



THE  
DUNAYEVSKAYA-MARCUSE-FROMM  
CORRESPONDENCE,  
1954–1978

DIALOGUES ON HEGEL, MARX,  
AND CRITICAL THEORY

EDITED BY KEVIN B. ANDERSON  
AND RUSSELL ROCKWELL



The Dunayevskaya-Marcuse-Fromm  
Correspondence, 1954–1978

# **Studies in Marxism and Humanism**

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## Editors' Note

Copies of all of the letters of Raya Dunayevskaya to and from Herbert Marcuse that have been preserved are held by the Raya Dunayevskaya Collection, Wayne State University Library, Detroit, Michigan. Since Dunayevskaya's letters to Marcuse are mainly her carbon copies, they do not always indicate the signature, especially when it was handwritten. For this reason, we have left many of these letters without a signature.

The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection also holds copies of most of the letters of Dunayevskaya to and from Erich Fromm that have been preserved. The Erich Fromm Archive, Tübingen, Germany, holds copies of additional letters of Dunayevskaya to and from Fromm that have been preserved.

Concerning the annotation of the correspondence: Our unsigned editors' source notes and (occasional) textual clarifications are in square brackets in the text of the letters. Our other editors' notes are in unsigned footnotes. Dunayevskaya's name is placed before her own (occasional) footnotes to her letters.

Concerning the appendix: Authors' footnotes are carried over from the originals without any special indication on our part; our editors' notes are in brackets, either in the text or added to footnotes.

A few of our editors' notes have been adapted from Dunayevskaya, *The Power of Negativity*, edited by Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), where several of Dunayevskaya's letters to Marcuse and Fromm were first published.



# Acknowledgments

We thank Olga Domanski and Robert French of the Raya Dunayevskaya Memorial Fund, Chicago, for permission to publish Dunayevskaya's letters to Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm, as well as Dunayevskaya's essays on Marcuse and Fromm contained in the appendix to this volume.

The letters of Herbert Marcuse to Raya Dunayevskaya are published here with the permission of the Literary Estate of Herbert Marcuse, Peter Marcuse, Executor. We also thank Peter Marcuse for permission to reprint Herbert Marcuse's preface to Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom*. Supplementary material from previously unpublished work of Herbert Marcuse, much now in the Archives of the Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main, has been and will be published by Routledge Publishers, England, in a six-volume series edited by Douglas Kellner and in a German series edited by Peter-Erwin Jansen published by zu Klampen Verlag, Germany. All rights to further publication are retained by the Estate.

We thank Rainer Funk, Literary Executor of Erich Fromm, for his assistance in providing access to Fromm's letters to Raya Dunayevskaya, to Dunayevskaya's handwritten letters to Fromm, and to background information and critical comments helpful to our edition. We have summarized rather than published Fromm's letters to Dunayevskaya because Fromm's letters are not available for publication at this time. We also thank Funk for permission to publish the English version of Fromm's Foreword to Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution*; the Fromm Estate, Tübingen, Germany, holds copyright to the Foreword.

We would also like to thank John Abromeit, Frieda Afary, Charles Herr, Peter Hudis, and Douglas Kellner for comments on the introduction. In addition, we are grateful to Buri Banerjee, Heather Brown, Kelly Depner, Alexander Hanna, Brian Lovato, John Worden, and Mir Yarfitz for research assis-

tance at various stages of this project. We would also like to thank the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), which funded Anderson's travel to Germany in 1994 to consult the papers of Erich Fromm in Tübingen and those of Herbert Marcuse in Frankfurt.

# Abbreviations

EL	G. W. F. Hegel, <i>Encyclopedia Logic</i> , trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991); sometimes referred to as Shorter or Smaller Logic; passages designated by paragraph number [¶]
LCW	V. I. Lenin, <i>Collected Works</i> , 45 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1961)
MCIF	Karl Marx, <i>Capital</i> , Vol. I, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1977)
MCIK	Karl Marx, <i>Capital</i> , Vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, revised by Ernest Untermann (Chicago, Charles Kerr & Company, 1906)
M&F	Raya Dunayevskaya, <i>Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 until Today</i> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)
M&F1958	Raya Dunayevskaya, <i>Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 until Today</i> (New York: Bookman, 1958);

- contains her translations of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks, dropped from later editions
- MECW Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1975–2004)
- ODM Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964)
- PhGB G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931)
- PhGM G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977)
- P&R Raya Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, orig. 1973)
- PON Raya Dunayevskaya, *The Power of Negativity*, edited by Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002)
- RDC The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection. Marxist-Humanism. A Half-Century of Its World Development (Detroit: Wayne State University Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, microfilm)
- R&R Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, orig. 1941)
- SLI G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Vol. I, trans. W. H. Johnson and J. G.

- Struthers (London: Macmillan, 1929)
- SLII G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Vol. II, trans. W. H. Johnson and J. G. Struthers (London: Macmillan, 1929)
- SLM G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969)
- PM G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)
- RLWLKM Raya Dunayevskaya, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991, orig. 1982)
- WLDR Raya Dunayevskaya, *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1985)





# Introduction

We present here for the first time the correspondence during the years 1954 to 1978 between the Marxist-Humanist<sup>1</sup> and feminist philosopher Raya Dunayevskaya (1910–1987) and two other noted thinkers, the Hegelian Marxist philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) and the psychologist and social critic Erich Fromm (1900–1980), both of the latter members of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.<sup>2</sup> In this introduction we will describe the intellectual trajectory of each correspondent and focus on their theoretical dialogues in these letters, which cover topics such as dialectical social theory, socialist humanism, the structure and contradictions of modern capitalism, and feminism and revolution. Since most of the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence transpired during the years 1954–1961, before the Dunayevskaya-Fromm correspondence really got underway, we begin with the former.

## THE EARLY TRAJECTORIES OF MARCUSE AND DUNAYEVSKAYA

Marcuse was a Marxist from his youth who had also studied with the existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger. Of Jewish origin, he subsequently joined the Frankfurt School and left Germany after 1933. In Germany, he had penned *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity* (1932a [1987]), a study that is widely thought to have retained a degree of Heideggerian influence.<sup>3</sup> Probably more relevant to his subsequent correspondence with Dunayevskaya on Hegel, Marx, and modern capitalism was the pathbreaking article on Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* he published a few months later, in which he was among the first to place this work of the young Marx solidly

within the overall Marxian corpus. Marcuse's article concluded with a ringing declaration of the centrality of the Hegelian dialectic to Marx's work as a whole: "Marx has expressed in all clarity the inner connection between revolutionary theory and Hegel's philosophy. . . . His examination of political economy is itself a continuous confrontation with Hegel" (Marcuse [1932b] 2005, p. 121).<sup>4</sup>

Neither of these two 1932 studies was known to Dunayevskaya during the 1940s. She and many others on the Left in the U.S. first became aware of Marcuse in 1941, with the publication of *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. At the time of this publication, Marcuse was a core member of the Frankfurt School, now in exile in the U.S., whose overall intellectual leader remained Max Horkheimer, under whom Marcuse worked as a specialist in dialectical philosophy. But Marcuse had also written on other themes associated with the Frankfurt School's distinctive form of Marxist sociology, which it dubbed "Critical Theory": the social psychology of fascism, Freudian Marxism, the critique of technology and instrumental reason, and the critique of the culture industry.

The first comprehensive analysis of Hegel's major works from a Marxist perspective in any language, *Reason and Revolution* also offered the first treatment in English of the whole of Marx's body of work, from the *1844 Manuscripts* to *Capital*, stressing the fetishism of commodities in the latter work. Marcuse's book contained in addition an explicit critique of positivism, which earned him an ill-tempered response from the American Marxist and pragmatist philosopher Sidney Hook.<sup>5</sup> *Reason and Revolution* also included an implicit critique of pragmatism, then very influential in the U.S.: "Knowledge begins when philosophy destroys the experience of daily life," Marcuse wrote. The latter is only "the starting point of the search for truth," which is ultimately based on a critique of commonsense notions of reality (1941, p. 103).<sup>6</sup> Marcuse's stress throughout the book on Hegel's concept of negativity was new and original, a position that was based on a close reading of Marx's 1844 "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic." Marcuse argues that "the origins of the Marxian dialectic" can be found in this unpublished 1844 text (1941, p. 282). Summing this up, he writes: "For Marx, as for Hegel, the dialectic takes note of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is 'the moving and creative principle.' The dialectic is the dialectic of negativity." Negativity is important to Marx in part because: "Economic realities exhibit their own inherent negativity" (Marcuse 1941, p. 282).<sup>7</sup> In this book, Marcuse also cited Lenin on Hegel and dialectics favorably, and did not, as in his subsequent writings, argue for a basic continuity between Lenin and Stalin.

From 1942 to 1951, Marcuse worked first for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, later reconstituted as the CIA) and then for the State Department. He concentrated on propaganda and later, on U.S. occupation policies for Germany, while also continuing to carry out studies of war and fascism

(Marcuse 1998). During these years, he also published one of the first Marxist critiques of Sartrean existentialism (Marcuse [1948] 1973). Marcuse also elaborated Marxist perspectives aimed at reconstituting the Frankfurt School after the war in “33 Theses,” a private memorandum sent to Horkheimer in 1947. As Douglas Kellner writes, Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who had replaced Marcuse as the philosophy specialist of a much-reduced Frankfurt School in exile, were probably “put off by the aggressively Marxian-revolutionary tone of Marcuse’s ‘theses’” (Kellner 1998, p. 34). On the one hand, referring to the emergent Western and Soviet blocs, Marcuse wrote: “Under these circumstances there is only one alternative for revolutionary theory: to ruthlessly and openly criticize both systems and to uphold without compromise orthodox Marxist theory against both” (1998, p. 218). This would have brought Marcuse close to the positions of Dunayevskaya and the anti-Stalinist Left more generally. On the other hand, however, Marcuse concluded by advocating that Marxists work with the Stalinist Communist parties of the West by “reconstituting revolutionary theory within the communist parties and working for the praxis appropriate to it” (1998, p. 227). This was a position at odds with that of much of the anti-Stalinist Left, especially those tendencies with which Dunayevskaya was associated. These kinds of differences—over the USSR and Cuba—would eventually emerge in acrimonious fashion in the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence.

By 1954, at the time Dunayevskaya first wrote to him, Marcuse was about to become a professor of philosophy at Brandeis University. He was completing *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* ([1955a] 1966), his subsequently famous study of the revolutionary implications of Freud’s analysis of sexual repression. One particular connection to his future correspondence with Dunayevskaya, which hardly ever addressed Freud, was *Eros and Civilization’s* chapter entitled “Philosophical Interlude.” This chapter took up the closing paragraphs of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind* [Spirit].<sup>8</sup> The *Philosophy of Mind* formed the last volume of Hegel’s *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which contained volumes on logic, nature, and mind or spirit. Taken as a whole, the *Encyclopedia* is often termed Hegel’s “system,” giving this last chapter of the last book of the *Encyclopedia* a particular importance.

Focusing on those last paragraphs of the *Philosophy of Mind*, Marcuse writes: “Hegel’s presentation of his system in his *Encyclopedia* ends on the word ‘enjoys.’ The philosophy of Western civilization culminates in the idea that the truth lies in the negation of the principle that governs this civilization—negation in the two-fold sense that freedom appears as real only in the idea, and that the endlessly projecting and transcending productivity of being comes to fruition in the perpetual peace of self-conscious receptivity”

([1955a] 1966, p. 116). As will be discussed below, the concluding paragraphs of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* were a central preoccupation of Dunayevskaya for over four decades.

Before turning to Dunayevskaya's early development, it should be noted that there was very little correspondence between Marcuse and Fromm during the period covered by the present volume, 1954–78. Fromm had been pushed out of the Frankfurt School by Horkheimer and Adorno in 1939,<sup>9</sup> while Marcuse had retained close ties to his other Frankfurt School colleagues, especially Horkheimer. In 1955, Marcuse launched a public attack on Fromm in his *Eros and Civilization* and in the pages of the democratic socialist journal *Dissent*. In his *Dissent* article, "The Social Implications of Freudian 'Revisionism,'" Marcuse argued that the form of neo-Freudianism Fromm was espousing since *Escape from Freedom* (1941) offered little in the way of a really critical social theory. Marcuse wrote that in works like *Man for Himself* (1947), Fromm had de-emphasized the concept of sexual repression that lay at the core of Freudian theory, thus jettisoning Freud's notion of the fundamental unhappiness of the civilized human being. This led Fromm to notions of happiness that "become compatible with the prevailing values" (Marcuse 1955b, p. 224). Fromm responded equally sharply, maintaining that Marcuse admired Freud's theory because its sexual core was materialist, but Fromm then argued that in fact Freud's theory was similar to "nineteenth-century bourgeois materialism," which had been "overcome by Marx's historical materialism" (Fromm 1955b, p. 344). Fromm further accused Marcuse of "a callousness towards moral qualities in political figures, which was so apparent in Lenin's attitude," which was "one of the reasons for the victory of Stalinism" (1955b, p. 349). In his rejoinder, Marcuse castigated Fromm for his espousal of management schemes to humanize factory work and argued that his recent writings were "a perfect example of how proposals for a smoother functioning of the established society can be confused with the notions that transcend this society" (1956, p. 81). In his "Counter-Rebuttal," Fromm wrote that Marcuse refused to concede that a degree of sexual repression was necessary for any kind of orderly society (Fromm 1956).

Overall, Marcuse was charging Fromm with having subsumed his earlier systemic critiques of modern capitalist society under liberal notions of healthy love, caring, and meaningful work, goals that Fromm now held could be achieved, at least on occasion, under the existing social arrangements. While this may not have been a completely accurate portrayal of Fromm's position, it illustrated Marcuse's lifelong quest for a total uprooting of the social structures and culture of modern capitalism.<sup>10</sup>

Given the enthusiastic embrace of Freud in American intellectual life in the 1950s and the 1960s, with Dunayevskaya a rare exception, the impact of the Marcuse-Fromm debate was enormous. Although most leftist intellectu-

als have tended subsequently to side with Marcuse against the supposedly more “conformist” Fromm in this dispute, others, among them some of the most astute interpreters of Marcuse, have argued convincingly that such a reading of their 1955–1956 dispute does not do Fromm justice (Rickert 1986; see also Kovel 1994, Bronner 1994, Kellner 1991).

In addition, we would argue that the disagreements between Marcuse and Fromm have been overblown, while Marcuse’s differences with Horkheimer and Adorno after the 1940s have been underplayed. Only five years after their Freud dispute, Fromm prominently and favorably cited Marcuse’s writings on Marxism (albeit not *Eros and Civilization*) in his *Marx’s Concept of Man* (1961). To take another key example, it is often forgotten that Fromm invited Marcuse—an invitation Marcuse accepted—to contribute an essay to his widely circulated collection, *Socialist Humanism* (1965). During that same period, Marcuse asked Fromm to review his *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) and while Fromm politely declined, as we will see below, in 1968 he wrote to Dunayevskaya of the need to come to Marcuse’s defense after he had received death threats from the far Right. At the same time, however, Fromm continued to criticize Marcuse. As will also be discussed below, this can be seen in his *Revolution of Hope* (1968), in which he argued that Marcuse’s revolutionary intransigence during the 1960s masked an attitude of utter despair about the future of humanity.

Moreover, it is surely no accident that Marcuse and Fromm were the only two members of the Frankfurt School who engaged in dialogue with Dunayevskaya, a lifelong Marxist-Humanist revolutionary thinker and activist. Despite their differences, both Marcuse and Fromm generally supported the radical movements of the 1960s, from which Horkheimer and Adorno recoiled. At the same time, Marcuse’s correspondence with Horkheimer and Adorno shows a persistent attempt to remain in their good graces, especially during the 1950s after their return to Frankfurt, as can be readily seen in the selections from their correspondence published by Douglas Kellner in Marcuse (2001). In this sense, Marcuse may have been worried that Horkheimer and Adorno would link him to Fromm, who had also remained in the U.S.

The German philosopher Bertolt Fessen has made an interesting observation on this in an article on Fromm: “As against Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse like Fromm held to the hope for a radical transcendence [*Aufheben*] of domination and alienation, and Marcuse thereby exerted himself to bring out clearly his differences with Fromm—not least for Horkheimer and Adorno—in order not to be lumped together with Fromm” (1993, p. 114). Be that as it may, the extensive correspondence of both Marcuse and Fromm with Dunayevskaya, who certainly saw the transcendence of domination and alienation as a concrete historical possibility in the postwar capitalist order, is also suggestive of some important affinities between these two Frankfurt School thinkers, and of differences with the less politically radical version of

the Frankfurt School that had been re-established in the 1950s in Germany under the direction of Horkheimer and Adorno. Moreover, on a more theoretical level, it should be noted that Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* were central to the major published work of Marcuse, Fromm, and Dunayevskaya, something that could not be said of Adorno and Horkheimer.

Dunayevskaya, who immigrated to Chicago from Russia as a child, became active as a teenager in the Communist Party, and later, the Trotskyist movement. A self-educated intellectual from a working class background and without a university education, she served as Leon Trotsky's Russian secretary in 1937–1938 during his exile in Mexico. A year later, she was among those who broke with Trotsky over the implications of the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact. This break in Trotskyism transpired after Trotsky had called for defense of the Soviet Union as a “workers’ state, though degenerate” and had endorsed Stalin's occupation of the Baltic countries and of eastern Poland as a necessary defense against Hitler. By 1941, Dunayevskaya had joined forces with the noted Afro-Caribbean Marxist and cultural theorist C. L. R. James, who had independently come to a state-capitalist position. The two formed what became known as the Johnson-Forest Tendency (officially the State-Capitalist Tendency) within the American Trotskyist movement. (James wrote under the pseudonym J. R. Johnson and Dunayevskaya under that of Freddie Forest.) A third key member of the group was the Chinese-American philosopher Grace Lee (Boggs). James, Lee, and Dunayevskaya debated Hegelian dialectics intensely in the 1940s, as part of an effort to write a joint book on Marxism and dialectics, never completed. Among the texts they discussed was Dunayevskaya's translation of Lenin's 1914–15 Hegel Notebooks.<sup>11</sup> During this period, they also corresponded about contacting Marcuse in an attempt to engage him in a dialogue about dialectics after having read and admired his *Reason and Revolution*. They never did so, apparently because as members of a Marxist revolutionary tendency that opposed World War II as an imperialist war (although they did support the ant-fascist resistance movements), they were wary about contacting him while he was working for the OSS.<sup>12</sup>

Dunayevskaya's first theoretical publications took up Stalin's Soviet Union as a state-capitalist society, occasionally referring to Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* in the process. This work on state capitalism began to gain her recognition outside the circles of Trotskyism in 1944, after she translated and critiqued in the *American Economic Review* an article from a leading Soviet theoretical journal describing a new program of teaching political economy. Most strikingly, the Soviet article argued that although the USSR was socialist, Marx's law of value and surplus value nonetheless continued to operate there, and that the teaching of political economy would have to be altered in light of this fact. In her commentary accompanying the translation, Dunayevskaya held that this was actually an admission of the reality that the Soviet

Union had become a state-capitalist society: “There is incontrovertible evidence that there exists in Russia at present a sharp class differentiation based upon a division of function between the workers, on the one hand, and the managers of industry, millionaire *kolkhozniki*, political leaders and the intelligentsia in general, on the other” (1944, p. 532). Dunayevskaya’s translation and commentary, which also criticized the Stalinist theoreticians’ downgrading of the first chapter of *Capital*, provoked strong responses from several pro-Soviet economists, among them Paul Baran and Oscar Lange, also reaching the front page of *The New York Times*.

Dunayevskaya and James went their separate ways in 1955. Two years prior to this, Dunayevskaya had penned her “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes” of May 12 and May 20, 1953. Originally addressed to Grace Lee as part of their three-way correspondence on dialectics with C. L. R. James, these 1953 Letters showed that her thinking had already taken an independent direction as a philosopher in her own right. Where many saw Hegel’s concluding chapter on the “absolute idea” in the *Science of Logic* as an airy flight into religious abstraction or a closed totality, in her May 12, 1953 Letter, Dunayevskaya perceived connections to social reality and deep contradictions. Picking up a thread from Lenin’s Hegel Notebooks, she quotes the opening sentence of the Hegel’s absolute idea chapter, noting that it refers to practice as well as theory: “The Absolute Idea has now turned out to be the identity of the Theoretical and Practical Idea” (Dunayevskaya 2002, p.16). She also notes that the absolute idea was hardly a synthesis, quoting Hegel to the effect that “the Absolute Idea contains the highest opposition with itself” (Dunayevskaya 2002, p. 16). Dunayevskaya connects all of this to the critique of totalitarian state capitalism, which she sees as a sort of absolute development of the capitalist system: “Now everyone looks at the totalitarian one-party state, that is the new that must be overcome by a totally new revolt in which everyone experiences ‘absolute liberation’” (Dunayevskaya 2002, p. 22).

Dunayevskaya elaborates the notion of absolute liberation in her May 20, 1953 Letter through a discussion of the “absolute mind” chapter of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind*, which she saw as most relevant for working out the dialectic of post-capitalist society. In so doing, she focuses on the same passage as Marcuse in *Eros and Civilization*: “The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind” (Hegel 1971, p. 315). Marcuse connected this to a more generalized idea of happiness, holding as we have seen that for Hegel “freedom appears as real only in the idea.” For her part, Dunayevskaya—and it is important to emphasize this was before the publication of *Eros and Civilization*—saw Hegel’s conclusion as connected to the envisioning of a new society in Marxian terms: “We have entered the new society” (Dunayevskaya 2002, p. 30). Earlier in her discussion of absolute mind, Dunayevskaya

stressed, contra Marcuse, that far from embarking upon a flight into religious abstraction at the stage of the absolute, “Hegel cannot avoid history, the concrete development” (2002, p. 27).

Thus, on the eve of their correspondence, Dunayevskaya and Marcuse shared as Hegelian Marxists a profound grasp of the interrelationship of the Hegelian and Marxian forms of dialectic. They also shared a commitment to the unity of the philosophical with the political dimension.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, Marcuse tended to see Hegel’s absolutes as not terribly relevant to a Marxian critique of capitalism or to the elaboration of a vision of a new society, while Dunayevskaya saw Hegel’s absolutes as the point of departure for a new dialectic adequate to the era of totalitarianism and to the new postwar social movements of rank and file workers, Blacks, and women. Later on, Dunayevskaya would regard her 1953 Letters as the place where she first articulated her Marxist-Humanist version of dialectics. However, she did not yet use the term Marxist-Humanism in 1953. That term emerged publicly in her writings only with *Marxism and Freedom* in 1958. In this sense, Dunayevskaya’s early and most extensive correspondence with Marcuse takes place during the period when she was making the transition from left-wing Trotskyist to Marxist-Humanist.

## THE DUNAYEVSKAYA-MARCUSE CORRESPONDENCE BEGINS

Dunayevskaya initiated the correspondence with Marcuse with a letter of December 7, 1954, at a time when her break with C. L. R. James was already in the offing. As mentioned above, and seen in the correspondence among James, Lee, and Dunayevskaya, contacting Marcuse had long been a goal of the Johnson-Forest Tendency. Moreover, he was no longer working with the OSS. An additional motivation to contact Marcuse at this time probably lay in the fact that with the breakup of the Johnson-Forest Tendency, Dunayevskaya no longer had among her own close colleagues a real philosophical interlocutor with even a basic knowledge of Hegel and dialectics. From Marcuse’s side, although the correspondence probably did not loom as large on his intellectual agenda, it should be noted that with Horkheimer and Adorno now back in Germany and McCarthyism raging in the U.S., he too was more isolated, at least in terms of others with whom to engage in serious dialogues on Hegelian and Marxist theory. During the early and most fruitful years of their correspondence, 1955–1960, Marcuse was to be sure somewhat interested, as was Dunayevskaya primarily, in dialogue about dialectics, but by 1960 he was also raising issues with her like the sociology of work and



more broadly, the new features of postwar U. S. capitalist society, this as part of the preparation for his study of “advanced industrial society,” *One-Dimensional Man* (1964).

This first letter of Dunayevskaya to Marcuse began, “Although I do not know you in person, you are of course familiar to me for your ‘Reason and Revolution.’ I was so impressed with the work at the time it was published I intended to write...[or] visit you. . . . You might have read my translation of ‘Teaching economics in the Soviet Union’ that appeared in . . . *American Economic Review*.” Marcuse and Dunayevskaya met personally for the first time in February or March 1955, when she apparently gave him copies of her 1953 Letters. In an April 3, 1955 letter to Marcuse, she referred to rank-and-file workers fighting against what she saw as the heightened alienation resulting from automation, which she viewed as a new stage of capitalist production. She commented on her plans for the book she was writing, later published as *Marxism and Freedom*: “The twin poles to me of any fundamental work . . . must have automation at one end, and the absolute idea or freedom at the other end.” Several other letters demonstrate Dunayevskaya’s interest in further developing Hegelian categories, especially around the concept of absolute negativity.

Marcuse’s responses suggest considerable interest, but also include sharp criticisms. First, although he too was a Hegelian Marxist, he expressed some reservations about her appropriation of dialectic for contemporary Marxist analysis: “I have now read the notes on Hegel [the 1953 Letters] which you lent me. This is fascinating, and I admire your way of concretizing the most abstract philosophical notions. However, I still cannot get along with the direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics: I think you somehow minimize the ‘negation’ which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes. I would like to discuss these things with you” (letter of April 14, 1955).

Second, Marcuse took issue with what he termed Dunayevskaya’s “glorification of the ‘common people’” in her discussions of Detroit workers, which he termed “abstract and undialectical” (letter of January 8, 1955). These critiques prompted a lengthy response by Dunayevskaya:

Now that the school season is drawing to a close perhaps you will take that trip to Detroit, and thus see that it is not a question of “my” direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics, but the dialectical development of proletarian politics itself as it struggles to rid itself of its specifically class character in its movement to a classless society. That is why I “translated” Absolute Mind as the new society. You seem to think that I thus minimize the “negation” which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes. But surely Hegel’s Absolute Idea has nothing in common with Schelling’s conception of the Absolute as the synthesis or identity in which all differences are absorbed by the “One.” (letter of May 5, 1955)

These two points of difference would mark their correspondence during the next few years, but this would not stop Dunayevskaya from continuing to share her reflections on Hegel and dialectics with Marcuse, since their correspondence in this period was based on strong intellectual affinities as well as differences. These affinities are illustrated by Marcuse's remark upon reading some draft material for *Marxism and Freedom*: "Your ideas are a real oasis in the desert of Marxist thought" (letter of December 2, 1955). In a letter of May 3, 1956, Dunayevskaya also expressed enthusiasm over their correspondence: "You have no idea how your encouraging words help me proceed with my work. As you no doubt know, my entry into the 'intellectual world' was thru very unorthodox ways and you are the first not to make me feel like a fish out of water."

During 1955–1956, Marcuse critiqued subsequent drafts of *Marxism and Freedom*, attempted unsuccessfully to interest his publisher Beacon Press in the book, and agreed to write the preface. In general, he lent great encouragement to Dunayevskaya as she finished the manuscript. Dunayevskaya also commented briefly on *Eros and Civilization* during this period: "Your original contribution lies in your extraction of 'Eros' from being in a field by itself and placing it within the historical context of Western civilization. . . . You thereby illuminated the field of psychoanalysis" (letter of September 6, 1956). She suggested further that she found Marcuse's critique of Fromm convincing, commissioning a review of *Eros and Civilization* in *News & Letters*, the paper she had founded in 1955, after the break with James, and continued to edit until her death in 1987.

Dunayevskaya and Marcuse's second meeting, for nearly two full days in November 1956, was to finalize Dunayevskaya's manuscript. In a letter to her husband John Dwyer, Dunayevskaya described the meeting with Marcuse in Boston, part of which also involved the historian of the Russian Revolution E. H. Carr. She outlined the theoretical differences between Marcuse and herself, and how Marcuse proposed to present these in his preface. As before, these differences continued to center on Hegel's absolutes and on the contemporary working classes. But a third element of difference also came to the fore at this juncture, the relationship between Lenin and Stalin, which by this time Marcuse had come to view as basically a continuity. In this sense, he strongly opposed her theory of state capitalism and its implications. Although not openly expressed in their correspondence, or in his preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, Marcuse was also leery of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, whose workers' councils Dunayevskaya ardently supported.

