal human social unit' (Handmer and Dovers 1996). The combination of the imperative of humanity to adapt with the representation of humanity as a 'weed species' recalls the discursive currency of similar combinations within the concentration camps of Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Those camps were, as Barrington Moore has demonstrated in a still brilliant and wide ranging historical study, sites for the constitution of such resilient subjects and the honing of such adaptive capacities. The inhabitants of such extreme spaces of suffering often failed to exhibit any sign of resistance, seeking to survive through the development of complex and ultimately failed strategies of 'adaptation' to the conditions of their suffering (Moore 1978: 66). The 'conquest' of the perception of inevitability and necessity of circumstances is 'essential', Moore argues on the other hand, 'to the development of politically effective moral outrage' (1978: 459). The making of resilient subjects and societies fit for neoliberalism by agencies of sustainable development is based upon a degradation of the political capacities of human beings far more subtle than that achieved in Auschwitz and Buchenwald. But the enthusiasm with which ideologues of sustainable development are turning resilience into an 'imperative' is nevertheless comparable with that of the SS guards who also aimed 'to speed up the processes of adaptive learning' among those Jews and other populations in their charge by convincing them of the futility of resistance (Moore 1978: 66).

One is human only insofar as one is capable of transcending merely biological existence and exercising one's powers of political action. Political action does not entail human beings resiliently suffering their vulnerability to environments that are hostile to them or enable them to adapt to their environments à la the subject of neoliberalism. In contrast, political action is what enables human beings to forsake the current courses of their worlds in constitution of new ones through, not the transformation of themselves, but the exercise of agency on their worlds. The valorization of capacities for resilience and adaptation and the recognition of our supposedly incontestable vulnerabilities to disaster are symptomatic of the depoliticized nature of our times. Political subjects do not merely live in order to fit in with and adapt to existing times or desire the sustainability of the conditions for their living

the lives they do. In contrast, they resist those conditions and, where successful, overcome them, transforming them in ways that conform with the transformative work their imagination demands of them, new worlds in succession of old and destroyed worlds (Reid 2011). The task is to affirm the capacity for political action of the subject which entails not its experience of vulnerability to injury and fear of death but the trust in itself and others with whom it decides what it wants, asserts what it possesses and celebrates what it is able to do, in accordance with truths which transcend its existence as a merely living entity.

7.4 Conclusion: Development Contra Neoliberalism?

Can the doctrine of sustainable development be retrieved from the grip which neoliberalism has fastened upon it? Can a politics of concern for the vulnerability of the biosphere to human endeavour be detached from modes of economic reason complicit with the degradation of the biosphere? Answering these questions requires addressing the paradox revealed in this chapter. While sustainable development deploys ecological reason to argue for the need to secure the life of the biosphere, neoliberalism prescribes economy as the very means of that security. Economic reason is conceived within neoliberalism as a servant of ecological reason, claiming paradoxically to secure life from economy through a promotion of the capacities of life for economy. If, then, sustainable development is to escape its appropriation, it would seem imperative that it contest the nexus of relations on which claims as to the necessity of neoliberal frameworks for the sustainability of life are based. For a start, this has to mean rethinking the ways in which it engages with the concept of resilience. The problem here is less the demands to improve the resilience of ecosystems which distinguished the agenda of sustainable development in its early years than it is the post-Johannesburg shift to propagating resilience as a fundamental property and capacity of the human. The ecological imaginary is colonizing the social and political imaginaries of theorists and practitioners of development in ways that are providing fertile ground for the application of neoliberalism as a solution to the problem of sustainability. Understanding how that is possible requires understanding the biopolitics of neoliberalism and how its claims to be able to increase wealth and freedom are correlated with ways to increase the prosperity and security of life itself, for its capacities to correlate practices for the increase of economic profit and prosperity with those dedicated to increasing the profitability and prosperity of the biosphere are precisely why the doctrine of sustainable development is so compatible with it.

What is needed is a differently constituted policy and practice of development reflexive enough to provide space for a contestation of the forms of neoliberalism that are currently being presented by Western states and international organizations as answers to the problem of sustainability, a policy and practice that will cut the poor and underdeveloped some slack when it comes to issues of environmental degradation, climate change and struggles for and over natural resources, and a

policy and practice that will, while taking into account the grave nature of these problems, take seriously the degradations of capacities for the development of political subjectivity that occur when adaptation rather than resistance to the conditions of worldly suffering becomes a governing imperative. We have enough voices, now, calling within the chorus of development for the saving of the planet. But where are the voices that will call for the saving of the political? For sustainable development to reinvent itself, it needs to master the ecological reason from out which it emerged and forge newly political paradigms of thought and practice. Why is it that the conception of ecology at work in sustainable development is so limited that it permits neoliberalism to proliferate, like a poison species, taking over entire states and societies in the wake of their disasters; utilizing their suffering, as conditions for its spread; installing markets; commodifying anything it can lay its hands on; monetizing the value of everything; driving peoples from countryside into cities; and generating displacement, homelessness and deprivation? Isn't this an ecological problematic? Why is this machine of depoliticization tolerated in the name of sustainability? It is not only living species and habitats that are today threatened with extinction, and for which we ought to mobilize our care, but the words and gestures of human solidarity on which resistance to such biopolitical regimes of governance depends (Guattari 1995). A sense of responsibility for the survival of the life of the biosphere is not a sufficient condition for the development of a political subject capable of speaking back to neoliberalism, nor a sense of responsibility for the life of humanity. What is required is a subject responsible for securing incorporeal species – chiefly that of the political – currently threatened with extinction, on account of the overwrought fascination with life that has colonized the developmental as well as every other biopoliticized imaginary of the modern age.

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Chapter 8
Lines of Siege: The Contested Government of Nature

Paulo Tavares

> *It is up to the government to change the air temperature and to improve the climate; a direction given to the stagnant water, forests planted or burnt down, mountains destroyed by time or by the continual cultivation of their surface, create a new soil and a new climate.*
>
> – Moheau, 1778, *Recherchessur la population de la France,* as quoted in Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*

Michel Foucault's archaeology of modern forms of power constantly resorted to spatial diagrams to describe the means and mechanisms by which power operates. Consider the text *La Metropoliteé* (1682), for example, a treatise on how to build a capital city written by the French military engineer Alexandre Le Maître in 1682, which showed to Foucault how, until the 17th century, sovereignty was defined and exercised primordially in relation to the government of territory. The state functions as a pyramidal architecture, says Le Maître, the peasantry forming its solid foundations, upon which the common and service quarters inhabited by the class of artisans are built, and at the top comes the noble areas, housing the officials of the sovereign and the sovereign himself. A well-governed country should be spatially organized according to this tripartite hierarchy distributed over the territory, which ideally would have the form of a circle: countryside at geographic (and social) periphery, small towns at the middle ring and, placed precisely at the geometric centre of this spatial arrangement, the capital city functioning as the political, economic and symbolic nucleus of sovereign power. Le Maître's utopian spatial layout shows that the effectiveness of sovereign's rule is directly related to territorial organization and control and, reversely, that the territory itself is conceived as the foundation of the juridical-political principle of sovereignty.

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Disciplinary modes of power entail problems of a different spatial order, less related to the articulation between sovereignty and territory, for here the central question is how to construct geometric arrangements that would facilitate the distribution and surveillance of bodies in such a way as to make a multiplicity of individuals operate in an orderly, docile and productive manner while simultaneously moderating the violence exercised to enforce this process of collective subjugation. Hence, Foucault's archive could be the architectural plans of asylums, hospitals and prisons – the laboratories of disciplinary governmental techniques – or an entire city like Richelieu, built from scratch based on the shape of Roman military camps. Power's blueprint is no longer geographic but geometric, formed of modular squares and rectangles which by successive and well-calculated operations of symmetric and asymmetric divisions configure a rigid system of architectural and urban partitions through which certain conducts and patterns are transmitted to the entire social body (Foucault 2007).

Foucault's spatial archives are not representations of social relations so much as archaeological traces of power's mode of operation. Territorial, urban and architectural diagrams were associated with particular historical problems concerning techniques of repression, policing, control or regulation, which were mapped onto very concrete situations (for example, through the recurrent analysis of the problem of how to govern disease inside the city). From reading a specific context, he then extracted 'abstract machineries' that characterized specific political rationalities and knowledge formations (the confinement of the lepers, an exclusionary mode of power that translated into space the permitted/forbidden binary division of the juridical code; the city partitioned by the plague, which registered the microphysical logics of the disciplines through the medicalization of the urban environment). Reflexively, a pure and simple architectural scheme such as Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon would help Foucault define an entire regime of government, for beyond its immediate purposes, the basic spatial-optical mechanisms of Bentham's design embodied the diagram of a specific form of political technology, one that could be applied to different social-spatial arrangements – the family house, the school, the barracks, the factory – and potentially inform the organization of an entire city.

The form of the urban fabric is thus inherently bound to political forces, because power functions by distributing and channelling bodies through material arrangements, opening up lines of communication and establishing divisions through which relations between people and things are articulated in a determinate pattern to produce certain effects and generate desirable outcomes. Not only the division of labour but also the partitioning of space. The city is not a passive support structure of social-economic arrangements, neither can architecture be reduced to a symbolic avatar of ideology, for space is the very medium of power relations, simultaneously a field of political intervention and the substance through and by which politics gains material dimensions.

When it came to the spatial schemes of biopolitical forms of power, Foucault's insights were less diagrammatic and not as thoroughly articulated as its disciplinary counterparts. To a large extent, it has been foremost through Giorgio Agamben's diagram of the camp as the quintessential biopolitical space (Agamben 1998), as well as

through critical cartographies of the control webs that sustain post-Fordist global capitalism – as in Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's *Multitude* (2004) – that the spatial logics of biopower have been filtered and mapped out. Enclaves and networks, archipelagos and rhizomes have been powerful tools in charting the most contentious sites of contemporary forms of subjugation and resistance, but these spatial diagrams are also limited because they fail to grasp a certain 'ecological rationale', which is at the core of the biopolitical mechanism and which today is present in virtually every domain of the apparatus of power. Biopolitics emerges when sovereignty started to be conceptualized as that which 'deals with nature', writes Foucault:

> … or rather with the perpetual conjunction, the perpetual interaction of geographical, climatic, and physical milieu with the human species insofar as it has a body and a soul, a physical and a moral existence … the sovereign will be someone who will have to exercise power at the point of connection where nature, in the sense of physical elements, interferes with the nature in the sense of the nature of human species. (Foucault 2007: 23)

Insofar as biopolitics is that mode of power that takes life as such into the arena of political calculations, the relations established between living beings and the material conditions upon which their life is dependent start to appear as a fundamental 'topos' inside the strategies and technologies of power. Biopolitical spaces include all those non-human bodies, materials and forces that we have named nature, and which the juridical-political theory of sovereignty has excluded from the social contract. The classic definition of sovereignty was of course immediately related to the control and appropriation of nature, but only insofar as nature was framed as territory and land from which wealth could be extracted. Disciplinary techniques also involved strategies directed to natural materials such as air and water, but only insofar as they could be domesticated into fully controllable artifices. Biopolitics imply a whole new understanding of space, not so much territorial or geometrical as environmental and geophysical, inside which nature appears as an entity in itself, with its ungovernable rhythms and laws and through which nature is made a 'subject' of – and subjected to – specific legal designs, spatial arrangements and governmental techniques.

In this chapter, I will try to capture the process by which nature enters into the realm of power. And thus I also hope to locate nature itself – insofar as nature is an element interwoven within social and economic relations and therefore designates a historical and not a natural category – at the centre of contemporary forms of domination and subjugation, struggle and resistance. In Sect. 8.1, I briefly dwell on Michel Foucault's notion of *milieu* in order to contextualize the intrinsic ecological dimension of the biopolitical spatial diagram. In Sect. 8.2, I draw on my own research at the frontiers Amazonia in order to probe the lines that are currently being drawn between sovereignty and nature, government and the environment, politics and ecology, as they unfold in the spatial conflicts of today. I do not intend to offer an exegesis on Foucault's theory and its different interpretations. Neither do I claim that this approximation between environment and biopolitics is completely original. Many authors emphasize how the development of techniques aimed at governing the labour force in the industrial cities of Europe in the 19th century was already grounded on a certain 'ecological reading' of the socio-urban environment

according to which the manipulation of the conditions of habitat of a certain population – air, water, housing, etc. – could serve as a less intrusive yet more pervasive medium through which power could extend its grip over people's lives (see, e.g., Rabinow 1995). Slowly but surely, as we progressed through the ecocidal 20th century and decisively after the 'ecological turn' initiated in the late 1960s, the environment became a governmental space in itself, on behalf of which novel forms of biopolitical calculation will be deployed in order to better regulate the relations between populations, resource supplies and ecological instabilities.[1] This text follows similar critical lines but its intent is nevertheless slightly – yet significantly – distinct. I will not be so much concerned in framing contemporary forms of *governing* nature, but rather on the very *nature* that is being shaped by governmental practices, discourses and techniques.

Following Foucault, I depart from the axiom that power is a productive force. Likewise one should never start with a given 'subject' who is repressed by power but rather with power relations that inform modes of subjectivation; we should not depart from nature as a 'natural given' which power appropriates and manipulates but try to grasp the ways by which power, insofar as it is a creative force, 'produces nature'. Not only in the sense that nature is a form of social construction operating on the level of the symbols and ideology but also in relation to the proper geophysical dimension of nature, insofar as the Earth is the ultimate realm of life of the human population in its totality, *qua* species. This process of environmental-biopolitical production was of course historically marked by widespread ecological depletion since its early moments in the late 18th century, but destruction too is a productive force. In the act of a sovereign whose objective is, as Foucault states, 'to create a new soil and a new climate' (Foucault 2007: 38), there is an intrinsic necropolitical intent of socioecological proportions. In many different ways, only very recently we became able to realize that, indeed, we are producing a new soil and a new climate, because the adverse effects of this novel nature are increasingly more frequent and more violent, as well as because science and technology now offer decisive evidences. In the field of earth sciences, for example, the hypothesis currently discussed is that anthropogenic activity has pushed the planet to a new geological era, which is distinguished from earlier millennia by the fact that humans have turned into the equivalent of a geophysical force capable of interfering in the course of the natural history of the Earth. The chemist Paul Crutzen (Crutzen and Stoerner 2000), who proposed to name this new epoch 'Anthropocene', suggested to date the geological turn around the late 18th century, which is the period when glaciers start to register increase in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Perhaps not coincidentally, the dawn of the Anthropocene overlaps with the birth of biopolitics, and if natural history clashes with histories of power, it becomes necessary to approximate 'nature' to people's struggle for freedom from power and economic and social equality. For nature is not natural; it is the product of conflict.

[1] On the relations between environmentalism and contemporary governmentality, see, for example, Luke (1996, 1999).

8.1 Foucault's Ecology of Power

Milieu is a spatial notion that appears a few times in Michel Foucault's writings, chiefly in the first lecture of his course at the College de France in 1977–1978, during which he elaborated directly on this concept as a form of biopolitical space (Foucault 2007).[2] Originating from Newtonian physics, milieu described a sort of fluidlike element between distant bodies through which one could affect the other – 'the medium of an action at a distance'. It was imported to biology in the late 18th century via the work of Lamarck, and throughout the 19th century, led by the influence of positivism and biological determinism in the emerging social sciences, the term progressively migrated to diverse fields in the humanities, notably to spatial disciplines and practices such as demography, geography and urban planning. George Canguilhem's essential genealogy of the conception in the text *Le vivant et son milieu* (1980 [1952]) explains that its prestige among different scientific domains was directly related to its epistemological malleability. From a notion in mechanics to its organicist adaptation, milieu came to define a pure relational diagram – 'The environment becomes a universal instrument for dissolving individualized organic syntheses in the anonymity of universal elements and movements' – which then turns functional whenever the problem of capturing the relations between bodies and their surroundings is presented (Canguilhem 1980 [1952]: 5). In the first biological theories of the environment, milieu was defined as 'circumstances' that exert influence over living beings. When adapted to spatial disciplines, it included all the elements that constitute people's habitat.

In Michel Foucault's formulation, it is important to grasp that milieu is a form of *natural-artificial* construct:

> … a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another. (Foucault 2007: 21)

The social connects with the biological insofar as a multiplicity of individuals depends on the material conditions within which they live, whereas, on the other hand, the natural is already social because the environment is modified and affected by the population who inhabits it. The milieu is the product of this open-ended process of interactions between one domain and the other operating in ecological chains of effects and counter-effects. Insofar as power starts to be exercised on the articulation between these two poles – at the frictions between the biological

[2] The notion of milieu first appeared in *Madness and Civilization* (Foucault 2001), though not as elaborated as in the lecture of 1977 on which I concentrate my argument. Foucault draws directly from Canguilhem's *Le vivant et son milieu* (1980 [1952]), which was later translated to English by a group of geographers from the University of Oxford under the title *The living being and its environment (milieu)* (n.d.).

environment and human historicity (Foucault 1990: 143–144)[3] – the notion of milieu offered a spatial-epistemic frame through which these separated domains could be synthesized into a single and continuous plane of forces and relations, simultaneously natural and historical, thus making possible to conceive and calculate interventions directed to the 'conditions of life' of a certain population as a means to obtain determinate effects in the socio-economic and political field. If the juridical-political model of sovereignty was characterized by the occupation of land and demarcation of territorial borders, and the disciplines by the design of panoptical geometries, the apparatus of security that sustain biopolitical forms of power operates to 'fabricate, organize and plan' (Foucault 2007: 21) that hybrid environmental-political medium which is the milieu.