It is important to note that in this early period of their correspondence Marcuse published two books, *Eros and Civilization* ([1955a] 1966) and *Soviet Marxism* ([1958a] 1985). Although Marcuse volunteered that he in-

tended to have Dunayevskaya review the manuscript of the latter before publication, this never happened. In this sense, their interactions were somewhat one-sided.

To assist in his writing of the preface, Marcuse asked Dunayevskaya for a summary of the main theses of *Marxism and Freedom*, which she provided in a letter of June 11, 1957. Above all, she singled out the themes of dialectics and humanism in Marx's work as a whole, from the *1844 Manuscripts* to *Capital*. As noted earlier, *Marxism and Freedom* was the first publication in which she proclaimed herself a Marxist-Humanist, a term never used by the Johnson-Forest Tendency. She writes, citing Marx's "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" from the *1844 Manuscripts*: "The central point, the pivot around which everything else in *Marxism and Freedom* revolves, is of course, the philosophic foundation of Marxism. As I put it in my introductory note, 'The aim of this book is to re-establish the original form of Marxism which Marx called 'thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism.'" She adds that in her discussion of *Capital*, "I show that not only are Marx's economic categories social categories but they are thoroughly permeated with the humanism that came out of the working-class struggles for the shortening of the working day." As to the next generation, "Lenin learned the critical importance of the philosophic foundations the hard way—when the Second International actually collapsed and, to reconstitute his own reason, had to return to Hegel's *Science of Logic*." A second and "subordinate" theme was "the division between the radical intellectual like Proudhon and the Marxist intellectual," because Marx "did not divide theory from history, including the current class struggles." Key here was the question of "what will happen after: are we always to be confronted with a Napoleon or a Stalin?" A third element was how her theory of state capitalism was rooted in dialectical methodology. She also suggests that her standing as a Marxist economist—and by implication, her combining of economics and dialectics in a new way in this book—would open up further the debate over Hegel, Marx, and dialectics launched by Marcuse over a decade earlier. In addition to its treatment of Marx, of Lenin, of the Russian revolution and its aftermath, and of contemporary U.S. capitalism, *Marxism and Freedom* also carried in its appendix Dunayevskaya's translations of Lenin's 1914–1915 Hegel Notebooks and of two of Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*, "Private Property and Communism" and "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic." None of these texts had previously appeared in English in a widely available form.

Marcuse's preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, reprinted in the appendix to this volume, stands as a theoretical text in its own right. He begins with the need to rethink Marxism in light of the failure of revolution in the West and the unhappy results of revolution in Russia. Marcuse locates Dunayevskaya's contribution at the center of a process in which twentieth century Marxism, beginning with Georg Lukács, slowly retrieved and then assimilated ever

expanding numbers of Marx's manuscripts and notebooks previously buried in oblivion and neglect, most notably the *1844 Manuscripts* and the *Grundrisse*. Marcuse argues that Marxist theorists had since the 1920s focused on how Marx's long-neglected early philosophical writings prepared the ground for the economic and political stages of his later writings. Marcuse suggests, however, that Dunayevskaya's analysis, in taking account of the *Grundrisse* as well, "goes beyond the previous interpretations," and thus for the first time adequately elucidates the "inner identity of the philosophical with the economic and political 'stage' of Marxian theory" (Marcuse [1958b] 2000, p. xxi).

But Marcuse also expresses his differences with Dunayevskaya, both explicitly and implicitly. At an explicit level, Marcuse differs only with Dunayevskaya's treatment in the second half of the book of theoretical and political events after Marx:

While the author of this preface agrees in all essentials with the interpretation of the Marxian *oeuvre* in the first parts, he disagrees with some decisive parts of the analysis of post-Marxian developments, especially with that of the relationship between Leninism and Stalinism, of the recent upheavals in Eastern Europe, and, perhaps most important, with the analysis of the contemporary position, structure and consciousness of the laboring classes. (Marcuse [1958b] 2000, p. xxv; see also the Appendix in this volume)

This critique bore upon Dunayevskaya's treatment of Lenin and the Russian revolution, of Stalinist state capitalism and the revolts against it, including the Hungarian revolution, and the contemporary struggles in the U.S. of rank-and-file workers against automation and of the nascent Civil Rights movement as seen in the Montgomery bus boycott.

At a second, implicit level, however, Marcuse also expresses some disagreements with Dunayevskaya's treatment of Marx, particularly concerning the *Grundrisse*. One disagreement revolves around Dunayevskaya's conclusions that for Marx in both *Capital* and *Grundrisse*, (a) "the creative role of labor is the key to all else" and (b) "the conception of freedom that the young Marx had when he broke from bourgeois society as a revolutionary Hegelian remained with him throughout his life" (Dunayevskaya [1958] 2000, p. 145). With respect to (a), here in this preface Marcuse interprets creativity *outside of labor* as central to post-capitalist society. In contrast, Dunayevskaya's interpretation posits the creativity of labor itself as central in the realization of a post-capitalist society. Marcuse writes with respect to this: "a truly rational societal organization of labor...is 'only' a political problem. For Marx, it is to be solved by a revolution which brings the productive process under the collective control of the 'immediate producers'. But this is not freedom. Freedom is living without toil, without anxiety: the play of human faculties" (see the Appendix in this volume). With respect to (b), Marcuse's

preface suggests that the *Grundrisse* actually represents a substantial, perhaps qualitative development of Marx's idea of freedom compared to how he had articulated it in the *1844 Manuscripts*.

As publication neared, Marcuse questioned another point in *Marxism and Freedom*, Dunayevskaya's stress on the "American roots of Marxism," something that had been picked up in the publisher's press releases. This led to an exchange in which Dunayevskaya outlined her argument, not only concerning Marx's support for slave uprisings in the U.S. and for the radical abolitionists in the North during the Civil War era, but also her view that these events had impacted the structure of *Capital*, Vol. I. This, she argued, was especially true of the chapter on the "Working Day," where Marx wrote concerning the Civil War that "labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded." This chapter on the working day had not entered into the "first plan" of *Capital* (letter of October 11, 1957). Marcuse was not convinced, however, calling Marx's references to the U.S. "rather casual" (letter of October 15, 1957).

Soon after the publication of *Marxism and Freedom*, Dunayevskaya wrote to Marcuse that she was thinking of a "supplement" in which she would develop her ideas on Hegel, partly in response to "a few American workers and student youth who have been writing me on Chapter 1 of M&F and have shown a much greater grasp than they are ever being credited with." She concluded: "Naturally I would still love to 'depend' on you and wondered whether you would care to read any drafts that I would write" (letter of January 28, 1958). In a letter of February 10, Marcuse agreed to read "what you write on Hegel," but he did not respond to a 2000-word letter of July 15, 1958, in which Dunayevskaya outlined her post-*Marxism and Freedom* thoughts on Hegel's dialectic. Her emphasis in this long letter returns to the category of absolute mind: "For anyone bound for 'adventures of the Hegelian dialectic,' the Absolute Mind lies beckoning, but, no, we go back to repeating the old about the de-humanization of ideas that Hegel is reproached with, although I maintain that today we should see it as its innermost essence."<sup>14</sup>

While Dunayevskaya congratulated Marcuse that *Soviet Marxism* had finally come off the press, there were no direct remarks in her last two letters of the 1950s indicating that she had yet read the work. Along with Dunayevskaya's eventual polemical response to *Soviet Marxism* (see Appendix, "Intellectuals in the Age of State-Capitalism"), Marcuse's new preface to the 1960 edition of *Reason and Revolution*, "A Note on the Dialectic," was also to become a point of difference. In that 1960 preface, he wrote: "I believe that it is the idea of Reason itself which is the undialectical element in Hegel's philosophy. . . . It may even be justifiable, logically as well as historically, to define Reason in terms which include slavery, the Inquisition, child labor, concentration camps, gas chambers, and nuclear preparedness" (p. xiii). Du-

nayevskaya, who appears to have first read this preface in the late 1960s, came to believe that it represented a major shift from the earlier perspective of 1941, when Marcuse had written: “The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely the revolutionary class itself. The realization of freedom requires the free rationality of those who achieve it” (1941, p. 319). Marcuse’s new perspective of 1960 on dialectics was probably rooted in the Nietzschean approach found in Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947), which itself marked a turn away from the Hegelian Marxism of the prewar Frankfurt School.<sup>15</sup> The sharp differences reflected in Marcuse’s preface to the 1960 edition of *Reason and Revolution* and Dunayevskaya’s subsequent review of *Soviet Marxism* were to underlie the next major phase of their correspondence, which was to end with a burst of polemics.

## HEGELIAN DIALECTIC AND SOCIAL THEORY

This next phase in the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence began more than two years later, with Marcuse’s letter of August 8, 1960 asking for Dunayevskaya’s response to his work on what was to become his best-known book, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (1964). Marcuse writes that “my new book with the tentative title *Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* is some sort of western counterpart of *Soviet Marxism*.” Seemingly picking up directly from where he left off in his preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, Marcuse poses “a question of a changing...more affirmative attitude of the laborer not only to the system as a whole but even to the organization of work in the more highly organized plants.” Marcuse asks for Dunayevskaya’s “considered evaluation” of this issue in the U.S., as well as references to “American literature on this pro and con.”

Dunayevskaya’s response to Marcuse’s request—in a letter of August 16—included a description of the current issue of *News & Letters*, particularly a section entitled “Workers Battle Automation,” which contained articles with “workers speaking for themselves on the conditions of labor and alleged high standard of living.” Dunayevskaya’s letter also included an extensive bibliography of works (mostly sociological) on labor, automation, class, and community, as well as Dunayevskaya’s own views, “which differ very radically from your views,” she informs Marcuse. Dunayevskaya directs Marcuse’s attention specifically to a debate between two worker activists on automation. Angela Terrano, a factory worker who had been quoted in *Marxism and Freedom* to the effect that work in a new society would have to be “something completely new, not just work to get money to buy food and

things. . . . It will have to be completely tied up with life” (Dunayevskaya [1958] 2000, p. 275), rejects automation altogether. Charles Denby, a Black autoworker and editor of *News & Letters*, held that workers’ control of production and a shorter work-day, in the context of the abolition of capitalism, would be needed to realize the potentials of automation. In the section of this letter offering her own views, Dunayevskaya also takes up where the discussion between them left off with the completion of *Marxism and Freedom*. She questions whether Marcuse, with his views on “the transformation of the laboring classes,” had not “fallen into the trap of viewing Marxian socialism as if it were a distributive philosophy.”

Marcuse’s response, in a letter of August 24, 1960, essentially restates his earlier points on automation, complete with references to the *Grundrisse* and to *Capital*, similarly to his argument in the preface to *Marxism and Freedom*. However, a notable addition to his 1958 argument includes explicit reference to a convergence of “interests” between capitalists and workers in “advanced industrial society.” He writes that “genuine automation” (instead of the current restricted, partial mode), which would “explode” the capitalist system, was being “held back by the capitalists as well as the workers.” They did so on different grounds: for the capitalists, “decline in the rate of profit, need for sweeping government controls, etc.; on the part of the workers, technological unemployment.” He concludes: “Re Angela T.: you should really tell her about all that humanization of labor, its connection with life, etc.—that this is possible only through complete automation, because such humanization is correctly relegated by Marx to the realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity, i.e., beyond the entire realm of socially necessary labor in the material production. Total de-humanization of the latter is the prerequisite.”<sup>16</sup>

On October 16, 1960 Dunayevskaya sent a long letter to Marcuse on Hegel’s absolute idea and the Hungarian and African Revolutions. This letter began with an implicit response to Marcuse’s previous letter, as she characterized the sociologists he was studying as “mechanical materialists” in the tradition of the Bolshevik theoretician Nikolai Bukharin, a topic to which she was to return in the coming weeks. In this October 16 letter Dunayevskaya addresses what she sees as some limitations to Lenin’s concept of dialectic, at the point where he skipped over the last paragraph of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* in his *Philosophical Notebooks*:

But the materialist in Lenin so overwhelmed him at this point of historic revelation that, you will recall, he wanted to stop where “Hegel stretched his hand to materialism” as he “ended” with Nature. Since that was so in the *Smaller Logic*, but there was another very important paragraph to go in the *Science of Logic*, the dividing point for our epoch is precisely on this free, individual, total liberation who show, both in thought and struggles, what they

are aiming us and thus compelling me in any case to read and reread that Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Idea, Absolute Mind as each developing struggle on the world scene deepens.

She had addressed these issues in the 1953 Letters, but not in *Marxism and Freedom*. The letter ends with the statement that she is “dying to go to Africa.” Dunayevskaya traveled to West Africa two years later, after which she published a series of articles in *Africa Today* and other journals on African Socialism as a form of socialist humanism.

In another letter of November 22, 1960, Dunayevskaya links her critiques of automation and empirical sociology to her earlier critiques of Bukharin. Following Lenin, she had been attacking Bukharin ever since the 1940s for failing to appreciate national liberation movements as the dialectical opposition to imperialism. She had also been attacking his mechanical materialism, something she linked to Lenin’s characterization of Bukharin in his Will as a theoretician who had failed to grasp the dialectic. In this letter, she emphasized the latter point, centered on a critique of Bukharin’s classic *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* (1921):

In place of self-activity, Bukharin, as all good determinists, looks for states of equilibrium; “laws” of development, uniformity. . . . Having defined science as objective content in and for itself, [Bukharin] can classify “bourgeois” science and “proletarian” science according to the abstract universal of usefulness or what would nowadays be called “neutrality.” His choice of “proletarian” science is therefore quantitative—it is more “far-sighted.” Even as<sup>17</sup> today’s Soviet as well as American sciences, Bukharin keeps using categories of a lower order, particularly mathematical categories which preclude self-movement and transformation into opposite for he seems not very oppressively aware of the fact that specific contents have specific forms of movement, and man’s self-activity cannot be subsumed under science, whether that is “near sighted” or “far sighted.”<sup>18</sup>

Marcuse does not respond to this effort on Dunayevskaya’s part to link her critique of science, technology, and mechanical materialism to some of his own concerns.

Sometime in the fall of 1960, Dunayevskaya sends Marcuse an excerpt of an early draft of her *Philosophy and Revolution*. Marcuse writes to Dunayevskaya once more on Hegel’s absolutes in a letter of December 22, 1960, responding both to her letters and to the draft material, on which he writes a handwritten critique. His letter states:

To me, the most important passages are those in which you stress the need for a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice, and the notion of the new Subject. This is indeed the key, and I fully agree with your statement



that the solution lies in the link between the first and second negation. Perhaps I would say: in the self-transcendence of materialism, or in the technological *Aufhebung* of the reified technical apparatus.

Marcuse shifts back to his longstanding differences with Dunayevskaya over Hegel and the dialectic, however: “But again, although I am trying hard, I cannot see why you need the Absolute Idea in order to demonstrate the Marxian content of self-determination of the Subject, etc. (The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the pre-technological stage.) Certainly you can ‘translate’ also this part of Hegel—but why translate if you can speak the original language?” The concept of the absolute idea as “pre-technological thought” was to figure prominently in Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man*. There, Marcuse was to argue that ancient “pre-technological” Greek philosophy contained an element of social critique that had been dropped by modern Western philosophy once the positivist stress on scientific objectivity as a standard for philosophy had come to the fore. While Marcuse’s formulation placed Hegel’s absolute idea within the realm of critical philosophy, as against the anti-Hegelians who tended to regard it as a closed totality that swallowed up all critique, it also suggested that the absolute idea was a holdover from premodern times with little relevance to contemporary capitalist society.

But contemporary relevance was at the heart of Dunayevskaya’s response. She answers him at great length in a 3000-word letter dated January 12, 1961, in which she writes:

If I must further justify myself, I would say that, frankly during the 1940s, when I first became enamored with the Absolute Idea, it was just out of loyalty to Marx and Lenin; Hegel was still hardly more than gibberish, although by now the music of his language got to me even if I couldn’t read the notes. But once the new technological period of Automation got to the miners and they started asking questions about what kind of labor, the return to the early Marx also meant the late Hegel. As I said, I do not agree with you that the Absolute Idea relates to a pre-technological stage. (So long as classes still exist, the dialectic will, and A. I. will forever show new facets.) What I do agree with is that once on the world scale, we have reached the ultimate in technological development, then the responses of the masses in the pre-technological underdeveloped economies are the spur to seeing something new in the Absolute Idea. Be it backward Ireland in 1916 or backward Russia in 1917, or backward Africa in 1960, somehow that absolute negativity of Hegel comes into play.

Marcuse does not answer her further on dialectics. Instead he takes issue with how Dunayevskaya had called his friend Isaac Deutscher a near-Stalinist. Marcuse attacks her as somehow in league with the U.S. government because

of her sharp criticisms of Deutscher, Castro, etc. (letter of March 6, 1961). Here is where the correspondence breaks off for several years, as Dunayevskaya answers him equally sharply.

Later in 1961, Dunayevskaya published a stinging critique of Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism*, which had just been reprinted in a paperback edition. This book, first published only two years after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which it ignored, was surprisingly uncritical of the Soviet Union. Douglas Kellner holds that "Marcuse's discussion of the Soviet bureaucracy . . . is really not as critical as one might expect," and he concludes that "it is probably Marcuse's most problematical work" (1984, pp. 201, 207). In her review, reprinted in the appendix to this volume, Dunayevskaya portrayed the book as a definite step backward in relation to Marcuse's earlier "profound study, *Reason and Revolution*," with its stress on human self-emancipation in Hegel and Marx. She suggests that the absence of a concept of state capitalism leads Marcuse into "a method of blaming everybody—Marx, Lenin, the proletariat, above all the proletariat—in order to avoid facing the reality of the new stage of world capitalism—state capitalism—which manifested itself first on the historical stage in the Stalinist counter-revolution in Russia." The chapter on dialectics, she holds, does "shine forth with some fine Hegelian-Marxian perspectives," but even these lead to flawed conclusions. Finally, she writes that where "even a Sartre had to separate himself from Russia's brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolutionaries and hail the Hungarian Freedom Fighters," Marcuse's focus is not on the self-liberation movements from within, as seen in his statement that "the ruled tend not only to submit to their rulers but also to reproduce in themselves their subordination."

### MARCUSE'S ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN AND AFTER

After a hiatus of more than three years, Dunayevskaya writes to Marcuse in August 1964. While this reopens their dialogue briefly, and they begin to meet occasionally again in the 1970s, their correspondence never resumes anything like the intensity or warmth of the period 1954–1960. In this letter of 1964, she mentions her recent critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's formulation of an existential Marxism<sup>19</sup> and encloses some of her writings on Africa. She also tells him that she will be reviewing *One-Dimensional Man*, which has just appeared. Marcuse responds, in a letter of October 7, 1964, that he "found particularly interesting your critique of Sartre," but seemed to disagree with it, writing that Sartre was "one of the few who knows and says

what is going on.”<sup>20</sup> Marcuse concludes by expressing his deep ambivalence toward Dunayevskaya’s work, writing that he had “rarely come across a case with such a large area of agreement and large area of disagreement.”

*One-Dimensional Man* begins with the notion that modern capitalist society has become “one-dimensional” in the sense that the deep contradictions between labor and capital of Marx’s time were no longer operative. Marcuse writes that in this relatively affluent society, where automated production, the labor bureaucracy that dominates the trade unions, and the culture industry have channeled class consciousness into directions harmless to the system, the “working class... no longer appears to be the living contradiction to the established society” (Marcuse 1964, p. 31). Instead, opposition takes the form of the “Great Refusal—the protest against that which is” (1964, p. 63), but this is felt only by artists and other marginalized groups, not by any of the major social classes.

In the second part of the book, “One-Dimensional Thought,” Marcuse skewers analytical philosophy and positivist social science. In its flattening of concepts into a “false concreteness,” analytical philosophy is “destructive of philosophic thought, and of critical thought as such” (1964, pp. 174, 176). Positivist social science operationalizes concepts like alienation that once had a critical character, reducing them to a series of empirically based specifics shorn of any real social critique: “The methodological translation of the universal into the operational concept then becomes repressive reduction of thought” (Marcuse 1964, p. 108). In the concluding section on alternatives Marcuse focuses again on the “Great Refusal” as the only remaining source of oppositional consciousness, to “the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable” (1964, p. 256).

Marcuse’s introduction to *One-Dimensional Man* acknowledges, among other sources on labor, Dunayevskaya’s newspaper *News & Letters*. He cites her colleague Charles Denby’s *Workers Battle Automation*, but disagrees with its conclusions. Dunayevskaya’s critical review of *One-Dimensional Man*, published in *The Activist* and reprinted in the appendix to this volume, stresses the second half of Marcuse’s book, with its sections on “One-Dimensional Thought” and “The Chance of the Alternatives.” Despite her major disagreements, especially concerning the first half of the book, Dunayevskaya praises *One-Dimensional Man* as “a ringing challenge to thought to live up to a historical commitment to transform ‘technological rationality’ into a truly real, rational, free society,” particularly in its critique of positivist thought. She writes presciently that “the conformists” would attempt to “bury *One-Dimensional Man* without ever getting a serious dialogue around it started in the academic world.” After which she adds: “I trust the youth will not let this happen,” thus foreshadowing Marcuse’s subsequent popularity

among radical youth. He responds to her review in a letter of January 12, 1965: “Your review of my book . . . is probably the most intelligent one so far—as I expected it would be.”

In her one substantial philosophical letter to Marcuse during this period, written on October 27, 1964, Dunayevskaya outlines the structure of her *Philosophy and Revolution*, also taking up once again Hegel’s absolutes and stressing: “I do not take your position on technology. I am so Hegelian that I still consider that subject absorbs object, and not object subject which then becomes its extension.” Again, she justifies her recourse directly to Hegel as part of her effort to concretize Marxism for the 1960s.

She sends Marcuse some draft material for *Philosophy and Revolution* as well. On the absolute idea he responds: “I read it once, I read it twice, and am afraid that my old criticism still holds” (letter of November 2, 1964). While this is the extent of their philosophical dialogue during this period, a few months later Marcuse agrees to write a letter in support of Dunayevskaya’s ultimately unsuccessful application for a Guggenheim Fellowship for *Philosophy and Revolution*.

After over a decade without much interaction, during which time Marcuse achieved world fame as a philosopher of the New Left, their correspondence resumes in 1976 around their respective Freedom of Information Act files from the FBI.<sup>21</sup> During this period, Marcuse writes to Dunayevskaya, suggesting that she would consider his latest project a bit frivolous: “You will laugh when you hear that I am working on Marxist aesthetics: ‘doesn’t he have other worries?’ But perhaps we do meet again some time somewhere for a good discussion and disagreement” (letter of November 1, 1976). Marcuse died within a year of the publication of his last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension* (1978).<sup>22</sup> Dunayevskaya’s 1979 memorial article to Marcuse, reprinted in the appendix to this volume, stresses the originality of *Reason and Revolution* and her critique of *One-Dimensional Man*. He had, she writes, responded to that critique by calling her a “romantic,” but she adds: “Those gentle eyes of his had a way of smiling even when he was theoretically shouting at you—as if he were saying: ‘It is really good to have one who still believes, for without revolution, what is there?’” She recalls their last conversation in 1978 when Marcuse engaged her in a discussion of Marx’s *Critique of the Gotha Program*, on the point where Marx had written that in a non-alienated society “labor . . . has become the prime necessity of life.” She writes that at issue was not “what Marx meant”: “No, what he was saying was: since we ‘cannot know’ when labor will become creative as united mental/physical, any more than we can know when the state will ‘wither away’—and we are surely living in a ‘repressive monolith,’ be it the U.S. or Russia—what can we, ‘a very tiny minority,’ do? If you think it is more than the Great Refusal—well!”

## ENTER FROMM

Dunayevskaya's correspondence with Erich Fromm began in 1959, but really developed in 1961, just as that with Marcuse was trailing off. Initially, Dunayevskaya seemed wary of Fromm. Recall that in 1956, she had commented on *Eros and Civilization* in a letter to Marcuse, seeming to side with Marcuse in his debate with Fromm around the issue of neo-Freudian revisionism and social criticism. In that letter of September 6, 1956 to Marcuse, Dunayevskaya wrote: "You separated what was genius and original [in Freud] from that which became transformed into revisionism. . . . Fromm's answer to you is a good example. . . . Here is a man who dares to speak in highly moral tones about 'the callousness towards moral qualities in political figures, which was so apparent in Lenin's attitude' while his own moral standards do not stop the man from dragging in Nazism in the hope that its stench will keep readers away from Freud and you." However, it is unclear whether or not Dunayevskaya had also read Fromm's *The Sane Society* (1955a), a work in which, as we discuss below, Fromm favorably assessed Lenin to some extent, and apparently began a process of rethinking Marx's theories, an important shift from his prior two decades-long focus on revising Freud's theories.

Fromm was a founding member of the Frankfurt School and an important colleague of Max Horkheimer for nearly a decade, during which time he also interacted with Marcuse. Fromm was the only trained psychoanalyst<sup>23</sup> among the Frankfurt School's leading members and as Martin Jay has noted, "it was primarily through Fromm's work that the Institute [Frankfurt School] first attempted to reconcile Freud and Marx" (1973, p. 88). It should be emphasized, however, that this turn to psychoanalytical Marxism was strongly supported by Max Horkheimer, who began to serve as the Frankfurt School's Director from 1930 onward.<sup>24</sup> Fromm's major article, "The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology: Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical Materialism," appeared in 1932 in the first volume of the Institute's journal, *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and later in English in *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (1970).<sup>25</sup> In it, he wrote that the goal of the Frankfurt School's ongoing study of the psychology of fascism was the development of a theory, rooted in Marx and Freud, capable of "explaining how ideologies arise from the interaction of the psychic apparatus and the socio-economic conditions" (1970, p. 162).<sup>26</sup> As the 1930s progressed, Fromm revised or rejected key Freudian concepts while retaining and developing others. He argued that as the socio-economic base of society changed so did the function of psychological structures. He revised Freud's instinct theory, emphasizing, for example, that the Oedipus complex was specific to "patriarchal" societies, while in Freud's theory it was extended to all human devel-

opment. By 1936, Fromm was arguing, “The problem within psychology and sociology is the dialectic intertwining of natural and historical factors. Freud has wrongly based psychology totally on natural factors” (cited in Funk 2000, p. 94). As Fromm developed these revisions he remained committed to psychoanalytic theory and practice, but his moves away from Freudian orthodoxy resulted in increasing tensions with Horkheimer and polemics with Theodor Adorno, who formally joined the Institute in 1938. The following year, Fromm was pushed out of the Frankfurt School altogether. With the publication of *Escape from Freedom* (1941), a study of the psychological appeal of Nazism, Fromm became an internationally celebrated social critic, albeit one often wrongly dismissed in academic circles as a mere popularizer (McLaughlin 1998; see also Bronner 1994).

Fromm’s *Escape from Freedom*, with its analysis of the “authoritarian personality” susceptible to the appeals of fascism, and *Man for Himself* (1947) develop the character structures of contemporary individuals, and the ethics, norms, and values of modern societies (Timbreza 2001). To an extent, these writings were grounded in Marxian categories like alienation, even when Fromm did not mention Marx explicitly, something Marcuse had not done in *Eros and Civilization* either. In *The Sane Society*, Fromm again offers an interpretation of Marx’s thought, this time as a form of humanism, one of the major “answers” to the “decay and dehumanization behind the glamour and wealth and political power of Western society” (1955a, p. 205). At the same time, as will be discussed below, Fromm criticized Lenin for having helped to lay the ground for Stalinism. On the one hand, he recognized Lenin’s early embrace of the grassroots soviets, “where decision making was rooted in the smallest and most concrete level of decentralized groups” (1955a, p. 227), which Fromm also depicted as a sharp divide from Stalinism. On the other hand, he attacked Lenin for having “no faith in man. . . . Faith in mankind without faith in man is either insincere, or if sincere, leads to the very results which we see in . . . Lenin’s dictatorship” (1955a, pp. 209–10).

At first glance, Fromm appeared to be a far less radical thinker than was Marcuse. That was certainly the verdict of the New Left of the 1960s, which usually sided with Marcuse.<sup>27</sup> But Fromm’s increasing interest in Marxist thought by the late 1950s calls this simplistic judgment into question, as does his 1958 unpublished but very sympathetic article on Trotsky. The latter was a review of *Trotsky’s Diary in Exile*, issued in 1958 by Harvard University Press, which Fromm may have intended to publish in the mass-circulation *Saturday Review*, for which he often wrote during this period. In his unpublished review, Fromm deplors the “general habit of considering Stalinism and present-day Communism as identical with, or at least a continuation of revolutionary Marxism,” especially the attempt to link “Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky” to “the vengeful killer Stalin, and to the opportunistic conserva-

tive Khrushchev.” Concerning Lenin and Trotsky, he adds: “They were men with an uncompromising sense of truth, penetrating to the very essence of reality, and never taken in by the deceptive surface; of an unquenchable courage and integrity; of deep concern and devotion to man and his future; unselfish and with little vanity or lust for power” (Fromm in Anderson 2002, p. 271). Fromm concludes that “just as was the case with Marx, . . . the concern, understanding and sharing of a deeply loving man . . . shines through Trotsky’s diary” (Fromm in Anderson 2002, p. 272). It may also be worth noting that this review was written in 1958 or later, after the publication of *Marxism and Freedom*, which, as we have seen, had argued for a total separation between Lenin and Stalin, on both political and philosophical grounds.<sup>28</sup>

The radical psychologist Joel Kovel sums up Fromm’s turn to Marxism, especially Marx’s humanism, as a distinguishing feature of his perspective, as against both orthodox Freudians and some other Freudian Marxists like Wilhelm Reich: “What distinguishes Fromm is the introduction of Marx’s humanism—the humanism of the 1844 Manuscripts—in place of Freudian instinct theory. This emphasis also distinguishes him from the other psychoanalytic Marxists of the time. . . . Fromm, who had not been saddled with Stalinism, was free to develop a socialist-humanist psychoanalysis as part of what he called a democratic decentralizing socialism” (1994, p. xi). It was this socialist humanist thread above all, as well as Fromm’s sympathy for Lenin and Trotsky, which surely constituted the threads of affinity that sustained the Dunayevskaya-Fromm correspondence. These threads of affinity coexisted with some important differences of opinion and intellectual interests, however, although these were not usually expressed openly in their correspondence. At a political level, Dunayevskaya’s positions were much further to the left than were Fromm’s, whose socialist humanism was closer to reformist social democracy than her revolutionary version of Marxist-Humanism. In addition, although he frequently acknowledged the importance of Hegel and dialectics for Marxism, Fromm lacked a deep and sustained interest in this topic. For her part, Dunayevskaya had even less interest in Freudian psychoanalysis, on which she almost never commented in her work, except to acknowledge at a very general level Freud’s having made the field of sexuality an open topic of discussion for the first time.

On June 6, 1959, Fromm wrote to Dunayevskaya, requesting that she translate some of Marx’s early philosophical writings for the book that Fromm was planning to publish on the topic. Fromm concluded the short letter by adding: “I read your book on *Marxism and Freedom* some months ago, and consider it an exceedingly important and most needed contribution to the socialist literature.”<sup>29</sup> Dunayevskaya’s reply of June 17 offered strong support for Fromm’s planned book on Marx, although she declined to do the translations Fromm requested. She also made a point of referring to her

correspondence with Marcuse, writing that he “was sufficiently free of the mores of the academic world to be willing to associate his name with mine, despite our violent disagreements of interpretation of the modern era.” Appealing to Fromm’s affinity to humanism and critiques of Stalinism, she added: “I am delighted to hear that you intend to publish Marx’s writings on philosophy and historical materialism, which, in my view, is more accurately described as humanistic materialism. . . . Since the publication of my book the Communists have redoubled their attacks on Humanism because it is the form of the actual movement against their totalitarian rule in Russia itself and in the Soviet zone. This much I can do for your work—keep you up to date on the latest in the Russian press on the philosophic writings of Marx.”

Fromm’s book, which appeared under the title *Marx’s Concept of Man* in 1961, probably did more than any other publication to introduce Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts* to the wider American public. *Marx’s Concept of Man* featured a 90-page discussion by Fromm, Tom Bottomore’s translation of most of the *1844 Manuscripts*, plus a few other texts by Marx, as well as several brief accounts of Marx by several of his contemporaries. Fromm’s stature as a public intellectual—he had published the best-selling *The Art of Loving* (1956) only a few years earlier—and his popular form of presentation helped to spark a wide discussion of the young Marx, not only among the broad intellectual public, but also in mass media outlets such as *Newsweek*.

In his introductory essay, Fromm attacks what he terms “the falsification of Marx’s concepts” in the mass media and even among intellectuals, adding that “this ignorance and distortion of Marx are to be found more in the United States than in any other Western country” ([1961] 1966, p. 1). Too often, he writes, Marx is portrayed as a crude materialist who “neglected the importance of the individual” ([1961] 1966, p. 2). Fromm refutes this, holding that “the very aim of Marx is to liberate man from the pressure of economic needs, so that he can be fully human” ([1961] 1966, p. 5). In so doing, he names some of those who fell into these errors and distortions, including the leading sociologist and Cold War liberal Daniel Bell. A second “falsification” of Marx, this one carried out by both Western intellectuals and Stalinist ideologues, was the forced identification of Marx with the single-party totalitarianism of the Soviet Union and Maoist China. Fromm sharply differentiates “Marxist humanist socialism,” on the one hand, from “totalitarian socialism,” on the other ([1961] 1966, p. viii), with the latter in reality “a system of conservative state capitalism” ([1961] 1966, p. vii). Finally, after surveying the European scene (both East and West) for significant developments in Marxist humanism, Fromm assesses the U.S. scene: “In the United States, the most important work which has opened up an understanding of Marx’s humanism is Herbert Marcuse’s *Reason and Revolution*; Raya Dunayevskaya’s *Marxism and Freedom*, with a preface by H. Marcuse, is also a significant addition to Marxist-humanist thought” ([1961] 1966, p. 74).



Fromm sometimes imposes his own more eclectic form of humanism on Marx, however, when he writes that “Marx’s philosophy constitutes a spiritual existentialism in secular language” and that Marx’s concept of socialism is rooted in “prophetic Messianism” ([1961] 1966, p. 5). Cold War liberals—and some of those on the Left who had sided with the West in the Cold War—seized upon this eclecticism to attack Fromm, whom they already resented for his critiques of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. But their real target was the whole new view of Marx as a radical humanist that Fromm was presenting. Sidney Hook, to whom Bell had dedicated his book *The End of Ideology* (1960), and who as mentioned earlier had attacked Marcuse’s *Reason and Revolution*, pontificated: “To seek what was distinctive and characteristic about Marx in a period when he was still in Hegelian swaddling clothes . . . is to violate every accepted and tested canon of historical scholarship” (*New Leader*, Dec. 11, 1961). Nonetheless, the ground was shifting toward a fuller appreciation of the whole of Marx and of the themes of dialectics, alienation, and humanism in his work.

Beyond Fromm’s explicit acknowledgement of Dunayevskaya’s *Marxism and Freedom* in *Marx’s Concept of Man*, additional and perhaps even more important indications about this influence—or at the least a shift in his thinking on Marx—emerge through another look at his treatment of Marxism in *The Sane Society*. In the latter, Fromm concluded that “for us in the middle of the twentieth century it is very easy to recognize Marx’s fallacy . . . we have seen the tragic illustration of this fallacy occurring in Russia” (1955a, p. 233); by contrast, in *Marx’s Concept of Man* Fromm wrote of the Soviet Union as “a system of a conservative state capitalism and not the realization of Marxian Socialism” ([1961] 1966, p. vii), adding that making this distinction clear was essential in “the battle for the minds of men” ([1961] 1966, p. viii). These arguments for the contemporary importance and relevance of Marx’s thought as a positive model—and in contrast to Soviet “state capitalism”—were precisely the central themes of Dunayevskaya’s *Marxism and Freedom*. And where *The Sane Society* had sharply attacked Lenin, *Marx’s Concept of Man* refrained from doing so.

Between Fromm’s publication of *Marx’s Concept of Man* in 1961 and that of his edited collection *Socialist Humanism* in 1965, to which Dunayevskaya and Marcuse both contributed essays, Dunayevskaya and Fromm corresponded occasionally. In terms of his engagement with Marx, these years also saw the publication of Fromm’s intellectual autobiography, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud* (1962), in which he acknowledged that Marx was for him the more important of the two thinkers. This early phase of the Dunayevskaya-Fromm correspondence included dialogue on *Marx’s Concept of Man*; Dunayevskaya’s attempts to engage Fromm in a discussion of the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind*; exchanges on the *Socialist Humanism* volume, particularly

Dunayevskaya's contribution to it; and several critiques of Marcuse's writings. Curiously, however, despite nearly two decades of friendly correspondence, Dunayevskaya and Fromm never met face to face.

In her letter to Fromm of October 11, 1961 that reopened their correspondence, Dunayevskaya criticizes *Marx's Concept of Man*. First, she questions Fromm's reference to "Marcuse's brilliant and penetrating book, *Reason and Revolution*, and the same author's discussion of Marx's theories vs. Soviet Marxism in *Soviet Marxism*," seeing both of them as sources "for the philosophical basis of Marx's thought" ([1961] 1966, p. 3). Offering a harsh verdict on *Soviet Marxism*, she adds: "In reading your 'Marx's Concept of Man' I noted that you referred to the works of Herbert Marcuse as if there were no difference between the period when he wrote his wonderful 'Reason and Revolution' and that in which he wrote his whitewash of Communist perversions in his 'Soviet Marxism.' I will not go into my views on the latter since I wrote about them extensively, and enclose herewith my review. The reason I mention it is that it illuminates the pitfalls awaiting one if the Humanism of Marxism is treated abstractly—and the dialectic of the present development is analyzed on a totally different basis."

Second, Dunayevskaya criticizes Fromm's essay itself for dealing with Marx's early essays "in too general terms." She contrasts Fromm's approach with how *Marxism and Freedom*, in linking Marx's humanism with all three volumes of *Capital*, had shown its "urgency for our day" in "the concrete terms of Russia, on the one extreme, and independent Marxism on the other end . . . [while] Marcuse goes to Russia which he most certainly knows is not the Humanism of Marxism which he has proclaimed to be the true Marxism." Having stated these criticisms, Dunayevskaya's letter nonetheless concludes with a plea to Fromm to "exert [his] influence to bring these serious discussions into the open, and invite me to participate in them," this versus what she calls the "'bourgeois conspiracy of silence' against works like my *Marxism and Freedom*." All this suggested—despite her criticisms—a substantial core of agreement with Fromm. Evidently, Dunayevskaya believed that publication of *Marx's Concept of Man* had the potential to shake up the discussion of Marxism in the U.S., affecting a wide range of intellectuals, from Marcuse, whom she considers to be too uncritical of the USSR, to Bell, whom she characterizes as a supporter of "American capital." Fromm responded politely to Dunayevskaya's criticisms, but the correspondence did not go very much further at this point.

Dunayevskaya reopened the correspondence again two years later, in a letter of November 21, 1963 in which she writes that the "central reason for this correspondence is a sort of an appeal to you for a dialogue on Hegel between us. I believe I once told you that I had for a long time carried on such a written discussion with Herbert Marcuse, especially relating to the 'Absolute Idea.' With his publication of *Soviet Marxism*, this became impos-

sible because, whereas we had never seen eye to eye, until his rationale for Communism, the difference in viewpoints only helped the development of ideas, but the gulf widened too much afterward.” The bulk of Dunayevskaya’s letter constitutes an analysis of “Spirit in Self-Estrangement—The Discipline of Culture,” a chapter of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind*. She connects this chapter of the *Phenomenology*, with its discussion of “the inversion of reality and thought,” to the section on “fetishism of commodities” in *Capital*:

Now this inversion of thought to reality is exactly what Marx deals with in “The Fetishism of Commodities,” and it is the reason for his confidence in the proletariat as Reason as against the bourgeois “false consciousness,” or the fall of philosophy to ideology. Marx insists that a commodity, far from being something as simple as it appears, is a “fetish” which makes the conditions of capitalist production appear as self-evident truths of social production. All who look at the appearance, therefore, the duality of the commodity, of the labor incorporated in it, of the whole society based on commodity “culture.” It is true that the greater part of his famous section is concerned with showing that the fantastic form of appearance of the relations between men as if it were an exchange of things is the *truth* of relations in the factory itself where the worker has been transformed into an appendage to a machine. But the very crucial footnotes all relate to the fact that even the discoverers of labor as the source of value, Smith and Ricardo, could not escape becoming prisoners of this fetishism because therein they met their historic barrier.

Dunayevskaya notes that she had reread Hegel’s “Spirit in Self-Estrangement” as she worked on writing a critical review of Sartre’s work *Search for a Method*, in which he had included a critique of Marx’s theory of fetishism while also declaring himself a Marxist. Again, Fromm does not respond substantially, probably because he lacked a deep knowledge of Hegel.

But Dunayevskaya’s letter, which must have impressed Fromm, resulted in something else, a major breakthrough for her in terms of finding a larger audience for her work. A few months later, in a letter of February 14, 1964, he invites her to contribute to his new edited book, “a symposium on socialist humanism which is to be published by Doubleday,” one of the largest publishers in the U.S. The next eight letters between them discuss issues related to this collection, including Dunayevskaya’s own contribution to it, “Marx’s Humanism Today.”

It was in this period, soon after Dunayevskaya had completed her “Marx’s Humanism Today” for *Socialist Humanism*—and never having received a reply from Fromm to her long letter on Hegel’s *Phenomenology*—that, as we have seen, she attempted to reopen her correspondence with Marcuse in her letter of October 1964. In another 1964 letter to Fromm, which has apparently not been preserved, Dunayevskaya seems to have discussed her correspondence with Marcuse. In his letter to Dunayevskaya of

July 15, 1964, Fromm writes, “I hope I will get around soon to answering you re your correspondence with Marcuse. Have you read his latest book [*One-Dimensional Man*]? I began, but am somewhat puzzled.” Dunayevskaya’s response to Fromm, in a letter of July 21, makes several critical observations on *One-Dimensional Man* that are a bit sharper in tone than her published review. These are exemplified by her observation that although Marcuse “attacks the status quo, he himself has very nearly given in to technology by attributing to it truly phenomenal powers.” Dunayevskaya also rejects the idea, which she had already discerned in Marcuse’s “previous discussions,” that Hegel’s absolute idea “was no more than the proof of the separation of mental and manual labor in the pre-technological stage of history.” Dunayevskaya concludes that “the objective compulsion to [Hegel’s] thought came from the French Revolution, not from pre-technology or post-technology.”

While it contained little overt discussion of Hegel, Dunayevskaya’s contribution to *Socialist Humanism*, “Marx’s Humanism Today,” focused nonetheless on the idea that there were indeed philosophical requirements for overcoming a capitalism that had assumed both “private” and “state” forms. Here we can mention only a few key points: Dunayevskaya draws attention to (1) the 1872–75 French edition of *Capital*, Vol. I, where Marx wrote for the first time of the “law of concentration and centralization of capital ‘in the hands of one single capitalist, or those of one single corporation’” (Fromm [1965] 1966, p. 69); (2) the fact that “‘Western philosophy’ . . . never saw the philosophical implications” in her 1943–44 debate with the Russian Stalinists over the law of value, including how they “had to deny the dialectic structure of *Capital*” in teaching that work by skipping the first chapter (Fromm [1965] 1966, p. 71); and (3) *Capital*, Volume III, where Marx’s analysis of the realm of freedom—“the development of human power, which is its own end”—is seen to be thoroughly consistent with his humanist writings of 1844 (Fromm 1966, p. 78).

Marcuse’s contribution—entitled “Socialist Humanism?”—questioned the general thrust of Fromm’s volume. Again, as with Dunayevskaya’s contribution, we can do no more than introduce a few key points in Marcuse’s piece: (1) that existing capitalist and socialist societies shared key characteristics, such as the centrality of a technological apparatus; (2) that the trajectory of existing “state socialist” societies was nonetheless positive in that the barriers to socialist humanism were not fundamentally internal but rather external in the sense of the costs entailed by competition with the West; (3) that both the “young Marx’s” concept of the “all-round individual,” and the mature Marx’s “realm of freedom” currently appeared to be “idealistic and optimistic” in view of the “technological management of freedom and self-realization . . . the assimilation of freedom and necessity, of satisfaction and repression, and the aspirations of politics, business, and the individual”

(Fromm [1965] 1966, p. 112); (4) that the reconstruction of the technical apparatus of production, distribution and consumption, the mechanization of labor, not its emancipation, defines the possibility of a new post-capitalist humanism (Fromm [1965] 1966, p. 111). The overall tone of Marcuse's essay is imbued with the notion of a one-dimensional society that experiences "technical progress as political progress in domination" in a situation where, "if suppression is compatible with individual autonomy and operates through individual autonomy, then the *Nomos* (norm) which the individual gives himself is that of servitude" (Fromm [1965] 1966, 116). In this sense, Marcuse questions the relevance of socialist humanism to contemporary society.

In Fromm's own essay for *Socialist Humanism*, "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory," he treats six concepts where he maintains that humanist psychoanalysis, usually as specific revisions of Freud's theories, can contribute to the realization of Marx's theory: character (as social character); the unconscious (as social unconscious); repression (as fear of social isolation); the essence and nature of the human being; determinism; and alienation. By far, Fromm devotes the most space to "social character," citing his previous work and discussing how the concept could help answer questions that had been ignored by Marx and later Marxists. Of the remaining five concepts, for all but the last—alienation—Fromm indicates the Freudian interpretation as well as the specific revisions that a humanist psychoanalysis would require. Fromm intimates that the concept of alienation is perhaps the one Freud dealt with the least. Fromm holds that the concept needs to be examined in its relationship to typically Freudian concepts, such as narcissism, depression, idolatry, etc., and that "psychoanalysis has all the tools to accomplish this" (Fromm [1965] 1966, p. 244). Fromm's essay also touches upon themes like state-capitalism, revolution, Marx's concept of a post-capitalist society, and the Frankfurt School.

## THE LATER DUNAYEVSKAYA-FROMM CORRESPONDENCE

Two important themes of Dunayevskaya and Fromm's post-*Socialist Humanism* correspondence were (1) intellectual ferment and revolt in Eastern Europe and (2) critical assessment of other members of Marcuse, Adorno, and the Frankfurt School. Dunayevskaya and Fromm demonstrated great interest in and developed personal contacts with Eastern European dissidents in the period leading up to the "Prague Spring" of 1968. Their letters also document Fromm's help in securing Spanish and German editions of Dunayevskaya's books. Others discuss the need to defend Marcuse against right-wing attacks.

Several letters comment on Sartre as well as Marcuse. In one dated September 13, 1965, Fromm writes: "I personally believe that Sartre represents the quintessence of the mood of a decaying bourgeoisie, renouncing however all religious and idealistic ideology and claiming wrongly to be the philosophy of the future by making an alleged synthesis with Marxism. The essence of his philosophy is an extreme form of egocentric 'individualism' . . . . The basic contrast to Marx lies in its profound hopelessness and despair about man, not to speak of his theory of absolute freedom." Dunayevskaya, in her response of September 23, is not completely convinced by this explanation, which does not account for Sartre's popularity among radicals: "You are, of course, right about his egocentricity and his thoroughly bourgeois nature. But that, too, does not explain the pull he exercised over many who thought themselves revolutionary [and it] shows the decadence of our so-called revolutionaries as well as of the bourgeoisie." This exchange continues with another letter by Fromm.

Later correspondence returns to Marcuse. This includes an exchange in the summer of 1968 about the need to defend Marcuse in the face of the death threats he had received after having become a prominent intellectual supporter of the global student uprisings of that year. In a letter of August 10, 1968 to Dunayevskaya, Fromm writes that in light of the attacks on Marcuse, he has removed a critical chapter on him from a forthcoming book. Dunayevskaya responds in a letter of August 10 that they should defend Marcuse against the Right but urges him "not to discard your criticism" (while also expressing doubt that she would agree with the specifics of Fromm's criticisms) because "I feel very strongly on the *historic* blunders made when revolutionaries feel that martyrs must never be criticized." Fromm's *Revolution of Hope*, a collection of essays offering a socio-psychological critique of U.S. society during that tumultuous year, came off the press in fall 1968. Near the beginning was a long footnote criticizing Marcuse as a philosopher of "hopelessness" who "presents his personal despair as a theory of radicalism" that lacked any real concern with politics and the needed "steps between the present and the future" (Fromm 1968, pp. 8–9).<sup>30</sup> It should be noted at this point that while Marcuse and Dunayevskaya generally supported (with varying degrees of critical distance) the revolutionary side of the New Left, Fromm supported the antiwar liberal Eugene McCarthy's 1968 bid for the Democratic Presidential nomination. Fromm did not cut his ties to the radical student movement, however, as seen in the fact that he agreed to appear as a speaker at the June 1968 counter-commencement at Columbia University, which had just suppressed a major student uprising in which Marcuse's ideas figured prominently.

Three years later, in a letter of July 25, 1971, Dunayevskaya notes the publication of Fromm's new book, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis*, which included a lengthy critique of Marcuse's interpretations of Freud. She sends

Fromm the completed draft of *Philosophy and Revolution*, and asks him for help in finding a publisher. She also criticizes Marcuse again in light of his recent writings, especially *An Essay on Liberation*, in which he had written of the radical youth movement in the face of war and state repression as a venue where, “prior to all political strategy and organization, liberation becomes a ‘biological’ need,” something that was “a far cry from the ideal humanism and humanitas; it is a struggle for life, not as masters and slaves, but as men and women” (1969, pp. 51, 52). In this letter of July 25, 1971, Dunayevskaya argues in this letter: “Every time Marcuse tries to bridge the divisions within himself—between the desire for instant revolution to the point of depending on ‘biological solidarity’ and the deep down pessimism about mankind having become one-dimensional in thought, in body (eroticism included?) and, above all, in labor becoming thing [*sic!*]<sup>31</sup>—it is as if he willed the death of the dialectic!”

The later letters between Dunayevskaya and Fromm feature discussion of Fromm’s never-published review of *Philosophy and Revolution*, which appeared posthumously as the introduction to the German edition of 1981, an edition he had helped to arrange. In a letter of March 6, 1973, a few months before it first appeared in English, Fromm tells Dunayevskaya that *Philosophy and Revolution* represented a “great contribution to the theoretical and political situation re socialism.” There is also some discussion of Fromm’s books-in-progress—*Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973) and *To Have or To Be?* (1976), as well as of Dunayevskaya’s *Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution*, published in 1982, two years after Fromm’s death.

Dunayevskaya’s *Philosophy and Revolution* came off the press in the fall of 1973, during the same period that a number of noted works in dialectical thought were being translated into English for the first time, among them Marx’s *Grundrisse* (1973), Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness* (1971), and Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics* (1973). *Philosophy and Revolution* began with a chapter on “Absolute Negativity as New Beginning” that traced her concept of Hegel’s absolutes as a source of revolutionary dialectics through his major works. Although Dunayevskaya noted that Hegel’s philosophy was rooted in history and thus contained aspects of materialism, she saw not this but what Marx termed the power of abstraction as the key to Hegel and the revolutionary dialectic: “Precisely where Hegel sounds most abstract, seems to close the shutters tight against the whole movement of history, there he lets the lifeblood of the dialectic—absolute negativity—pour in” (Dunayevskaya [1973] 1989, p. 32). Thus, a plunge into Hegel’s abstract absolutes could offer new beginnings for revolutionary thought. This was followed by a chapter on Marx that stressed the birth of the Marxian dialectic in 1844, the creativity and the limitations of the *Grundrisse*, and the fetishism section of *Capital*. In discussing the *Grundrisse* on machinery, she

noted that it was an unfinished work and argued that it did not re-create the dialectic anew in the way that Marx was able to do a decade later in *Capital*. She also took issue with those like Marcuse who, she writes, “regard technology as if it ‘absorbed’ the proletariat,” in part on the basis of the discussion of machinery in the *Grundrisse*, here referring to *One-Dimensional Man* ([1973] 1989, pp. 70–71). A much-discussed chapter on Lenin focused on his 1914–1915 Hegel Notebooks as a new departure, while also noting his ambivalent stance toward Hegel as a major limitation of his thought. Long critical chapters addressed other thinkers whom Dunayevskaya regarded as far more limited and problematic—Trotsky, Mao, and Sartre. The last three chapters took up various forms of contemporary revolutionary ferment, both in ideas and in action: Africa’s anti-colonial liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s and their socialist humanist dimension; the Eastern European revolts of 1953, 1956, and 1968 and their relationship to the philosophy of socialist humanism; the Black, student and worker revolts in the 1960s in the U.S., France, and other Western capitalist lands and the ideas that motivated them. The chapter on Eastern Europe built on the essays in Fromm’s *Socialist Humanism* by Ivan Svitak, Bronislaw Bazcko, and especially Karel Kosík, author of *The Dialectics of the Concrete*, whom she termed a “rigorous” philosopher.

Fromm expressed particular interest in the chapter on Sartre. There, Dunayevskaya credits Sartre with opening up the question of the absolute in postwar philosophy, this versus the easygoing moderation of prewar liberalism and social democracy, which could not meet the test of fascism. But her basic thrust is toward a sharp critique. Where Marcuse had seen a form of bourgeois individualism lurking behind Sartre’s “nihilistic” preoccupations with nothingness, with absurdity, and with the difficulty of human solidarity (“hell is other people”), Dunayevskaya countered: “The real tragedy is that ‘behind’ Sartre’s nihilistic language lurks—nothing” ([1973] 1989, p. 196). This led, she held, to a voluntaristic form of subjectivity, an abstract universalism that sought to overcome objective reality through the will or through a radical concept of choice. Sartre’s attempts to unite his form of existentialism with Marxism fell far short, not only for this reason, but also because of the fact that the Marxism he took up was more often orthodox Stalinism or Maoism, rather than the critical, dialectical, or humanist versions of Marxism. This resulted in a sort of “metaphysic of Stalinism,” in which Sartre in too many cases justified the rule of the party over the worker ([1973] 1989, p. 208).

In a letter of December 1, 1974, Dunayevskaya recounts her participation at a meeting of the Hegel Society of America, where she discussed the themes of *Philosophy and Revolution*: “The Hegelians, orthodox, have actually been more serious about my work than the so-called Left. I have just returned from the conference where I read my paper on Hegel’s Absolutes as



New Beginnings and almost got a standing ovation; they were falling asleep over their own learned theses, and here I was not only dealing with dialectics of liberation—Hegel as well as Marx tho the former was, by his own design, limited to thought—but ranging in critique of all modern works [including] Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* . . . On the other end, they were amazed that 200 came out to hear me—to them that was 'endless mass.'"

This phase of the correspondence includes an expanding criticism of Marcuse's theories and of the Frankfurt School more generally, as well as other discussion of Marxist thinkers, most notably Nikolai Bukharin and Rosa Luxemburg. In a letter of February 13, 1975, Fromm mentions Cohen's noted study of Bukharin: "I am reading right now a book by Stephen F. Cohen, entitled *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*. I find the book very interesting and actually written with great sympathy for Bukharin and Lenin. . . . The author stresses . . . that the whole change into centralism, terror etc. was entirely brought about by civil war, and quite in contrast to all intentions of Lenin and Bukharin before." Dunayevskaya responds at some length in a letter of February 19, which begins by recapitulating some of her earlier critiques of Bukharin: "I naturally was glad to read an objective study that helps right the record on terror in general and Bukharin in particular. Since the dialectic is the center of my attention, and that is exactly where Bukharin went amiss, I do not have as high a view as [Cohen] does of Bukharin. . . . Regarding the economic plan, that is even more proof of the mechanical rather than dialectical form of development than Bukharin's mechanical Historical Materialism . . . And Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period* . . . led Lenin to write that sharp summation of Bukharin as being 'major theoretician' and 'not understanding dialectic.'" In this sense, Dunayevskaya held to her old criticism of Bukharin's mechanical materialism, which she linked to positivism, as discussed above in her correspondence with Marcuse.

But she also showed a greater appreciation than in her previous writings for Bukharin's attempt to stand up to Stalin at a crucial moment. This occurred at the Twelfth Party Congress of 1923, where an infirm and dying Lenin had wanted Stalin to be attacked for trampling the national rights of the Georgians: "The one thing that I loved most of all of Bukharin is both his audacity and 'correctness' in daring the damned Congress where Trotsky who was empowered by Lenin to act in his behalf on the Georgian question 'conciliated.' Moreover, it is not only the bravery, it is the depth of his understanding the National Question, the very question which he hadn't previously understood. . . . But, suddenly, once Bolsheviks were involved, and still Stalin displayed 'Great Russian chauvinism,' Bukharin caught it as both principle and national life and culture and revolutionary—all three together." In a letter of June 9, 1975, Fromm responds, after apologizing for the delay: "As far as Bukharin is concerned, the only one of his writings which I have

read was the *ABC of Communism* . . . and that was fifty years ago. I was then more negatively impressed by the narrowness and the mechanistic outlook of his writing and I guess for this reason later on never cared to read more by him, and Cohen's book struck me and impressed me because he shows a much richer personality than I had really expected."