The origins of the spatial formula of the concept can be traced from the late 18th century, says Foucault, and emerges as a direct reaction to the problem of governing cities as they were being radically transformed by developments in trade and industrial production, increasing influx of migrants and sprawling urbanization. The medieval urban fabric with its narrow alleys, sharp corners and complex street network imposed technical frictions in dealing with increment of flows. It constricted movement, most importantly the movement of goods, and therefore had a negative impact on commerce. Stagnant air and water accumulated in crowded areas generating pockets of disease, moral pollution and social unrest, while the closed grid facilitated the operation of vagrants, delinquents and criminals. The problem therefore was how to intervene in this spatial dynamics in order to enhance circulation and at the same time provide better means of policing movements. The central issue at stake was the necessity of opening up the town from its enclosed medieval logic at many different levels: placing the city inside an expanded web of commercial relations with other cities and trade routes, amplifying control over the countryside, cutting wider channels to secure ventilation and hygiene, improving the infrastructure of mobility in order to facilitate circulation and exchange, etc. By its own turn, this process of 'opening up' generated a set of new problems. A city without barriers facilitated migration, increasing the number of the floating population inhabiting the peripheries and thus engendering more vagrancy and criminality. Larger streets helped to refresh the urban atmosphere but also amplified contact between different parts of the town and thus facilitated dissemination of vectors of contamination. All those elements – goods, people, viruses, buildings, water flows and air streams – formed a complex ecology so that an intervention upon one element could cause effects onto another. Rather than establishing rigid exclusions and suppressions, urban government would then have to deal with the calibration of the interactions between those various forces

[3] See Foucault (1990: 143–144): 'If the question of man was raised – insofar as he was a specific living being, and specifically related to other living beings – the reason for this is to be sought in the new mode of relation between history and life: in this dual position of life that placed it at the same time outside history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by the latter's techniques of knowledge and power. There is no need either to lay further stress on the proliferation of political technologies that ensued, investing the body, health, modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, the whole space of existence.'

and bodies, organizing and separating forms of circulation, promoting certain flows and at the same time trying to minimize others.

Different from the disciplined town, whose ultimate objective was a perfect geometry, interventions in the urban milieu try to achieve an 'optimum performance' inside a wide spectrum of probabilities, taking into consideration a series of risks to which the city is constantly exposed. Elements such as theft and disease can never be fully extinguished since they are part of the very nature of the urban milieu, but under certain mechanisms they can be contained at safe statistical levels. Furthermore, the city itself is immersed in a larger environment whose oscillations directly influence its dynamics but escape full control. At the horizon of government's calculations there is always the possibility of scarcity, epidemics, natural catastrophes and, no less important, revolt. Often, those exceptional events are the outcome of combined and interrelated effects: drought-causing crop failure leading to higher prices of grain and lack of food supply in the city, which can immediately turn into social unrest. A good government will try to operate within the immanent laws of this system, taking this socio-natural ecology inside a planning strategy that, being conscious it cannot assume total control, aims at maximizing efficiency while keeping the risks of negative feedback loops at certain thresholds of security.

Observing the last developments in the field of global governance, we find a very similar ecological rational to the one indentified by Foucault as emerging in the late 18th century. Consider, for example, the series of studies on the incorporation of climate change into military and geo-political doctrines of security that came in the context of the UN Summit in Copenhagen in 2009.[4] Droughts, flooding and other climate-induced disruptions are identified as conflict catalysers, particularly in vulnerable ecological zones such as the Sahel. According to the basic schemes put forward by these analyses, planetary ecological instabilities will lead to more frequent situations of scarcity and displace unprecedented numbers of people around the globe, thus increasing anthropogenic pressure over territories already susceptible to environmental distress, which in turn will contribute to aggravate social-ecological instability in areas that most often are also characterized by volatile political milieus. In the context of this new geo-political space, these studies contend that international security will demand more precise forecasting technologies and stronger capacity of humanitarian and military response to contain the collateral effects of climate disruptions. In parallel, and increasingly so after the financial crisis hit in 2008, we have been observing more aggressive manoeuvres by states and transitional corporations alike to secure subsoil resources and land surface, whereas new technologies are opening up formerly unreachable terrains to capitalist exploits (deepwater oil drilling, gas hydrofracking, water and carbon markets, etc.).

[4] A series of reports on climate change and security, as well as conferences and international roundtables, appeared in the context of other more well-known reports on climate change that nurtured the debate of COP15, notably the study of the U.S. state-financed security think-tank CNA Analysis and Solutions (2007), and the UNEP (UN Environment Programme 2013) report on the conflict in Darfur, which directly associated climate change with the causes of the conflict. See also Pemberton (2009).

The biopolitical calculus implied in this double movement assumes that post-climate change/post-Anthropocene scenarios will be defined by further/deeper expansion of resource frontiers, while the risks and collateral effects generated henceforth, unevenly distributed across global geographies, will be contained by environmental/humanitarian security programmes and, in case necessary, deployment of military forces.[5] This emerging global apparatus of 'climate security' is not so much biopolitical as geophysical-political, so to say, for it takes the whole spectrum of the Earth's dynamics as its ultimate realm of political intervention. Inside this new spatial diagram, global populations are more likely to be framed as shifting 'physical variables', whereas the sovereign's calculation between life and death is now registered in political decisions over the oscillations of the temperature of the Earth, as exemplified by the controversial debate at Copenhagen concerning the maximum 2 °C-increase over pre-industrial levels as the desirable benchmark of global security.

The contemporary context thus presents itself as a radicalization of the environment-security nexus described in Foucault's concept of milieu. Indeed, current ecological-political anxieties must be observed in relation to a much longer historical genealogy whose origins lie in the emergence of environmental ethos in the late 18th century in Western Europe. This period saw the formation of the first civil society campaigns and organizations for the protection of the environment; laws were enforced in attempts to remediate the ecological degradation of industrial cities and preserve green parks at the countryside; and early forms of sustainable practices such as forest conservation came to be an integral part of colonial administrations. As similar to today, the crystallization of ecological sensibilities in the most diverse fields of thought/practice at that time came as a direct reaction to the destructive conditions generated by the expansion of capital-intensive modes of exploiting natural resources around the globe as the geo-powers sought to enlarge their markets and search for new sources of raw materials. Whereas the awareness of the environmental impacts of modern industrial/colonial production started to coalesce into the understanding of the limits of the Earth's natural resources, the environment gradually appeared as a space of symbolic, scientific and political intervention. Both in their metropolitan and colonial expressions, environment-led forms of advocacy were intrinsically related to notions of security and political order. 'Anxieties about environmental change, climate change and extinctions and even the fear of famine, all of which helped to motivate early environmentalism, mirrored anxiety about social form', writes the historian Richard Grove, concluding that: 'at the core of environmental concern lay anxiety about society and its discontents' (Grove 1995: 14). Early environmentalism was formulated as part of a larger governmental agenda that as similar to Foucault's definition of milieu found many

[5] For example, following the UNEP report on Darfur, a series of debates were held in the UN Security Council in relation to climate change. It has been suggested that it was necessary to consider whether or not the United Nations should expand its mandate to areas affected by conflicts related to shrinking resources and climate disruptions and create a new environmental peacekeeping force – 'the green helmets' – that could act in such zones and situations.

of its conceptual roots in the theories elaborated by the physiocrats in the late 18th century. Biopolitics therefore appears inherently bound to the formation of this novel ecological ethos that came at the service of securing and maintaining established regimes. Yet, Foucault's ecology of power – I will argue below – even though grounded on 18th-century archival material, seems to be much more informed by the environmental visions that emerged during the Cold War rather than to its earlier manifestations.

During the postwar 'development decades', the nexus between environment-security was articulated with particular sophistication within the philanthropic and foreign aid branches of the U.S. war machine, whose ideologues advocated for the diffusion of progress to the Third World because from their perspective it was poverty, hunger, malnutrition and all other pathologies of underdevelopment that provided fertile ground for the dissemination of communist ideals. Theories of modernization that informed containment strategies deployed by the U.S. via programmes of international development and aid, such as Walt Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960), carried an intrinsic evaluation that a radical transformation of people's modes of inhabitation was a fundamental step to trigger economic and social progress, especially concerning peasants and indigenous livelihood. Rather than locating underdevelopment as the historical product of uneven economic and power relations of global scope, such visions naturalized poverty as a backward stage in human evolution, while their structural-cultural bias tended to equate nonmodern/noncapitalist forms of life with poverty itself. The transition from traditional to modern forms of living was immediately related to the task of overcoming 'archaic' human-environment relations, which were attributed either to the lack of adequate techno-scientific means or to the lock-ups of primitive modes of life.

This environmental dimension of Cold War's development-security doctrine is particularly visible in the special attention that was given to agricultural production, and the subsistence of the rural poor, chiefly in South and Southeast Asia, where artificial methods of the 'Green Revolution' were widely promoted by the U.S. government as means of holding economic and geo-political influence over the region. As historian Nick Cullather shows in the book *The Hungry World* (2010), calculations between rising populations and lack of proteins were associated with potential dangers to international stability, while the deployment of agricultural mechanization, artificial irrigation, seed modification, fertilizers and pesticides turned into mechanisms of security. Because of the environmental violence implied in developmental schemes such as the Green Revolution, these early political rationales tend to be placed diametrically opposed to the more recent ones in which ecological discourses figure prominently. But although the notion of environment was not yet properly in place, there was a fundamental biopolitical diagram according to which containment and security could be articulated through the radical modification of environmental conditions – literally, the production of a new soil. In that sense, the *scorched-earth* campaign carried out by the U.S. military against the forests of Indochina, which was often described by the biological metaphor of

'draining the water to kill the fish',[6] expresses the extreme necro-political capacity of the same environmental rationale which had by that time become fully integrated into the mechanisms of power.

As development migrated to become a mainstream category inside the institutional apparatus formed around the United Nations, similar calculations were integrated into the discourses and practices of international governance that were formed during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Inside the aid agencies of (non-)governmental institutions, the relations between development and security assumed a less ideologically charged and more technocratic-bureaucratic face, while the central focus was progressively reoriented from interstate world order towards 'human security'. The decisive change in emphasis from the geopolitics of territories to the government of global population came in the context of the larger transformations brought by the rupture of Cold War's geo-political architecture and the consolidation of neoliberal economic doctrines inside international financial institutions. Increasingly criticized for the authoritarian character they assumed in the hands of the militarized regimes that ruled much of the Third World, state-centralized programmes of development lost support in favour of more liberal approaches based on bottom-up/community-based initiatives, civil society self-reliance, NGO work and the discourse of human rights. In parallel, there was a gradual turn towards a more eco-oriented perspective, which was consummated in the late 1980s with the introduction of the qualifier 'sustainability' next to the concept of development.

Besides the influence of ecological sciences and countercultural critic, post-Vietnam environmentalism was also shaped by neo-Malthusian fears of demographic explosion, resource scarcity and world disorder. Influential global ecosystem models such as *The Limits to Growth* commissioned by the Club of Rome in 1972 (Meadows et al. 1972), or popular scientific narratives such as Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* published in 1968, registered these new political anxieties that slowly started to transform the articulations between environment-security within the development establishment. There was the growing perception that the levels of resource depletion generated by unrestrained modernization combined with projections of overpopulation and diminishing natural reserves had turned into a potential source of global insecurity, whether in ecological, socio-economic or political terms, or combinations thereof. These future scenarios therefore called for the introduction of a set of mechanisms and techniques capable of framing, monitoring and modulating the relations between population and environmental dynamics at global scale. Similar to the notion of milieu in the 19th century, in the 1960s and the 1970s the concept of ecosystem offered the epistemic-spatial frame for this emerging form of environmental governmentality. Ecosystem theories expanded ecology from its original domain inside biological sciences towards more complex and interdisciplinary fields including economics, demography, geography and other areas dealing with anthropogenic/spatial variables, thus helping to forge the articulation between the idea that a certain equilibrium of the Earth system should be maintained in order

[6] This counterinsurgency metaphor was based on the inversion of the famous aphorism attributed to Mao Tse-tung: 'The guerilla must swing in the people as the fish swims in the sea.'

to preserve 'world stability'. While keeping the vitalist connotations of ecology, the notion of ecosystem gave a more cybernetic and managerial approach to perceptions of global environmental dynamics. Concepts of self-regulation, homeostatic balance, feedback loops and optimal performance were central in shaping contemporary environmentalism, and, ultimately, they were responsible to give intelligibility to an entire new form of globalized space, one increasingly interconnected by telecommunication technologies and large-scale ecological disasters that ignored geo-political boundaries.

Then by the time Foucault was lecturing about milieu and biopolitics, those debates about security, environment and global demographic explosion were taking place in many different scientific, political and media forums. Certainly, Foucault must have been familiar to them, if maybe, followed them with interest, but as far as my limited reading of his work goes, regardless the convergence with some of the key problems with which Foucault was dealing at the time, those debates passed distant from his central concerns. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify traces of the grammar of ecosystemic theories in fragments of language employed in the lectures of the late 1970s, as, for example, in this description of the security apparatus: 'regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field' (Foucault 2003: 246). Observed in relation to the wider historical context, Michel Foucault's description of biopolitical power appears as much informed by – or descriptive of – its contemporary notion of environmentalism as to the notion of milieu itself. It thus may also reflect, even more precisely, the process of deeper incorporation of nature into rationales of government that was unfolding at the time of his writing. In that sense, Foucault's ecology of power anticipated the important function that governmental techniques embodied in notions such as 'environmental security' or 'sustainable management' would gradually assume in post–Cold War geo-political and economic scenarios. Forged through the ecological violence of the militarized developmental machine, *environmentalism* came to occupy a structural role in emerging forms of neoliberal governmentality.

During one of his few incursions in contemporary history, while elaborating on the relations between governmentality and the neoliberalism of the Chicago School, Foucault left a few notes about what he named 'environmental technology' of power, of which the basic mechanisms he described in sketchy lines:

> … you must consider everyone as a player and only intervene on an environment in which he is able to play… Not a standardizing, identificatory, hierarchical individualization, but an environmentalism open to unknowns and transversal phenomena. (Foucault 2004: 261)

This type of power technology is less concerned with individuals and concentrates on defining a 'framework around the individual which is loose enough for him to be able to play', and a good government acts by modulating this environmental framework rather than interfering with the individuals themselves: 'on the rules of the game rather than on the players'. The concept of milieu/environment – 'the medium of an act at a distance' (Foucault 2004: 259–261) – served Foucault as the

spatial diagram to articulate biopolitics and liberal rationalities of government, describing a form of power that limits excessive government by restricting action just to the *frame* that define the space of existence of a population rather than direct onto the subjects themselves. The former, milieu, translated into space the economic-political thought of classic liberalism in the 18th century; the latter, environment, appeared in sketch on the verge of the neoliberal turn.

Different from the material emphasis given to the notion of milieu, Foucault's use of the concept of 'environment' in relation to neoliberal governmentality appears to be virtually synonymous to the economic space of the market. But in turn the market itself assumes the form of a completely natural entity, in a very similar sense to the idea that 'economics is a physics' held by the physiocrats in the 18th century, but much more radically, becoming practically coextensive to the entire spectrum of life. Liberal economic rationales imply an entire anthropological perspective, one according to which humans are calculating beings who act in a purposeful manner upon a given reality in the pursuit of their self-interest and security, trying to maximize gains and minimizing costs as per the variations in this given reality, constantly searching for the most economic means to reach objectives that would lead to greater self-benefit. The market is the organic product of the series of exchanges between economic men – the very milieu of *homo oeconomicus* – and the better it works, the less restriction it suffers, for it is part of the very natural order of the system to search for more efficient allocation of resources, production and distribution of goods and thus yield greater common wealth. Foucault explains that the Chicago School's neoliberalism radicalizes these basic ideological tenets of liberal economy by expanding the analytical grid of the market mechanism beyond the study of the market itself, projecting economy as a form of knowledge/practice which deals fundamentally with the calculative reason that defines human conduct and which therefore can be applied to domains other than the strictly economic. 'Rational conduct is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which responds to environment variables… and economics can be defined as the science of systematic nature of responses to environmental variables' (Foucault 2004: 269).

Although immersed inside a regime of calculations, this environmental reading of human condition cannot be reduced to economic space, but rather the other way around. Neoliberal governmentality is that mode of power which expands economic rational to a series of noneconomic relations, inscribing the logics of the market into a much wider space, of which the ultimate form is the entire setting of environmental conditions within which life is produced and reproduced – the 'whole space of existence', as Foucault writes elsewhere (Foucault 1990: 144) – insofar as the milieu/environment is the space which forms the material terrain of biopolitics. Fundamentally, this environmental technology of power is concerned with framing the entire field of relations that constitute collective life into forms and signs that are recognizable and manageable according to the basic rationale of the market. It is a proper geophysical dimension that when countering this environmentalism, for the act of *framing* by which neoliberal governmentality operates, involves the deployment of set of technologies through which the relations between humans and the

material conditions within which they live can be defined according to parameters that are easily internalized into the field of economic calculations. By saying this, I am referring to the structural necessity of neoliberal political economy in reducing every form of human-nature assemblage to relations between atomized individuals and private property and to all the technologies of fencing and enclosing that are implied in that process. I am also referring to the specific ways by which, following a certain ecological ethos and making use of a set of security mechanisms of environmental order, the aleatory and eventful nature of the milieu is incorporated inside a political economy of risks. Therefore, one of the important questions that emerges from Foucault's diagram of environmental power concerns the modes by which that process of 'framing' takes shape, that is to say, it is necessary to ask how and by which means the *artificial environment* that makes possible and sustains neoliberal governmentality and biopolitical forms of regulation have been historically produced.