The last years of the Dunayevskaya-Fromm correspondence, 1975–1978, continue with more exchanges about Marcuse and the Frankfurt School, as well as indications of continued efforts to find common ground in their different approaches to Marxist humanism. There is some discussion of *Philosophy and Revolution*, including: Dunayevskaya asks Fromm to write a preface to the German translation; Fromm dialogues with Dunayevskaya concerning sources in Marx for his last major work, *To Have or To Be?* (1976); and Fromm lends strong encouragement to Dunayevskaya's development of her ideas on Rosa Luxemburg and gender, which culminated in the publication of her *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982).

As with Sartre, Fromm's critical remarks on Marcuse are often "characterological." A new round of discussion on Marcuse began in June 1975, after Fromm "half-jokingly" referred to him as a "friend" of Dunayevskaya. In a letter of June 30, 1975, Dunayevskaya writes that "ever since he had introduced *Marxism and Freedom*, he has felt so very uncomfortable in my 'extreme' 'anti-Russian' attitudes that by the time of the mid-1960s and his espousal of 'biological solidarity' . . . there has hardly been any contact. Angela Davis, even when she was freed and yet totally refused to sign against the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and all East European revolts is his new heroine. I attribute it to his impatience of wanting any revolution before his days are over, or so he fears." Fromm responds in a letter of July 8: "I think your comment on his political attitude is very well taken; it refers to his great egotism and it is only another aspect of this that, as far as I can see, he is terribly concerned with his 'image' and much of what he says and, I guess, thinks, is determined by the wish to keep it shining, not to lose customers." Fromm also expresses interest in Dunayevskaya's new writings on "women's liberation."<sup>32</sup>

In addition, he asks her for advice on writings by Marx relevant for *To Have or to Be?* She discusses a number of Marx references in a letter of July 16, 1975. The theme being vs. having, with the latter characteristic of capitalism, is already prominent in Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*. It had long been a topic of interest for both Fromm and Dunayevskaya.

In this same letter of July 16, Dunayevskaya emphasizes again that while she had always "been at odds" with Marcuse, her "total parting of the ways" with him came in the 1960s. In a letter of July 28, Fromm criticizes Marcuse's "romantic thinking in his vision of the ideal that the new man would live a completely eroticist life, enjoy the perversions of sadism and copro-

philia and live the life actually of the playful child.” As to the Frankfurt School, Fromm makes some very acerbic comments: “These people, particularly Horkheimer, became so frightened after they had come to America of being considered radicals that they began first to suppress all words which sounded radical, and Horkheimer eventually ended as a pillar of society in Frankfurt, praising religion and the virtues of capitalism.”<sup>33</sup> In a subsequent letter to Dunayevskaya of October 2, 1976, Fromm expanded this attack to include Adorno.

Fromm returned to these issues again in a letter of November 25, 1976, criticizing Marcuse and the Frankfurt School, and dismissing its whole notion of Critical Theory as a subterfuge in order to avoid any explicit mention of Marxism:

Incidentally there is quite a bit of renewed interest in the Frankfurt School. I get quite a few questions from various people who study the history of the School. It is really a funny story; Horkheimer is now quoted as the creator of the Critical Theory and people write about the Critical Theory as if it were a new concept discovered by Horkheimer. As far as I know, the whole thing is a hoax because Horkheimer was frightened even before Hitler of speaking about Marxist theory. He used in general Aesopian language and spoke of Critical Theory in order not to say Marxist theory. I believe that is all, behind this great discovery of Critical Theory by Horkheimer and Adorno.

In her response of November 30, 1976, Dunayevskaya defends Marcuse to a point:

He surely is no coward, and his *Reason and Revolution* surely did not hide his Marxism, as he understands it. . . . What was strange in . . . the 1950s, is that our fights were over my “optimism” and “romanticism” over proletariat and Black; he used to argue that they only want a “piece of the American pie,” and while he doesn’t oppose that, it couldn’t be called “revolutionary,” as I insisted. He also opposed my view of the East German Revolt of 1953 as revolution from under totalitarianism, saying it was only because Germans couldn’t stand Russians, etc. And I got nowhere with him when I tried to convince him that he shouldn’t use “Marxism” when he was speaking of Russian communism.

But she does not delve into Horkheimer and the rest of the Frankfurt School, beyond recalling that she had run into hostility at the Hegel Society after criticizing Adorno: “Yes, when last year I talked to the Hegel Society of America, and I dared criticize Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics*, it appeared as if the whole Frankfurt School was there in person sharpening their knives at my expense.”

In that paper, Dunayevskaya had attacked Adorno's identification of absolute negativity with Auschwitz in his *Negative Dialectics* (1969). She took issue with Adorno's dismissal of the notion in Hegel and in Marx of the "negation of the negation," which brings forth what Hegel termed the positive in its negative (Dunayevskaya 2002, p. 186). For Marx, this meant the new society, i.e., creative new beginnings after the destruction of the old. She contrasted what she considered to be Adorno's retrogressive position in *Negative Dialectics* with his earlier writings like *Aspects of the Hegelian Dialectic* (1957), which she saw as still adhering to a version of Hegelian Marxism. The "real tragedy of Adorno (and the Frankfurt School)," she concluded, was "the tragedy of a one-dimensionality of thought which results when you give up Subject, when one does not listen to the voices from below—and they were loud, clear, and demanding between the mid-fifties and the mid-sixties" (Dunayevskaya 2002, p. 187).

Another topic taken up in a number of Dunayevskaya's letters to Fromm during the 1970s was that of gender, in the wake of the burgeoning women's liberation movement of the time. Among the points she addressed in these letters were the mythic Amazon warrior Penthesilea, feminism and the Portuguese Revolution, the polite sexism she experienced at the Hegel Society meeting, sexism in Maoist China, and new feminist writings in the U.S.

But it was with regard to the martyred Marxist leader Rosa Luxemburg—whose revolutionary theory and antiwar stance had so impacted Fromm and his generation—that their dialogue on gender became the most substantive. In a May 1976 letter, Dunayevskaya raised the issue of Luxemburg and gender for the first time with Fromm, referring to changes in the conception of what was to become *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*: "I . . . decided, instead of writing only on Today's Women Theorists . . . to combine Women's Liberation Movement with Rosa. What do you think?" A few weeks later, in a letter of July 15, she posed the question with greater specificity:

Nothing has maddened me so much . . . as the complete disregard that today's so-called theoreticians of the women's movement display towards Rosa, as if only that woman who writes on Women (with a capital W) "*as such*" merits attention. I have also been feeling very strongly on the reason why there has been a lack of camaraderie between Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky in the period of the 1905 Revolution in which they were all participants, and after which they did collaborate on an amendment to the Resolution on war at the 1907 International Congress. Could there have been, if not outright male chauvinism, at least some looking down on her theoretical work, because she was woman?

Fromm did not respond to these points at the time.

The following year, Dunayevskaya raised the issue of Luxemburg and gender again, in a letter of October 20, 1977:

May I start right off by asking you whether I may engage in a dialogue with you on Rosa Luxemburg? There is a very specific field that I thought you would be most profound in—the difference between [Luxemburg’s] correspondence, especially with women, and the writings (very nearly non-existent) on that very subject, Women. I’m not referring to the fact that they were on flowers, cats, or other small talk. Rather I am referring to the very sharp attacks on their reformist husbands, their using many references to mythical or long-ago historical characters—Penthesilea, the queen of the Amazons. . . . Now, my question is: what has all this to do with the Second International’s betrayal, 1914, and how does it happen that whereas she kept away from the “Woman Question” other than what all Marxists were for—equal wages, suffrage, etc.—would certainly go to mythology and the roles of women as greater than life? . . . There seems a great contradiction between her awareness that there is more to the “Woman Question” than economics in letters as contrasted to books, pamphlets, etc.

Fromm seems to have been very affected by these questions concerning Luxemburg, gender, and revolution.

In his response—written on October 26 when he was still hospitalized from a heart attack—Fromm also seems to take up themes from Dunayevskaya’s letter on Luxemburg from the year before:

I feel that the male Social Democrats never could understand Rosa Luxemburg, nor could she acquire the influence for which she had the potential because she was a woman; and the men could not become full revolutionaries because they did not emancipate themselves from their male, patriarchal, and hence dominating, character structure. After all, the original exploitation is that of women by men and there is no social liberation as long as there is no revolution in the sex war ending in full equality, which has never existed since pre-history. I believe she was one of the few fully developed human beings, one who showed what a human being can be in the future. . . . Unfortunately I have known nobody who still knows her personally. What a bad break between the generations.

This was the last substantive exchange between Dunayevskaya and Fromm.

This exchange would be an important one for Dunayevskaya’s development of her 1982 book, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution*. In contrast to almost all previous studies of Luxemburg, Dunayevskaya’s book uncovered a feminist dimension to Luxemburg, a theorist of Marxist economics and politics who wrote only a few brief essays on women. Dunayevskaya did so by reexamining not only these writings, but also Luxemburg’s correspondence and her interactions with her male colleagues, whether reformist or revolutionary.<sup>34</sup>

Marcuse died the year after this exchange on Luxemburg between Dunayevskaya and Fromm, in 1979, and Fromm the year after that. Dunayevskaya lived until 1987, during which time she completed the above-mentioned *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982), as well as *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (1985), and made extensive notes for an unfinished book, "Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy: The 'Party' and Forms of Organization Born Out of Spontaneity."<sup>35</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Dunayevskaya's correspondence with Marcuse and Fromm over the course of three decades records in fairly minute detail the intersection and crystallization of Marxist humanism and Critical Theory as these important tendencies of radical thought developed in the U.S. It shows the Marxist underpinnings of the thinking of Marcuse and Fromm in ways that are not always apparent in their published work. The correspondence illuminates the thinking behind Marcuse's best-known work, *One-Dimensional Man*, not only in philosophy, but also in sociology. Moreover, it sheds important light on Fromm's relation to Marxism, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, including with respect to gender. It additionally illuminates his thinking about the heritage of the Frankfurt School, with which he had broken in a bitter dispute several decades earlier. In addition, the correspondence documents in great detail Dunayevskaya's early development as a dialectician, as well as later aspects of her work, especially her study of Rosa Luxemburg and gender.

Initially, Dunayevskaya's correspondence with Marcuse seemed aimed at the mutual clarification and development of dialectical thinking, but as the correspondence continued over several years, it became increasingly evident that their viewpoints diverged on key issues, not only over Hegel's relation to Marx and the contemporary relevance of these two thinkers, but also over issues with more directly political ramifications. The latter included automation and other changes in the technological structure of modern capitalist production, where Marcuse took a more affirmative stance toward the potential of automation. They also differed over the theorization of the Soviet Union and similar societies, among them Cuba, where Dunayevskaya's sharply critical stance drew the ire of Marcuse. Overall, the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence offers a living documentation of the origins of a specific, U.S.-shaped Hegelian Marxism.

Dunayevskaya also attempted, with less success, to focus on clarifying the Hegelian and Marxian versions of the dialectic in her correspondence with Fromm. While Fromm did not directly take up the Hegelian threads

Dunayevskaya introduced, they did engage in dialogue for over two decades around Marx's humanism and around support for socialist dissidents in Eastern Europe. Their correspondence also offers some pungent critiques of Marcuse, Sartre, Adorno, and Horkheimer, and at the end, some notable reflections on Rosa Luxemburg and gender.

Overall, the letters and essays by Dunayevskaya, Marcuse, and Fromm published in this volume bring to light some important threads in the development of radical thought and activism in the United States. Remarkably free of dogma, ideological posturing, or sympathy for either Cold War liberalism or authoritarian strains of Marxism like Stalinism or Maoism, the correspondence shows Marxist intellectuals at their most creative, rethinking problems and issues for their times. In this sense, the writings published here are of more than historical interest, as they open up a window of tremendous heuristic value concerning how to rethink and redeploy the Marxist critique of philosophy, politics, and society in the twenty-first century.

## NOTES

1. When referring to Dunayevskaya's work, we have hyphenated and capitalized the term "Marxist-Humanism," in keeping with her own usage. We have used the terms "Marxist humanism" or "socialist humanism" to denote a broader current of thought that includes Erich Fromm, various Eastern European Marxist philosophers, as well as Dunayevskaya. Finally, we have used the term "Marx's humanism" to denote the humanist themes within Marx's own writings.

2. A few of the letters in the present volume have been published previously in Marcuse (2001) and Dunayevskaya (2002). The Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence has been discussed previously in Kellner (1984, 1991, 2001), and Anderson (1989, 1990).

3. In a recent treatment of this question, however, John Abromeit concludes: "Hegel and Marx were far more important for Marcuse than Heidegger, particularly after the initial enthusiasm for *Being and Time*, which was expressed in Marcuse's first two essays, and had largely worn off—by 1930 at the latest. . . . It is true that *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity* begins with a deferential gesture to Heidegger. . . . [but] Heidegger is not mentioned at all in the rest of [*Hegel's Ontology*], which is devoted to a careful exposition of [Hegel's] *Science of Logic*" (2004, pp. 151, 139; see also Kellner 1984, Abromeit 2010a). On Marcuse's interpretations of Hegel's *Science of Logic* in *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, see also Rockwell (2004).

4. We cite the newest English version of this essay, originally translated by Joris de Bres in the 1970s but here revised by Abromeit, who has restored Marcuse's critical remark about Engels, among other things. The new collection in which this article appears bears the unfortunate title *Heideggerian Marxism*, which imposes a Heideggerian reading on this important Marcuse essay on the young Marx.

5. For discussions of the book's context and reception, see Kellner (1984), Anderson (1993), Rockwell (2004), and Wheatland (2009).

6. A number of Marcuse's earlier critiques of positivism and pragmatism have been published, some for the first time, in Marcuse (2011). The introduction to this volume by Douglas Kellner, Clayton Pierce, and Tyson Lewis offers a probing discussion of Marcuse's critique of pragmatism. For her part, Dunayevskaya, who had emerged from the Trotskyist movement—in which John Dewey was revered for having helped to defend Trotsky during the Moscow Trials,

and many were influenced by pragmatism, often through the combination of Marxism and pragmatism in the philosophical writings of Sidney Hook—had kept her distance from Hook and pragmatism as well.

7. By 1954, however, just before his correspondence with Dunayevskaya was to begin, Marcuse had offered a somewhat different picture, wherein changes during the twentieth century had “enabled late industrial civilization to absorb its negativity” (p. 437). At the time, Dunayevskaya does not seem to have been aware of this discussion, published in an epilogue to a second edition of *Reason and Revolution*.

8. The German term “Geist”—as here in *Philosophie des Geistes*—was for many years rendered as “mind” in Hegel translations, but more recently, translators have tended to use the less restrictive term “spirit.” Dunayevskaya, Marcuse, and Fromm all tended to use the term “mind,” however, in keeping with English usage at that time.

9. We discuss Fromm’s intellectual trajectory in its own terms in the second half of this introduction, since his correspondence with Dunayevskaya did not begin until 1959.

10. This is not the place for a more detailed discussion of the Marcuse-Fromm dispute over Freud, since it figured very little in the correspondence that makes up the present volume. Two recent studies should be mentioned, however, which have shed new light on these differences: (1) Abromeit’s 2011 book on Horkheimer traces Fromm’s argument over Freud in the late 1930s with Horkheimer (whose position Marcuse largely shared), making use of some recently unearthed texts. (2) The introduction by Kellner et al. and the papers collected in Marcuse (2011) give greater illumination to Marcuse’s engagement with Freud as part of his radical concept of the “Great Refusal,” contrasting his radical appropriation of Freud not only with that of Fromm, but also with more recent radical appropriations in the Lacanian and post-structuralist modes.

11. These substantial notes by Lenin on Hegel in 1914–1915 are often termed his “Philosophical Notebooks,” in keeping with the title given by the Moscow editors to Vol. 38 of Lenin’s *Collected Works*, which included some extraneous material not related to Hegel, much of it from before 1914, and thus prior to his “Hegelian” philosophical transformation. Therefore, we have used the more precise term Hegel Notebooks for these 1914–1915 notebooks, sometimes also referring more specifically to the most lengthy and important of them, the “Abstract of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*.” For a discussion of the Hegel Notebooks and their context, see Anderson (1995).

12. Recall also that a number of Trotskyist leaders, among them James Cannon, were prosecuted under the Smith Act for opposing World War II, and that the Stalinist Left had supported this law, but would subsequently feel its weight during McCarthyism.

13. Kellner, Pierce, and Lewis describe Marcuse as “one of the few contemporary thinkers to attempt a fusion of philosophy and politics” (2011, p. 7). This characterization could also be applied to Dunayevskaya, whose writings during the 1970s and 1980s included a series of *Political-Philosophic Letters*, many of them in response to the Iranian revolution.

14. Interestingly, a passage from Marcuse’s *Reason and Revolution* (1941) suggests a more affirmative stance on his part—at least in that earlier period—toward Hegel’s absolute mind than was apparent in the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence during the 1950s. In *Reason and Revolution*, Marcuse follows his account of Hegel’s *Logic* with an examination of the *Philosophy of Right*. The latter contains the categories of objective mind, or the political, which followed the transitions from the *Logic to Philosophy of Nature* and from the latter to *Philosophy of Mind*. Not far into his analysis of *Philosophy of Right* Marcuse notes: “Some of the gravest misunderstandings that obscure the *Philosophy of Right* can be removed simply by considering the place of the work in Hegel’s system. It does not treat with the whole cultural world, for the realm of right is just part of the realm of mind, namely, that part which Hegel denotes as objective mind. It does not, in short, expound or deal with the cultural realities of art, religion and philosophy, which embody the ultimate truth for Hegel. . . . *Even Hegel’s most emphatic deification of the state cannot cancel his definite subordination of the objective to the absolute mind, of the political to the philosophical truth*” (Marcuse 1941, p. 178, emphasis added).



15. In terms of changes in Marcuse's philosophical position, it is important to note that in his letters to Horkheimer during the 1940s, Marcuse never commented about *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, despite promising to do so. This suggests some hesitation on his part to accept this new turn in the thinking of Horkheimer and Adorno (Marcuse 1998). For a study of the slow evolution during the 1930s of Horkheimer's positions toward those of Adorno, see Abromeit (forthcoming). However, by the mid-1950s in *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse favorably cited *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. *Eros and Civilization* also contained a substantial analysis of Nietzsche's philosophy, in which Marcuse wrote in positive terms that "Nietzsche speaks in the name of a reality principle fundamentally antagonistic to that of Western civilization" ([1955a] 1966, p. 121). The argument that Marcuse's position on dialectics by the 1960s differed radically from that of 1941 – and for the worse—is elaborated in Dunayevskaya (2002) and Anderson (1993). For a more affirmative view of these changes in Marcuse's perspectives on dialectics, which stresses "the common ground underlying both rational dialectics and poetic language" in these two periods of his work, see Robert Sayre and Michael Löwy's important study of Romanticism (2001, p. 222).

16. This exchange between Marcuse and Dunayevskaya over automation was first published in Marcuse (2001), along with other correspondence on this topic between Marcuse and the Frankfurt School economist Friedrich Pollock. Kellner (1991) discusses this correspondence as an important part of the background to Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man*.

17. In this volume, we have preserved the occasionally ungrammatical form of these letters, very rarely adding editors' interpolations in brackets for the sake of clarity.

18. For a discussion of Bukharin's *Historical Materialism* and its critics, including Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, and Dunayevskaya, see Anderson (1987).

19. Dunayevskaya published this as a pamphlet with the polemical title, *Sartre's Search for a Method to Undermine Marxism* (1963); many of its arguments were later incorporated into her *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973).

20. Perhaps Dunayevskaya had expected a more favorable response from Marcuse, given his own rather negative assessment of Sartre fifteen years earlier, when he had concluded: "Behind the nihilistic language of Existentialism lurks the ideology of free competition, free initiative, and equal opportunity. Everybody can 'transcend' his situation" (Marcuse [1948] 1973, p. 174).

21. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, they corresponded occasionally, but after Marcuse became a leading intellectual figure of the global New Left, Dunayevskaya encouraged one of her younger colleagues, Richard Greeman, to publish a lengthy essay critiquing Marcuse's writings (Greeman 1968), also issued as a News and Letters pamphlet. During this period, Marcuse and Sartre were two figures on the Left whom Dunayevskaya regularly criticized, along with Mao, for what she considered to be their deleterious theoretical influence on the New Left.

22. In Marcuse (2007), Kellner has published a number of Marcuse's shorter writings on art and revolution, which include dialogue with the Chicago surrealists around Franklin Rosemont, several of whom also interacted with Dunayevskaya.

23. Fromm was also a practicing psychoanalyst who saw patients throughout his career.

24. In his 1931 inaugural address as Director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (Frankfurt School), Horkheimer spoke of "the question of the connection between the economic life of society, the psychological development of its individuals and the changes within specific areas of culture to which belong not only the intellectual legacy of the sciences, art and religion, but also law, customs, fashion, public opinion, sports, entertainments, lifestyles, and so on" ([1931] 1989, p. 33).

25. This volume contains translations of much of Fromm's early work on Freud and Marx. Other early Fromm texts on Freudian Marxism have been translated in Bronner and Kellner (1989) and in Anderson and Quinney (2000).

26. For an interesting historical analysis of the Frankfurt School's studies of authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and fascism, which began during this period, see Kramer (forthcoming).

27. For a well-argued critique of this view, see Bronner (1994).

28. Burston (1991) explains Fromm's sympathetic interest in Trotsky differently, as a psychological affinity on his part to someone who went against communist orthodoxy, as Fromm had done in relation to Freudian orthodoxy.

29. Here and elsewhere in our introduction, we quote from Fromm's letters to Dunayevskaya. However, legal restrictions in Fromm's Will concerning the publication of his letters have resulted in the fact that in the main text of the present volume, we have published Dunayevskaya's letters to Fromm, accompanied by summaries rather than the actual texts of his letters to Dunayevskaya. We thank Fromm's Literary Executor, Dr. Rainer Funk, for allowing us to quote from Fromm's letters in our introduction.

30. See note 10 for more details on Fromm's writings on and interactions with Marcuse in this period. In his introduction to a collection of Marcuse's writings on the 1960s, Kellner argues that Fromm's footnote contains a fundamental misinterpretation of the complexity of Marcuse's view (Marcuse 2005). Kellner reprints an interview with Marcuse that appeared in the *New York Times Magazine* of October 27, 1968, in which he held: "I am optimistic, because I believe that never in the history of humanity have the resources necessary to create a free society existed to such a degree. I am pessimistic because I believe that the established societies—capitalist society in particular—are totally organized and mobilized against this possibility" (Marcuse 2005, p. 111). Still, it could be argued that Marcuse saw less of a real possibility of radical change than did either Dunayevskaya or Fromm. Dunayevskaya saw radical change as more of a possibility, not least because—unlike Marcuse—she held to a view of the modern working class as retaining an important measure of revolutionary consciousness. Fromm saw radical change as more of a possibility because, unlike Marcuse (and also unlike Dunayevskaya), he was more sanguine about the possibilities of radical change from within the established institutions of the Western democracies.

31. Parenthetical expression in the original.

32. These later appeared in Dunayevskaya ([1982] 1991, 1985). Fromm's writings on gender have been collected in Fromm (1997) and have been discussed by Kellner (1992) and Wilde (2004).

33. Without acceding to Fromm's extremely polemical language, it can nonetheless be stated unequivocally that Horkheimer had moved to the right by the 1960s, as had Adorno, albeit to a lesser extent. This has not been discussed widely in English. A detailed account of this history, including Horkheimer and Adorno having summoned the police to end the student occupation of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in 1968, can be found in Wiggershaus ([1986] 1994). As Kellner suggests in his introduction to Marcuse (2005), however, Wiggershaus downplays the differences at that time between Marcuse and his erstwhile colleagues Adorno and Horkheimer. There is also some discussion of the post-1960 theoretical evolution of Horkheimer and Adorno in Kellner (1991) and of Adorno in 1968 more recently in Holloway, Matamoros, and Tischler (2009) and in Abromeit (2010b).

34. While the theme of Luxemburg as feminist received some support in the 1980s, especially on the part of the poet Adrienne Rich, who contributed a foreword to the 1991 reprint of Dunayevskaya's book, in an overall sense, Luxemburg's work continued to be neglected by feminist scholars. This may have begun to change in 2011 with the publication of *The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg*, one of whose editors was Peter Hudis, a former colleague of Dunayevskaya. A greater acceptance of Luxemburg as feminist, or as having had a feminist dimension, could be seen in the reviews of a number of prominent feminist thinkers of the *Letters of Rosa Luxemburg*—among them Vivian Gornick, Sheila Rowbotham, and Jacqueline Rose.

35. Some texts related to the latter appear in Dunayevskaya (2002); others are discussed in Hudis (1989).

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*Part 1*

**The Dunayevskaya-Marcuse  
Correspondence, 1954–1978**





## Chapter One

# The Early Letters: Debating Marxist Dialectics and Hegel's Absolute Idea

December 7, 1954

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Although I do not know you in person, you are of course familiar to me for your "Reason and Revolution."<sup>1</sup> I was so impressed with the work at the time it was published that I then got your address from Meyer Schapiro<sup>2</sup> and intended to write you. I intended also to visit you, but you were then living in Washington, D.C. and I in Pittsburgh. I hope when next I come east, there will be an opportunity to meet you in person.

Now let me introduce myself. I am Raya Dunayevskaya. You might have read my translation of "Teaching Economics in the Soviet Union" that appeared in the September, 1944, issue of the *American Economic Review*. The introduction that I wrote to it, "A New Revision of Marxian Economics," caused sufficient stir to hit the front page of the *New York Times* at the time and to prolong the debate in the *AER* for a whole year at which time I came back with a rejoinder, "Revision or Reaffirmation of Marxism," in the September, 1945, issue of the *AER*.<sup>3</sup>

Then I turned to philosophy and translated Lenin's "Philosophic Notebooks."<sup>4</sup> However, as you know, they are strictly notebooks and need an introduction, a lengthy one. When I got down to work on that I found that I wanted nothing less than the work on Marx on which I had been working for no less than a decade to serve as that "introduction." I also wished to include other material from Marx's Archives, including "Chapter 6," or the original

last chapter for *Capital*,<sup>5</sup> which I had translated for my own benefit into English. You can sense how elaborate the project became and I never got to finish it, and here is why:

I became interested instead in some live philosophy, a working class view of the world, and the newspaper projected by a group of workers and intellectuals to be called *Correspondence*<sup>6</sup> absorbed all my time. In fact, I am the only intellectual who has a regular column in that paper (*Two Worlds: Notes from a Diary*). Up to a couple of months ago I was not in correspondence with any intellectuals and, of course, the workers around *Correspondence* have next to no contacts with intellectuals—it is a paper written mainly by workers. Each section—Labor, Women, Negro, Youth—is edited by the local committee, and there is no distinction made between committee members and “outside” workers either in the articles or the Readers’ Views which occupy the full center pages as well as each separate section. Now, however, when the paper got into straits, I decided also to reestablish my contact with intellectuals for it seemed inconceivable to me that intellectuals would appear indifferent to this grass roots journalism. Also, I cannot see any work on Marx except one addressed to the workers, instead of limited to the intellectual audience, and hence I felt that, although I have delayed my work for over a year, I may actually be able to return to it and on an entirely new level.

At this time, however, my absorbing interest is *Correspondence*, which I consider a demonstration of the dialectic in the concrete. Under separate cover I have sent you a copy of “The Correspondence Booklet,” several back issues of *Correspondence* and my article on “The Human Personality in Class Conflicts,” which appeared in this paper. I hope you will find the time to comment on these.

Sincerely yours,

\* \* \*

January 8, 1955

Dear Raya Dunayevskaya:

I apologize for the long delay in answering your letter: I was out of town most of the time. Now I have read the “Correspondence Booklet” and the issues you sent me. I am very grateful to you, and I don’t have to emphasize that I agree with many of the things you say. But I think I should tell you from the beginning that I must dissociate myself strongly from some of the views you take. For example, I disagree with your singling out the intellectuals, bureaucrats, etc. as principal target. Nor do I have to tell you that in doing so you fall in line with one of the most dangerous reactionary trends in

present-day America. I don't think today there is any opportunity for promoting any sort of anti-intellectualism: this is a diversion from the real enemy. The second point on which I disagree is your—in my view romantic—glorification of the “common people.” You know to what extent the “common people” today reproduce and reflect the powers that be, and manifest desired attitudes and hatreds. Your own “Correspondence” quotes many good instances of it. This use of the notion “common people” is (pardon me for using a cliché) abstract and undialectical.