The concept of environment, a word that derives from the French verb *environ*, which means 'to surround', suggests that an environment is the spatial outcome of a procedure of encircling, enveloping, enclosing or policing, being the surrounding lines epistemic, legal or proper physical barriers (see Luke 1995). Whereas the concept of milieu emphasizes circulation, and therefore the idea that (neo)liberal governmentality operates by promoting freedom of movements and flows, the concept of an environmental technology of power points towards that process of 'framing' that defines the basic context within which such freedom is produced and stimulated by power, thus denoting the presence of a certain coercive apparatus existing at the core of neoliberal/biopolitical regimes. To a large extent, Michel Foucault's conceptualization of milieu downplays the repressive dimension of biopolitical/liberal governmentality in order to emphasize the vitalist dimension assumed by modern sovereignty when it starts to make use of techniques of social and environmental welfare as means of political control. But following the historical lines from which his spatial-ecological diagram derives might lead us to argue that Foucault's ecology describes a mode of power that operates according to dialectics between 'letting it flow' and containment, stimulating freedom inasmuch as limiting the scope of liberty, 'making live' only to the extent that it simultaneously attempt to eliminate life forms other than those it can control. Because modern environmentalism is historically rooted in discourses articulated on behalf of the protection of a dehistoricized/nonsocial nature, its constructive and artificial dimensions tend to be obliterated, while its intrinsic governmental rationale is diluted into ethical intents. But arguably environmentalism is as much the result of an ethical response to the unrestrained anthropogenic violence towards nature as well as a form to exert more control over the relations between materials and people, territories and populations, and humans and their habitats. Rather than the protection of nature from human action, environmentalism expresses a greater influence of anthropogenic action towards the non-human world, for nature appears ever more deeper integrated into the networks and institutions by which government operates. This process of encircling/encompassing is as much material as discursive – spatial, technological, legal, scientific and symbolic – and has less to do with the defence of a given nature and

more to the process by which *a nature* is being shaped and defined. In the section that follows, I offer some thoughts on the lines of political dispute and conflict that are intrinsic to that process of 'natural production'.

8.2 Lines of Siege: Notes on the 'Amazon Insurgency'

> The robbery of the honey and the robbery of our safety, the robbery of communing and the taking of liberties, have gone hand in hand.
>
> – Peter Linebaugh, *The Magna Carta Manifesto*

As the frontiers of development move deeper into the Amazonian territories, opening up new soils to be integrated into the global market economy while simultaneously enforcing new forms of land enclosures, the forest's geography turns into a contested terrain between dissident modes of relating to, appropriating and managing nature. In the Peruvian Amazon, territorial conflicts got to a breaking point on 5 June 2009, when violent clashes between state forces and thousands of Awajún and Wampís indigenous people erupted at the Curva del Diablo – the 'Devil's Curve' – a precarious road bent of the Belaúnde Terry Highway, the principal route linking the Pacific coast to the lowland areas across the Andes, near the entrance of a frontier town named Bagua that serves as the main gateway to all the Amazonian districts of northern Peru. Thirty-three people were killed – more than half were police officers – and at least 200 people were injured. In the previous weeks, state repression had been escalating in response to well-orchestrated demonstrations and infrastructural disruptions that spread throughout 60 % of the Peruvian territory that is covered by the Amazon Basin. Protests had been thus far peaceful, but not inconsequential. Marches were reported in many towns across the jungle and demonstrators held position for more than 50 days straight at various strategic points such as refineries and airports, gas valves and oil pipelines, river passages, bridges and roads, leading to the disruption of virtually all the resource extraction channels and transport routes that connect Amazonia to the rest of the country.[7]

Geographically distributed but politically articulated, these various demonstrations embodied a common protest against the enforcement of 99 laws that would unleash a process of massive territorial, ecological and social reorganization of the

[7] The Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollode la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP), one of the main organizations behind the protests, published day-to-day online reports which are accessible at http://www.aidesep.org.pe/. Several local and international NGOs also monitored the conflict. See AmazonWatch (2009), World Rain Forest Movement Bulletin (2009) and Amnesty International (2009). Among the corporations operating in the affected regions are the national oil company Petroperu, Spanish Repsol and Argentinean Pluspetrol. Protests were also related to conflicts around mining sites operated by Chinese gold mining firm Zijin, the Canadian consortium Dorata and British-owned Monterrico Metals.

entire Peruvian Amazon in the decades to follow. In December 2007, 18 months before the confrontations in Bagua, the Congress approved a special mandate allowing the executive branch of the government to bypass parliamentary debate and rule by decree issues related to the implementation of a free-trade agreement signed with the U.S.[8] Holding extraordinary legislative powers, the cabinet of President Alan Garcia drafted a radical new legal agenda aimed at introducing land-zoning schemes and proprietary regimes that would facilitate the investment of transnational capital in large-scale extraction activities and biofuel production in the entire country, chiefly in Amazonia, whose subsoil contains large reserves of yet untapped hydrocarbon and mineral deposits and wherein indigenous populations remain with relative territorial autonomy in relation to state control. At the centre of the demands formalized by the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollode la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP), the Peruvian coalition of Amazonian indigenous nationalities, there was the revocation of a series of articles related to use and control of land and natural resources. Most fiercely opposed by protesters was Decree 1090, otherwise known as the 'Forest Law', which introduced a set of modifications in the legal status of forestlands that would result in the removal of 64 % of the Peruvian Amazon out of the national public forest heritage and thus potentially open up this massive territory for trading in the global market (see Zibechi 2009).

After the legal package was made public in the middle of 2008, public reaction came immediately. Indigenous and peasant groups marched in protest; human rights and environmental NGOs published reports that contested the legal legitimacy of the decrees; and later a special parliamentary commission was formed to probe the constitutional validity of the new laws.[9] The opposition held to the claim that the government was using its extraordinary mandate to push a wider neoliberal agenda in the Amazonian territories that in principle had little effective connection to legal issues related to the implementation of the free-trade contract between the U.S. and Peru. As the government was determined to carry on with the laws regardless, mobilization got pace and protests gradually radicalized towards direct action on the ground. By 10 May 2009, after more than 1 month of sustained demonstrations and disruptions conducted by the indigenous mobilization, President Alan Garcia suspended civil liberties and declared a 60-day state of emergency in several Amazonian areas, enclosing practically the entire Peruvian jungle into a large siege zone (see Fig. 8.1). Military police units were deployed to break peaceful blockages and regain control of strategic passages and infrastructure, carrying out a nationwide campaign of political containment that was characterized by the intimidation of entire communities, arbitrary imprisonment of protesters and juridical persecution

[8] The Free Trade Agreement between Peru and the USA was subscribed between the presidents Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) and George W. Bush (2001–2009) in April 2006 in replacement of the 'Law of Andean Commercial Promotion and Eradication of Drugs'. After a long process of economic, legal and technical negotiations and adjustments before passing in the U.S. Congress, President Alan Garcia (2006–2011) and George Bush approved the implementation of the FTA in early 2009.

[9] For a detailed analysis of the unconstitutionality of the decrees, see the report commissioned by Oxfam (2008).

Fig. 8.1 The great enclosure: lines of the state of emergency in the Peruvian Amazon 2009 (Source: Map by Paulo Tavares)

of key activists.[10] State violence was not met without resistance. The conflicts at the *Curva del Diablo* in early June marked both the culmination of the government's repressive campaign as well as a decisive turning point to the 'Amazon Insurgency', as the long-standing indigenous mobilization of 2009 became known in Peru. The violent mishandling of the situation by the government generated widespread reactions locally as well as internationally, and instead of retreating, public pressure increased manifold. Solidarity marches took place in various Andean cities and got support of tens of thousands in the capital Lima, expanding the mobilization across different segments of the Peruvian society, including indigenous peasants of the Sierra, miners, urban workers, teachers, students and middle-class liberal professionals, whom together eventually forced president Alan Garcia to suspend the decrees and initiate debates about the forestland reforms (Arce 2009).

For a nation like Peru, still healing from a long civil war fought between an extremely violent counterinsurgent state and equally murderous guerrillas that had

[10]The state of emergency was imposed in four districts of eastern Peru, including Loreto, Amazonas, Ucayali and Cusco. In the aftermath of Bagua, the president of AIDESEP, Alberto Pizango, was charged with sedition and sought asylum in the embassy of Nicaragua and later had to flee the country. For a journalistic account of the events, see *Peruvian Times* (2009).

converted practically the entire country into a generalized emergency zone for almost two decades, the events in Bagua had deep historical-political connotations. Starting from the mid-1980s during the second presidency of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980–1985) – the first democratically elected government after 12 years of military rule – and continuing throughout the first mandate of young President Alan Garcia (1985–1990), the armed insurgents of the Left-wing groups Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionário Tupac Amaru (MRTA) increasingly intensified and amplified the geographical reach of their actions. In parallel, the whole of Peruvian society underwent a process of progressive militarization as the nation's territory was gradually locked up into several military-controlled areas. By the time Alberto Fujimori was elected president in 1990, one-third of the Peru's provinces, including the capital Lima, was under exceptional law, and more than half of the country's population had constitutional rights suspended (Poole and Rénique 1992: 13). Informed by Cold War's counterinsurgency doctrine, the military interpreted every form of political activism as a potential base of support for the guerrillas and systematically targeted the civilian population, particularly in the shanty towns of major cities and indigenous villages of the Sierra. Those same sites and communities were also the object of Sendero's 'people's war'. Whereas state repression followed very closely the class and racial-based spatial cleavages that structured colonial/postcolonial Peruvian society, at the opposite side but with equal brutality, Sendero's vicious tactics of polarizing the conflict by trying to 'eliminate' the moderate opposition led to widespread killing of peasants, urban workers and human rights activists and to the collective punishment of entire indigenous communities who most often resisted the party's attempt to impose its radical interpretation of Maoism into their cultural and political milieus.[11] After 5 April 1992 – the date that President Alberto Fujimori dissolved the Congress, disbanded the judiciary and declared a self-imposed coup with support of the military – state repression grew more powerful and pervasive. Vowing to decisively eliminate the guerrillas, Fujimori allowed the military to conduct the counterinsurgency war with greater autonomy and impunity, unleashing a campaign of terror throughout the urban and rural peripheries of Peru. The use of torture, kidnappings, enforced disappearance and extrajudicial executions became even more systematic, while the government further curtailed channels for political dissidence by making use of a more insidious and secretive intelligence apparatus, enforcing tighter control of social movements, the media and human rights activism.

The greater concentration of power and the escalation of state repression that marked Fujimori's 10-year-long 'emergency government of national reconstruction' came combined with one of the most violent of the neoliberal structural adjustments that were imposed in Latin America during the late 20th century. Like the

[11] The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru concluded that Sendero was the main perpetrator of crimes and human rights violations, stating that it was responsible for almost 54 % of the total number of deaths and cases of disappearances. The full report is available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/index.php

majority of countries in the region at that time, Fujimori inherited Peru's economy in a shambles, engulfed by huge foreign debt and hyperinflation, and similar to most other governments, he opted to abide to the austerity programmes and free-market policies required by the World Bank, IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank to renew financial credit lines. Justified by the necessity to contain Sendero's murderous war, the exceptional powers assumed by Fujimori, combined with the militarized state he presided, allowed him to swiftly impose a radical deregulation and privatization of Peru's economy and enforce drastic cuts in public spending with little political friction. The effects of the sudden and almost complete withdrawal of social security and agricultural subsidies, combined with the sharp rise in the prices of basic needs such as food, water and energy caused by the deregulation of the economy, were of course most severely felt by the population of the poor, who formed the large majority of the country and who also happened to be the ones who suffered the most from the cross-violence of the armed conflict. As early as November 1992, according to data gathered by anthropologist Gerardo Rénique (Poole and Rénique 1992), the effects of Fujimori's economic reforms had nearly doubled the number of Peruvians living according to the UN definition of 'absolute poverty', reaching 13 million people out of a total population of 22 million.

The popular name coined to describe Fujimori's neoliberal package was 'Fujishock', a term which reflected both its latent violence as well as its conceptual filiations to what the neoliberal extremists of the Chicago School in the mid-1970s called the 'shock treatment' – a political-economic rationale which contends that painful adjustments that are necessary to install free-market regimes are facilitated if imposed in a rapid and drastic manner, taking advantage of a state of crisis in the social field. As Naomi Klein (2007) shows in her insightful genealogy of 'the shock doctrine', a context of collective trauma or social-psychological breakdown was considered beneficial by the Chicago School's ideologues because it served to neutralize the collateral sociopolitical effects generated by the adjustments. Since its original elaboration by economist Milton Friedman and his team while helping to design the economic reforms that were launched in Chile after the coup d'état conducted by Augusto Pinochet in 1973, Klein argues that the remarkable historical conjunction between the implementation of shock treatments and authoritarian political rule exposes a structural relation that exists between the making of neoliberal regimes and state violence. Rather than an expression of the irrationality of illiberal governments, 'some of the most infamous human-rights violations of this era were in fact either committed with the deliberate intent of terrorizing the public or actively harnessed to prepare the ground for the introduction of radical free-market reforms' (Klein 2007: 10). Seen through this lens, Fujimori's state terror was not marginal to the neoliberal agenda he promoted but a determinant factor in defining the conditions of shock and containment that were necessary to absorb the disastrous effects unleashed by the liberalization of the market.

These collectively shared memories were brought up alongside the events in Bagua, for the conflict was fought against the actualization of the very same power mechanism, one according to which neoliberal governmentality is not opposed to but in fact sustained by authoritarian means of political containment. The leader of the

populist Centre-Left party APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) – one of the most important political forces in the modern history of Peru – President Alan Garcia, whose first government (1985–1990) was initiated with a nationalist and anti-IMF platform but ended opening up the path to financial orthodoxy, was indeed only expanding the agenda that had been firmly established during Fujimori's decade. In that sense, Peru followed a common historical trajectory to most of Latin America. Forged by the alliance between capitalist elites and hardline military officials, the terror states that ruled over Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and many other countries in the continent during the Cold War must be counted as decisive forces in preparing the political and economic terrain for the neoliberal regimes that were latter consolidated during the process of 'transition to democracy'. Hence, the forceful argument made by historian Greg Grandin (2004) that the liberal democracies installed in post-dictatorship Latin America must be interpreted not so much as representing a complete negation of the violence through which the military governed, but in fact, at least in some very significant dimensions, as the very product of such violence. The case of Peru is exemplary of this historical continuity. Generally regarded as mainly responsible for dismantling nearly all guerrilla activity and successfully controlling the macroeconomy, the shocks launched by Alberto Fujimori (who now serves 25 years in prison for the human rights atrocities committed by state forces under his presidency) came to define the basic lines of the pro-free-market governmental framework that was adopted by the two subsequent governments of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) and Alan Garcia (2006–2011). Today, among many sectors of the Peruvian landed and financial elites, as well as for the community of orthodox neoliberals who collaborated in shaping the 'Fuji-shock', the reforms enforced by Fujimori are still held in positive balance, regardless of the fact that the much-heralded political and economic stability brought alongside the instalment of neoliberalism came at the price of the dramatic reduction of democratic spaces and a wider rift between rich and poor.

Since 2000, when Fujimori was ousted from presidency amidst gross scandals of corruption, Peru gradually emerged as one of the world's fastest growing economies. In recent years, the country has presented GDP growth rates of over 6 %, a remarkable performance in comparison to other similar-sized economies that was mostly driven by the massive enlargement of its resource extraction sector since the mid-1990s. Following the privatization of traditionally state-owned industrial assets and the implementation of mining-friendly laws by the government of Fujimori, in the last two decades, the volume of mining operations in Peru has tripled, and the land area devoted to mineral exploration has increased from 4 to 18 million hectares (Moran 2001). Both the governments of Toledo and Garcia promoted further expansion of resource frontiers also by opening up oil and gas concessions in formerly unexploited areas, notably in Amazonia, as well as by encouraging private investments in the development of large-scale farming of biofuel crops. While the more intensive exploitation of the natural wealth of the Peruvian territory has triggered steady macroeconomic growth, the patterns of capital accumulation remained concentrated, and little has changed with regard to the deep income gap left by Fujimori's neoliberal package. In 2009, when the

'Amazon Insurgency' erupted, as much as 40 % of the Peruvian population lived below the poverty line, and in the Andes that index reached nearly 70 % (Oxfam 2009). Moreover, the deregulation of the resource extraction sector has also produced extremely poor socio-environmental records throughout the country, and in some cases entire communities have been severely affected, as, for example, in the mining city of La Oroya, which is now listed as one of the most impoverished and contaminated regions of the world.

The rapid advancement of resource frontiers in Peru was followed by a significant rise in the number and scale of conflicts around the areas where the government has been attempting to implement these new 'national projects of development'. In December 2008, months before the clashes in Bagua, Peru's Public Defenders Office reported more than 70 active confrontations around mining areas (Oxfam 2009). Fearing the expropriation and depletion of the common resources upon which their lifeworld is structured and seeing little perspectives of socio-economic development and collective well-being in activities such as large-scale mining and oil drilling, peasant and indigenous communities, whose territories are affected most, have increasingly resorted to direct confrontation in order to state their disagreement with the perpetuation of such policies and projects. In turn, inside and around the areas where the extractive industry operates, sites that are generally located at remote zones of the Sierra and the Amazon Basin, there has been going a process of further 'securitization' by more ostensive presence of state armed forces as well as private police units working in the service of transnational corporations. According to former Minister of Defence Alan Wagner, this triangular articulation between state capital security follows a new conception of territorial control that implies 'moving from defensive security to corporate security' (ODECOFROC 2010: 8). The blueprint of this strategy was outlined by Wagner during a special meeting of the Defence Committee of the Peruvian Congress that was held in September 2006 to discuss issues related to the porous border with Ecuador along the Cordillera del Cóndor, a mountainous forest ecosystem over which state control is severely limited by topographical and ecological conditions and which in the last decade has been under increasing pressure due to the large mineral reserves of its subsoil. This frontier zone also covers the area of the Ichigkat Muja National Reserve, a protected area whose jurisdiction overlaps with the traditional territory inhabited by the Awajún and Wampís indigenous peoples. It was from this region that the large majority of the contingent of protesters marched to set up blockades at the Curva del Diablo 3 years later. In the face of mounting reaction of local populations, the introduction of this novel model of 'neoliberal sovereignty' has been articulated foremost by the intent of enforcing tighter political containment in those troubled zones, particularly in the region of Cordillera del Condor, where popular mobilizations have been closely followed by sustained and acute repression. Transnational corporations have reportedly lobbied the Peruvian government to remove key activists from 'conflictive mining communities' located around this area. In some cases the logic of corporate security has been held responsible for gross human rights violations, as, for example, in the infamous episode of Monterrico Metals, a British-owned mining company that was brought

to court under accusations of false imprisonment and torture during protests carried out by indigenous groups in 2005.[12]

'Democracy is now but a shade of its former substance. This is Cold War terror's most important legacy', sentenced the historian Greg Grandin (2004: 198). Starting with the coup against freely elected president Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the U.S.-backed counterinsurgent states that in the following decades gradually spread throughout Latin America, once observed from a continental perspective, reveal that the logic of the Cold War was grounded on a broader conflict – 'an international civil war' not only between capitalism and communism but 'between different views of the shape that social citizenship would take' (Grandin 2004: 17). In the context of the promises brought in by the defeat of fascism and ensuing movements for decolonization in Africa and Asia, mid-20th-century Latin America was populated by various social forces that, while advancing a commitment to the enlargement of economic welfare and popular political participation, were forging novel and radical forms of democratic practices. In many different dimensions, what these social movements were doing was in fact radicalizing the democratic elements of liberalism which, although intrinsic to the formation of the republican states that were born out of decolonization in the 19th century, had thus far been primarily used as a means to justify and perpetuate economic and political domination by restricted elite groups. Peasants and working class organizations, Marxist and socialist activists, nationalists, radical Catholic missionaries and many other manifestations of the multifaceted and vigorous Left that populated Latin America at that time cultivated liberal notions of freedom and liberty, yet they came to define freedom as immediately attached to social and economic equality rather than strictly individualism. There were of course many contradictions and paradoxes in this regional conjecture, which assumed different forms according to the historical specificity of each country, and which was inevitably conditioned by the power structures that shaped those societies. Nevertheless, the political scenario of the region in the years after the Second World War shared similar demands for social and economic reforms, which were promoted by different parties and individuals aligned to the left, both communist and non-communist, who facing the growing pressure of mass movements that emerged from a novel middle class and urban working class as well as a more organized peasantry promoted certain visions of social citizenship that challenged the order of privilege which had historically ruled over Latin America.

This is not to say that all individuals and organizations that advocated for reforms were immune to the compromises of Cold War's realpolitik. In Brazil and Argentina, for example, while advancing a popular agenda based on sovereignty and

[12] The political pressure exerted by corporations for the Peruvian government to 'rotate' teachers, Catholic bishops and other professionals who act as community leaders in such conflict zones was revealed by cables of the U.S. embassy released by Wikileaks. Such measures were directly related to the zone where Monterrico Metals operated. See Webb (2011) and Cobain (2009). For a comprehensive report on the relation between Peru's expanding resource extraction frontier and social conflicts, see the report by Oxfam (2009).

development, some nationalist sectors openly flirted with fascism and later supported the authoritarianism of the military, whereas in other cases, particularly in Peru, the radicalization of the Left led to the formation of violent and totalitarian ideologies of social order. But this is to claim that, nevertheless, at least from the perspective of Latin America, one of the most important objectives of the counterinsurgency strategy developed during the Cold War was not so much concerned with the potential instalment of one-party communist regimes in the continent but in fact with a radical form of 'socialized democracy' that was being advanced by many forces and segments of those societies, insofar as the socio-economic and political transformations implied in that process threatened both the hegemonic power of local ruling classes as well as the geo-political influence of the U.S. over the region. The coup against the nationalist government of Arbenz in 1954 – who in his inaugural speech promised to convert Guatemala from 'a predominantly feudal economy into a modern capitalist state' (Streeter 2000: 18) – is certainly one of the most notable cases in that respect, as well as the coup against the labour government of João Goulart in Brazil in 1964. Both of them blocked a set of reforms – especially land reforms – which, when taking into consideration the extremely unequal structures inherited from colonialism, can only be interpreted as fundamentally democratic rather than as potential seeds of totalitarianism.

Forged through the violence of Cold War's politics of containment, the (neo) liberal democracies installed in Latin America during the period of transition to constitutional rule are in many ways the products of destruction of this democratic agenda that were being formulated in the aftermath of the Second World War. Defeated by state terror, this socialized understanding of democracy and citizenship was translated into a less participative, more procedural and indeed more restrictive notion, less associated with social security and economic equality and more with individualism and personal freedom. As Greg Grandin (2004) argues, Cold War's terror operated a redefinition of democracy that was decisive in preparing the ground for the instalment of the free-market ideology that later became hegemonic in the continent. The state of fear engendered by the systematic censuring, persecution, criminalization, imprisonment and execution of individuals that were disseminated throughout the spaces of everyday life resulted not only in the near annihilation of ideological opposition but also in the complete disruption of the bonds between individuals and their social networks, in the breaking up of ties between collectives and common spaces and in the reduction of citizenship to minimal public engagement. 'This divorce between self and solidarity', Grandin writes, 'was the fundamental requirement of Latin America neoliberal regimes' (Grandin 2004: 198).

The historical context in Peru was in some ways very similar and in others totally distinct but in general more acute and, once again, exemplary of that process of 'reshaping democracy by restricting it', as described above. The military came to power in Peru in 1968 through a coup conducted by reformist army officials against the first government of Fernando Belaunde Terry (1963–1968). Headed by nationalist General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the initial 7 years of military government promoted a political agenda that combined state-led modernization with a set of popular reforms, including an unprecedented land reform. On the one hand, Alvarado's

commitment to enlarge social and economic welfare was an intrinsic part of the government's strategy to tame the radical left not only by force but also by absorbing popular demands through centralized programmes of development. On the other hand, while sectors of the Left criticized the authoritarian and capitalist character of the reforms, Alvarado's anti-imperialist discourse and his project to dismantle the last vestiges of an agro-exporter oligarchic order and replace it with modernized state capitalism agglutinated large sectors of the working class and peasant organizations and ended up being responsible for enlarging spaces of popular political mobilization. In opposition, as a means to combat Velasco's statism, liberal Right-wing elites adopted a much more radical stance in favour of a free-market regime, engendering a renewed ideological apparatus that would be decisive to the political scenario of the following decades (Poole and Rénique 1992).

Faced with debt and economic recession, a more radicalized Left and growing pressure from the upper classes, Velasco's leadership lost force, and in 1975 moderate military officers seized power to establish a 'transition government' that led to the second election of Belaunde Terry in 1979. Undoing the strong state economy built during Velasco's rule turned into the central objective of the IMF-infused austerity programmes implemented in the 1980s and the neoliberal shocks of the 1990s. Throughout that process, subsequent governments had to confront the vigorous popular movements gestated during the previous years as well as the expanding force of the insurgent guerrillas. Mutually supporting each other, the combination between the progressive liberalization of the economy and the increasing militarization of the state helped not only to contain the political grievances that those movements had in relation to the neoliberal adjustments, but also, and no less importantly, it helped to place the values embodied in the free-market agenda championed by the liberal right as the only ideological challenge to Sendero's murderous war. By its own turn, the widespread violence inflicted by the guerrillas on the social and cultural milieu of peasant and working class organizations reinforced the Right's intent to reduce the political spectrum to a polarized conflict between freedom and terror, the former represented by the tenets of free market and private property, the latter by the totalitarian communist utopia of Sendero. Caught in the middle of the crossfire, the broader vision of 'commons' embodied in the social movements that coagulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s had little space to develop. In Peru the militarization of the state was not only the supra-economic force that enabled the frictionless introduction of neoliberal order, but neoliberalism itself assumed the form of counterinsurgency doctrine. This is never more evident than in the work of economist Hernando de Soto (1989), a leading neoliberal intellectual in Peru who was decisive in shaping Fujimori's shock treatment and whose influential study on the Peruvian informal economy synthesized the ideology that the only antithesis to the illiberal forces of 'collectivism' was to promote a form of citizenship and political subjectivity forged on the models of individualism, private property and the freedom of the market.

This polarization still runs deep into the current political context of Peru. Faced with the mass resistance that culminated in the conflict in Bagua in 2009, President Alan Garcia tried to frame the situation according to that same logic when he

immediately condemned the demonstrations as acts of 'terrorism' and brought legal charges of the kind against key protesters (Zibechi 2009). His perspective echoed the interpretations of some sectors of the U.S. intelligence establishment, which considers that, rather than enhancing democracy, the growing indigenous activism of recent years in Latin America might pose future risks to the political stability of the region (National Intelligence Council 2004). It also resonated with similar situations in other countries of the continent, as, for example, in Chile and Ecuador, where governments have recently made use of antiterror laws that were introduced in the context of the Cold War's National Security Doctrine to charge indigenous protesters fighting similar conflicts against the expansion of mining and oil drilling activities in their territories (Macdonald 2005). In Peru, the emergency laws that sustained the counterinsurgent state were overturned after Fujimori's downfall, but Alan Garcia's attempt to link the protests of the Awajún and Wampís with the period of Sendero's terror came amidst a broader process of criminalization of social protests that according to rights activists has been practically institutionalized through a set of legislative decrees passed during his government.[13] The state of exception through which Garcia tried to push the land/forest reforms, as if re-enacting Fujimori's counterinsurgent apparatus, demonstrated the conspicuous presence of the legacy of Cold War's state terror operating at the core of the neoliberal governmental framework that was being pushed towards Amazonian lands. By exposing an intimate connection between neoliberalism and exception, the 'Amazon Insurgency' also made visible the determinant role of 'illiberal forces' in shaping modes of citizenship and political subjectivity based exclusively on the spatial-legal form of private property and notions of freedom and security defined according to the imperatives of the market.

While challenging the limits of this project, the Amazon-wide mobilizations in Peru were also recovering common spaces and networks of solidarity that were disrupted by the state of fear that dominated Latin American societies during the Cold War. In the last two decades or so, similar protests over ways of appropriating, managing and sharing collective resources have been a central element in the political landscape of continent, most notably in Peru's neighbour countries Ecuador and Bolivia. Since the 'indigenous uprisings' of the early 1990s, Ecuador has witnessed consecutive mass demonstrations organized by peasant and indigenous organizations, most of them articulated around claims for territorial recognition and/or against the perpetuation of IMF-led 'structural adjustments' that promoted indiscriminate privatization. These movements were decisive in stimulating a much wider process of political mobilization that culminated in the adoption of a new constitutional law after the anti-neoliberal platform of the Left-wing coalition headed by the incumbent president Rafael Correa was elected in 2007.[14] Supported

[13] See the report by NGO Asociación pro Derechos Humanos – APRODEH (2008), *La criminalización de la protesta en el gobierno de Alan Garcia, Serios peligros para los derechos humanos* Peru: Lima.

[14] At the time of writing, few months after the re-election of President Rafael Correa in Ecuador, the political landscape has changed considerably. Largely based on the extractive sector, chiefly oil

by a vigorous indigenous movement of Bolivia, the political rise of President Evo Morales's party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS – Movement Towards Socialism) reflects a similar historical trajectory, which as in Ecuador was characterized by the imposition of emergency laws and state violence, particularly in the context of the conflicts against the privatization of water in Cochabamba in early 2000 and during the so-called gas war against the privatization of natural gas reserves that in 2003 led to the fall of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. Beyond a dissident agenda from the Washington Consensus, these popular movements encompass a broader political claim for the reformulation of democratic practices, manifesting not only a reaction against the ecological dispossession produced by neoliberal enclosures but also a reaction against exclusionary and violent political regimes by which they have been implemented. Ultimately, they call for a radical reformulation of the state apparatus itself, actualizing a historical demand of the indigenous movement that has led to what has been described by some jurists as the 'second wave of Latin America's new constitutionalism', notably expressed by the adoption of the plurinational constitutions of Ecuador in 2007 and Bolivia in 2008.[15]

The first moment of this so-called 'new constitutionalism' emerged in the context of constitutional reforms of the 1990s, which were set in the paradoxical conjecture between the process of 'democratic opening' and the subsequent consolidation of the neoliberal order. During this period, there were significant and unprecedented advancements in relation to the rights of indigenous people, both regionally as well as internationally, a process that followed a broader 'culturalist turn' in the definition of civil rights. This led to the introduction of a set of legal measures aimed at including linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity as part of the reformulation of the national polity. In relation to indigenous cultural and territorial sovereignty, the most meaningful achievement of this period was arguably the Convention 169 on the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the International Labour Organization passed in 1989, currently the most important instrument of international law that guarantees some degree of autonomy to indigenous peoples through mechanisms such as the 'right to free, prior and informed consent' before development projects are implemented into their lands. Of the few countries in the world that have ratified the ILO-169 in the last two decades, most of Latin America is signatory, and elements of the convention have been incorporated into the national legislation of several countries of the region. Efforts to ensure that these abstract legal provisions turn into effective mechanisms operating on the ground have since then defined important lines of indigenous advocacy and political struggle.

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and minerals, President Rafael Correa's model of national development and welfare, although popular among the impoverished population of the country, increasingly faces the opposition of indigenous movements and sectors of the Left that had brought him to power.

[15] The reflections on Latin America's 'new constitutionalism' come from an interview I conducted with Brazilian jurist Carlos Marés in April 2012. The idea of sovereignty being *constituted* by multiple nationalities implies a decisive rupture in the link between 'nation' and 'state' as a single and homogeneous entity. Cultural, ethnic and linguistic difference must be acknowledged and promoted as a form of territorial-governmental organization, granting collective rights over land and resources according to different 'political-ecological' regimes.

Nonetheless, whereas the 'multicultural constitutionalism' of the 1980s–1990s was fundamental in breaking up the homogenizing authoritarianism of inherited regimes and responding to the demands of communities that have been historically marginalized, it also turned functional to the managerial logic that neoliberal governmentality came to attribute to multiculturalism. What at the beginning emerged as a political agenda for the transformation of the constitution of the national polity was gradually absorbed as localized and specific demands of particular 'minority groups'. As the Ecuadorian anthropologist Catherine Walsh argues, the recent constitutional reforms represent a radical shift from the former paradigm because it is no longer a question of asking and demanding from the State what it can do for those peoples and cultures but how the political and cultural institutions that are alive among those communities can contribute to reformulate and rethink the very idea of the State itself (Walsh 2009). Among many others, one of the interesting developments that emerged out of this process has been the introduction of the Rights of Nature in the Ecuadorian constitution (and later in Bolivia). By establishing nature as a subject of law, more than expanding the arena of liberal human rights towards the non-human world, it is the very 'epistemic apparatus' that sustains the modern state and its legal base that is being challenged, which thus far only recognized nature as an object of property and control. Moreover, the very 'subject' of rights is being transformed, moving from the frame individual state towards the frame collective state, insofar as the Rights of Nature are necessarily bound to a subject who is by definition a social-natural collective of which humans are part but not central. Whereas in the 1990s, social mobilizations were foremost articulated around issues of land titling and cultural recognition, the current struggles for land rights are grounded on claims for a form of 'natural recognition', so to say, a conflict through which not only *rights* are being called into question but the very notion of *land* to which those rights are attached and which in turn is reshaping the very constitution and consistency of those rights. Luis Macas, the former president of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador (CONAIE), explained this to me during a recent conversation:

> Our struggle begins in the defence of our territories, to defend this vital environment that is fundamental part of life that is the territory. When we speak about territory, we are not saying 'the territory of the Kichwas' or 'the territory of the Achuar'. We speak about nature. Unfortunately, here, when we talk about territory, it is commonly understood as 'let's give them a piece of land so the community can live. Let's give them land-titles so this people can survive'. Anthropologists have labelled these struggles as 'reclaim struggles': fight for land, for identity, for language… and that is all. But those forms of perceiving the indigenous people are changing, precisely because we believe that indigenous movements are not struggling to reclaim something that is exclusive us, we're fighting for something that has to do with life itself.[16]

The following lines chart out the biopolitical terrain in which 'life itself' appears at the centre of conflict – both as medium by which power is produced, reproduced and circulates, as well as the very material substratum through which resistance is

[16] Interview conducted by the author, February 2012.

being fought out. As a way of concluding this text, I briefly dwell on some of the spatial/territorial implications of the legal recoding introduced by the Forest Law in Peru against which the Amazon Insurgency erupted in 2009. Insofar as neoliberal governmentality is grounded on 'environmental technologies', as Michel Foucault described, the spatial diagram that is drawn below aims at mapping the lines through which an entire ecology of power is being enforced and contested on the ground.