I say all these things so bluntly and unpolitely only because I do hope that we meet soon and can discuss them. Will your way lead you to this region or to New York in the near future? Then we could easily get together, and I am very much looking forward to it.

Let me thank you again for writing to me.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Marcuse

\* \* \*

February 12, 1955

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Another tour had been in the offing for me when I received your letter of last month, but that has been called off for the time being. Perhaps you know that complications with the authorities arose. If you do not, then in good time you will. I still think it will be possible for me to get to New York in a month or so and if so, please tell me how often you get to New York and how easy it would be to contact you. Please note my change of address: Raya Dunayevskaya, c/o J. Dwyer, 4993-28th Street, Detroit, 10, Mich/

This, then, is mere acknowledgment of your letter, not a dispute with points we definitely disagree on—relationship of worker and intellectual—or those we might find greater agreement with. I was looking forward especially to meet and talk with you precisely on that question of dialectics for I had been working for quite some time on the Absolute Idea [SLM, pp. 825–844; SLII, pp. 466–486], Absolute Knowledge [PhGB, pp. 789–808; PhGM p. 479–493], Absolute Mind [PM, pp. 292–315] which, to me, is “to *be* free” rather than merely “to *have* freedom” and answers the question of the man on the street who wants to know whether in this totalitarian age: *can* man be

free?<sup>7</sup> We have indeed reached the age of absolutes that are not in heaven but concretely in life when the question that bothers philosophers is the same that the ordinary worker asks in his everyday workaday world.

Forgive the hurried and unclear nature of this but when you have a paper and the daily routine of administration there is no time for careful phrasing.

Yours sincerely,

Raya Dunayevskaya

\* \* \*

April 3, 1955

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

I'm a bit late with sending the Two Worlds which tried to catch the impulse on automation and the automation articles themselves. But when I returned to Detroit I found that the owner of the paper is trying to take advantage of his ownership to exclude most of the worker writers and intellectual features which have lent the distinctive features to *Correspondence*.<sup>8</sup> No doubt we will come out again, even if it takes some time to regroup, but you can imagine my mind had wandered from the book on Marxism after putting out what might be the last issue of the paper (Vol. II, No.7). That's another story.

Meanwhile here are the articles I promised. I didn't do very well, but that in any case is what I mean by impulse that is new and that I wish to surround myself with in writing any work on Marxism. The twin poles to me of any fundamental work there must have, automation at one end, and the absolute idea or freedom at the other end. I'm very anxious to hear your reaction to those two letters<sup>9</sup> where I first posed the question of the absolute idea in terms of a movement from practice to theory as well as from theory to practice.<sup>10</sup>

I would also like to hear from you what in general you thought of prospects of publishing a work on Marx in the historical setting in which I placed the one chapter I left with you on the second edition of *Capital* and the Paris Commune.<sup>11</sup>

It was indeed a pleasure to have finally met you and I'm only sorry that it was so brief that we barely got to know each other and I could not meet your friend. But I feel sure that now that we have met it will not be the last time.

I told the editor (John Zupan who is with me in this break or evident break with *Correspondence* and also Charles Denby the author of "Workers Journal" that always appears on the front page as well as two women production

workers) about meeting you and the fact that you might wish to come here when your school semester was over and they all felt they would like that very much, so the invitation to you stands.<sup>12</sup>

Do let me hear from you.

Yours, as ever,

Raya Dunayevskaya, c/o Dwyer

\* \* \*

Waltham, April 14, 1955

Dear Raya Dunayevskaya:

I have now read the notes on Hegel which you lent me.<sup>13</sup> This is fascinating, and I admire your way of concretizing the most abstract philosophical notions. However, I still cannot get along with the direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics: I think you somehow minimize the “negation” which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes. I would like to discuss these things with you, and I hope that we can do so in the near future; I shall let you know as soon as there is a chance.

As to the Sixth Chapter<sup>14</sup> I wonder whether it is really novel enough to warrant publication. Also one should check how much of it is already contained in the *Theorieen Über Mehrwert* [Theories of Surplus Value]<sup>15</sup>

Please let me know when you come again to this area.

Your papers are enclosed.

Many thanks.

With best wishes & greetings,

Yours,

Herbert Marcuse

\* \* \*

May 5, 1955

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Now that the school season is drawing to a close perhaps you will take that trip to Detroit, and thus see that it is not a question of “my” direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics, but the dialectical development of proletarian politics itself as it struggles to rid itself of its specifically class character in its movement to a classless society. That is why I “translated” Absolute Mind as the new society.<sup>16</sup> You seem to think that I thus minimize the “negation” which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes. But surely Hegel’s Absolute Idea has nothing in common with Schelling’s conception of the Absolute as the synthesis or identity in which all differences are absorbed by the “One.”<sup>17</sup> Lenin sort of put a period in that chapter when Hegel speaks of the Idea as Nature,<sup>18</sup> pointing out that Hegel was stretching a hand to materialism [LCW 38, p. 233]. That was as far as 1915 could reach. It was far enough: for his transformation of everything into its opposite was no abstraction but the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war.<sup>19</sup>

But this is 1955, and if 4 decades does not mean all new, we should surely start at least not with Lenin on the eve of revolution but Lenin *after* conquest of power. 1922-3 shows how hard Lenin labored to find the something which would make his Universal—that everyone “to a man” run production and the state<sup>20</sup>—a reality. He came up with the notion that what is needed is that “the work of the party must be checked by the non-party masses.”<sup>21</sup> No small thing for the creator of the party as *the* knowing of the proletariat!

30 years later when neither the state withered away nor the party checked itself but, on the contrary, turned into the one-party state, we must see that the point to day is the liberation *from* the party. The withering away of the state (Doesn’t Hegel’s phrase about the “falling off” of the Idea<sup>22</sup> remind you of this?) is no overnight job and the party not in power does remain the knowing of the proletariat and hence a much more complex job, *its* withering away or “falling off.” But in that contradiction does lie the movement toward liberation and theoreticians can least of all allow themselves to be enslaved by any divisions between philosophy and politics. In truth, only when you do have the “translation” in mind, and posit the proletariat, the freely associated proletariat, as the Notion, can you hear the Idea at all. How is it that Hegel phrases it? “The self-determination in which alone the Idea is is to hear itself speak.” [SLII, p 467; SLM, p.825].

Do I sound brash when I say: do come here and listen? Without this new impulse from the proletariat the theoretician is not just the absentminded professor inhabiting an ivory tower. He is dead and doesn’t know it. What is needed in this age of absolutes is not the separation of politics from philosophy but its integration. We must in fact go a step further than Lenin and where he first saw that his Marxist colleagues, *himself included*, had not really understood *Capital* before 1915 for they had not understood the dialectic and urged us to see *Capital* as our *Logic*,<sup>23</sup> we must include in that logic

also history and politics. I don't go in for quantitative distinctions: which is the worst evil—the Kautskyans always “teaching” Marx or the Stalinists “applying.” 1955 compels that where Hegel made it the job of philosophy to elicit necessity under the semblance of contingency, today's intellectuals must elicit the new society present in the old by seeing the human freedom totally unfolded in freely associated labor alone deciding its own fate.

Yet when I tell my theoretical brethren that I want the two poles of the book on Marx to be that of automation and the absolute idea, they look at me as if I were talking a foreign tongue not yet invented, which is a polite way of saying I talk gibberish. But the worker, in his opposition to automation, is counter-posing his full development which is at the same time the *only* total technological development to the mechanical solution (mechanism and chemism)<sup>24</sup> the industrialists and engineers seek to make of automation. The reason this is the age of absolutes is that the objectivity, all objectivity, is now in the proletariat himself. That is how I read Hegel on the Absolute Idea freely releasing itself.<sup>25</sup>

Enough! I don't know what got into me unless it is the fact that it is a beautiful morning to have evoked this outburst from me. When I sat down to the typewriter it was only to welcome you here.

Or is the outburst just an evasion of writing an actual outline of the book itself?<sup>26</sup> I doubt I will have time to do anything like that before the fall. (Does that end your publisher's<sup>27</sup> possible interest in it?) However, I do want you to see not alone the strictly philosophical letters that I showed you, but some of the economic ideas as I outlined them when I intended to write the work on state-capitalism that I spoke to you about for all my writings are built on the necessity, nay, urgency, of not treating dialectics as if it were an adjunct to Marx's economic theories. I enclose the outline of that work, which I will ask you to please return to me.

Would you be so good as to send me the name and address of that friend of yours you wished me to meet when I was in NY? I mislaid the piece of paper and thus have been unable to write to him: it was impossible to see him in person as I left but a few hours after I left you.

Has your book,<sup>28</sup> including corrected proofs, gone to press and are you now a free man?

Yours,

\* \* \*

June 22, 1955

Dear R.D.

I am still in the middle of moving from New York to Boston—which explains my utter negligence in answering your letters. I still can't do it: I am unpacking 50 cases of books, and my files are hidden somewhere. Let me just tell you that I read your draft re Marxism and State Capitalism<sup>29</sup> and found it most needed and useful. The whole idea is excellent—but my publisher just wouldn't undertake such a project for the time being. Be sure that I keep after him, and that I shall discuss the problems with you as soon as I get around a little better.

Your answer to my brief remarks re Hegel does not satisfy me. Certainly you do not suspect me of ignoring the substantive connection between philosophy and praxis. BUT it is—*sit venia verbo*<sup>30</sup>—a dialectical connection, not an immediate one. What is the meaning of the explicit or implied “is” in your statements: “the dialectic of the Absolute Idea is the dialectic of” the proletariat or whatever it may be? Is this a mere analogy? An equation or identification? You cannot just “apply” Hegel's text to an essentially different sphere without demonstrating why and how.

But this is not supposed to be an argument—just to show you that I am really thinking about these problems. Since you requested return of your draft, I am enclosing it—hoping that at a later time I shall have another opportunity.

With best wishes and greetings,

Yours,

Herbert

\* \* \*

June 28, 1955

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Thanks for the letter and the return of the MSS; I will be in a position to send it back to you in a week since you do seem interested. This is not, however, the form of the book I intend to write now. I had done it as *State Capitalism in Marxism* in 1947 when there was a possibility that Oxford University Press would publish it and I had already completed a study of the Three Five-Year Plans of Russia<sup>31</sup> from original sources and in general written a whole series of articles on the French edition of *Capital*, the revisions of Marxism going on in Russia during the war, and the concrete data of this stage of capitalism.



When Oxford University Press backed out and I turned more to philosophy than economics, I wrote only isolated chapters of the work on Marxism. I enclose one such brief chapter on Lenin's method after 1915 along with a letter on his Philosophic Notebooks that I had written at that time. Although these are very rough sketches, you can see how comprehensively I try to deal with the transformation of Lenin's mode of thought after 1914 for that is the crux. Not the betrayal, nor even the stage of monopoly capitalism that was the economic foundation for the transformation of the Second International that had been going on for years and burst forth into betrayal, but, above, all, the mode of thought which allowed for no self-movement or impulse from the masses. You know I'm sure that he didn't treat monopoly as just one more stage in the development of capitalism, but as a new category, a new absolute from which all else flows. That is why "transformation of one thing into its opposite" meant so much to him, why he did not leave that truth only in its economic guise as transformation of competition into monopoly but in its social and human form as the breakdown of the International.

Naturally I do not mean when I go further in the *Logic* and say the Absolute Idea "is" the proletarian self-emancipation or liberation from the party that there is such a direct relationship between the laws and movement of the logic and the field of human freedom. It is always a dialectical relationship and will need to be developed in all its manifoldedness. But that "is" is an absolute necessity to cut through not alone detail and the gibberish of so much that passes for Marxism these days but to open up those closed intellectual ears of ours to the fresh impulses from the workers. That is why I dropped any work on the book for two years and came here to work on the paper. As soon as *News & Letters*<sup>32</sup> gains a certain momentum of its own, I will return to the work. But note how I mean to return to it so that you will see what I mean by method of work and impulse from the only *theoretically new thoughts* from the proletariat itself. This is not simple movement from theory to practice—I'm sure you above all know that in both Hegel and Marx—but one from *practice to theory* not as mere verification of the latter but its creator.

In any case, here is my plan: In fall I will prepare a series of 4 lectures on what I see the book as. These are to be given not on campuses but to small groups of workers and intellectuals, mainly workers, and given in a form where they know that that is not a definitive piece of work but will be greatly changed by what they have to say. I will begin in West Virginia where we have some miners who are interested, then to Detroit and L.A. (I hope also to stop in New York especially if you can be there for I consider you very integral to all this and I would like to spend more time than just on the fly. Does your move to Massachusetts mean you will not be in NY or what?)

By December when I have studied all the back and forth that went on in these talks I ought to know how I wish to cast my work on which I have been at over a decade. At that time I could work out an outline of the actual work for any publisher and begin to work on the book itself. It is not, I believe, a very long job—6 months ought to do it.

Would you know where I can get hold of a *chronique* of Marx's life, in Russian preferably but I will accept it in French or German if I can't get the Russian. It is a very good reference work but I have been unable to obtain a copy for myself and to photostat it from the Slavic Division copy would cost a bit more than I have money to spare at the moment. I would be very grateful if you could direct me to a place where I could obtain—perhaps your own library. I sympathize with your trials and tribulations of moving a library—I'm always on the go and that is the one thing that gets heavier with each moving. I trust you will like Cambridge. I lived there in the Depression days—in fact taught a group of Russian students English. But when they found out I was “some creature called a Trotskyite” and informed Moscow about it that was the end of my earning my livelihood. I did succeed in selling a complete set of Trotsky's *Opposition Bulletin*<sup>33</sup> to the Harvard Library that grim year of 1931.

Yours,

\* \* \*

September 5, 1955

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Now that the summer is over with its heat, flood, hurricanes and general resistance to any consistent study which necessitates “the patience, labor and suffering of the negative” [PhGB, p. 81; PhGM, p. 10], I trust I will hear from you and that we finally will be able to get together. There is, however, a change. It turns out that my tour begins on the West Coast rather than the East and that I will not reach New York till the middle of November. I hope I will hear from you long before then. (I leave Detroit September 12th)

Dr. Robert Cohen,<sup>34</sup> who tried to get me a publisher for a “package” of Marx's Early Essays<sup>35</sup> and untranslated chapter from first version of *Capital*, as well as Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*, writes that the project has fallen through: the Early Essays are being brought out in England and the American publisher did not feel the “Philosophic Notebooks” would have a paying audience. I would hate to think that when I get my book done there will still be no English translation of Lenin's Notebooks and that I would thus be

limited to quotations from original sources. That is a privilege that intellectuals can both allow themselves and can utilize, but the public that I am aiming at cannot.

Incidentally, I have not seen the new edition of your *Reason and Revolution*<sup>36</sup> so do not know whether you had grappled with Stalinism and its violent attempts in 1943 and 1947 to break Marx from Hegel and transform the Marxian dialectic from development through contradiction to an idealistic totalitarian development of "criticism and self-criticism."<sup>37</sup> That of course will be integral to my work.

If I hear that you are interested I will correspond with you from the various places of lecture-discussions on the work and tell you how in fact this movement from practice to theory that I am always harping on is actually working out on the concrete question of the book.

Yours,

Raya

The *News & Letters* this issue is carrying a notice of *Dissent* just in order to call attention to your article in it.<sup>38</sup>

\* \* \*

October 27, 1955

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

The amazing thing about this tour on the book is the accidental feature rather than the planned for groups of workers and intellectuals. It turned out that some universities on the coast had heard that I was coming and invited me to speak before various classes. Although my articles that they were acquainted with (*American Economic Review*)<sup>39</sup> were a decade old, they were being used as standard text reference both in the history of social thought classes and in the classes on economics and economic systems. They are starved for any non-Communist Marxist views. I told them that my interest had shifted to the philosophic foundations rather than the economic aspects and even that did not seem to surprise them because they said that they gathered from my economic articles the philosophic interest and saw a prediction in them: where I spoke of the Stalinists violating the dialectic structure of *Capital* I said it was not for pedagogic reasons but *what* they taught and that by 1947 when it was followed up by Zhdanov's saying that Russian theorists better find "a new dialectic law" rather than the one of contradiction since the "classless society" operated only on "criticism and self-criticism," etc. etc.<sup>40</sup>

In any case, in Berkeley I spoke to a small seminar on “The Philosophic Foundations of Marxism.” I was amazed that they had not heard of your *Reason and Revolution* and recommended highly there as everywhere else. The Professor (Oscar Landauer)<sup>41</sup> then asked me whether by any chance you were the son of Julian Marcuse whom he knew well in Germany and who has since died. I told him I would find out. By the time I reached LA and spoke to UCLA, SC<sup>42</sup> and Occidental, I convinced not only the economics and sociology classes but a philosophic seminar to let me speak to them on “Hegel’s Absolute Idea: A Marxian Interpretation.” I thought it was strange of me to address a metaphysics class but 4 professors came just to hear what it is a Marxist would say on Hegel, especially since various seminars they tried holding on Hegel’s Works fell apart before ever they reached their end. Here, on the contrary, the excitement was as genuine as in the topical classes and no one could make the students leave when the bell rang. They thought it was my “pedagogic talents” but I assured them it was the topic itself and if you really believe in the dynamism of ideas, especially in the dynamism of the dialectic, that the whole self-movement adds a greater dimension to the human being than any Cinemascope invention. They thanked me for giving them “a new frame of reference” to make Hegel’s abstractions more concrete.

All this and the book itself as I now think of it I would like to discuss with you. I have not heard from you so do not know when or if you can get to NY when I reach there Nov. 15th. I doubt I could make it to Boston unless some university there invites me and pays fare from NY to Boston. I will be back in Detroit by the time you get this letter, so please let me know there your plans.

Yours,

\* \* \*

December 2, 1955

Dear Raya Dunayevskaya:

I apologize for my long silence: (1) I did not have your address *en route*, (2) I was so busy with the final rush of the publication of my Freud book<sup>43</sup> that I had to abandon all correspondence. In addition, I was most of the time not in Cambridge and picked up your letters with great delay. However, I have read—at least as a first reading—your notes and I should like to tell you that I must encourage you to go ahead with the elaboration. Your ideas are a real oasis in the desert of Marxist thought—there are many things I have to discuss with you—points of disagreement and points which require clarifica-

tion, but I am at present just unable to come to New York or even Detroit and also unable to write my comments down. We will have to wait until my schedule and program is a little easier.

Please believe me that this is not laziness—I just have to stick to a rigid intellectual diet if I want to go on. But keep me informed about your progress. And as soon as I see the slightest chance, I shall get in touch with you.

Your notes are enclosed.

Again with apology.

and best wishes,

Cordially,

Herbert Marcuse

## NOTES

1. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960 (orig. 1941), hereafter R&R.

2. Meyer Schapiro (1904–96) was a leading art historian and an anti-Stalinist Marxist who defended Trotsky during the Moscow Trials of the 1930s. In 1949, Schapiro helped Dunayevskaya in an unsuccessful attempt to publish her translation of Lenin's "Philosophical Notebooks" (see below), a translation that appeared in shortened form in the appendix to *Marxism and Freedom* a decade later.

3. "Teaching of Economics in the Soviet Union," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 34:3, 1944, pp. 502–530, was translated by Dunayevskaya from the Russian theoretical journal *Pod Znamenem Marxizma* [Under the Banner of Marxism]. Dunayevskaya's article, "A New Revision of Marxian Economics," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 34:3 (1944), pp. 531–537, accompanied "Teaching of Economics in the Soviet Union." The debate was covered in the *New York Times* of October 1, 1944. Oscar Lange, Leo Rogin, and Paul Baran (who also corresponded extensively with Marcuse) responded critically to Dunayevskaya's article, and she responded to these critics in her "Revision or Reaffirmation of Marxism? A Rejoinder," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 35:3 (1945), pp. 660–64.

4. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, a major part of which was first published in English in the appendix to the first edition of Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (New York: Bookman, 1958—hereafter referred to as M&F1958), pp. 326–55; published more fully but in a less precise translation in Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1961—hereafter referred to as LCW 38, etc.). The most important part of the *Philosophical Notebooks* is the lengthy "Abstract of Hegel's 'Science of Logic'" of 1914–1915, written after the outbreak of World War I and the breakup of international socialism. V. I. Lenin (1870–1924) is best known as leader of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and of the early Soviet Union, the first state claiming to be inspired by Marxism. His best-known theoretical writings include *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), a defense of a top-down "vanguard party" style organization; *Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism* (1916), a study of monopoly capital, and related writings in defense of "national liberation" movements against imperialism; and *State and Revolution*

(1917), a study of socialist principles that emphasized destruction of the state as well as capital, and workers' rule from below. Dunayevskaya gave particular importance to the concept of dialectic worked out in Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* (and, as she saw it, concretized after 1914 in *Imperialism and State and Revolution*), which she contrasted to his reductionist, and crudely polemical *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1908). In his *Reason and Revolution* (1941), Marcuse seemed also to appreciate Lenin's contribution to dialectical theory after 1914. (On these issues, see Kevin Anderson, *Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism: A Critical Study* [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995]).

5. This chapter, with which Marx may have at one point intended to conclude *Capital*, Volume I, was titled "Results of the Immediate Process of Production." It finally appeared in English as an appendix to Marx's *Capital*, Vol. I, trans. by Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976). [This edition of *Capital* hereafter referred to as MCIF.]

6. *Correspondence* was the newspaper published by the Committees of Correspondence, the U.S. revolutionary organization led by Dunayevskaya (along with C. L. R. James [1901–89] and Grace Lee Boggs [1915–]) from 1951 to 1955. The group is usually referred to as the Johnson-Forest Tendency or JFT (James used the pseudonym J. R. Johnson and Dunayevskaya the pseudonym Freddie Forest), although Dunayevskaya favored the term State-Capitalist Tendency. By 1941, James was already a well-known figure, primarily because of his book on the Haitian Revolution, *The Black Jacobins* (1938). The JFT began as a minority tendency within Trotskyism in 1941, first within Max Shachtman's dissident Trotskyist Worker's Party and then within the more orthodox Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party, but in 1951 the Tendency broke away to begin an independent existence. The Tendency was united around a theory of state capitalism (especially with regard to the Soviet Union), the direct study of Hegel and of dialectics more generally, a questioning of the Leninist concept of the vanguard party, support for rank and file labor movements against the "labor bureaucracy," and the notion that the Black struggle in the U.S. constituted a revolutionary force in and of itself. Among the more notable theoretical studies produced during these years were James's *Notes on Dialectics* (1948) and his study of Herman Melville, *Mariners, Renegades, and Castaways* (1953); Dunayevskaya's articles on state capitalism, some of which appeared in the *American Economic Review* in 1944–45; and *State Capitalism and World Revolution* (1950), written jointly by James, Dunayevskaya, and Lee. The Johnson-Forest Tendency splintered in 1955, with Dunayevskaya founding her own organization, News and Letters Committees.

7. This sentence refers to the themes developed in Dunayevskaya's two "Letters on Hegel's Absolutes" of May 12 and May 20, 1953, reprinted in Dunayevskaya, *The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx*, edited and introduced by Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002, pp. 15–30; hereafter PON). The ideas first elaborated in these Letters form the underlying basis of many of Dunayevskaya's discussions of dialectics in her letters to Marcuse and Fromm. In these 1953 Letters, written the year before her correspondence with Marcuse began, Dunayevskaya explores the "Absolute Knowledge" chapter of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* [Spirit], the "Absolute Idea" chapter of his *Science of Logic*, and the "Absolute Mind [Spirit]" chapter of his *Philosophy of Mind* [Spirit]. In the May 12, 1953 Letter on the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, she argues that Hegel's absolute idea in the *Science of Logic* was hardly a closed totality or synthesis, let alone a flight into the religious dimension, as had so often been claimed. Instead, the absolute idea chapter offered concepts of freedom and self-determination that were crucial in an age of totalitarianism, she held. In the May 20, 1953 Letter on the absolute mind chapter that concludes Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* [Spirit] and also his entire *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (often termed his "system"), Dunayevskaya discerns the philosophical foundations a new, humanist society beyond the capitalist order. Here, she focuses in particular on Hegel's discussion of absolute mind engendering and enjoying itself, this at the end of a long road of development through contradiction, both philosophical and historical.

8. *Correspondence*, the newspaper of the Johnson-Forest Tendency, fell into the hands of supporters of C. L. R. James (Johnson) after the 1955 split.

9. Dunayevskaya's 1953 "Letters on Hegel's Absolutes." See note 7.

10. In the 1953 “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes,” Dunayevskaya, in analyzing the last paragraph of the last chapter of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, “The Absolute Idea,” criticized Lenin’s reading of this paragraph in his Hegel Notebooks of 1914–15. Although he appreciated and emphasized Hegel’s description of the movement from the idea to nature, seeing it as a dialectical movement from theory toward practice and from idealism toward materialism, Lenin neglected the rest of the paragraph where Hegel stresses a movement *from* nature or practice to spirit or mind. Dunayevskaya, who saw this as a one-sided reading that emphasized practice over theory and nature or materialism over idealism, put forth a new reading that stressed the unity of idealism and materialism, and of theory and practice.

11. Dunayevskaya developed this chapter, on the 1872–75 French edition of *Capital*, where Marx added important material on his concept of commodity fetishism and other issues, and on the impact of the Paris Commune on theoretical issues in *Capital*, for her *Marxism and Freedom*, first published in 1958 [hereafter *M&F*]. The Paris Commune was a revolutionary regime that took over the city in the spring of 1871, instituting a form of direct democracy that included worker control of some factories before it was crushed by the French military. In *The Civil War in France* (1871), Marx extolled the Commune as “the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labor” (MECW 22, p. 334). It was later analyzed as a model of socialism in Lenin’s *State and Revolution* (1917), and by many others since then.

12. John Zupan was a white autoworker who was an editor for a few years after 1955 of *News & Letters*, the paper Dunayevskaya (Forest) founded that year, after the breakup of the Johnson-Forest Tendency. Charles Denby (1907–1983), a Black autoworker, soon became the editor of *News & Letters*, for which he wrote the column “Worker’s Journal.” Denby’s *Indignant Heart*, an autobiography, had appeared under the name Matthew Ward in 1952 during the period of the Johnson-Forest Tendency. A greatly expanded version, *Indignant Heart: A Black Worker’s Journal*, was published under Denby’s name in 1978 by South End Press.

13. Dunayevskaya’s 1953 “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes.” See note 7.

14. Dunayevskaya typed this footnote (date unclear) onto her copy of Marcuse’s letter: That is the original Ch. 6 of *Capital* which in its first draft was the last chapter, as distinct from “Accumulation of Capital,” which is now the last part of *Capital*, and which I translated unfortunately from the Russian. I had originally intended that that chapter and the “Philosophic Notebooks” of Lenin which I likewise translated be part of the book I would write. Now I conceive of it as much simpler presentation.

15. Marx wrote *Theories of Surplus Value* between January 1862 and July 1863, intending it as an additional volume of *Capital*. It was first published in heavily edited form by the German social democratic theoretician Karl Kautsky in 1905–10. The first full English translation was issued by Moscow-based Progress Publishers in 1969–71.

16. A reference to Dunayevskaya’s 1953 “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes”; see note 7.

17. Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), German idealist with whom Hegel was closely associated until the publication of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). There, Hegel famously attacked Schelling—without naming him—as a philosopher of identity who portrayed reality as a “night in which . . . all cows are black” [PhGM, p. 9; PhGB, p. 79—these refer to the two English translations of the *Phenomenology*, as outlined in the Abbreviations page of the present volume].

18. In the final chapter of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, “The Absolute Idea,” Hegel writes of the Idea as nature [SLM, pp. 843; SLII, p. 485—these refer to the two English translations of the *Science of Logic*, as outlined in the Abbreviations page of the present volume].

19. In November 1914, Lenin wrote of “the proletariat, which has brought forth its slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war” [LCW 21, p. 29], an example of the concept of revolutionary defeatism that he continued to develop over the next few years.

20. This is a reference to *State and Revolution*, completed by Lenin not long before the October 1917 revolution began.

21. Quoted more fully in *Marxism & Freedom*, p. 204.

22. Dunayevskaya’s source for this remark is probably Richard Kroner’s Introduction to Hegel’s *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), which states: “In the system of 1801 Hegel does not describe this transition from logic to

the philosophy of nature in the well-known fashion of the ‘great logic,’ i.e., as an act by which the Absolute Idea ‘resolves to dismiss itself deliberately out of itself.’ Here he designates this intricate transition as a ‘falling-off’” (p. 35).