8.2.1 Recoding the Soil

One of the first initiatives of Alan Garcia's second mandate was to try to modify a very specific piece of legislation, Law 28852, also known as the 'Law for the Promotion of Private Investment in Reforestation and Agroforestry', which had been implemented a few days before he assumed power on 28 July 2006.[17] In December the government submitted to Congress a proposal to alter various provisions in the second article of this law that would change the legal framework governing state-held forestlands characterized as *terras eriazas sin coberta boscosa*, a term that can be roughly translated as something in between 'uncultivated/unproductive/wastelands without forest cover'. The alterations would enable those areas to be transferred from the national forest heritage to investors willing to develop activities of agroforestry, reforestation and 'environmental services', such as carbon farms. In order to stimulate private capital investment, the original text of Law 28852 introduced a set of corporate-friendly measures into the regime of state concessions that regulate the use of forestlands rather than full-fledged privatization, adopting a form of legislation more closely associated with the exploration of subsoil resources, such as in case of mineral, oil and gas. Garcia's amendments intended to re-route that legal frame towards an 'agricultural model' based on the rules of the global land market. According to the Peruvian Constitution, lands identified as being 'apt to forest production' are part of the inalienable national patrimony of natural resources and must be managed by state concessions, whereas regimes of private property apply exclusively to lands identified as having more potential to agriculture and grazing. The notion of *forest areas without forest cover* is of significant importance here. The presence of vegetation turned into the index that determined the position of land in relation to law – private property or common heritage – and thus the proposed alterations would virtually convert deforestation into a mechanism by which not only the 'natural nature' but also the 'legal nature' of land could be completely modified.

Project of Law 840/2006-PE – as the amendment proposal is registered in Congress – embodied the DNA of Alan Garcia's neoliberal governmental rationale that would later be radicalized with the new Forest Law presented in Decree 1090. Reflexively, the public reactions it generated were responsible to gather the

[17] *Ley de promoción de la inversion privada En reforestación y agroforesteria*, Ley 28852, implemented on 19 July 2006 under the presidency of Alejandro Toledo.

first campaigns and social mobilizations that escalated to the Amazon-wide conflict in 2009. By practically 'institutionalizing' environmental destruction as a means of enclosure, the reforms would turn the violent practices of the lawless frontiers that advance towards the Peruvian Amazon into the very means through which an entire market-oriented environment could be implemented. The opposition criticized the amendments by arguing that they would stimulate the expansion of illegal extraction of timber, agricultural colonization and land grabbing in indigenous territories and attempted to block its implementation by showing that the proposal violated constitutional law. A central element in that strategy was to demonstrate that the presence of forest cover was not a determinant factor in defining the legal characterization of those lands as 'apt for forest production' and, since they remained as 'legal forests' regardless the conditions of the surface, that deforested zones should continue to be governed by the same constitutional provisions that establish that forests are part of the national heritage and therefore could not be transferred to private hands. Rights activists explained that under Peruvian legislation the concept of forest follows a biogeographic definition that 'embraces a set of elements like the climate, the soil, the vegetation, water, fauna and other elements' and that the relation between land and law are not established exclusively in reference to the surface cover but primordially in relation to 'the conditions of the vulnerability of the soil that goes well beyond the presence or not of the trees' (DARN 2009: 4). The reforms proposed by Garcia were therefore unconstitutional not only because they breached the regime of appropriation and use that governed those lands but also because they violated the very natural concept of forests as defined by Peruvian law.

The characterization of land use in Peru is determined by a national geological index that was institutionalized by Supreme Decree N0062/75-AG. Implemented in 1975 in the context of the Forest and Wildlife Law introduced by the government of Gal. Velasco Alvarado, this decree establishes rules and methods for land classification, distinguishing five great groups according to an economy-driven taxonomy ordered by the 'best-use/productive capacity' of the soil:

1. Lands apt to *cultivo en limpio*, which are highly fertile and suitable for intense agricultural production
2. Lands of *cultivo permanente*, less productive yet capable of accommodating sustained cultivation
3. Pasture lands, which are not suitable for agriculture
4. Lands for forest production
5. Protected lands

At one extreme, *cultivo en limpio* can encompass every other form of use – agricultural, pasture, forest production and protection. At the other extreme, *protected lands* are the ones defined as incapable of sustaining any of the former, for 'even if they present vegetation their use is not economic' and therefore should be designated to other purposes such as 'natural conservation, aesthetic values, social recreation or scientific interest'. In between, forest areas are defined as those that do not present the ecological conditions necessary for agriculture or pasture but can be

explored for timber and other forest products.[18] This combination of biogeographic and legal taxonomies is reflected in variations of the position occupied by each land category in relation to constitutional law. Whereas all types of land are included as part of the national patrimony of natural resources – as defined by Article 66 of the Peruvian Constitution, *Of the Environment and Natural Resources* – only the lands apt for agriculture and pasture are included in the provisions that define land property rights that must be provided and protected by the State, being the property private, communal or belonging to any other form of juridical persona, as defined by Article 88 of the Peruvian Constitution, *Of the Agrarian Regime and Peasant and Indigenous Communities.* Insofar as the lands characterized as forests are governed under provisions of Article 66 and not Article 88, the applicable modes of use and exploration of those areas are governed by a regime of state concessions and cannot be turned into private property like agricultural and grazing lands (DARN 2009).

The Supreme Decree N0062/75-AG also institutes the official form of allocating land into these five categories, establishing that the process of identification must follow a very specific ecological cartography of the Peruvian territory designed according to a model originally developed by American botanist Leslie R. Holdridge. First published in 1947 in *Science* magazine under the title 'Determination of World Plant Formations from Simple Climatic Data' (Holdridge 1947), Holdridge's system is based on a diagram that divides the entire climate range of the Earth into discrete ecological units, which he initially named 'plant formations' and later 'lifezones'. Through mathematical operations, a combination between bioclimate data such as temperature, precipitation and estimated evapotranspiration is equated with different patterns of vegetation and soil, forming a global abstract grid of 'plant formations/lifezones' that can be applied to the codification of complex environmental settings. According to this model, the best capacity of land use is defined in relation to the climate factors that condition a certain lifezone and inside each lifezone according to edaphic characteristics. In order to oppose the government's proposal to reform Law 28852, rights activists held on to the legality of the ecologically oriented framework that is intrinsic to Holdridge's model of land classification, arguing that the amendments violated the 'juridical nature' of forestlands. The law that governs those lands is therefore defined not in relation to the surface cover but to its integral biogeographic consistency as part of a specific lifezone, which includes but is not limited to 'plant formations' and which ultimately must be characterized by climatic and geological variables (DARN 2009).

Holdridge's diagram expresses the paradoxical yet complementary logic of environmentalism that was forged through Cold War's resource race. On the one hand, the maps generated by the lifezone modelling system are the products of the decisive influence that the episteme of ecology had on scientific practices of that time, and as such the cartographies embody a certain environmental ethos informed by the intent of 'harmonizing' anthropogenic action with the dynamics and limited capacities of the Earth's ecosystems. On the other hand, the diagram offered a relatively easy and fast methodology for charting out resources and locating economic

[18] Reglamento de Clasificación de Tierras, Decreto Supremo N° 0062/75-AG.

land potential over large territorial extensions, thus reflecting the rationale of the development doctrine that dominated inter-American relations in that period. Holdridge elaborated the world lifezone diagram based on the vast information and knowledge he accumulated about the ecology of tropical environments while working for the U.S. government on botanic and climatic research projects in the Caribbean and South America. During the 1950s, he developed the model further as the director of the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, the agricultural development branch of the Organization of the American States (OAS) was founded in 1948. In collaboration with U.S. development offices and international aid institutions and in some cases with direct support of the U.S. military, the OAS founded the production of lifezone maps for a series of countries in Latin America during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (Zimmerer 2011).

The first lifezone classification map of the Peruvian territory was designed in 1958 by the American geographer Joseph A. Tosi, at the time an associate researcher at the IICA and a close collaborator to Holdridge (Tosi 1958). Accompanying the multicoloured cartographies of the *Ecologic Map of Peru* (Figs. 8.2 and 8.3), a descriptive catalogue authored by Tosi and Holdridge was published under the title *Natural Life Zones of Peru* (Tosi 1958), replacing the original expression 'vegetal formation' to 'lifezones', the term that latter named Holdridge's updated and definitive version of the diagram presented in the book *Life Zone Ecology* of 1967 (Holdridge 1967). This modification was conceptual, a contemporary commentator noted, and should be attributed to the fact that the scientists wanted to shift the emphasis from 'the presumed original plant cover, admittedly extensively modified almost everywhere, to the climatic elements on which the system is really based' (Persons 1962: 278). The 271-page catalogue provided a detailed textual characterization of climate, topography and soil for each of the 33 lifezones that compose the incredible biodiversity of the Peruvian territory and illustrated each of them with photographic representations of respective 'natural vegetation typologies' (Figs. 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6). The authors also presented a series of recommendations on land use potential and limitations for every 'ecological unit', suggesting basic directions for territorial planning, conservation policies and future modes of occupation. The publication of the ecological map of Peru by the ICCA/OAS came amidst a process of growing 'governmentalization' of the forest areas of the country, which ran in parallel with an unprecedented expansion of colonization schemes directed towards the Amazon. Joseph Tosi's cartography anticipated the creation of the Office for Evaluation of Natural Resources (ONERN) in 1961, the foundation of the FAO-sponsored Institute of Forest Research in 1963 and the implementation of the first proper Forest Law of Peru by President Fernando Belaunde Terry in 1963. In the context of the U.S.-aligned government of Belaunde, which counted on large financial support of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, the lifezone classification of the Peruvian territory served foremost to guide planners and developers on the implementation of Belaunde's ambitious plan for colonizing/modernizing the Amazon through major roadworks. Although in the catalogue that accompanied the map Tosi and Holdridge are outspokenly critical about the penetration of highways into the more humid parts of the Amazon Basin, specially aimed at agricultural

Fig. 8.2 Lifezoning cartography: Mapa Ecologico del Peru (Source: ONERN 1976)



Fig. 8.3 Leslie R. Holdridge's diagram of Peru's ecology (Source: ONERN 1976)



Fig. 8.4 Cover of guide to the ecological map of Peru showing Leslie Holdridge's diagram

FOTO N° 51
Bosque húmedo - Tropical (bh-T): Proximidad a la localidad de Nueva Requena en el departamento de Loreto. Es un bosque clímax con alrededor de 2,500 especies arbóreas de las cuales aproximadamente 500 han sido clasificadas. Los árboles son de gran desarrollo, hasta 40 metros de altura así como palmas con "bejucos" y "lianas".
FOTO : V. Grande (ONERN).



FOTO N° 52
Bosque húmedo - Tropical (bh - T): Afluente del río Santiago sobre su margen izquierda. La vegetación es propia de las zonas ribereñas.
FOTO : V. Grande (ONERN).

Fig. 8.5 Land taxonomy: extracts from the descriptive guide accompanying the lifezoning map of Peru (Source: Version of 1995, based on the original version designed by Tosi [1958], Chap. 47: Tropical humid forest [bh-T])

FOTO N° 53

Bosque húmedo - Tropical (bh - T): Asociación hidromórfica de esta Zona de Vida cercana a la ciudad de Iquitos en el departamento de Loreto. El "aguaje" (Mauritia flexuosa) representa una palmácea que prolifera en las zonas del mal drenaje de la amazonía peruana y cuyo fruto de altó tenor graso es motivo de estudios e investigaciones para su posible industrialización.

FOTO : W. Danjoy (ONERN).

Fig. 8.6 Land taxonomy: extracts from the descriptive guide accompanying the lifezoning map of Peru (Source: Version of 1995, based on the original version designed by Tosi [1958], Chap. 47: Tropical humid forest [bh-T])

Note: Chap. 47, section E: actual and potential use of land: 'The original population, consisted of tribal groups, uses the resources only for subsistence without causing major changes into the ecology.… A largest portion of the total area of tropical-forest is ecologically capable of producing great quantities of wood, basis for the development of an industrial complex of timber production inside the jungle itself, which is the real and maximal potential of the region'

colonization, they described tropical forests as vast resource terrains that could potentially support industrial production of lumber, paper and products of cellulose chemistry and recommended that those areas would be best placed as part of a national reserve.

Only in 1975, with Supreme Decree N0062/75-AG, did the lifezone cartography turn into law. This was followed by the publication of an updated version of the *Ecological Map of Peru* (1976) and a corresponding national map of land use potential by ONERN (1981) (see Appendix Fig. 8.7). Following the geo-taxonomy established by the decree, this latter cartography describes the territory of Peru as formed by 3.81 % of lands apt for '*cultivo en limpio*'; 2.11 % of lands are apt for '*cultivo permanente*'; 13.84 % are defined as pasture lands; 37.89 % are defined as forestlands; and 42.25 % are defined as protected lands (Fig. 8.8). Through the implementation of the 1975 Forest Law (Law 21147), which substituted the legislation of 1963, the nationalist government of Gal. Velasco Alvarado incorporated the recommendations of Holdridge and Tosi, establishing that every land defined as forest was part of the inalienable national heritage. In 2000, while attempting to revert what is currently described as the 'socialist influence'[19] of the 1975 Forest Law, Fujimori's government successfully passed a new legislation introducing a more flexible and corporate-oriented concession regime. Nevertheless, forestlands remained part of the national patrimony and were thus not turned into private property. Decree 1090 – Alan Garcia's new Forest Law instituted on 28 July 2008 – was an attempt to recode precisely those lands, taking out the 37.89 % of the territory defined as 'forest' from the national heritage, most of which is located in the Amazon Basin. Hence, the claim held by the opposition that 64 % of the Peruvian Amazon – i.e. all the forest areas that are not defined as 'protected lands' – could be suddenly converted into private property. Decree 1090 was in fact the means that would institutionalize one of the largest movements of enclosure in modern history and, by virtue of the force of law, potentially unleash a radical transformation of the very nature of Amazonia.

Besides expressing the continuous resistance against land dispossession and erosion of customary rights of indigenous peoples, the conflicts that culminated in the Curva del Diablo rendered visible a disagreement over the monolithic notion of nature that was being inscribed by the new Forest Law. If ecology can be conceptualized as politics, it must be defined as a theory and a practice that is less concerned with the ethical imperatives of 'saving' or 'protecting' nature rather than with the necessity to destabilize the very hegemonic notion of nature that is being actualized through recent neoliberal enclosures. In that sense, the crucial conflict fought in the Amazon was not so much to defend land rights but to resist the imposition of a concept of land that threatened the socioecological diversity that historically shaped those territories. While describing the history of the Amazon Insurgency, the chapter has tried to show how a series of legal mechanisms functioned as design tools inside a technology of power that is fundamentally environmental. In order to

[19] This is the term that is used today in the official website of the Peruvian Government to describe the 1975 Forest Law.



Fig. 8.7 Ecology coded by law: map of land use potential of Peru (Source: ONERN (1981). Notes: 3.81 % of lands apt for 'cultivo en limpio', 2.11 % of lands apt for 'cultivo permanente', 13.84 % of pasture lands, 37.89 % of forestlands and 42.25 % are considered protected lands)



Fig. 8.8 Political-legal enclosure: analysis of the geological index map of Peru (maps by Paulo Tavares) (Note: 37.89 % of the territory is defined as forestlands. Taking out the area which is legally defined as protected lands and indigenous territories, 64 % of the Peruvian Amazon would be potentially re-legislated by the new Forest Law. This area practically overlaps with the lines that demarcated the state of emergency in 2009)

liberate 'natural materials' to circulate freely as commodities in the networks of the global market, Alan Garcia's government projected a completely new cartography over Amazonia through the legal recoding of its soils, attempting to enhance certain flows through the enforcement of new boundaries. The logic behind this form of governmentality combines neoliberal forms of managing resources with primitive forms of expropriation – at the same time, circulation and confinement. Starting with Fujimori's shock doctrine, the history of the implementation of neoliberalism in Peru illuminates the dialectics between these two apparently opposed but interconnected poles – free-market policies and strategies of containment, liberalization and encircling – thus demonstrating that the ideology of freedom promoted through economic laissez-faire is intrinsically related to the enforcement of a set of restrictions which, non-rarely, assume the form of repression. Enclosures were not only legal and territorial but, above all, political. Articulated at the same time in congress and on the ground, an exceptional state was employed as a legal-political mechanism through which the reorganization of an entire ecology could come into force. The curtailing of civil rights and the erosion of the rights to communing are operating to mutually reinforce each other.[20]

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[20] This is the crucial point of the much necessary manifesto written by Peter Linebaugh (2008). Linebaugh recalls that the elaboration of 'The Great Charter of the Liberties of England' in 1215, the landmark medieval law that limited the king's power over its subjects, was accompanied by the formulation of another law named 'The Charter of the Forest', which guaranteed access to the common forests of the kingdom. The former provided political rights, the latter limiting material expropriation: the right to the practice of communing was integral to minimize state power over people, it was a freedom guarantee. Hence, Linebaugh's conclusion, that one and the other are mutually constitutive and, reversely, that enclosures have been historically related to the erosion of civil and political liberties. Conflicts around resource extraction operations carried out by large corporations in indigenous territories have been escalating in the last few years in many countries in Latin America, chiefly in Peru, whose recent high index of GDP growth is heavily dependent on raw earth exports. In turn, resource extraction sites have become more securitized and militarized, while protests are constantly dealt with through exceptional political measures. In May 2012, the region of Cuzco was again put under a 30-day state of emergency after violent clashes erupted during indigenous protests against the Swiss mining corporation Xstrata plc.