23. Dunayevskaya is referring to Lenin’s “Abstract of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*” [LCW, 38, p. 180].

24. “Mechanism” and “Chemism” are the titles of two of the chapters in Hegel’s *Science of Logic* preceding the concluding one on the “Absolute Idea.”

25. A reference to Dunayevskaya’s 1953 “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes”; see note 7.

26. *Marxism and Freedom* (1958).

27. Beacon Press.

28. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).

29. An early, unpublished outline of Dunayevskaya’s *Marxism and Freedom* (1958).

30. May I be forgiven the word (Latin).

31. Dunayevskaya’s analysis of the three 5-year state economic plans from 1928, the year Josef Stalin (1879–1953) emerged as the complete victor over all competing tendencies in the Russian Communist Party, to the outbreak of World War II, appears in *Marxism and Freedom*, pp. 215–234. Dunayevskaya had published a longer, earlier version entitled “The Nature of the Russian Economy” under the name F. Forest in *New Internationalist* (Dec. 1946–Jan. 1947), much of which was reprinted in a collection of Dunayevskaya’s writings on state capitalism, *The Marxist-Humanist Theory of State-Capitalism*, edited by Peter Hudis (Chicago: News & Letters, 1992).

32. The newspaper Dunayevskaya founded in 1955 and on which she served as Chairwoman of the Editorial Board until her death in 1987.

33. The co-leader alongside Lenin during the Russian Revolution of 1917, Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) also commanded the Red Army during the Russian Civil War of 1918–1921 and developed the theory of “permanent revolution.” Sidelined after Lenin’s illness and death in 1923–1924, Trotsky formed a leftist opposition to the group around Stalin, but was pushed into exile in 1929, ending up in Mexico. From exile, he issued the *Bulletin of the Opposition*, founded the Fourth International (1938) as a counter to the Moscow-based Third International, and published numerous works, most notably the *History of the Russian Revolution* (1932), *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), and a detailed refutation of the Moscow Trials of 1936–1938. He was assassinated by a Stalinist agent in Mexico in 1940. Dunayevskaya served as Trotsky’s Russian-language secretary in Mexico in 1937–1938, but broke with him over his defense of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. Later, as she theorized Stalinist Russia as a form of state capitalism, Dunayevskaya critiqued Trotsky’s notion that the abolition of private property meant that Stalinist Russia was a worker’s state, though bureaucratically “deformed,” but that this nonetheless represented a “higher” form of social development than capitalism. Dunayevskaya also critiqued what she considered to be the flawed methodology that led Trotsky into such a “fixed particular” based upon a property form rather than the underlying relations of production. This can be seen in the essays from the 1940s collected in *The Marxist-Humanist Theory of State-Capitalism*, in Ch. 4 of *Philosophy and Revolution*, and in “Leon Trotsky as Man and as Theoretician,” with a comment by Ernest Mandel, *Studies in Comparative Communism* 10: 1–2 (Spring/Summer 1977), pp. 166–83.

34. Robert S. Cohen, later the editor of the book series, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science; longtime Professor of Philosophy and Physics at Boston University.

35. Two key essays from Marx’s *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, “Private Property and Communism” and “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic,” were first published in English by Dunayevskaya in *Marxism and Freedom*, pp. 289–325.

36. R&R had been reprinted with a new “Epilogue” where Marcuse took a more pessimistic tone with regard to the realization of reason and freedom in the Hegelian or Marxian manner (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1954), pp. 433–39.

37. Dunayevskaya was to take up the 1947 claim by Andrei Zhdanov, then Stalin’s chief ideologist, to have discovered a “new dialectical law: Criticism and Self-Criticism” to replace “the objective dialectical law of development through contradiction” [*M&F*, p. 40].



38. This notice appeared in *News & Letters* 1:6 (September 7, 1955), calling attention to Marcuse's article, "The Social Implications of Freudian 'revisionism,'" *Dissent* 2:3 (Summer 1955), pp. 221–240. Also published as the Epilogue to *Eros and Civilization* that year, Marcuse's article made a sharp attack on Erich Fromm. An acrimonious debate between Marcuse and Fromm then took place in the next two issues of *Dissent* (Fall 1955 and Winter 1956).

39. See note 3.

40. See note 7.

41. Probably Carl Landauer (1891–1985), Professor of Economics at Berkeley and the author of studies in comparative economic systems.

42. University of Southern California.

43. *Eros and Civilization* (1955).



## *Chapter Two*

# **Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom and Beyond***

January 26, 1956

Dear R.D.

This is just an interim note to tell you that I have forwarded your outline<sup>1</sup> to the editor of my publisher's. The press is at present in a state of transition: they are going to get a new director, and until the appointment has been made, no new commitments will be undertaken. However, I did not want to cause any delay, so I forwarded the outline.

As soon as it is returned to me, I shall again go through it and send you my comments. You know how vitally I am interested in your problem, and I hope I have something to say that may be of value to you.

Don't be too optimistic as far as the publishing prospects are concerned: you know the general reluctance, and I do not yet know how the new director will react to my recommendations.

You will hear from me as soon as I have word from them.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

Herbert Marcuse

\* \* \*

March 10, 1956

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Some one ought to invent a day that is twice as long and a night that is half as short. As it is, I am quite dissatisfied with the world and its time habits (including my own). Now that I have registered my protest, here is what I was able to accomplish within the confines of night and day division!

I have returned to the beginning and I enclose herewith the first two chapters of Part I.<sup>2</sup>

New aspects constantly evolve and I now feel the need for some “character sketches”; Proudhon and Lassalle<sup>3</sup> are included; Stalin I will do later. For the time being I am including the first two under some heading as a Theoretic Interlude which would precede the analysis of *Capital* itself.

What I will do next I do not know—perhaps rest a few days. In any case, the enclosed plus the two sections you already have on The Great Divide in Marxism and State Capitalism should give you a pretty good idea of the book as a whole. Since you are kind enough to want it in draft form, you might also be good enough to let me know your views. There is no doubt in my mind that sometime between the draft and the final writing we will need to spend more than two hours together. Do you suppose that in early summer you would have a whole weekend to spare?

Yours,

\* \* \*

April 18, 1956

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

No doubt I should by now be used to your long silences. But I have good reason to be anxious since this is the month you told me that Beacon Press would have its new director and be in a position to consider publishing my book. Please do let me know how matters stand.

I enclose the drafts of two other chapters. Again they are not consecutive although they consecutively follow what you have, one as part of Part III on Marx’s *Capital*, and the other, “Toward A New Unity of Theory and Practice” as a sort of conclusion to the book. As soon as I receive word of encouragement from you I’ll brave the one on Hegel.

You did not reply to my query about summer. I would like to spend a day or two with you (say middle of June or July) before I settle down to the final rewriting. If I can complete it all this summer then perhaps I could have a late fall publisher.

Warmest regards,

In case you wish to check the quotations from *Capital*, I happen to be [using the] Dona Torr (I.P.) edition because that separates the parts Marx added to the French edition into a separate section where it is easy to follow. There are 40 pages difference between this and the Kerr edition.<sup>4</sup>

\* \* \*

May 1, 1956

Dear R.D.

I have no excuse for my silence—except that the thing is still out of my hands. It has been with Beacon Press for quite some time; the first general reaction was favorable i.e. they are definitely interested in publishing “such a book.” As you undoubtedly know: this means that they send it to their readers. Since I do not know the new director, I cannot exert any influence, nor even expedite the process. In a couple of days I shall inquire again. I myself like your approach and the development of the theory *very much* and am anxious to see the whole book, but I just could not sit down and send you my comments: this is a full time job for me and I don't see how I can manage.

As for the summer: I am leaving for Europe (lectures) end of June but hope to get to New York at least for a couple of days end of May. What are your plans?

Mail reaches me better at Brandeis University. With best wishes and regards,

Yours,

Herbert Marcuse

\* \* \*

May 3, 1956

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Thank you very much for your kind letter. You have no idea how your encouraging words help me proceed with my work. As you no doubt know, my entry into the “intellectual world” was thru very unorthodox ways and you are the first not to make me feel like a fish out of water. I will now even settle down to write the chapter on Hegel and have it with me by the time you get to New York the end of May.

I’m hurrying this note because I do not want you to “escape” to Europe before I have had a few hours undisturbed conference on the book. Therefore please write me immediately the exact days you will be in New York and where I can reach you and I will be there with Russian bells or maybe the Old Man Hegel will accept me and let me enter accompanied by the more melodic German music.

If the worst comes to the worst and Beacon Press refuses, please bring with you the original outline and I will begin a new campaign either with Oxford University Press or Praeger. Norman Mailer<sup>5</sup> suggested the Grove press; do you know anything of that. If this book doesn’t get out of my system by the end of this summer and unto the press I’m liable to burst from all these *decades* of pregnancy. How long will you remain overseas? It has hurt me to see what they have done to poor Marx’s grave instead of that simple stone that marked his grave to which I did not feel out of place to bring a single red rose in 1947. I could go with you over every hill in Hempstead Heath too and show you just where he played with his children every Sunday and when they recited Shakespeare to each other. Oh, you don’t think I was there!

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

September 6, 1956

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Your *Eros and Civilization* has broken down my adamant refusal lasting two decades “to have a position on sex.” Because your work is of such an original character it of necessity invalidated the self-defensive gesture of an old politico who feels it necessary not to get embroiled in every question “intellectuals” feel called upon to thrust into a political argument to deflect from the main point.

In the use of the word, original, to describe the character of your book I do not mean to limit it to the contribution of your own philosophic thought (though it is natural that my favorite chapter is the "Philosophical Interlude"). I mean that in the reinterpretation of Freud you rescued him not only from the epigones but from himself, so that anyone can see where he is genius and original and where lie the elements which gave rise to quackery. Although in no fundamental sense is Freud responsible for that, the ambivalence of his theory has of necessity obscured the great critical contribution. You know, I am sure, that there are radicals who consider a reinterpretation of an original doctrine as if it were mere repetition, a carbon copy of the original. I knew one radical who held that Lenin's *State and Revolution* was a "rewrite" of Marx's Paris Commune (*Civil War in France*)! Your original contribution lies in your extraction of "Eros" from being in a field by itself and placing it within the historical context of Western civilization without in any way deflecting from the specific field. Quite the contrary. You thereby illuminated the field of psychoanalysis. That is what I meant by the statement that you separated what was genius and original from that which became transformed into revisionism, if not outright quackery. Fromm's answer to you is a good example of the meaning here. Here is a man who dares speak in highly moral tones about "the callousness towards moral qualities in political figures, which was so apparent in Lenin's attitude" while his own moral standards do not stop the man from dragging in Nazism in the hope that its stench will keep readers away from Freud and you.<sup>6</sup>

Belatedly I congratulate you and will see what I can do to get the book in the hands of friends, workers as well as intellectuals; I may try to quote some "easy" parts on alienation in *News and Letters*,<sup>7</sup> which will reappear soon.

How was your European trip and are you back? I had only one month off for concentrated work but I worked like a Trojan (Did they work 7:30 a.m. to midnight daily?) and finished the draft of the book. I enclose the three chapters you have not yet seen and the new contents page. You will note that I also changed the Appendix, substituting for the section on Crises from the *Theories of Surplus Value*<sup>8</sup> 2 of the early Essays, Private Property and Communism, and Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic.<sup>9</sup> In a month I will get down to the final revision or writing of text. I have no publisher's signature on the dotted line, yet, but I do have a promise from Praeger that if no publisher will dare undertake this he will "though unwilling as it is a complex and worrisome book and will bring a lot of criticism down my head." If Praeger does publish, the publication would be simultaneously American and English; I understand he also has a publishing house in Frankfurt but he said nothing of any German translation. Instead he asked me to keep submitting the outline to other publishers. I wondered whether you knew anyone at Harvard University Press (Russian Research Center) to whom I might submit it.

When do you think you will be ready to write your introduction? Would you require the completely retyped MSS before you do? Do let me hear from you. Since I'm not sure you are back, I'll register this.

Yours,

Raya Dunayevskaya

\* \* \*

September 21, 1956

Dear R.D.

I found your letter and manuscript after my return from Europe later than I expected and therefore again too late for a stay and meeting in NY. I did not know that Beacon had rejected the book and I do hope that Praeger sticks to his promise.

Of the three sections you sent me, I liked most the last chapter of Part I<sup>10</sup>—splendid! The chapter on the Second International<sup>11</sup> is too sketchy and does not justice to the historical problem. You accept—as far as I can see, in *toto*—Lenin's theory of the corrupted labor aristocracy—a theory which, in my view, is utterly inadequate. Whereas you handle the dialectic so consistently and refuse so valiantly to treat Marxian concepts as dogmas, you do not take this position with regard to the notion (and to the reality) of the proletariat. In the development of late industrial society in the advanced countries, this class *qua class* has changed its position, structure, consciousness, etc. The full force of a Marxian economic and political analysis has to be applied in the examination of this process—the aristocracy business wouldn't do!

As to the last part<sup>12</sup>: I disagree with your assumption of a complete break between Leninism and Stalinism. I have recently reread Lenin's writings and speeches of 1921-22 and was amazed at the degree of continuity and consistency in basic questions and policies—even formulations! But all these things have to be discussed orally. I expect to be in NY after Christmas, for the meeting of the Philosophical Association—should I get to NY prior to this date, I shall let you know immediately when I know. My study of "Soviet Marxism," in which I try to discuss some of the problems indicated above, is before completion and will be published by Columbia University Press early in 1957. I shall send you the typescript for your comments and your critique before it goes to the printer's.

Thanks, and with very best wishes,



Yours,

H.M.

\* \* \*

October 23, 1956

Dear R.D.

Thanks for your letter and chapter. Again you did an admirable job—perhaps a little too admirable. It is so condensed that it is hard for me, who has read volumes 2 and 3<sup>13</sup>—wouldn't it be still harder for many others? Much of what Marx tried to demonstrate appears in your chapter only as thesis or statement. But don't do anything now—first let the publisher have his word.

As to our meeting here . . . Friday Nov. 15th is better: I shall be through at 1. Sorry, but life is not all rosy even for an intellectual!

I still hope that we get together.

With best wishes,

As ever,

H.M.

\* \* \*

Nov. 6, 1956

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

To allow me to complete the entire manuscript and give you a few days to read it as a totality I have decided to change date of arrival by a week, using the fact that Friday is a better day for you as the date of my arrival. *Please* try also to be free Saturday as I simply *must* arrive at some concrete conclusions by then or there will be no point to the trip to the publisher in New York afterward.

I will arrive in Boston, *Friday, November 23rd* and stay there *through* Saturday November 24th so that I hope I can see you both days. I can meet you anywhere you say or you will be able to meet me at my hotel, which ever is more convenient. I will send in for reservations the minute I hear that this

meets your approval and we can meet without watching the minute handle on the clock. I'm sorry to be so presumptuous and insistent but without a few solid hours of work together the project could fall through. It is not that I am not sympathetic to the woes of intellectuals and know how hard they labor and that their time too is not their own, (Think how Marx even looked at some of the meetings of the International as time away from *Capital*) but I'm sure you also see that *Marxism and Freedom* gets published and will help me do that. So, holding my breath until I hear from you,

I am, gratefully,

Raya

P.S. What has happened to your typescript?<sup>14</sup> I am looking forward to reading your book before it reaches the public. I will create time for a careful criticism. One day I will succeed in creating a day longer than 24 hours minus 6.

\* \* \*

Nov. 27, 1956

Dear John<sup>15</sup> :

It is 9 p.m. and this is the first I get to write to you since Marcuse left just this minute. We talked for hours on my book. He was so anxious to reemphasize that he will do everything possible to get it published and to write the introduction that he would not even begin criticizing it, until he made the positive feature of wanting to see it published clear all over again. The introduction will not be written until I actually do have a contract, but it will be done promptly then. It will stress the contribution I make and the dialectical approach—until I reach the “notion” of the proletariat. It will then make 3 criticisms: 1) first that I romanticize the workers instead of seeing that “it” too changed along with capitalism, that is to say, is satisfied instead of revolutionary, 2) it will take some exception to state capitalism as a designation of Russia stemming from Marx's foresight,<sup>16</sup> and 3) question my optimistic perspectives. I told him he could criticize it to his heart's content, I certainly don't want agreement, but he kept saying “You are so excellent in handling the dialectic except when you deal with the proletariat” and “Why do you so berate the intellectual? I do not see the relationship of theory to practice that you do; I think theory should be the guide, what you call the prescription instead of you just waiting on the proletariat.” These professors—but he is really remarkable for a professor. We had a magnificent

seafood dinner, cocktails and all and I fear he was set back some \$10 or more. Still I have another appointment scheduled with him tomorrow. He promised to go over paragraph for paragraph my translation<sup>17</sup> since I did it from the Russian rather than German and let me know how I stand scholastically on that.

Now on the publisher—he agrees it is worth waiting to see if London<sup>18</sup> will accept it, even if it means a couple of months delay, and that I should stall P<sup>19</sup> meanwhile. O, yes, he also proposed that I go to Germany in his stead to be present at some conference on Marxism this winter. I said I would love to but doubt that I would be quite as acceptable. He already began discussing my *next* book with me, as he feels he will not write again after the publication of his next, and I should carry on, although he disagrees with me. He also told me one interesting point for Saul<sup>20</sup> (I'll send him a copy of this) since he met Rieff<sup>21</sup> and told him, O, I'm in a hurry to make an appointment with RD, whereupon Rieff said, O, yes, her lit. agt. sent me a letter asking us to reconsider and told us she would be in town. Period. Paragraph. End of conversation. Or, as M [Marcuse] put it "No implications in this at all."

His favorite chapter remains "A New Humanism," to which he also added that although he disagrees with my Automation chapter,<sup>22</sup> my interpretation of the Absolute Idea in that form rather than in the letters is "clearest." He kept saying "What would Father Marx say if he lived now" and his eyes lit up as to the paragraph where Marx stopped in the *Philosophy of Mind* and where my analysis began.<sup>23</sup> If only he could be around some workers—Am now ready to storm NY.

Love,

Rae

\* \* \*

Nov. 28, 1956

Dear John:

Today I was down at Brandeis University where Marcuse arranged a luncheon to which he invited E. H. Carr. Professor Carr is about the only non-Marxist Englishman (I was very surprised to find him in America and just as surprised that one of the reasons was the fact that the Russian material in this country covering the period of the 1920s is superior to that in England) who has specialized in non-factional, objective history of the period of the Russian Revolution and throughout the 1920s. We have his "The Bolshevik Revolution," both the 1917 and 1923 volumes, and you should glance at

them to get a concept of the distinguished scholar. He was acquainted with “the value controversy,” which shows you how far that little article in *AER* carried me all these years,<sup>24</sup> and was as surprised to find me there as I him. I don’t know exactly Marcuse’s point, but I liked the results very much indeed. Carr was not only interested in reading my MSS but I gave Marcuse “permission” to turn the book and address over to him, he said he would write his comments to me. This is a find.

These professors who spend all their lives in books do make me laugh. When they cannot “break a category,” to use a Hegelian phrase, they just lapse into the most vulgar political explanation of an event. For example, they see none of what we see in the 1920-1 trade union debate<sup>25</sup> —Carr practically said that Lenin’s position was merely that of middleman between Trotsky and Shlyapnikov, that is mediating to bring peace between warring factions! When I opened my mouth with “You intellectuals . . .” Marcuse interrupted to say “You need not say it—I know what you will call me. But you are a bloody intellectual yourself and you have 12 hours a day to write—or how could you have produced so much in so little time; I would have been dead attempting it—while we with classes, administrative work,” etc. etc.

Incidentally 2 tables in that faculty room were filled with ex-Trotskyists led by Howe,<sup>26</sup> whom I disdainfully disregarded; one, however, a woman whose name slips my mind but she led the attack on Reva Craine back in 1944<sup>27</sup> and we were anything but friends—came up to greet “Freddie”<sup>28</sup> very warmly. I took it as a good sign, although I did no more than smile and turned back to my own guests. No doubt the university will be buzzing for the following week from this visit of mine and all the “theories” on the reason would make a funny drama indeed.

Carr said Macmillan is a “slow” house, but most distinguished if they actually took the MSS which evidently he doubted; he said the atmosphere as to Marxist works was a “little better” than here, but not too much. They will all be waiting for my letter on the meeting with the publishers almost as much as you will.

Tomorrow morning I am off for NY, but will see no one till Fri.

Love,

Rae

\* \* \*

November 30, 1956

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

The good news is that Ian MacKenzie of St. Martin's Press<sup>29</sup> remains interested in both the English and American publication of the work, *Marxism and Freedom*. Furthermore, when he heard that E. H. Carr was in this country, he was willing to write to Macmillan's of London and suggest that Professor Carr be the reader for the book instead of needing first to mail the whole book there and get a reader, etc. etc., (all that which Professor Carr no doubt had in mind when he said Macmillan's was "slow"). In that case they would be ready to give me an answer before the end of December. Would you please undertake to speak to Mr. Carr and see whether we can thus speed up the work? Yesterday, before I had spoken to Mr. Mackenzie I had sent Mr. Carr the Philosophic Notebooks<sup>30</sup> for him to insert in the copy of the book you would give him to read so that the text and appendices would be complete, except for my preface and your introduction, and, of course, the index and bibliography.

St. Martin's Press retained the copy of my book that they have so that Mr. MacKenzie could read it and also for any other purpose, should Macmillan insist on reading the entire text before committing itself. I doubt that, however, because surely Professor Carr's name is good enough, and MacKenzie felt that if he sends them the outline and other material and then gets the approval that he would forward his copy to Carr. I did not tell him that Carr would in any case have a copy since that arrangement between us three was made as interested friends, not in any other sense, and I did not feel free to speak for Mr. Carr. Incidentally, St. Martin's Press is located at 103 Park Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

At the same time there has been another good development—Beacon's has written to Mr. Blackman<sup>31</sup> saying they would be interested in reading the text after all. Since even them I would prefer to Praeger, do you suppose your copy would hold for them too? Would it be possible, for example, for Mr. Carr to read it between now and December 6th and have this then turned over to Beacon? As I said before, if Macmillan approves MacKenzie's plan, then Mr. Carr will get the St. Martin's Press copy. Please write to me to Detroit where I will be Tuesday re both Carr and Beacon.

Praeger will not see me before Tuesday morning—I do not expect much from him. Saw Buttinger<sup>32</sup> who will do all he can to help (he is leaving for Europe tomorrow) but also preferred Macmillan. In fact, everybody does; the point is will Macmillan?

It was a pleasure to spend the two days in Boston in your company—disagreements never disturb me when the mind is actively functioning.

\* \* \*

December 10, 1956

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Upon my return to Detroit last week, I found that, while my outline of *Capital*,<sup>33</sup> was sent you to the university, the brief abstract I made of the Questions of Philosophy Article<sup>34</sup> was not sent you as it was not found. I herewith enclose it. Should you wish it translated in full, I'll be glad to do so.

I do not know whether you did or did not turn over your copy of *Marxism and Freedom* to Mr. Rieff of Beacon Press. Please answer this point for I know not how to write them otherwise.

The only point of the NY trip that I have not yet reported to you is the meeting with Praeger. He was a wee bit more polite now that I had the manuscript complete in my hands. I informed him that you would not write the introduction until the contract is actually signed. He said he would first have to read the work and it would take him 3 weeks. It was clear enough what bothered him was the criticisms I made of the American system for while I was in his office he turned quickly to the last chapter on Automation. I laughed: "If you must read the climax of this novel and see how it all comes out first, why turn to page 365." He then closed the book and said well, nothing is definite yet, and I was still free to submit it to other publishers. I said it was precisely what I was doing and he would not get his copy for a couple of weeks since I wished to proofread and edit the copy. I took the publisher's copy back with me rather than leaving it with him. As I told you in my previous note, if the one with St. Martin's Press in NY and Macmillan in London falls through, then I would prefer Beacon to Praeger.

Will you also be kind enough to tell me whether Mr. Carr has read the manuscript and what were his reactions to the idea of his reading it for Macmillan? Has he heard from them directly? I doubt it since there would have been insufficient time between my meeting with MacKenzie<sup>35</sup> and his writing to London. Understandably, no one is in quite the hurry I am in trying to get the book published, but I do have more hope now than ever before.

As ever,

Raya

\* \* \*

December 12, 1956<sup>36</sup>

Just got it back from Carr. I'll give it to Rieff<sup>37</sup> tomorrow.

Yes! [Carr has read the manuscript].

I don't know about Macmillan.

Sorry, I am in a terrible rush! Shall do what I can to impress Beacon, but must wait for their reading the ms. Carr's reaction was quite favorable. Good luck to you.

As ever,

HM

\* \* \*

April 29, 1957

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

I am glad you insisted that I see Humanities Press although I had already signed with Bookman Associates. They were so interested in *Marxism and Freedom* that they volunteered to do all sorts of work for it, although they were not its publisher. (Mr. Silverman was out of town; I spoke to Richard Huett instead.)<sup>38</sup> For one thing, I had reserved exclusive foreign rights and hence have authority to look for other publishers in other lands, and Humanities promptly offered to see whether they couldn't get Routledge, Kegan and Paul to publish it in Britain; the MS will go forward there this week. For another, the catalogue that they send out to their readers will definitely list my book—I believe their circulation is 20,000—and listings are not to be sneezed at in promotional work. A friend of mine is going to Germany and will try to get me a publisher in Hamburg and I have had inquiries both from Italy and France as to translations and publication there. I knew that I could have gotten a bigger publisher in England but I refused to capitulate on the question of *needing* to go first to England steal back to the US by the back-door. Bookman Associates are interested and will see that the book does get a good promotional. Naturally they are pleased you will preface the book. We will strike a blow at *both* poles of world capital—US and Russia—that they will not soon forget.

Gratefully yours,

\* \* \*

June 5, 1957

Dear H.M.

Finally I have completed the editing and the book was this day sent to the printer. I believe I'll now be in favor of a new law forbidding authors to do their own editing—I can't look at anything I write without wanting to re-write, and then begins the footnoting. Although I had made up my mind to have very few because of the working class audience I aim at they now number nearly 300. Just the letters alone for permission to quote has taken nearly a week. The Bibliography, although quite selective, is another 4 pages. The text now is 400 pages; appendices another 95. With your preface it will be over 500 so I suppose the hard-headed businessmen who run the publishing firms were right when they refused to commit themselves to a price until they actually had the manuscript ready for printer in hand.

I wrote Bookman that your Preface will be sent in all typed and ready for printer (I assume you will send it to me in whatever condition you please—I am expert in reading my handwriting, so I can read anyone's—and I will make copies before I send to him) in a couple of weeks, but that he should not delay going to press since your Preface will be numbered differently—I intend to suggest Roman numerals for it to distinguish it from my introduction and text. The reason I did so is that he had told me from the start that if I want October publishing date it must be at printer in June.

Yours,

Raya

I just heard from Humanities Press that the first reaction of Routledge, Kegan and Paul was quite favorable. "It certainly looks like a possible" they wrote of *Marxism and Freedom* before turning it over to readers. Having had the experience with Macmillan, who had practically signed the contract before they turned and ran, I will not believe Routledge's reaction until that contract is signed.

\* \* \*

June 7, 1957

Dear R.D.

Would you do me a favor? In writing the Preface, I want to recapitulate the gist of your book as adequately as possible in such a small space. Could you send me a brief statement on what *you* consider to be the main thesis (or



theses) and the basic trend of thought in your book? This would greatly expedite matters. Sorry to bother you with additional work at this important juncture.

Greetings,

HM

\* \* \*

June 11, 1957

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

It was good to hear from you. I'm sure that you are well acquainted with the fact that it is much easier to write 100, if not 500, pages than it is to summarize the gist of a book on which one has worked for some 15 years, in a page or two. But I will try.