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Chapter 9
Politics of Truth and Pious Economies

Michael Dillon

9.1 The Religio-political Nexus of the Modern Age

From the 17th century onwards, all political and governmental debate addressed the question of the effectiveness as well as the legitimacy of rule, effectiveness in relation to securing the peace and prosperity of domestic populations as a concomitant of securing the best form of government. Somewhat contra Foucault, what Foucault calls the royal questions of power concerning the derivation and exercise of sovereignty, the division of powers and the organization of the offices and revenues of the sovereign (cameralism) always also addressed how the favoured form of government would improve, renew or advance the material conditions of the subjects of the sovereign. The issues of the commonweal – whether it was construed as subject, citizen or people – and of its improvement and renewal as a matter of the good order supplied by rule were always addressed as well. It was axiomatic that the right form of government was one that would necessarily also lead to the improvement of the conditions of populations. How people were governed was necessarily correlated, then, with how well they were governed in respect of provision not only for their basic material means of subsistence but also for their religious and civic training. There were none that argued for the rule of liberty, equality and representation, alone, or indeed for that of divine right or tradition.

Royal questions of rule were therefore also tied up with what Foucault called the conduct of conduct, more generally, and with welfare of the commonweal, however, the commonweal was figured. Hence, from the very early days of modern political rule, sovereigns were always also in the market for strategic ideas about how to govern populations and, in particular, how to govern them in ways that also made them more productive, since productivity was closely associated with both domestic

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peace and tranquillity at home as well as geo-political power abroad. The two went together. They still do, not least in terms of the development of financial systems in the late 20th as much as in the 18th century and of novel financial mechanisms strategically driven to finance war as much as they were commercially driven to promote trade (Brewer 1988; Brantlinger 1996; de Goede 2005). Indeed, once more, the two could hardly be separated. So far as the modern state was concerned, Churches could be strategic partners in these enterprises, for the Christian Churches were also in the business of rule particularly in respect of governing the conduct of conduct. But they also had a long track record of being violent strategic adversaries and competitors with one another as well as with the state.

The point about the evangelically inspired Christian Churches in particular, such as the Lutherans and contemporary Pentecostal evangelicals to which reference is made later, is precisely that their activities were never confined to the spiritual realm. Their work has been part of the vast reformation of Christian confession in which a foundational issue as old as St. Augustine recurrently comes to the fore (O'Donovan 2003; O'Donovan and O'Donavon 2004; Wallace 2004). It now arises under the novel conditions set by political, economic and commercial as well as scientific modernization and development. Modernity did not therefore settle the problem of the religio-political nexus of truth and rule. It refigured it in ways that continue to exceed its enframing by secularism as well as fundamentalism.

Critics write as if there is, however, something integral to the Foucauldian analytics that inspire this chapter, which somehow 'marginalize' the interrogation of forces at work in the modern transformation of truth and rule that Foucault nonetheless also frankly acknowledged – such as those, for example, of dominance, brute extraction and primitive accumulation. Others similarly claim that Foucault's interrogation of discursive practices of biopower, so influential in critical development studies, and of the orientation of power around the properties of species being rather than the subject is somehow not 'material' (Wilson 2012), as if such dispositifs were not themselves brutally material and experienced in brutally material ways. It is a curious account of materiality that excludes such practices from the realm of materiality. Foucault certainly did not (c.f., e.g. the later lectures in *Society Must Be Defended*, 2003, where he discusses the racism and genocide implicit in biopolitics). What crass materiality is it that cannot also recognize that the very processes of materialization always already signify more and less than they materialize? That rules of truth and truths of rule – the rites of material manifestation – make things happen and confer a concreteness materially exceeding 'materiality' by manifesting a world (Schwartz 2008), albeit a world of exploitation, injustice and self-aggrandizement.

Much of this debate comes down to what Foucault called the politics of truth and to how thinkers come to be read through them (2007); in other words, the complex processes of pedagogy, politicization and depoliticization bound up with the correlations of truth and rule. Suffice to say that Foucault never attempted to address all aspects of the manifold of modern power relations, that he continuously stressed that he was not trying to develop a general model of power and that he did not say that biopower succeeded sovereign power. But he did draw an important distinction

between domination and power, observing that, while domination of course existed, one of the features distinguishing the plural and diverse as well as changing manifold of modern power relations was the way in which these worked through the specified freedoms of modern subjectification.

Novel ways of disciplining bodies were an additional aspect of modern power relations that he observed. Another seemed focused less on sovereignty, individual bodies or the freedom of subjects – which did not thereby mean that sovereignty, individual bodies or subjectification ceased to be points of application for power relations – than on the properties of species existence, for which dispositif of power relations he borrowed and adapted the term 'biopower'. Population was a specific – material – point of application for the operationalization of biopower. Foucault continually also repeated the classically observed point that government had to take into account the nature of the thing being governed. In his insistence on the correlation between knowledge and power, he also noted how knowledge provides an account of the nature of things that makes them amenable to governance; albeit rendering things knowable in different ways opens them up to being governed in different ways as well. One of the ways in which the politics of truth takes place is the operationalization of power/knowledge.

In no place and in no way, then, did Foucault proscribe the interrogation of domination, of the dispositif of sovereign power or indeed of any other manifestation of power relations such as that, for example, of structural concentrations of state and corporate power capable of exercising forms, and forces, of domination with global and psychic reach unattainable in previous centuries (Butler 1997). If other aspects of modern power relations have been 'marginalized' – for whom? where? and how? – such marginalization is not warranted by Foucault.

Foucault may be more fairly criticized, however, for the European and Franco-centric parochialism of his account of the development of power relations to which he devoted his attention (Stoler 1995). Many of the distinguishing features of modern power relations to which he drew attention emerged simultaneously also in European colonies and plantations and in England, Holland and the Americas as much as they did in France and Germany (Rusnock 2002; Cassedy 1969), including early and brutal forms of biopower in Ireland as well (Petty 1690; Buck 1977, 1982). So what? Equally, he can be justly criticized for neglecting the contribution to novel technologies of government, made by the revision of Christian pastoral power that followed the break-up of Christianity into rival Christian Churches. Moreover, except for his reports on the Iranian Revolution (Afary and Anderson 2005), Foucault had little to say about the mutual implication of religion and politics so characteristic even then of modern politics nationally and internationally.

There are many gaps and lacunae in Foucault's work that are not mandated by that work but which leave an opportunity, instead, to extend the kind of questioning that he pioneered, such as that specifically here of the politics of truth. Many such gaps can also be addressed simultaneously, since the revision of modern religious power relations had as much to do with the participation of the Christian Churches in the global spread of commercial imperialism, racism and colonial conquest, for

example, as it did with their participation in shaping the scientific and social mores as well as power relations of modern societies and states.

Since Constantine (306–337 AD), Christianity had defined itself in relation to the secular authorities and demands of imperial power as much as it had in relation to the soteriological and spiritual power of its God. Similarly, from the 17th century onwards, so also did the Reformed Christian Churches of northern Europe in particular define themselves in relation to the newly emerging national and international power relations instituted or patronized by the modern state, such as disciplinary and biopower, as they did to the reformed interpretation of their God and his worship. Christian Churches, along with other religions, now construed by neoliberal governmentality as 'faith-based communities', continue to do the same today.

God had only ever been one pole, or point, of problematization and application, however, for the development of Christian politics of truth. From the very inception of Christ's ministry, let alone Paul's revolutionary interpretation of it so influential among Pentecostal evangelical churches in the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa today (Marshall 2010; Chan 2003; Robbins 2010), its relation with secular political authorities had always been another. The very differentiation of the secular from the spiritual was itself originally a theologico-political accomplishment of the Christian differentiation of eternity from finitude and of God from Man (Augustine 1984; Markus 1988). The secular is then a religio-political trope, and modern secularization a reference to how a swing from the religious to the secular became a defining feature of political modernization in what nonetheless remained a deeply religio-political nexus of truth and power relations.

As the rule of truth underwent profound techno-scientific and religious transformation during the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, so also did corresponding truths of rule. Similarly also, however, as new truths of rule emerged from the dynastic and increasingly national rivalries unleashed as much as by the rise of transoceanic commerce, enslavement and techno-scientific revolutions in war-making (Parker 1988; Glete 2002), as by the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire's enframing of the political order of the *Res Publica Christiana*, so also were new rules of religious as well as political truth enunciated.

From the very advent of modernization, Churches responded directly to the challenges of modernization and development materially as well as theologically, in the realm of knowledge and social relations as much as in the realm of conscience, liturgy and observance. The Reformed Churches were especially committed to the development and improvement of the material conditions of individuals and populations. For Christian politics of truth, material welfare was to be reconciled with redemption. For newly emerging states and forms of governance, it had to be reconciled with sovereignty and its geo-political ambitions as well as the governability of individuals and populations. There was a strategic intersection here between the Churches and the State, but a strategic intersection that by no means assumed an identity of purpose. Atlantic ideals of republican, later also liberal, political virtues, in particular, for example, were not to be conflated with religious ideals of public morality (Pocock 1975; Skinner 1998, 2008; Joyce 2003). But they could be strategically allied.

Such strategic intersections were and remain, however, contingent and not guaranteed. Thus, by the end of the 20th century, the civic ambitions of Atlantic liberalism and republicanism had been widely reduced to government. More than that, government has undergone a biopoliticization in which both local and global poor, reduced to threatening populations exposed to uninsurable risks, are widely regulated and policed now through the provision of emergency relief. In the process the high republican and liberal ideals of civic virtue, along with later social democratic ones, have given way extensively to regulation by public, often populist, morality and media disseminated religiosity. In this regulation through public morality rather than civic virtue, whose single most popular point of application is the local and the global poor notably in Africa, the Churches have found the basis for a new strategic alliance with liberal and republican regimes high on hyperbole, low on delivery and in thrall to capital and military more than political virtues (Patterson 2011). For many influential military strategic thinkers of the last 25 years, capital and martial virtues have amounted to much the same thing, which accounts in part also for why they share the same popular bio-philosophical discourses of networks, complexity, the emergency of emergence, event and resilience (Dillon and Reid 2009; Osinga 2007).

One indicator of the evisceration of republican and liberal political culture is indeed this new strategic interdependence with religion via the very designation of confessions of faith as faith-based organizations (FBOs). Thus renamed, religions are rendered into more governable material. That way also the discursive practices of government are more readily able than they once were to recruit religion to the rules of truth and truths of rule currently practised by neoliberal governance locally and globally. Hence, FBOs now widely administer U.S.- and UK-funded aid and development programmes in biopolitical regulation of the local and the global poor, 'eventually' focused on complex health, food and security emergencies widely assumed to inspire terrorism (AIDS, famine and drought, and civil war). While the wealthy are most heavily armed and bellicose, the poor seem to inspire most fear.

The generative principles of formation operationalizing these programmes thus translate civic virtue into emergency relief, the city into battle space and the pursuit of the good into event-driven kairologically enflamed fear and anticipation of cascading catastrophic breakdowns of subsistence, law and public order. Their specific points of application are food and health and, especially in the U.S., the unwed ethnic woman and the emergency ward of the local public hospital. Politics has become conflated with government, citizenship with membership of endangering as much as endangered populations and civic virtue with more intensely regulated sexual conduct. Once celebrated as the privileged locale of a vibrant democratic political culture, the city has degenerated into conflict zones.

As a complex, mutating assemblage of truth and rule, the religio-political nexus of the modern age thus yields analytically to the Foucauldian enframing of the politics of truth. As the 17th century drew to a close, in few places was early modern transformation in the politics of truth undergoing more enterprising revision than in the new university town of Halle in Brandenburg-Prussia. Religious ferment mixed with pedagogic as well as scientific and political change. Indeed, it

was hard to differentiate between them since rule was at issue in science, teaching and religion as much as commerce, profit and salvation were at issue in the newly emerging discourses, institutions and practices of politics, government and rule. When are they not?

If the religious and other revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries had, as Foucault felicitously observed, problematized the conduct of conduct *tout court*, in few places was that opportunity to re-problematize seized with such pedagogic, entrepreneurial, scientific and religious zeal than by the Lutheran evangelical August Hermann Francke (1663–1727). Francke's zeal was matched with equal if counter-determination, however, by a former co-religionist ally, the jurist and political theorist Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) (Hunter 2001, 2007; Hunter et al. 2007). The vicious conflict that erupted between them was a microcosm of the stakes at issue religio-politically in Europe at that time and throughout its burgeoning colonies overseas, namely, how faith and civics were to accommodate one another to the dual ends of glorifying God and governing Man. If this was an old problem, the revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries had blasted open the ways in which it was re-problematized and addressed from then on. That microcosm is a good place to begin this reflection.

9.2 The Pious Developmental Economy of the 17th Century

9.2.1 Civic Decorum

The Jurist and Protestant Theologian Christian Thomasius contested the metaphysical connection between divine and human reason championed by the evangelical Lutheran Pietist Hermann Francke and other religious enthusiasts. In keeping with his drive less to eliminate faith than to separate faith and reason, Thomasius denied this continuity. His argument was theologically twofold. First, that the damage done to man's faculties at the 'Fall' meant he could not hope to derive the norms of natural law by exercising a reason similar to that informing natural law. Second, he made great use of the theological category of *adiaphora* or 'indifferent things' (*Mitteldinge* in German). *Adiaphora* referred to all matters said to be neither commanded nor forbidden by God. They were thus irrelevant to the question of salvation for which God's commandments could then, Thomasius argued, be reduced to three: to love God, to love one's neighbour and to have contempt for oneself as a creature of passion prone to disorder and in need of correction, both civic and Christian. As a result, many of the things that the competing confessions had declared to be essential and over which so much violence had occurred – church liturgies, sacraments, the Trinity, transubstantiation and so on – could thereby be declared to be matters of moral indifference. That way they could be construed as matters of 'Christian freedom' or political regulation (Hunter 2007; Hunter et al. 2007). This nonetheless still left quite a lot to fight over.

Compare how Thomasius derived these new truths of rule from his reinterpretation of the Christian rule of truth with the fate of the Eucharist in the medieval history of Church and State. According to Henri de Lubac (2006) and Michel de Certeau (1992), for example, two changes had a profound impact on the way religious life was instituted in the medieval period: the specialization of the elite class, including the priesthood, and the organization of the Church into a more centralized body whose theology was more technical, doctrinal and professionalized. Thus, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) made sacramental practice, for example, 'the instrument of a campaign to free Christians from the grip of the first large popular heresies, autonomous communal movements, and growing secular powers'. In the meantime, the Eucharist in particular was also given a strategic function: to consolidate the Church, by positing not just the equivalence but the identity between mystical reality and the visible and by making this depend upon the hierarchical authority and dispensation of the Church (de Certeau 1992: 85–86; de Lubac 2006). Kantorowicz (1997) documented how the model of the Eucharist was later appropriated to sacralize Kingship, underwriting it with a theologico-political rule of truth/truth of rule. For Thomasius as much as for the Scholastics, that he like Hobbes abjured, theology was politics and politics was essentially a theologico-political problematic however much the Christian God had by that time become a *deus absconditus* cutting more slack in the universe for Man (Blumenberg 1986). But it was one construed differently and the construal required a re-engineering of the institution of both Church and State as well as the training of the functionaries that staffed them.

Thomasius' campaign was of course part of a much broader struggle that was taking place throughout Europe and in European colonies overseas. On one side were those for whom the consolidation of a new form of territorial political sovereignty required the general exclusion of the Christian churches from the exercise of civil power. On the other side were the clerical estates whose imperial rights in particular had permeated the exercise of such power, through the threat of blasphemy, heresy and witchcraft, for example, as well as of excommunication. Compounding the problem was the new interpretation of faith and worship introduced by the Protestant religion, particularly Luther's pronouncement of *sola fides*, salvation through faith alone. It compounded the problem because it also transformed the everyday conduct of conduct of adherents to Protestant articles of faith. Its new rules of truth resulted in new truths of rule, and both were challenging to established secular authorities, although they could also be recruited to support newly assertive and ambitious states.

In terms of his interpretation of the problematic of Christian truth, then, Thomasius' campaign amounted to a generic attack on the truth of rule and rules of truth of the confessional Christian state, dividing religion and government in ways that removed salvation from the domain of church ritual while removing political authority from the domain of salvation. The purpose was expressly that of developing new truths of civic rule that, rendering other clerical truths both theologically as well as politically illicit, served as a means also of revising clerical truths of rule in

order to establish grounds for driving clerics from the juridical and political domain (Hunter et al. 2007: xv–xviii).

Thomasius' new 'civic decorum' (Walker 2002a, b) directly opposed the new 'disciplinary' training and pedagogy for which Francke's schools were becoming famous. Through it, Thomasius not only conducted what was labelled a *decorumstreit* (decorum struggle) with Francke (Walker 2002a, b), he deliberately formulated discourse and practices designed to open the way to training quite differently instructed legal and governmental cadres in the sciences of law, government and police (Hunter 2007, c.f. especially Chap. 1; Dubber and Valverde 2007).

This was no abstract doctrinal dispute. Construing it as such would entirely miss the point of what was at stake for the participants, stakes of which they were only too well aware. Neither was this only a dispute about constitutions, legitimacy and offices of state, although, of course, it was that too. According to his conception, in order to live peaceably in the post-confessional society whose very rules of truth and truth of rule Thomasius was seeking to reformulate, and whose 'decorum' or civic sociability he was trying to specify, it was necessary according to Thomasius for individuals to be trained in separating their personae as Christians and as princes, subjects and believers (Hunter et al. 2007). Thomasius' revision of the relationship between the theological and the political not only entailed a revision of the relationship between Church and State, from which neither were to emerge unchanged, it demanded a transformation of the lived embodiment of prince, subject and governmental functionary. The whole novel and embodied ensemble was interrogated and explored through the very baroque German dramas, or *Trauerspiele*, of the time (Benjamin 1998).

9.2.2 Evangelical Discipline

Originating in the Protestant territories of southwest Germany in the 1670s, German Pietism was an evangelical Lutheran movement as much concerned with social as it was with religious reform. A 'Pietist' was someone who was affiliated with a reform movement first initiated by Philipp Jakob Spener in the 1670s. A long and deeply entrenched historiographical tradition has portrayed the proponents of this movement – especially Francke – as zealous, yet practical, Lutheran reformers who were forced to directly confront the ideals of early Enlightenment in conjunction with the state building mandate of Brandenburg-Prussia.

In Foucauldian terms, Pietism was deeply committed to the revision of the conduct of conduct as it was to revising the articles, liturgies and practices of Christian faith. The one project could never of course be divorced from the other, and, so, with the reformation of religious faith and observance came a protracted revision of the pastoral powers of a Christian Church gone bloody and sectarian. The right of Pietist laypersons and clergy to preach as well as to teach and discipline in the course of organizing charity, religious observance and spiritual guidance was contested by

orthodox Lutherans, in the South German Duchy of Württemberg, for example, and throughout several of the large German trading cities. Led by Francke, the Pietists nonetheless succeeded in establishing themselves in Brandenburg-Prussia under the protection and patronage of Frederick II and Frederick William I. These allowed him to establish and develop a large Charitable Foundation and Orphanage in the town of Halle, in whose new university Francke also took up a university professorship.

The Francke Foundation rapidly became a form of global corporation with powerfully entwined religious and commercial trading links stretching from Muscovy in the East to the colonies of North America and the Caribbean in the West, and the Coromandel Coast of the Indian subcontinent in South Asia. Evangelical Christianity thus strategically aligned itself within the political rationalities and governing technologies of state formation and empire building by powers of the North Atlantic Basin during the course of the late 17th and early 18th centuries, but it nonetheless independently also sought to pursue its own mission locally and globally; the break over the issue of slavery was an important illustration.

It would therefore be wrong to see Halle Pietists in particular as cultivating their identity in direct opposition to the civic Enlightenment involved in the development of cameralist *staatswissenschaftlische* (state science) experiments in governance in the very state that gave the Pietists support and sanctuary. The relation was instead more complicated and reciprocal. The Halle method on educational reform, in particular, as well as the meaning 18th century Europeans attached to philanthropy more generally, had a wide impact on the political and intellectual reformers of the period. The Pietist Orphanage promoted Pietist pedagogy designed to introduce children to the conciliatory knowledge-making strategies of the first Berlin Academy of Sciences. These strategies championed the status of the 'heart' as an assimilatory juncture point for a reconciliatory form of governance and self-governance. It was the material expression of Halle Pietists' commitment to a 'third way' not dissimilar in its ambitions from the general intent of the interfaith foundation established by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, albeit the Pietists were concerned to assimilate experience and cognition as well as theology, philosophy and voluntarism to absolutism rather than global liberal governance.

Thus, according to one of the most detailed accounts of the work of the Francke Foundation:

> Pietist orphanages were both real and imagined spaces. They did and did not house orphans. Their founders were and were not Pietists. They were funded by everyone and no one (with the exception of God). They were and were not supported by the state. They were inclusive and exclusive. They existed to regulate both the environment and the soul. The educational programming in place within these sites aimed to create a world in which there was no difference between thinking and feeling, or between knowing and doing. Here the seemingly impassable fissure imagined as existing between the world of the mind and the world of the hand had been bridged and Cartesian dualism mediated. The founding of a Pietist orphanage, or application of its pedagogies in other institutional settings, signified the pursuit of a rigorous method of action and assimilation, a middle way. Following the example of the Jesuits, whose prowess as educators was widely known, Pietists cultivated the 'visual aptitudes' of children and held up the eye as the perfect conciliatory, didactic and edificatory medium. In the spaces touched by their methods, the eye and the

> heart became fused together into a single entity that observed, reconciled and loved. (Whitmer 2008: 1)

Religious, the Francke Foundation was nonetheless also committed to the improvement of populations pursuing the renewal of their governance as well as the salvation of their souls:

> Halle Pietists believed in the promise of helping individuals acquire 'visual aptitudes' through training in the mathematical sciences, which provided a methodological point of orientation for solving the problem of dissonance between competing regimens of truth – including competing confessional systems. Although, as Lorraine Daston has noted, 'the divergence, integration and transcendence of individual perspectives were the province of moral philosophy and aesthetics' in the 18th century more generally, in Halle, around 1,700, this group of radical Lutheran theologians attempted to link moral philosophy and aesthetics to 'primitive Christianity' or the idea of a universal faith. Like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose 'perspectival metaphysics' and preoccupation with harmony is well documented, Halle Pietists pursued a pansophic vision of universal harmony, justice or benevolence; only they institutionalized their version of this vision in an orphanage and placed it at the center (or heart) of a self enclosed 'city of schools.' They were participants, like Leibniz and so many others, in a culture of reconciliation, or what the noted Professor of Medicine at the University of Halle, Friedrich Hoffmann, called a 'culture of understanding,' and their conciliatory and vision oriented method was hugely influential precisely because of their ability to replicate it in new and existing institutional settings. (Whitmer 2008: 8)

Theirs was a knowledge-based as well as faith-fuelled experiment in social formation and reformation. Whitmer again:

> … passionate inquirers, observers, consumers and assimilators of the cacophony of materials and methods so characteristic of knowledge making in 18th century Europe. Like Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke and other members of the Royal Society in England, they believed in the possibility of reconciling several forms of knowledge (and knowledge making) by exploiting the potential of middling objects and instruments. In doing this, they participated in the same sorts of conciliatory knowledge making as the polymaths they associated with: Ehrenfried Walters von Tschirnhaus, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Johann Christoph Sturm, Leonhard Christoph Sturm, Christian Wolff, Christian Thomasius, Friedrich Hoffman, Georg Ernst Stahl, Daniel Ernst Jablonski, even Frederick Slare (a former student of Boyle's and Royal Society member). (Whitmer 2008: 7)

Not unlike faith-based organizations today, missionizing, medicine and teaching were its business. Thus, from the very beginning, it was transnational and religio-commercial as much as it was religio-political. Similarly also it targeted public morality, the education and training of children and of future spiritual leaders. Its virtues were religious rather than political. But inasmuch as its pedagogy domesticated as it religiously inspired, it contributed towards producing skilled, diligent and industrious subjects. No bad thing from the original governmental perspective of cameralism and police, or indeed later liberal and republican regimes equally as much concerned with domestication and industry pursued, however, instead, through the complex mixture of specified freedoms, discipline and biopolitics crafted by the development of liberal governance (Dean 2009; Barry et al. 1996).

Inspired by the evangelical fervour of the European Reformation, Pietist beliefs were nonetheless often criticized as excessive and irrational. These created many

surfaces of friction within the Lutheran Church as well as between the Lutheran and other churches. In Tranquebar, for example, they fought with other Protestant coreligionists such as the Anglicans as well as the especially feared Jesuits. In the states of the North American Colonies especially Georgia, and notwithstanding the fact that leading Pietist Pastors also owned slaves and that the community was divided on slaveholding as well as related questions concerning the conversion of slaves and their attendance at Church, Pietists ultimately clashed with colonial governments and commercial interests over the question of slavery (Strange 1968).

Despite Whitmer's observations, it is evident from her pioneering work, and other sources, that the relation of the Foundation to early modern politics was equally also characterized by mutual suspicion and contingent strategic alliances in respect not only of its missionizing work but also the social reform pedagogy that it pioneered, the medicine that it marketed as well as the treatment of slaves and its teaching on the spiritual as well as racial and economic status of slaves (Strange 1968). Inevitably so, the relationship of the Francke Foundation to the royal authorities in Brandenburg-Prussia, directly competitive also with that which Thomasius sought to cultivate, was one in which Church and State though allied were conscious of their differences.

More interesting still, a point that bears comparison with the operations of evangelical churches in the U.S. today, the Francke Foundation was commercially astute. Francke was an energetic self-publicist, an assiduous social as well as religious networker and tireless fundraiser. Bankrolling its missionizing by selling medicine with the Bible and other religious tracts, the Francke Foundation was as much a commercial, epistemological and pedagogical enterprise as it was a religious and spiritual one. Its operations were equally as much a contribution to new ways of ruling in the service of the Lord as they were to the emerging polizeiwissenschaft (police science) of early modern absolutism and the biopolitical governmentality of early modern liberalism. The Francke Foundation had nonetheless continuously to check that in serving the Lord it was not simply also serving the state. In this respect the situation for Christian Churches in the 18th and 19th centuries was little different, at least in principle, than that of so-called FBOs today. Their historical circumstances, of course, differ widely.

Whereas new cameralist *staatswissenschaftlische* and *polizeiwissenschaftlische* rules of truth and truths of rule proclaimed the sovereignty of the state, along with other Christian churches the Pietist Lutherans ultimately proclaimed the sovereignty of God. The two had not been contingently reconciled since the Constantine conversation of the Roman Empire lost its Christian apologist in Eusebius, gaining a very different account of the relation between the City of Man and the City of God in the teachings of St. Augustine. The issues ran deep and wide, neither were they confined to the problematic of sovereign rule alone. The conduct of everyday life, the very object of Pietist teaching and practice equally as much as it was for cameralist reformers throughout the following century in Prussia, or Liberal governmentalists in the British Isles, was simultaneously at issue as well.

Governance, specifically self-governance, is required if sovereign will and the force of law is actually to work. Governance, specifically self-governance is equally

necessary also to achieve salvation. That is why the Churches were in the business of rule equally as much as the secular authorities. For every account of truth is accompanied by some corresponding governmental imperative that specifies how one should be governed or exercise self-governance in light of the truth proclaimed. Cameralists recognized this as much as preachers or indeed liberals and republicans. Theorists of *polizeiwissenschaft* understood it just as well as physiocrats, political economists and liberal thinkers like Adam Smith who wrote among other things, of course, on *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. What differentiated them was the how of rule – the how of governance and self-governance – not that religious and political truth alike required there to be rule and self-rule.

Operating within the strategic nexus of relations comprising new formations of power relations, Christian Churches, the Francke Foundation in particular, were therefore no mere dupes of the State, although they could operate as agents of the state. Neither were they dupes of commerce and economic exploitation although they often also served the interests of colonization and imperial exploitation. Indeed their missionizing was integral to the civilizational and racist rationales that provided the veridical and ideological underwriting to colonization and imperial rule. The Churches, too, attended scrupulously to business in order to spread their message, and in the process it was often difficult also to dissociate religion as a business from the business of religion. The point is that these dangers and difficulties were as much in evidence with Lutheran evangelicals in the 17th and 18th centuries as they are today with FBOs (Patterson 2011).

Whereas the Francke Foundation, correctly, feared being recruited into the cameralist drive of Brandenburg-Prussia and other European states, FBOs, Pentecostal evangelicals in the U.S. in particular, seem less circumspect today, being enthusiastic recruits to biopolitical and disciplinary neoliberal targeting and regulation of the poor at home and abroad. (The point is the referent governmental object 'the poor' and less the constantly reproduced distinction international between inside and outside.) Then, as now, states and secular organizations also expressed suspicion of Church involvement in the improvement, renewal and developmental regulation of populations. But then as now the changing religio-political rule of truth and truth of rule of modernization and development was open to strategic exploitation, by both sides.

The religio-political nexus of the modern age has always been a shifting field of strategic formation and intervention, often as much adversarial as it has been cooperative. Whereas reforming political authorities were often deeply suspicious of religion because it was held responsible for intractable doctrinal conflicts and protracted warfare, in a new expression of the long-established conflict between Church and State, the Reformed Churches also remained institutionally suspicious of political authorities as well. For the vocation of the Church was to serve a higher authority. Having gained their freedom of belief and observance from Rome, the Reformed Churches may have welcomed the protection of political authorities from Rome, and from Princes loyal to Rome, but they remained conscious of the danger of conflating their mission with that of the new political authorities. If the Church had always been concerned with the material conditions of existence of its flock, it had

always also been concerned with its own specific pastoral and disciplinary arts of governance as well. That said it could not readily function if the secular authorities proscribed it. What was true then has remained true since.

In short, finding themselves in the midst of historical re-problematizations of the nature of nature, and thereby also of the corresponding re-problematization of the very origin and nature of rule and law, temporal as well as spiritual, Church and State reformulated the how as well as the why of governance and rule (Daston and Stolleis 2008). And they did so in ways that made political authorities newly reliant for the purposes of display, spectacle and the very arcana of statecraft upon novel political economies of the sign. Statecraft was sign craft and no less socialized and cultic or preoccupied with glory than it had ever been (Agamben 2011; Dillon 2012). If this was the triumph of secularism, it was certainly not the triumph of a disenchanting politics. The rules of truth and truths of rule that underwrite 21st century government and politics, within as much as outside the North Atlantic world, are no less sacralized and cultic in their pursuit today than when Churches were more widely assured of their spiritual and temporal missions. Now, however, their societies of spectacle and their renditions of glory demand analytical attention extending beyond that once supplied by Guy Debord (1995) and towards that which Giorgio Agamben (2011) has recently gestured.

Indeed, the very exigencies and pressing urgency of how to rule were at least as important as the broader royal questions of the legitimation and formal constitutional structures of rule. Church and State alike experimented in the pursuit of everyday governance, as much as they did in formally constituting and legitimating themselves as governors. That they therefore shared an interest in the development of new forms of governance via welfare, of which biopolitics was a variant, did not however mean that the problematization of governance and rule arose for them in the same ways, was based on appeal to the same sources of rule or was motivated by the same interests in ruling. These considerations applied to absolutists as much as they did to liberals and republicans.

9.3 The Pious Economy of the 21st Century: Faith-Based Organizations

By the end of the 20th century, global rules of truth and truths of rule had changed dramatically, of course, from those obtaining at the end of the 17th century. While it is an exaggeration to say that sovereignty and *polizeiwissenschaft* were wholly superseded by neoliberal dispositifs of power characterized by the use of biopolitical technologies of governance, these do seem to have become widespread, a favoured mechanism of global governance. Meantime, also, discourses of modernization and development became characterized by intense and novel interpretations of security, a response driven by a perceived generalized threat from the global poor to the globally advantaged in what had by then become a closely integrated global

economy. Just as the Francke Foundation was implicated in the early modern emergence of new forms of governance and rule, so also were confessions of faith now directly targeted by neoliberal governance in the guise of 'faith-based organizations' recruited into the development-security complex. This change was pursued most directly by the U.S. and the UK, but it is a feature also of indigenous religio-political developments in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the U.S., the new strategic alliance between religion and politics was dominated by the growing strength of the religious right. This populist phenomenon was nonetheless also deeply implicated in the saturation of public discourse by a rabid free market ideology, relentlessly disseminated by corporate media, designed to rationalize and disguise a larcenous raid on wealth, in particular by corporate financial intuitions, unprecedented in global, let alone U.S., history. Along with an astonishing transfer of wealth from the U.S. 'middle' as well as its poorest classes to the already vastly wealthy, came a social agenda driven by Christian evangelical religious preferences and proscriptions. These twinned developments transferred also into the distribution of U.S. aid and development overseas, the vast bulk of which now takes place through evangelical churches. By way of distinction the recruitment of FBOs in the UK was driven by the perceived threat from its immigrant communities, increasingly typified as religious communities, and the widespread fear of radicalized elements of its Muslim youth following the UK joining the U.S. War on Terror and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, military adventures that, British intelligence noted, increased the threat of terror attacks in the UK. Here, then, FBOs were recruited as part of a differently engineered development-security response to the securitization and militarization of British participation in the revision of the regulation of the global poor that followed the dissolution of the Cold War, and the global hegemony established thereafter by neoliberal economic and geo-political policies pursued also through key international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF as well as national security apparatuses (Dillon and Reid 2009).[1]

9.3.1 FBOs in the UK

It thus came as little surprise to hear in August 2001, in the midst of a historically unprecedented retrenchment of public expenditure, from reports in *The Guardian* leaking an internal UK Department for International Development (DFID) paper explaining that the new UK National Security Council had said that, 'the ODA [Overseas Development Administration] budget should make the maximum possible contribution to national security consistent with ODSA rules'. 'Although the NSC will not in most cases direct DFID spending,' the DFID paper was reported as saying, 'we [DFID] need to be able to make the case for how our work contributes

[1] For a wide-ranging analysis of 'Governing (In)security in the Postcolonial World', see the special issue of *Security Dialogue* (2012).

to national security' (*The Guardian*, 30 August 2010). That additional national security value should be squeezed out of every aspect of the national budget when the UK fiscal military state found itself unable to sustain extensive borrowing from international capital markets to help fund overseas war, as it has been able to do so successfully since the financial innovations of the 18th century enabled it to defeat France in imperial competition for global hegemony, should come as no surprise.