1. *The* central point, the pivot around which everything else in *Marxism and Freedom* revolves, is of course, the philosophic foundation of Marxism. As I put it in my introductory note, "The aim of this book is to re-establish the original form of Marxism which Marx called 'thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism.'"<sup>39</sup>

This runs like a red thread throughout the book. Thus Part I begins with the French Revolution and Hegel and ends with Marx's Early Economic-Philosophic Essays: A New Humanism. It constitutes his answer to classical political economy as well as to the utopian socialists and vulgar Communists of his day and establishes a new world outlook, Marxian philosophy, which is distinguished from the Hegelian dialectic and closely knit with it. What is established as the thesis of the young Marx then reappears in Part III, Marxism: the Unity of Theory and Practice, where, in *The Dialectical Humanism of [Capital] Volume I*, I show that not only are Marx's economic categories social categories but they are thoroughly permeated with the humanism that came out of the working-class struggles for the shortening of the working day. As Marx put it, the mere question, when does my day begin and when does it end, was on a higher philosophic level than "the pompous catalogue of the Declaration of the Rights of Man."<sup>40</sup> What is true of Volume I of *Capital* is true of the *Logic and Scope of Volumes II and III*, including *Theories of Surplus Value*, where I show that all of history to Marx was the struggle for freedom, which, as its basis, is the shortening of the working day, and only from there do we go from the realm of necessity to that of freedom.

Lenin learned the critical importance of the philosophic foundations the hard way—when the Second International actually collapsed and, to reconstitute his own reason, had to return to Hegel’s Science of Logic. The chapter, *A Mind in Action*, then traces what the philosophic foundations meant to Lenin and the Russian Revolution and ends with the thought that just as Marxism without its philosophic foundation is meaningless, so is Leninism. Neither is an “economist.” Finally when we come to our own age, which I call Automation and the New Humanism, I show the *methodology* of Marxism and the compulsion of our own age for a total outlook.

II. Subordinate to this main theme of the book, and running parallel with it, is the division between the radical intellectual like Proudhon<sup>41</sup> and the Marxist intellectual. I contend that Marxism is not only the theoretical expression of the working-class striving to establish a new society on socialist beginnings, but it is that which gave intellectuals a new dimension. That new dimension arose precisely because he did not divide theory from history, including the current class struggles. The relationship of theory to history is seen as a live element that changes the very structure of Marx’s greatest theoretical work. In 1863 and 1866 when he fundamentally revised that structure and 1872-75 when he wrote the French edition of *Capital*—the period from the Civil War in the United States through the Paris Commune—is proof of this relationship of theory to history and at the same time shows that what the young Marx established in the Early Essays [of 1844] when he held that never again must society be counter-posed to the individual<sup>42</sup> and which in 1848 he emblazoned on his *Communist Manifesto* as the thesis that the development of the individual is the condition for the development of all<sup>43</sup> reappears in his “most economic” work which is preferred by the academic economists—Volume III of *Capital*.<sup>44</sup>

Again, when I move from Marx’s time to that of Lenin’s time I show that the contribution of the Second International—Organization—was taken over by Lenin in his concept of the so-called Vanguard Theory in 1902–03, but as the actual Russian Revolutions occurred, he threw it overboard—or at least radically revised his theory no less than 6 times so that in 1917 he says the workers on the outside are more revolutionary than the vanguard party [M&F, p. 190] and by 1923 says that unless the party work is checked by the *non-party* masses the bureaucracy will yet bring the workers state down and they will retrogress to capitalism [M&F, p. 40]. In any case, our problem is certainly not will there be a revolution: but *what will happen after*: are we always to be confronted with a Napoleon or a Stalin? In a word, without relating the spontaneous self-organization of the proletariat and its quest for universality<sup>45</sup> in the manner in which Marx did it for his time, we can expect nothing but totalitarianist results.

III. In my introductory note I state that the 3 main strands of thought in the book are: 1) Classical Political Economy, Hegelian Philosophy, and the French Revolutionary doctrines in relationship to the actual social and economic conditions of its time, the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution and up to the first capitalist crisis. 2) Marxism in relationship to the class struggles of his day, the period of his maturity, 1843–1883, as well as Marxism in the period from 1889–1923; and 3) The *methodology* of Marxism to our era which I call the period of state capitalism and workers revolt,<sup>46</sup> the analysis of the Five Year Plans of Russia<sup>47</sup> and the revolts in East Germany, and Vorkuta<sup>48</sup> following Stalin's death; finally the analysis of Automation<sup>49</sup> but this is a comparatively free and easy essay. I think this too in a way can be summed up in the introductory note where I explain the method in which this book is written—that research began in 1939 when I broke with Trotsky over the “Russian Question”<sup>50</sup> but that it did not assume the form of *Marxism and Freedom* until 1950–53 when the miner's strike on automation<sup>51</sup> and the revolts in Eastern Europe<sup>52</sup> from their separate vantage points led me to present all my ideas to groups of workers who checked and discussed the material. “No theoretician, today more than ever before, can write out of his own head. Theory requires constant shaping and reshaping of ideas on the basis of what the workers themselves are doing and thinking” [M&F, p. 23]. I return to Hegel (page 73 ftn in the *Science of Logic*) where he shows that those who took Kant's *results* without the process did so as a “pillow for intellectual sloth” [SLM, p. 62; SL1, p. 73] and that if the intellectual sloth which has accumulated in the Marxist movement concerned only Marxists then we wouldn't be confronting the H-bomb threat without ideological backwardness showing. The need is for a new unity of theory and practice which must begin with the new impulses coming from the working-class, that this, far from being intellectual abdication, would mark the actual fructification of theory. Once the theoretician gets that, his work does not end, but first *begins*.

In a word, I have no prescriptions of rhetorical conclusions. I show a method at work and appeal to the intellectuals to use that dialectic method as a basis to view the contemporary scene, to get out from under domination of either the Russian totalitarian or the American “democratic” bomb threats in their thinking. The workers by themselves can do a lot but they too have not achieved a new social order, but if the movement from practice to theory met the movement from theory to practice, then a *serious* start could be made.

There are naturally other points in the work—from the American roots of Marxism to the Communist perversions both of Marx's Early Works and *Capital*—since it tries to deal with our machine age since the Industrial Revolution to Automation, but I do not believe anything germane to the book is lost once one grasps the central point, the philosophic foundation.

I know the effect that your *Reason and Revolution* had in 1941. They could neither treat Hegel as an “old dog” nor Marx’s Early Writings as mere humanitarian adjuncts to “the great scientific economic theories.” But then it was a philosopher speaking and not “a solid economist” like me. When the two were combined, glory, hallelujah—there was havoc. But the academicians need not think themselves any smarter—they all fell into the “Popular Front”;<sup>53</sup> it is not possible to fight Russian totalitarianism or any other kind without some solid theoretic foundation and social vision.

I naturally cannot say whether I succeeded in doing what I aimed at but *if* intentions were indeed achievement then I could say that what was *new* in *Marxism and Freedom* was 1) the re-establishment of the philosophic foundation of Marxism in Hegel in so concrete a way that the origins of our machine age as well as the latest period of automation came alive; 2) the summation of all three volumes of Marx’s *Capital* in a manner that the reader knows Marxism both as theory and as methodology; and 3) the new dimension Marxism endows the intellectual with became so real to him that he could indeed discern the movement from practice to theory and as eagerly long for the unity of the two as does the worker.

I hope this in some way answers what you wanted me to do in recapitulating the gist of the work. I also enclose the introductory note to the bibliography so that you can see all my problems there.

Looking forward to your Preface *very* eagerly,

\* \* \*

June 27, 1957

Dear H.M.

I’m certainly glad I live other than an academic life—think of a factory worker forgetting the time clock. It certainly was a discipline for me—now I’ll have to be as ingenious in keeping that publisher-wolf from my door with demands for your Preface. He has 400 pages of type to set so I don’t know what he is complaining about, and I will insist your professorial word is as good as mine and that the brochure on the book with you listed as writer of preface go out on schedule in July, even if there should be an overlapping of the week it goes out and you send yours in.

I expanded the contents pages to include sub-heads so as to help make the index brief and also because I believe it gives a view of the scope of the book before you delve into it. In any case I include it for you to glance at.

Did I tell you that Professor Carr, when he read the MSS, was gracious enough to write me that it is a contribution to contemporary thought and that especially my work on *The Great Divide in Marxism*—not its political aspects which he knew, but the philosophic impact of Hegel on Lenin—would compel a reorganization of many previously cherished views, evidently including his own? I wrote the publishers of Hegel—Allen & Unwin—that I believe my work will open a new audience for the works of Hegel and that I certainly would, in turn, like to be in “that publisher’s stable”. Don’t know that that will help—but I did receive an inquire about *Marxism and Freedom* from Japan!

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

July 22, 1957

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Your Preface certainly points up some fundamental questions in dispute as well as in illumination. I wouldn’t think of discarding it. By pointing directly at what I have called the forever-beating heart of Marxism—the workers who in their everyday life and struggles have given it a new life and dimension—you will certainly have stirred a polemic that should be going at full blast as soon as the book is published. Sharp disagreements have never disturbed me; monolithis[m] has.

One thing, however, did surprise me in your Preface and that is that your last sentence focuses on the writer of the preface rather than the book. In your place I would have continued with one more sentence along some such line as this: Whether you agree or disagree with Dunayevskaya, her book creates a solid serious foundation on a vast scope for the re-examination of Marxism from its roots in Hegelian philosophy until its post-Marxist development of our own day.

It may appear to you that you have said something similar in its proper context but as a reader who will next turn to some 400 pages of RD I felt the need of such a link between preface and body of work. *Please let me know at once* whether you agree to such an addition, and how you would phrase it so I can hurry it on to the publisher in whatever you state you approve it. The decision is yours.<sup>54</sup>

The enclosed brochure has been sent out to 5000 asking advance orders of the book. I hope the fires of dispute have been stirred up and we will not again just lapse into intellectual sloth. Many, many thanks for your contribution and encouragement.

\* \* \*

October 9, 1957

Dear R.D.

To tell you the truth, I am getting a little uneasy about the publicity with the “American roots of Marxism” and the statement that Marx “completely re-created the structure” of *Capital* under the impact of the American civil war. I do not remember whether your book actually justifies these formulations—when I read it, I did not have this impression; but then my memory may be at fault. The little and very unsystematic checking I did recently has not been very successful: I did not find any evidence which would corroborate such statement. My friends bombard me with questions, and I myself am naturally rather sensitive about the Americanization of Marx!

You would do me a great favor if you would sum up very briefly your evidence or just jot down the main references—either in Marx’ correspondence or elsewhere.

Sorry to bother you—but since you are through with the page proofs and with the index, this may not be too much of an imposition. If it is, please forget about it.

With best wishes,

HM

\* \* \*

October 11, 1957

Dear H.M.

Thank you very much for your letter of the 9th which gives me the opportunity to trace briefly the American roots of Marxism. Heretofore I have concentrated on the warp and woof of the book—the philosophy, dialectics, Humanism of Marxism. As publication date approaches, it is time to indicate the complementary thesis. I use the structure of *Capital* to illustrate this. The changes in the structure of this work meant nothing to the Second Interna-

tional, reformist and revolutionary wings alike. Until Rosa Luxemburg, in 1913,<sup>55</sup> began to question what Engels “had made out” of the material left him by Marx, all Marxists treated the changes in the structure as a “literary question.” The Communists continued this tradition (cf. Leontiev in *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopaedia*<sup>56</sup>). The battle of quotations with which Rosa Luxemburg was attacked, both by the Second and Third Internationals, never went into the structure of *Capital* until Henryk Grossman, in 1929.<sup>57</sup> His was the first serious analysis of the changes in the structure. However, his interest was primarily economic; it was directed against Luxemburg’s underconsumptionism<sup>58</sup> and the reestablishment of the decline in the rate of profit as central to the theory of accumulation in its Marxist form.

Now let us look at these changes in structure during the late 1850s when he worked on the *Grundrisse* and *Critique*<sup>59</sup> and in the 1860s when *Capital* took final shape:

1) As you know, both in his letter to Engels (4/2/58) [MECW 40, p. 296] and in the Preface to *Critique*, he shows that the first draft of *Capital* was to have 6 volumes, thus: I. Capital; II. Landed Property; III. Wage labor; IV. State; V. International Trade; VI, World Market.

As he shows in Introduction to the *Critique* which he did not allow to be published, even here the United States played its role as the illumination for the category of labor: “This state of affairs has found its highest development in the most modern of bourgeois societies, the United States. It is only here that the abstraction of the category ‘labor,’ ‘labor in general,’ labor *sans phrase*, the starting point of modern political economy, becomes realized in practice.”<sup>60</sup>

2) My Chapter V, The Impact of the Civil War on the Structure of *Capital* shows that the decade of the 1860’s was decisive for the structure of *Capital*. It was the period of the Civil War in the United States, the great mobilizations of English workers on the side of the North, the Polish insurrection, the unrest in France, and the creation of the First International. Marx himself best describes the newness of this decade when on January 11, 1860 he writes to Engels: “In my opinion, the biggest things that are happening in the world today are on the one hand the movement of the slaves in America started by the death of John Brown and, on the other, the movement of the serfs in Russia” [MECW 41, p. 3]. Two years later (7/30/62) he argues with Lassalle as to the contribution of the “Yankees” [MECW 41, p. 388]. This is climaxed by his letter to Engels on August 15, 1863 where he directly involves the structure of *Capital*: “when I look at this compilation and see how I have had to turn everything around and how I had to make even the *historical* part out of material of which some was quite unknown, then he (Lassalle) does seem funny with ‘his’ economy already in his pocket” [MECW 41, P. 488].

I show what “turning everything around” was by contrasting the structure of *Critique* with *Capital*. I base myself on the letters and the listing of the materials by Engels in the Preface to *Capital*. There is also in the Archives II (VII),<sup>61</sup> besides the first ending of *Capital*, the outline of his changes; Leontiev on *Capital* also lists Notebooks and changes.<sup>62</sup> Also not to be left out is Marx’s reporting of the Civil War for the Vienna Press<sup>63</sup> where he reproduces the speeches of the Abolitionists, especially Wendell Phillips, upon whom he comments “In the present state of affairs Wendell Phillips’ speech is of greater importance than a battle bulletin.”<sup>64</sup> (This, along with his letter to Abraham Lincoln, and other letters are reproduced in his *Civil War in the United States*, Int. Pub.)<sup>65</sup> As you know, in contrast to some emigre Marxists in America who avoided any involvement in the Civil War under the abstraction that they were “opposed to all slavery, wage and chattel” [M&F, p. 84], he participated actively in the mass movement abroad. This contrasts to the 1850s when he kept away from the emigre circles and their type of activity. As I show at the beginning of that chapter dealing with the impact of the Civil War on structure of *Capital*, “No one is more blind to the greatness of Marx’s contribution than those who praise him to the skies for his genius as if that genius matured outside of the actual struggles of the period in which he lived. As if he gained the impulses from the sheer development of his own thoughts instead of from living workers changing living reality by their action . . . He who glorifies theory and genius but fails to recognize the *limits* of theoretical work, fails likewise to recognize the *indispensability of the theoretician*” [M&F, p. 89].

3) After three intensive years—1863–66—of reworking *Capital*, Marx is still not satisfied. On February 10, 1866, we hear why: “Historically I developed a part about the *working day* which did not enter into my first plan” [M&F, p. 88; MECW 42, p. 224]. After he has finished working out the immense section on Working Day he writes again to Engels and shows how happy he is that the American workers “by correct instinct” came to the same formulation on the eight hour day that he had worked out for the Geneva Congress of the First International.<sup>66</sup> This he brings directly into *Capital* (end of Ch. X [on “The Working Day”]) when he quotes that Baltimore Resolution, ties it in with the First International “Thus the movement of the working class on both sides of the Atlantic . . .” and further ties in white and black labor “Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded. But out of the death of slavery a new life at once arose. The first fruit of the Civil War was the eight hour agitation . . .”<sup>67</sup>

4) Finally the American roots are not only in the finished (by himself) Volume I but in the unfinished Volumes II and III.<sup>68</sup> In the [chapter on the] Logic and Scope of those volumes I quote from his letter to Danielson where he asks him not to wait for Volume II before translating Volume I because of the mass of material he received from Russia and the United States: “The



United States at present have overtaken England . . . the masses are quicker and have greater political means in their hands to resent the form of a progress that is accomplished at their expense.”<sup>69</sup> I then say that it is clear that Russia and America were to play roles in Volumes II and III that England played in Volume I, that Lenin filled out Volume II for Russia and that I believe American worker are concretizing it for America in their attitude to Automation [M&F, p. 148]. In the final chapter on Automation and the New Humanism where I deal with the 1929 crash and the division between Planners and rank and file workers building their own organization—CIO<sup>70</sup>—and in the 1940s when they turn against their labor leaders who have become the bureaucracy that oppresses them even as the managers in the shops—I approach the final section called “Toward A New Unity of Theory and Practice in the Abolitionist and Marxist Tradition.”

As I wrote you once before I have neither blueprints nor banners which scream “Follow me,” but that I sketch out only where to gather new impulses—from the workers: “The American working class has long been a mystery to the European, worker and intellectual. Until the formation of the CIO, Europeans used to “prove the backwardness of the American worker by virtue of the fact that he had not built industrial unions... Because the American worker has built no mass party, he seems apolitical. Because he is largely unacquainted with the doctrines of Karl Marx, he seems non-socialist [up to here, M&F, pp. 276–77] . . . It is not Marxists who have compelled society at last to face with sober senses the conditions of workers and relations of men with each other. . . . The seal of bankruptcy of contemporary civilization, *including the so-called Vanguard Parties*, is the bankruptcy of its thought. The void in the Marxist movement since Lenin’s death would have a significance only for Marxists except that Marxism is in the daily lives and aspirations of working people. Marxism is neither in the pathetic little theses gathering dust in small radical organizations, nor in impressively big tomes gathering dust on the shelves of large conservative universities” [M&F, p. 282]. For my part I explain the method used to write *Marxism and Freedom* and I call the American workers and student youth who collaborated on it its true co-authors.

Now, if I may, I would like to add a personal note since although the book has not yet been published the attack on me has already begun. Your friends bombard you on the American roots of Marxism<sup>71</sup> while the Communists are bombarding publisher and distributor with “true stories,” that I supposedly escaped from Russia in 1917 because I had “white blood running in her veins.”<sup>72</sup> I hope I will not have to return to the cloak and dagger days when I was Trotsky’s secretary and had to carry a gun and learn how to shoot it.<sup>73</sup> The *American Economic Review* had its own kind of experience in 1944 when they published my translation of the Russian revision of Marxism with my commentary.<sup>74</sup> Between the Soviet Embassy accusing me of being a

fascist and the State Department telling the review that Russia and America were “allies” and publication would not help, the editors needed all the intellectual integrity and courage to proceed with the work. As a good general—philosophers these days must be good strategists—I trust nothing that comes with the publication will surprise you. Your Preface speaks for itself, and I trust my book does well for itself.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

October 15, 1957

Dear R.D.

Thanks for your prompt reply. It seems to me that your references do not corroborate the statement that the structure of *Capital* was completely re-created *under the impact of the American Civil War*. It is certainly true that the original plan or plans were thoroughly revised between 1857 and 1866, but I found no evidence that this change was decisively influenced by American developments. In point of fact, going through Marx’s letters written during this period, I am struck by the rather casual references to the United States. Or, if you deny the “casual”: such references seem to me in no way different from others to contemporary European events. Sorry!

A personal remark on your personal remark: there is no rational ground on which you can associate the questions of my friends with the recollection of attacks on your life and on your carrying a gun! They took your announcement as that of a scholarly (*sit venia verbo!*)<sup>75</sup> interpretation of Marx, subject to intelligent critique. Believe me, they wanted information, not attack and counterattack. You should be the last to resent this or to obliterate the difference between their attitude and the other.

Greetings!

HM

\* \* \*

Jan. 28, 1958

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

I assume you received M&F: I'm surprised that you did not ask for more than the 3 copies I sent.

The reviews have not yet appeared and I naturally do not know when they will appear, but already I'm thinking of a "supplement." You know that I had many more rough Ideas than those that I developed on Hegel's Absolute Idea ever since 1953 when I first broke through the "sound barrier" of Hegelian terminology.<sup>76</sup> For obvious and not so obvious reasons it was not necessary to develop those for the book itself. However, I cannot seem to part either from Hegel or a few American workers and student youth who have been writing me on Chapter 1 of M&F<sup>77</sup> and have shown a much greater grasp than they are ever being credited with—they certainly create sufficient ground for me to want to take off from. I'm starting on a lecture tour in March and I thought that that might give me a chance for a serious and rather lengthy essay that I would either submit to a periodical or actually try to publish as a booklet. Naturally I would still love to "depend" on you and wondered whether you would care to read any drafts that I would write.<sup>78</sup> I am anxious to read your book, so please keep me informed when its official publication date is.

As ever,

\* \* \*

Feb. 10, 1958

Dear R.D.:

I'll be glad to read what you may write on Hegel—if you don't press me and give me time!

And I could indeed use two more copies of "Marxism and Freedom!"

Good Luck!

HM

\* \* \*

April 18, 1958

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

It was impossible after all to develop the ideas I had in mind relative to Hegel's Absolute Idea while on tour. It was just too hectic—I spoke nearly every day for 30 days sometimes for 2-3 hours a day. It seems if you are scheduled to give a lecture on a university campus, you therefore “belong” to the Administration before and after and on any subject that comes into their head. The range of subjects in my case extended all the way from “Adventures in the Hegelian Dialectic”<sup>79</sup> to “Khrushchev's ‘Point 4’ Program,”<sup>80</sup> with *Marxism and Freedom* being the center of all. The turnout was also quite different than anticipated—I'd be scheduled for a small seminar of 25 and 150<sup>81</sup> would turn up or I would be scheduled for a double class of 100 and 500 would turn out, as they did in the University of California at Berkeley when I spoke on the American Roots of Marxism. In addition there was a radio appearance and one on TV's “Cavalcade of Books” where suddenly I found my work counterposed to J. Edgar Hoover's “Masters of Deceit.”<sup>82</sup> That got me so angry that I exploded that “Hoover's work was at best a *negative* approach. You get nowhere by jailing people or passing laws against thinking. You certainly cannot win the global struggle for the mind of man by imitating Russian Communist totalitarianism. Mine is a *positive* approach, giving people a theory of liberation—Marxist Humanism—ideas people live by and die for.” That got the panelists so worried that I had criticized their “hero” that they quickly moved me away from the TV screen and mike and stated that of course I was “a very controversial figure, a Marxist” and they invited, “all to write in on having had me on when they discussed Hoover's book.” They said they expected an avalanche of people. At least I got them to laugh when they handed me the guest book to sign. As it happened to be March 5th, I wrote “On the 5th happy anniversary of Stalin's death.” I do not believe I'll ever get invited again. Yet I wish I had gotten that distance in breaking the conspiracy of silence that surrounds *Marxism and Freedom* on the East Coast.

May 1st I'll be off one short lapse—to Pittsburgh and West Virginia—and so I do not know whether I'll get a chance to write what I wish to. At least let me indicate the two problems that are preoccupying me now. Ever since Mao Tse-Tung's speech on the “100 flowers” to bloom,<sup>83</sup> I have, instead of having a straight economic state capitalist approach, a phenomenological one for I feel that Hegel's “Spirit in Self-Estrangement—the Discipline of Culture”<sup>84</sup> very apropos. (Do you recall that Marx points precisely to the “noble type of consciousness” as one of the areas in Hegel where the dialectic far outstrips his own use of it?)<sup>85</sup> And while working on that I had returned also to the AI<sup>86</sup>, again in relation to a concrete stage now—the something new which made the backward Vietnamese recognize these “haughty vassals”<sup>87</sup> like Mao and Ho-chi-Minh<sup>88</sup> and suddenly stop the on-

ward rush of Russian Communism throughout Asia. There are some very new impulses at work, and I'm dying to get down to work them out, but it might have to wait.

Yours,

Raya

I noted the announcement that your book<sup>89</sup> is finally off the press—congratulations!

\* \* \*

July 15, 1958

Dear HM,

The absoluteness of my silence is not to be construed as proof of the fact that the Absolute Idea has lost its grip on me, but only that the practical everyday life of an author whose publisher is so small as almost to unite with the politicians to silence the work and thus burdening her with all the “promotional” work as well. But, outside of an appearance on TV next week for University of Detroit, I have nearly nothing to do till fall when I appear at Cooper Union.<sup>90</sup> In any case I grasp what momentary lull there is in my tours and lectures to resume where I left off when publication of *Marxism and Freedom* ended our correspondence.

I will begin with what will not be contested, I believe: the dialectical relationship of subject and object in the process of history as the center of Hegel's Absolute Method. Or, to put it differently, the conception of reality as totality, the unity of inner and outer; the relationship between the whole and the parts which constitutes the passage from existence to reality. But the real world, even when Hegel is the Prussian philosopher glorifying the state as the combination of the ideal and the real, is not Plato's republic with its “philosopher-kings”; to Hegel not even kings can substitute for philosophers and thus, just as the Christian Hegel lets “Revealed Religion” play second fiddle to philosophy, so the state philosopher Hegel leaves the state as “Objective Mind” remain[ing] on the doorsteps, not in the inner sanctum, of “Absolute Mind.”<sup>91</sup>

Now Marx criticized Hegel for not having really surmounted the duality of thought and being, of theory and practice, of subject and object; that his dialectic, no more than Kant's, could in its mystical shell be the actual, interior dialectic of the historic process, but was just froth appearance, “the origin” not the *actual history* of man. He insisted that under the circumstance

Absolute Spirit was mere appearance so that, even when he had “people” as content, the expression was restricted to that alien man, the philosopher, and that in fact, it is always *after* the fact that absolute spirit makes history, so that it is not only Nature which is “unconscious” and does, through necessity, what Logic accomplishes freely, but Absolute Spirit as well accomplishes the real movement unconsciously: “For in effect the absolute spirit does not become conscious of itself as creator of the world until after the event and its making of history only exists in the consciousness, in the opinion and representation of the philosophers, in the speculative imagination.”<sup>92</sup> But when “corporeal Man”<sup>93</sup> standing on his own feet, the maker of his own history *and* his own thoughts, then first will self-knowledge and knowledge coincide, the proletariat being both subject and object of knowledge *and* maker of history.

There is no argument with Marx’s materialism, nor did the mature Marx separate his dialectics from his materialism, but the young Marx, when the need of the hour was to free oneself and the whole generation from mysticism, did underplay (because he did not know the early works?) Hegel’s insights to “peoples” and not just consciousness and self-consciousness, who receive the heritage of history as “natural principles” and “have mission of applying it.”<sup>94</sup> In any case, I am not here interested in what Marx did or did not see (to that we will come later) but what our age can and must see and to which it has a contribution to make.

To return to Hegel, first as Absolute Knowledge appears in *Phenomenology*, where he sums up<sup>95</sup> the movement from Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” through Spinoza’s abstract unity in Substance to Leibniz’s recoil from this abstraction to the Individuality of—may I add?—commercial, pre-1789 capitalism which Kant anticipated and developed further after the French Revolution as abstract freedom, or Individual Will: all good men get together and work out contradictions according to a general will. Hegel continues with his rejection of the Absolutes of other philosophies when the millennium did not follow the French Revolution and we had Fichte’s analysis of reality as Ego, Schelling’s “intellectual intuition” (of which Hegel says, “Substance by itself would be void and empty intuition”) [PhGB, p. 803; PhGM, p. 489] and Jacobi’s “*reactionary*” (my emphasis) reestablishment of Absolute as faith alone [EL, ¶76].<sup>96</sup> To this Hegel adds “However, Spirit has shown itself to be neither mere withdrawal of self-consciousness into pure inwardness, nor mere absorption of self-consciousness into Substance . . . Spirit is the movement of the self which empties (externalizes itself) and qua subject . . .” [PhGB, pp. 803–04; PhGM, p. 490]. Well, what does it accomplish “qua Subject”? (1) it “wound up process of embodiment” [PhGB, p. 804; PhGM, p. 490]; (2) History was born anew to combine with science of the ways in which knowledge appears and ended up as absolute spirit; but (3) “the process of releasing itself from the form of its self” which is supposed to

be “the highest freedom and security of its knowledge of itself” [PhGB, p. 806; PhGM, p. 491] does not make it as happy as the ending of the *Phenomenology* would have it appear for it will reappear as Absolute Idea in Logic and Absolute Mind in the *Encyclopedia* and there we will see, not the work of art with its “double-tongued equivocal character of what they gave out as certainty” [PhGB, p. 740; PhGM, p. 446], but (1) “Individuality purified of all that interferes with its universalism, i.e., freedom itself” [PM, ¶481]; (2) freedom not as a possession but as a dimension of being; in a word (3) Absolute Mind as the *actuality* of freedom. The philosopher doth protest too much when he keeps repeating knowledge is the Olympus when all the time he comes down to earth and its freedoms *and* lack of them. That is why I said, in *Marxism and Freedom*, that “Translated materialistically, the fact that Nature has gone through the same dialectical development as Idea shows there is a movement *from* practice to theory as well as v.v. [vice versa]” [M&F, p. 42].