But it did. Condemned by a radically discredited Labour opposition that had done more to securitize development than any previous British political administration, an anonymous New Labour source complained that: 'This document is deeply worrying, as it confirms the fears of many in the international development and humanitarian development community that the government plans to securitize the aid budget' (*The Guardian*, 30 August 2010). Labour had already largely securitized it. For, sometime during the course of the 1990s, as Mark Duffield (2001, 2007) has documented so well, a tightknit, wide-ranging and more ideologically self-conscious, alliance was formed between security and development among the liberal societies and states of the North Atlantic basin. It increasingly targeted, and more systematically incorporated, resourced and directed, Christian and humanitarian organizations pursuing health and educational as well as poverty and disaster relief programmes globally. The genealogy of development was the history of empire. The history of empire is as involved as that of security and development as well. Christian Churches played a notable part then as they do in the security-development complexes of the 21st century.

Hence, the UK government issued a White Paper on International Development in 1997, for example, committing the Blair government to prioritizing support for development through enrolling businesses and trades unions, faith communities, black and minority ethnic (BME) communities and diaspora groups. The aim was to further resource a development strategy already committed to linking poverty with war and the war-poverty nexus with threats to British national security and prosperity. The Building Support for Development Strategy (BSDS April, 1999), subsequently published in 1999 (DIFID, April 1999), set out how this would be achieved. While the overall policy context has developed over the intervening period, the BSDS has continued to set the direction of policy. The BSDS gave priority to education and the media that were covered by seven of its objectives and the bulk of the funding. However, the strategy expressed a commitment to reach hitherto unreached parts of society through innovative organizational partnerships with businesses and trade unions, churches and faiths.

A short time later, Prime Minister Blair formally proclaimed the international strategy, latent within the emergence of the security-development complex, in a speech to the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999. Albeit prompted by the need to justify NATO intervention in Kosovo, Blair's Chicago speech detailed a wide-ranging doctrine of liberal interventionism on the grounds that, given globalization and the radical interdependence of the world poverty and war overseas, global interdependence threatened national security and prosperity at home. Liberal war making in pursuit of such intervention was justified on the grounds that it pursued values not territory: 'This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values.'

Security, peace and prosperity conflated so also were international boundaries as well as international distinctions between faiths, cultures and peoples. This recruitment drive was followed by other states as well. It was extended and intensified as part of the rollout of the war on terror after 9/11 in particular through DFID and USAID.

9.3.2 FBOs in the U.S.

Towards the end of the 1990s, international and national donor agencies ranging from the World Bank and the United Nations to the UK Department for International Development were moving towards a consensus on privileging faith-based service providers of humanitarian aid and emergency relief (Cooper 2014: 4). In 1998, the World Bank convened a World Faiths and Development meeting which led to the creation of the World Faiths and Development Dialogue, an advocacy group now based at Georgetown University, promoting collaboration between faith-based service providers and international development agencies. Systematic Christian Right lobbying of the United Nations throughout the decade progressively committed UN agencies also to privileging faith-based provision of aid and relief (Cooper 2014).

In May 2003, shortly before also launching the invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush announced a $15 billion President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) billed as the largest public health campaign in history to target a single disease. A 5-year programme, it was designed to address the international AIDS epidemic in 12 sub-Saharan African countries and two Caribbean nations. With bipartisan Congressional support and the endorsement of the incoming President-Elect Obama as one of the success stories of the Bush administration, the programme was reauthorized in 2008, providing a further $48 billion in funding over a further 5 years. Its scope was also extended to a further fourteen countries in the Caribbean (Wright 2009: 59–60).

From its very inception, PEPFAR was informed by theologically warranted prohibitions against extramarital, commercial and non-heterosexual relations that reversed previous public health strategies focusing on harm reduction rather than sexual regulation. Congress levied three conditions on the distribution of PEPFAR funds when it authorized the programme. The first required that at least one third of all prevention funds should be spent on the promotion of sexual abstinence before marriage. Based on so-called ABC principles of Abstain, be Faithful, use Condoms, condom distribution was treated as an absolute last resort. Second, FBOs were exempted from participating in prevention strategies they found theologically objectionable. Third, it applied a loyalty test. Any organization refusing to state in public its opposition to prostitution and sex trafficking, thereby excluding agencies that worked directly with sex workers, would be ineligible for funding. The effect of these and other provisions was to channel disproportionate amounts of funding to Pentecostal evangelical churches that were in any event

already being privileged as the mechanism for the delivery of U.S. aid (McLearey 2009; Clarke 2007; Patterson 2011).

The following year, Bush issued a further executive order creating an Office for Faith-Based Community Initiatives within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Its express purpose was to facilitate the channelling of aid projects to FBO service providers.

USAID subsequently published guidelines on 'Participation by Religious Orders in USAID programs' prohibiting discrimination against organizations that combined emergency relief with religious activities such as proselytizing, ritual or scripture (Cooper 2014). Ostensibly designed to provide a level playing field for secular and religious organizations alike in fact it tilted the balance materially in favour of religious organizations since U.S. or non-U.S. NGOs providing information, for example, on abortion (and overwhelmingly secular) were of course already ineligible for USAID funding.

Whereas the UN-focused FBOs traversed the range of Christian denominations as well as Islam and Judaism, especially in the campaigns against AIDS, Pentecostal evangelicals dominate U.S. FBOs. U.S. Pentecostalism is a genre of contemporary evangelicalism deeply committed to an imminent messianic, eschatological and kairological, interpretation of Christian faith. Salvation is close at hand but radically conditional upon observance of the moral law preparing its believers for the coming of the Kingdom. If the rule of truth of Christian messianism is that Christ will come again – and for the Pentecostals that coming is imminent – the truth of rule messianically is, be prepared for the coming. That spiritual preparedness does not simply thereby become a simple condition for the receipt of aid and emergency relief, strict observance in one's everyday conduct of conduct becomes the very way in which one qualifies through one's lived embodiment for that aid and emergency relief.

Confessions of faith thereby become protocols of rule. A world simultaneously of truth and rule is born here. Imminent anticipation of the Kingdom requires governance. Governance is delivered through the very conduct of conduct that anticipation of the Kingdom demands. What appears as Christian charity is delivered as Christian rule, rule delivered in sub-Saharan Africa, however, to communities that are nonetheless themselves widely governed by Pentecostal rules of truth and truths of rule.

9.4 Conclusion

> …what I am doing is something that concerns philosophy, that is to say the politics of truth. So…what is involved in this analysis of the mechanisms of power is the politics of truth, and not sociology, history, or economics. Foucault (2007: 3)

What is called the modern age thus arose out of a complex series of transformations in the orders of both truth and rule, as did its religio-political politics of modernization, security and development as well as its revised promises of spiritual and

political salvation. Political modernity was therefore not a period waiting to be discovered (Davis 2008). Modernization and development no less than security with which these are now also comprehensively linked are not final states. Rather, their changing rules of truth and truths of rule are eschatologically driven fields of formation in continuous experimentation with government and politics; battle spaces of fragile and shifting strategic alliances comprised of complex surfaces of friction within and between new confessions of truth as much as new formations of rule.

From the outset, this contest extended across the entire field of human settlement and endeavour. Even as it was cultivated and pursued in a Europe hardly cognizant of its European-ness – its Christian-ness, however, deeply influenced by its encounter with Islam in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular – it was simultaneously and experimentally pursued eastward to Russia and China as it was to Africa, North America and the Caribbean. It was that differentiating encounter with other worlds which directly contributed to the formation of national and regional as well as religious and political accounts of 'Western', 'European' and 'national' identities (Todorov 1984; Anderson 1991). Similarly also did changing definitions of modernization, security and development emerge.

In pursuit of their modern expressions of political and religious identity, the French became French, the English English, the Catholics Catholics and the Protestants Protestants as much through murderous religious, political and commercial pursuit of one another by land and sea (then air) across the globe, as through the workings of putatively 'indigenous' forces of spiritual reformation, commercial industrialization and wider socio-economic development. Competition for slaves, souls, territory and capital have to be distinguished from one another but as deeply complicit and intimately allied constituent elements of a breathtakingly violent, rapacious and transformative process, one operating in revised but ever more powerful forms threatening the very habitability of the planet, and with centres of power lodged elsewhere than in the North Atlantic Basin alone now.

The racism that accompanied the very many different and mutating processes that claimed modernization as their warrant was similarly integral to them. It was not epiphenomenal either. It was an integral and changing expression of the rules of truth that inspired modernization as much as it was the truths of rule – of capture, exploitation and enslavement – through which these found their diverse forms of operationalization (Eze 1997; Dillon 2011b). It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that many of the process claiming to advance modernization and development over the last 300–400 years comprised doctrines of truth and formations of rule that had exploitation and enslavement, together with the displacement, dispossession and mass murder of entire populations as their very *raison d'être;* leave aside the allied *raison* of their *raison d'état* (Davis 2002).

From the 17th to the 21st centuries, the 'missionizing' of new religious, political, economic, racial and scientific rules of truth could not be divorced from the corresponding imperializing of their allied new truths of rule. In short, colonization and (trans)plantation together with cultural dispossession and capital accumulation were not enterprises that European states, corporations and Churches did only once they were formed. They were formed to do it. Neither did they pursue these

developments in closely integrated and uniform ways. The processes were diverse and changing, they warred with one another as much as they did over the objects of their material and spiritual ambitions (Hont 2005; Braudel 1982; Tilly 1990; Cook 2007). Christian missions, plantations and colonies were similarly also as reliant upon slavery (Strange 1968) as they were involved in relentless patronage seeking and commerce in ways in which Francke excelled in his day and evangelical churches especially in the U.S. excel in their hypermediated ways today.

If missionizing is thus a differentiating practice in which you refine and define your rules of truth, imperializing is a dividing practice in which you refine and define your truths of rule. The colony was always already an invention of the metropolis, the metropolis always already an invention of the colony. The two served to reflect and refract one another. There was no original. In pursuing their mutually disclosive belonging together, even as the American colonies did in revolt against the British Empire, metropolis and colony emerged through differentiating practices that often also bound imperialists, religionists, revolutionaries and the colonized together in ways more enduring than any of them desired or cared to admit.

In consequence, and however much it was a source of controversy and dispute, imperializing was never a political afterthought of the religio-political nexus of the modern age. Such disputes as it engendered were constitutive of the way conflict over the rule of imperial truth shaped the truth of imperial rule and thus of modernization and development itself. The same obtains in respect of the modernization and biopolitically driven development programmes of global liberal governance during the course of the last 25 years.

However much it, too, was a source of controversy and dispute, neither was missionizing a Christian afterthought. Such disputes as it engendered were constitutive also of how missionizing Christian truth shaped the truth of missionizing Christian rule. Consequently, you did not join the missions once you believed. You fashioned your faith in the missionizing that you did. You did not imperialize after having formed your modern institutions and practices of rule. You fashioned your modern practices of rule through the very imperializing that you did. What was true in the 17th century remains true today.

Regina Schwartz made some remarkable reflections on sacramental poetics and the translation of Christian transubstantiation etc into the modern age in a way that provides a fitting conclusion here. Observing that now living in an age of conflicting identities, 'each asserting their particularity against another, the result is invariably violent', she nonetheless also recognized that the 'opposite demand for a universal is attended by another kind of violence, the risks of political totalitarianism, a global imperialism, a violence that crushes particularity in its relentless drive towards universal control' (Schwartz 2008: 140). However much it has worked most recently through the politics of subjectification, particularities of ethnicity, religion, the specified freedoms of the market and the biopolitical manipulation of populations, in the pursuit of modernization, security and development neoliberal governance, preaching these as universals engenders much the same outcomes.

Finally, a note on method. This chapter has enframed its analytic in terms of what Michel Foucault called the politics of truth (Foucault 2007). It did not offer a

detailed exegesis of what Foucault meant by this. The political analytic of truth courses throughout Foucault's work, but surfaces most directly in the lecture series *Security, Territory Population* that he gave between 1977 and 1978 at the Collège de France (2007). What was offered instead was a summary deployment of it.

By politics of truth, I take Foucault to mean something that can be put quite simply. Every rule of truth implies a truth of rule just as every truth of rule implies a rule of truth. Emmanuel Levinas put the point theistically, but it could equally well be put in certain scientific and social scientific as well as onto-theological ways. 'To know God', Levinas observed, 'is to know what must be done' (Levinas quoted in Bernasconi 1998: 17). The problem is of course not simply a matter of knowing God. The problem of knowing God is the problem of how to know God. The problem of how to know God gets us directly to the politics of truth since every way of knowing God is precisely that, 'a way'. Every 'way', as the monastic Christian orders, for example, taught, is a rule; hence, no rule of truth without a truth of rule. Equally, also, however, the logic works in reverse. Every truth of rule invokes a rule of truth. Take, for example, the sovereign truth of rule and rule of truth. Schmitt taught well that sovereign rule is anarchical rule and that the Judaeo-Christian God was its paradigm. The truth that sovereignty proclaims is the truth of unconditioned self-making ex nihilo (Schmitt 2005) whose seemingly irresistible erotic attraction also indicates that it occupies the realm of desire as much as power (Schmidt 1990).

There can therefore be no truth without its corresponding governmental politics of truth. The sovereign truth of the Judaeo-Christian God, for example, had not simply to be proclaimed in mystical, theological and liturgical confessions of faith. The truth of this faith had to be translated into government. What is the point of belief if it does not seek out its points of application in the conduct of the conduct of believers and nonbelievers alike, as well as the organization of matter? Like all sovereignties, God's sovereignty had also to be operationalized, a task first undertaken, we are taught, by angels (Peterson 1964; Forsyth 1987; Keck 1998; Auffarth and Stuckenbruck 2004; Reed 2005). Agamben has recently retraced the sinuous dexterity and violent controversy with which Christian theologians pursued the question of how the truth of divine sovereignty was to be translated into the discourses and practices of Christian government, the *oikonomia* (economy) of both God and His Church (Agamben 2011).

This millennial-old problematization of the rule of Christian truth and the truth of Christian rule did not produce a solution to a problem. It instituted a complex and still mutating field of problematization, formation and intervention driven by very many surfaces of friction and violently unresolved controversies of both truth and rule. The arcane dispute over the appointment of female bishops within the Anglican Communion is a contemporary case in point. Victoria Kahn's account of the English Revolution of the 17th century beautifully illustrates also how theology and religious discourse simultaneously worked as political theory and political discourse in ways that served to undermine and revise the truths of rule and rule of truth of Medieval and Scholastic traditions in the process of producing new ones (Kahn 2008; Kahn et al. 2006). To cite Regina Schwartz, 'If the Reformation inaugurated the beginning of modernism – the death of God and the birth of the modern Self',

introducing processes that newly enslaved as they emancipated, 'it also transfigured values that in the earlier regime and in another register were conveyed as God-given: justice, love, and a living universe' (Schwartz 2008: 139). New truths of rule and rules of truth emerged to give concrete political and governmental form, including novel expressions of justice and love as well as novel demands for their fulfillment, to the outright rejection as well as revision of Christian truth and rule.

No truth teller therefore proclaims the truth as pure abstraction without any implication for the conduct of conduct. No ruler rules without reference to the truth of the order of things said to warrant his or her rule. Whether or not truth tellers own up to the correlation of truth and rule, whether or not they are faithful to either or both, this imperative to rule lies within the logic of truth telling itself: 'I do not think there is any theoretical analytical discourse which is not permeated or underpinned in one way or another by something like an imperative discourse' (Foucault 2007: 3). The political analytic of truth therefore proceeds by posing the two simple questions that have guided this reflection: What truth of rule proceeds from what rule of truth? What rule of truth proceeds from what truth of rule?

Correlations of truth and rule thus constitute fields of formation, intervention and application which give rise to changing idiomatic (specific, historically contingent, spatiotemporally located) problematizations and strategic formations of politics, government and rule. These problematizations necessarily also presuppose changing problematizations of space and time, of epochs of time and periodizations of history as well as of locations, both virtual and territorial in which they take place, in addition to the technologies by which they are operationalized. What times are these? In what place or places do we find ourselves? What is the truth of the matter? Such questions help determine the problematization of politics, government and rule. For time, place and truth are not simply containers. The specification of time and place are categories of truth, simultaneously in fact of both truth and rule, to which rules of truth and truths of rule give concrete form. Their very specification is designed by the rules of truth and truths of rule to make demands upon us, shape our conduct and circumscribe the imaginaries in which we dream about what we are, who we are and what we can and must do.

Humans also come and go, as do all their rules of truth and truths of rule. Both are finite (Stambaugh 1992; Schmidt 1988; Hyland 1995; and O'Byrne 2010). That finitude seems all the more marked because it is not only humans that come and go, it is their gods as well. From Nietzsche's death of God to Heidegger's keening for the presence of a god, the flight of the pagan gods is complemented by the withdrawal of the Christian God (Bulhof and ten Kate 2000; Schwartz 2008). God and gods leave the world repeatedly. Eschatological sensibility, both secular and religious, is thus a function now of finitude as much as of eternity. Thus, the obsessive security-development politics of the 21st century are a secular, Judaeo-Christian eschatology a spiritual, expression of it, for our current politics of security and development are as saturated as revealed religion with the fear of the end and the organization of government and rule around it.

There are, however, similarities and differences. For example, the eschaton of revealed religion marks a rupture between the immanent and the transcendent. The

eschaton of modern finitude is immanent alone. It continuously punctuates the infinity of finite things of which modern finitude is comprised (Dillon 2011a). For each, the eschaton is as much a source of violent division as it is a foundational expression of theologico-political faith, a generative principle of formation for rule and misrule alike (Baylor 1993; Toscano 2010; Fiddes 2000; Ratzinger [Benedict XV] 1988; Schwarz 2000). In at least one very important respect, however, modern secular eschatology is more unforgiving than its religious counterpart. Its eschatologically driven security-development complexes offer no end to their violently modernizing emergency politics of the end.

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