With your indulgence, therefore, I wish to look at the real world of ours and spell out this movement *from* practice *to* theory (for it is only there where we'll get the new insights, “the new impulses” emerging from the objective movement and the maturity of our age which will *compel* us to make concrete what was only general to Marx): 1) The period of the 1930's—not of Hitler for I am consider[ing] not the development of counter-revolution but of revolution—the French Sit-Down Strikes, the American CIO, the Spanish Revolution[,] all adding up to new forms of *workers' control of production*. That is to say, the climax in the Spanish Revolution and occupation of factories by workers showed the workers were moving from Soviets or political control to actual management of production by themselves. (2) The period of the 1940's; National Resistance Movement, including Negro demonstrations, wartime and post-war general strikes, including GI movements for return home, ending in the flocking by the millions into the Communist Parties. All this signified, not ‘backwardness’ of workers, but search for *new political form* to work out both freedom from occupation and economic slavery. The fact that that “double-tongued” enemy—Communism in Western Europe—won the allegiance is only one more manifestation that this is an age of absolutes, and that the counter-revolution is not only in the innards of the revolution but v.v. [vice-versa]. And because the two are so tightly linked we had stalemate. (3) But with the period of 1950's and Automation new grounds were laid for overcoming this total contradiction. Where state capitalism posed, but only in general, and only for theoreticians or those where Communism actually ruled over production, the question of the *new* type of workers' revolts and the return to Marx's theories of alienation, Automation made it concrete, evoking the question: what Kind of Labor Should Man Perform? If that was a cry in the wilderness during the miners' strike against

[the] continuous miner [in 1949-50],<sup>97</sup> it began to be heard three years later during recession, and, above all, that year it was united with the cry for political freedom [from] out of totalitarianism in the East German Revolt.<sup>98</sup>

From then on there *should* have been no rest for the theoreticians until they had broken through on that Absolute Idea and absolute freedom in the manner in which Marx broke through the mystical shell, and in the concrete manner Lenin, confronted with “transformation into opposite” [LCW 38, p. 109] made his own re-transformation with “Turn the imperialist war into a civil war” [LCW 21, p. 39]. But, no, the Kantian ought remained exactly as abstract as Kant had it—and no Marxist would move to make the abolition of division of mental and manual as concrete for our age as Marx had made “the general absolute law” of capitalism<sup>99</sup> concretely mean for the movement the mobilization of “the new passions and new forces” for the establishment of the new society.<sup>100</sup> The greatest deterrent to the indispensability of the theoretician is the theoretician himself who flocks to anything from Existentialism to Zen-Buddhism and from “war guilt”<sup>101</sup> to psychoanalysis—anything, anything at all to avoid the *responsibility* of the Marxist theoretician to be where the workers are.

For anyone bound for “adventures of the Hegelian dialectic,”<sup>102</sup> the Absolute Mind lies beckoning, but, no, we go back to repeating the old about the de-humanization of ideas that Hegel is reproached with. Now, I admit that the humanism of Hegel is not the most obvious element in the Hegelian philosophy, although I maintain that today we should see it as its innermost essence. Naturally, the academic tradition that operates on Prof. Windelband’s assumption that the generation that could understand Hegel’s *Phenomenology* has died<sup>103</sup> cannot help the youth of our epoch grasp the grandeur of the vision of the most encyclopedic mind of Europe who wrote: “Within the short span of man’s own life, an individual must learn the whole long journey of mankind. This is possible only because the universal mind is operative in every individual mind and is the very substance of it.”<sup>104</sup> It is true that Hegel himself did throw a mystical veil over his philosophy by treating it as a closed ontological system, but he also warned against those who become the self-styled “representatives” of a philosophical work who, he wrote, “are like the dead burying the dead” [PhGB, p. 130; PhGM, pp. 44–45]. He put his own faith in the public instead, not alone because of its modesty, but because “it is the nature of truth to force its way to recognition when the time comes” [PhGB, p. 129; PhGM, p. 44].

You once told me that what I wrote in the first letters in 1953 on the Absolute Idea and what appeared in *Marxism and Freedom* were miles apart and, in a sense, it is. No public work, popular or unpopular, can contain the intricacies of thought as they develop in their abstract form before they become filled with more concrete content. And no doubt also part of the reason of leaving it in its undeveloped state was finding none but “dumb



workers” agreeing while the theoreticians were shying away. But I do mean to follow up the book with further development and I certainly would love to have your help, no matter how sharply critical, in breaking through those murky categories. At least you shouldn't merely keep silent. I will await to hear from you before I go any further.

Yours,

Raya

Did you notice the paragraph in the last issue of *American Economic Review* on *Marxism and Freedom*? It surprised me that an economic journal should be the one

to stress the humanism: “The book centers on the frequently neglected or misunderstood aspects of Marxian thought; its thorough-going commitment to the humanist tradition of all earlier revolutionary and socialist movements and of German classical philosophy. The crucial significance of Marx and Engels of this basic orientation is demonstrated by a close scrutiny of their works. The student of Marxism will appreciate the appendices presenting first English translation of important but little known philosophical statements by Marx and Lenin. The volume includes a preface by Herbert Marcuse.”<sup>105</sup>

## NOTES

1. Of Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom*.
2. Dunayevskaya is referring to draft chapters for *Marxism and Freedom*.
3. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–65), French utopian socialist criticized in Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847); Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64), German socialist leader with whom Marx clashed. Dunayevskaya emphasized in *Marxism and Freedom* that these clashes were over Lassalle's statism, something that in her view continued to influence the Marxist movement in a deleterious fashion.
4. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, with a supplement edited and translated by Dona Torr (New York: International Publishers, 1939). This edition contains some 60 pages of appended material, added by Dona Torr (1883–1957), a British Communist historian who was part of a circle that included the younger scholars E. P. Thompson and Christopher Hill. Torr's appendices to *Capital* included a list of changes from the 1872–75 French edition introduced by Engels into the fourth German edition of 1890, and Marx's preface and postface to the French edition. Dunayevskaya also refers to Charles H. Kerr and Co.'s earlier English edition, which was based mainly on the third German edition of 1883: Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, revised by Ernest Untermann to include some aspects of the 1890 fourth German edition (Chicago, Charles Kerr & Company, 1906). [Dunayevskaya usually quoted the Kerr edition, henceforth abbreviated as MCIK]. The 1976 Ben Fowkes translation, based upon the fourth German edition of 1890, has largely superseded the Kerr edition [MCIF].

5. The novelist Norman Mailer (1923–2007) was loosely associated with the anti-Stalinist Left during the 1940s, when he was influenced by the theory of state capitalism. His *The Naked and the Dead* (1948) has sometimes been interpreted not only as a critique of militarism, but also of Stalinism.

6. Dunayevskaya is citing Fromm's first response to Marcuse, "The Human Implications of Instinctive 'Radicalism,'" *Dissent* 2:4 (Fall 1955), pp. 342–49.

7. A selection of five paragraphs from Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*, entitled "This Inhuman World," appeared in *News & Letters* 2:6 (Nov. 27, 1956). A few months later, the columnist M. D. (pseudonym of Dr. Louis Gogol, a founding member of News and Letters Committees and Dunayevskaya's brother-in-law) published in his column, "A Doctor Speaks," a laudatory review of *Eros and Civilization* entitled "The Link Between Mental and Physical," *News & Letters* 2:11 (Feb. 5, 1957). The review stated: "It is to the great credit of Marcuse that he clearly and persistently points out the dynamic revolutionary core of Freudian psychoanalysis: that life instincts—the instincts for growth and health—require not compromise but rejection of the present society, not sublimation but confronting the sickness that is disturbing life." The review concluded with a brief criticism of Marcuse for failing to recognize that "the idea of liberation" could be seen "in the actual practice of living, working people," a lapse that Gogol attributed to intellectuals' "separation from the daily experience of the working man and the lack of confidence in their wisdom."

8. See note 15 in Chapter 1.

9. See note 35 in Chapter 1.

10. Marcuse is referring to what Dunayevskaya continued to develop and publish as Part I of *Marxism and Freedom*, "From Practice to Theory: 1776 to 1848", the last chapter of which was titled, "A New Humanism: Marx's Early Economic-Philosophic Writings" [M&F, pp. 53–66].

11. Marcuse is referring to Ch. 9 of *Marxism and Freedom*, "The Second International, 1899–1914" [M&F, pp. 150–163], which Dunayevskaya developed under the heading "Organizational Interlude." Founded in 1889 as a large federation of socialist parties around the world, at the outbreak of World War I in 1914 the Second International splintered, as the major socialist parties backed their respective governments in the war, despite their having adopted antiwar resolutions at international socialist congresses.

12. Marcuse is referring to what Dunayevskaya developed in *Marxism and Freedom* as Part V, "The Problem of Our Age: State Capitalism vs. Freedom," especially Section One, "The Russian Scene."

13. Marcuse refers to the draft of Ch. 8 of *Marxism and Freedom*, "The Logic and Scope of Capital, Volumes II and III" [M&F, pp. 126–149].

14. For *Soviet Marxism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), which Marcuse had expressed the wish to send to Dunayevskaya for comment in his letter of September 21.

15. Because they shed considerable light on the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence, we include this and a subsequent letter the next day from Dunayevskaya to her husband John Dwyer. Dwyer (1912–1989, wrote under pseudonyms John Fredericks, John O'Brien, and Peter Mallory) penned the "Our Life & Times" column on international issues for *News & Letters* for four decades.

16. Dunayevskaya built her theory of state capitalism in part upon Marx's statement, first added to the French edition of *Capital*, 1872–75: "In any given branch of industry, centralization would reach its extreme limit if all the individual capitals invested were fused into a single corporation. In a given society this limit would be reached only when the entire social capital was united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single capitalist company" [MCIF, p. 779; MCIK, p. 688].

17. Of two essays from Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*. See note 15 in Chapter 1.

18. Macmillan Publishers.

19. Praeger Publishers.

20. Saul Blackman, a Dunayevskaya colleague from the Johnson-Forest Tendency and for a time a leading figure in *News & Letters*. He contributed to John Cogley's *Report on Blacklisting* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1956).

21. Publishing agent of Beacon Press.

22. "A New Humanism: Marx's Early Economic-Philosophic Writings" appeared as Ch. 3 of *Marxism and Freedom*, while "Automation and the New Humanism," a discussion of the contemporary U.S., appeared as Ch. 16.

23. See Dunayevskaya's "Letter on Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*," in her 1953 "Letters on Hegel's Absolutes"; see also footnote 7 in Chapter 1. Marx, in his 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic," ended his discussion of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* at ¶384; Dunayevskaya began her 1953 Letter on this work at ¶385.

24. On Dunayevskaya *American Economic Review* articles, see note 3 in Chapter 1.

25. A chapter in Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* [M&F, pp. 196–201] analyzes the debate over the role of trade unions in the Soviet state, 1920–21, including the contrasting positions of Lenin, Trotsky, and Alexander Shlyapnikov, the latter the head of the "Workers' Opposition."

26. Irving Howe (1920–1993), leading literary critic and founder of *Dissent*; earlier a Shachtmanite Trotskyist and by this time a social democrat.

27. Reva Craine was a leader of the Trotskyist (Shachtmanite) Workers Party, to which Dunayevskaya's Johnson-Forest Tendency belonged as a minority faction during the years 1941–47. Dunayevskaya differed strongly with Craine over Rosa Luxemburg's economic theory, but defended Craine after World War II, when the Workers Party replaced Craine and other women leaders with men returning from the military. Without naming Craine, Dunayevskaya discussed this in "On Women and the Old Radicals," *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (hereafter WLDL, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1985), pp. 31–35.

28. Freddie Forest was Dunayevskaya's pseudonym from the early 1940s to the early 1950s.

29. U. S. affiliate of Macmillan.

30. Lenin's "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*" [LCW 38], which Dunayevskaya translated into English for the first time as an appendix to *Marxism and Freedom*.

31. Saul Blackman, then a leading member of *News & Letters*.

32. Joseph Buttinger (1906–92), prominent Austrian left-wing social democrat and anti-Nazi resistance leader; author of *In the Twilight of Socialism: A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria* (New York: Praeger, 1953) and later of studies of Vietnam; engaged in a lengthy correspondence with Dunayevskaya.

33. Dunayevskaya, *Outline of Marx's Capital Volume One* (Detroit: News & Letters, 1979, orig. 1946).

34. Dunayevskaya is probably referring to V. A. Karpushin, "Marx's Working Out of the Materialist Dialectics in the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts in the Year 1844," *Questions of Philosophy*, No. 3 (1955). In *Marxism and Freedom*, Dunayevskaya attacks this article, which appeared in Russia's leading philosophic journal, for its belittling of Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* (pp. 40, 62).

35. Editor at St. Martin Press, Macmillan's U.S. affiliate.

36. This note was handwritten on Marcuse's copy of Dunayevskaya's letter of December 10.

37. Beacon Press representative.

38. Simon Silverman later founded Humanities Press, which specialized in Continental philosophy; Richard Huett, later a major editor at Delacorte Press, which published Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* in 1973.

39. This description by Marx of his philosophical position appears in the 1844 "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic," M&F1958, p. 313; see also MECW 3, p. 336.

40. Marx's statement appears in the concluding sentence of Ch. 10 of *Capital*, Vol. I, "The Working Day."

41. See note 3.

42. In Marx's 1844 essay, "Private Property and Communism," he wrote, "We should especially avoid establishing society as an abstraction opposed to the individual. The individual is the social entity." (M&F1958, p. 295; MECW 3, p. 299).

43. Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* cites Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto*: "The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (p. 65; see also MECW 6, p. 506).

44. Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* cites *Capital*, Vol., III, where Marx wrote of "development of human power which is its own end, the true realm of freedom" (M&F, p. 145).

45. Marx wrote of the worker's "quest for universality, the tendency toward an integral development of the individual," this after "the automatic workshop wipes out specialists and craft-idioty" in 1847 in the *Poverty of Philosophy* (MECW 6, p. 190).

46. Chapter 13 of *Marxism and Freedom*, "Russian State-Capitalism vs. Workers' Revolt."

47. See note 31 in Chapter 1.

48. In July 1953, some 10,000 miners went on strike at the forced labor camps in Vorkuta in northern Russia (M&F, pp. 252–254).

49. See *Marxism and Freedom*, chapter 16, "Automation and the New Humanism", pp. 266–287.

50. See note 33 in Chapter 1.

51. A nine month-long strike, the longest since the creation of the CIO in the 1930s, broke out in West Virginia, where the largest coal company, Consol, had introduced automation in the form of the "continuous miner." (See *M&F*, Ch. 16, "Automation and the New Humanism.")

52. Dunayevskaya refers to the June 17, 1953 East German workers' uprising for "bread and freedom," the July 1953 strikes in the Vorkuta forced labor camp in northern Russia, and the November 1956 Hungarian Revolution, as discussed in *M&F*, Ch. 15, "The Beginning of the End of Russian Totalitarianism."

53. From 1934–39, the Stalinized Communist International (Comintern) established the "Popular Front" against fascism. During this period, Communist Parties allied themselves with reformist Socialist Parties and liberals in the name of democracy and anti-fascism. At the same time, the Popular Fronts, which achieved state power in Spain during the Civil War and briefly in France, kept silent about the repression inside the Soviet Union. The Popular Fronts also excluded anarchists and anti-Stalinist Marxists, especially Trotskyists. In Spain, the Republic, which had a USSR-supported Popular Front government that included Communists and Socialists, became involved in a Civil War with fascists supported by Germany and Italy. The Popular Front government in Spain refused to support radical social changes like land seizures by peasants or worker control of factories, something that far leftists like Dunayevskaya believed would have energized the Republic in its anti-fascist struggle. For their part, Stalinists accused these far leftists of being fascist agents who were attempting to divide the Left. In 1939, after the fascists had defeated the republicans in the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union reversed course, abandoning its Popular Front policy and forging the Hitler-Stalin Pact. In this way, the USSR effectively gave up the struggle against fascism for two years, until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. As a result, anti-Stalinist leftists like Dunayevskaya saw the Popular Front as a failed policy that had led to defeat in Spain, and in which independent leftists had been used by the Comintern.

54. Illegible word here.

55. Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919), important German and Polish Marxist thinker and leader, who critiqued reformism and elaborated a theory of revolutionary spontaneity in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1905. Also a fierce opponent of imperialism and war, Luxemburg was assassinated in 1919 while helping to lead a socialist uprising in Berlin. In addition, she opposed all forms of nationalism as obsolete, including in her native Poland, then under foreign rule. Before her death, she made some very discerning criticisms of the one-party state established by Lenin and Trotsky in Soviet Russia, written while serving a prison sentence for speaking out against German militarism. Her most outstanding economic work is *Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to the Economic Explanation of Imperialism* (1913); English trans. by Agnes Schwarzschild (London: Routledge, 1951).

56. *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* [The Great Soviet Encyclopedia] was published in three editions, 1926–1947, 1950–1958, and 1969–1978. A. Leontiev (1901–1974) was the author of *Political Economy: A Beginner's Course* (New York: International Publishers, 1935) and of *Marx's 'Capital'* (New York: International Publishers, 1946).

57. Henryk Grossman, *The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System: Being Also a Theory of Crises*, trans. Jairus Banaji (London: Pluto Press, 1992, orig. 1929).

58. The notion that economic crises arise due to insufficient consumer demand; critiqued as superficial and ultimately incorrect by Dunayevskaya in *Marxism and Freedom*, Ch. 8, where she wrote: "What Marx did, in disproving the underconsumptionist theory was to demonstrate there is no direct connection between production and consumption" (p. 131). This is because production creates its own market, and the part of the surplus product that cannot be consumed by workers and capitalists is consumed by capital itself through a process referred to by Marx (and other economists) as productive consumption. Dunayevskaya also considered Luxemburg to have been ultimately an underconsumptionist, whose economic theories anticipated Keynesianism. For more on Dunayevskaya's critique of Luxemburg, see "Marx's and Luxemburg's Theories of Accumulation of Capital, Its Crises and Its Inevitable Downfall," Ch. 3 of her *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991, orig. 1982), hereafter RLWLM.

59. Marx's *Grundrisse*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin, 1973) is an early draft of Marx's critique of political economy composed in 1857–8. Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) was a shorter work that was the first published version of his critique of political economy.

60. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 105; see also MECW 28, p. 41. This text is now known to have been the introduction to the *Grundrisse*.

61. *Arkhiv Marks Engelsa*, ed. V. V. Adoratsky (Moscow, 1933).

62. Leontiev, *Marx's Capital* (1946).

63. *Die Presse*, a Vienna newspaper in which many of Marx's Civil War writings appeared.

64. Wendell Phillips (1811–84), prominent abolitionist, labor, and women's rights advocate who briefly joined Marx's First International. Dunayevskaya cites Phillips in M&F, Ch. 5, "The Impact of the Civil War in the United States on Structure of *Capital*."

65. Marx and Engels, *The Civil War in the United States* (New York: International Publishers, 1937).

66. Dunayevskaya appears to be referring to a letter to the German socialist Ludwig Kugelmann of October 9, 1866, where Marx wrote: "The American Workers' Congress at Baltimore, which took place at the same time [as the Geneva Congress of the First International] caused me great joy. The slogan there was organization for the struggle against capital, and remarkably enough, most of the demands which I drew up for Geneva were also put forward there by the correct instinct of the workers" (MECW 42, p. 326). Marx also wrote in *Capital*, in the chapter on "The Working Day": "Thus the working-class movement on both sides of the Atlantic, which had grown instinctively out of the relations of production themselves, set its seal on the words of the factory inspector, R. J. Saunders; 'further steps toward a reformation of society can never be carried out with any hope of success, unless the hours of labor be limited, and the prescribed limit strictly enforced'" (MCIF, p. 415; MCIF, p. 329).

67. See M&F, p. 84. Marx's full passage reads: "In the United States of America, every independent workers' movement was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the republic. Labor in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin. However, a new life immediately arose from the death of slavery. The first fruit of the American Civil War was the eight hours' agitation, which ran from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New England to California, with the seven-league boots of the locomotive. The General Congress of Labor held at Baltimore in August 1866 declared: 'The first and great necessity of the present, to free the labor of this country from capitalistic slavery, is the passing of a law by which eight hours shall be the normal working day in all States of the American Union. We are resolved to put forth all our strength until this glorious result is attained'" (MCIF, p. 414; MCIF, p. 329).

68. Marx completed and published *Capital*, Vol. I in his lifetime; Vols. II and III were edited by Engels and published after Marx's death in 1883, in 1885 and 1894 respectively.

69. Marx's letter to Nikolai Danielson (1844–1918), one of the translators of *Capital* into Russian, was dated April 10, 1879 (cited in M&F, p. 148; see also MECW 45, p. 358).

70. Congress of Industrial Organizations, a 1935 breakaway from the more conservative American Federation of Labor; the two labor federations merged in 1955.

71. See Marcuse's letter to Dunayevskaya of October 9, 1957.

72. A suggestion that as an opponent of Stalin, Dunayevskaya was really a conservative “White Russian.”

73. See note 33 in Chapter 1.

74. See note 3 in Chapter 1.

75. May I be forgiven the word.

76. A reference to Dunayevskaya’s 1953 “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes”; see note 7 in Chapter 1.

77. Chapter one of M&F, “The Age of Revolutions: Industrial, Social-Political, Intellectual,” includes parts on “The Philosophers and the Revolution: Freedom and the Hegelian Dialectic” (Part 3), and “Hegel’s Absolutes and Our Age of Absolutes” (Part 4).

78. Dunayevskaya note: I do not mean to impose—I mean only your criticisms, informal, to me.

79. An apparent reference to French existentialist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s *Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955).

80. In April 1958, just as the American clamor for imitation of Soviet schools was reaching its height, Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) severely criticized the Russian educational system for failing to meet the needs of economic development and called for greater emphasis on physical labor and actual part-time work in factories as part of the curriculum; such a program was enacted in December.

81. Dunayevskaya types “15-” but seems to have intended “150.”

82. J. Edgar Hoover was the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from May 10, 1924 until his death in 1972. *Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It* (New York: Pocket Books, 1958) was one of Hoover’s many ghost-written books.

83. Chinese leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) delivered a speech, “Let 100 Flowers Bloom, Let 100 Schools of Thought Contend,” in February 1957. A brief period of open debate ensued in May and June, after which the critics were ruthlessly crushed. Dunayevskaya added a brief criticism of Mao’s theory of contradiction at the last minute to the 1958 edition of *Marxism and Freedom* (see fn. 17, p. 357). The second English edition of *Marxism and Freedom* (New York: Twayne, 1964) included a new chapter 17, “The Challenge of Mao Tse-Tung” (pp. 288–326), originally written for the 1964 Japanese edition.

84. “Spirit in Self-Estrangement: The Discipline of Culture and Civilization” is a section in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* [PhGB, pp. 507–610; PhGM, pp. 294–364].

85. In his “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic” in the 1844 *Manuscripts*, Marx writes that despite Hegel’s idealist mystifications in the *Phenomenology*, “elements of criticism” of society “are often prepared and worked out in a manner extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint. The sections on the ‘Unhappy Consciousness,’ the ‘Honorable Consciousness,’ the fight of the noble and downtrodden consciousness, etc., etc.... contain the critical elements—although still in an alienated form—of whole spheres like Religion, the State, Civic Life, etc.” (M&F1958, p. 309; see also MECW 3, p. 332).

86. Hegel’s absolute idea.

87. See PhGB, pp. 529–30; PhGM, p. 308. Hegel’s discussion here is part of the section on “Spirit in Self-Estrangement.”

88. Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), Communist leader and founder of modern Vietnam; led his country in wars against France and the U.S.

89. Marcuse’s *Soviet Marxism* (1958).

90. Dunayevskaya’s lecture at Cooper Union, given on Oct. 27, 1960, was entitled “Intellectualism and Creativity in the USSR.” For the text, see *The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection* [hereafter RDC], 13036–42.

91. In Hegel’s philosophical system, the stage of “Objective Mind” includes ethics as well as political institutions like the state, civil society, and the family, and always precedes that of “Absolute Mind.” This is seen especially in his *Philosophy of Mind*.

92. Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family* (1845), MECW 4, p. 86.

93. Marx, “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic” (1844), M&F1958, p. 313; see also MECW 3, p. 336.

94. An apparent reference to Hegel, *Natural Law*, trans. by T. M. Knox with an Introduction by H. B. Acton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975, orig. 1802), where he writes, "The absolute moral totality is nothing else than a people" (pp. 128–29).

95. This and the next sentence refer to a brief discussion in the concluding pages of the *Phenomenology*, where Hegel implicitly critiques a number of previous philosophers, from Descartes through Schelling [PhGB, pp. 802–804; PhGM, pp. 488–90].

96. Friedrich Jacobi (1743–1819), German philosopher who Hegel attacked for his "retrogressive" criticisms of Enlightenment reason and advocacy of a return to faith. Jacobi is discussed more below and in Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, orig. 1973), hereafter P&R.

97. See Andy Phillips and Raya Dunayevskaya, *The Coal Miners' General Strike of 1949–50 and the Birth of Marxist-Humanism in the U.S.* (Chicago: News and Letters, 1984).

98. A reference to the June 17, 1953, East German uprising—for a discussion by Dunayevskaya, see *Marxism and Freedom*, pp. 249–52.

99. Concerning the "the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation," Marx wrote "The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its growth, and, therefore, also the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productivity of its labor, the greater is the industrial reserve army [the unemployed]. The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, develop also the labor-power at its disposal. The relative mass of the industrial reserve army increases therefore with the potential energy of wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labor army [the employed], the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labor. The more extensive, finally, the pauperized sections of the working class and the industrial reserve army, the growth of official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation" [MCIF, p. 798; MCIK, p. 207, emphasis in original].

100. In the last pages of *Capital*, Vol. I, Marx wrote concerning the transition to capitalism in Western Europe: "At a certain stage of development, it [the old society] brings into the world the material means of its own destruction. From that moment, new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society, forces and passions which feel themselves to be fettered by that society. It has to be annihilated; it is annihilated" (MCIF, p. 928; MCIK, p. 835). Dunayevskaya reworked this as "new passions and new forces," giving somewhat greater emphasis to the subjective element, also reinterpreting the concept in terms of opposition to contemporary capitalism, especially in connection with her concept of new forces of revolution besides the working classes. See especially Ch. 9 of her *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), "New Passions and New Forces: The Black Dimension, the Anti-Vietnam War Youth, Rank-and-File Labor, Women's Liberation," which offered a critical discussion of the radical movements of the 1960s.

101. The notion that the German people shared a collective "war guilt" for Nazism, a notion that was attacked in the 1940s by the Johnson-Forest Tendency and by other members of the anti-Stalinist Left like Dwight MacDonald (1906–82).

102. An apparent reference to Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955).

103. Wilhelm Windelband, author of *A History of Philosophy* (1892), was a member of the neo-Kantian Marburg school. Dunayevskaya's source for this remark is probably Richard Kroner's Introduction to Hegel's *Early Theological Writings*, where he writes, "In his *History of Modern Philosophy* Wilhelm Windelband says that the generation able to understand the *Phenomenology* has died out" (p. 43).

104. This is actually Richard Kroner's paraphrase of Hegel's comment in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*: "What in former days occupied the energies of a man of mature mental ability, sinks to the level of information . . . in this educational progress we can see the history of the world's civilization delineated in faint outline" [PhGB, pp. 89–90; PhGM, p. 16]. See Kroner's Introduction to Hegel's *Early Theological Writings*, p. 46.

105. This appears as an advertisement from the publisher in *American Economic Review* 48:3 (June 1958).





## Chapter Three

# On Technology and Labor on the Eve of Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man*

August 8, 1960

Dear R. D.:

I feel pretty bad for not having answered your various notes and letters,<sup>1</sup> the main reason being that I am neurotically busy with my new book and equally neurotic about the slightest interruption. Please accept my apology. I am sure you will understand. I should even feel worse about it because I am writing you now to ask a favor. I may have told you that my new book with the tentative title *Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*,<sup>2</sup> is some sort of western counterpart of *Soviet Marxism*<sup>3</sup>—that is to say it will deal, not only with the ideology but also with the corresponding reality. One of my problems will be the transformation of the laboring class under the impact of rationalization, automation and particularly, the higher standard of living. I am sure you will know what I mean if I refer to the discussion among the French sociologists in *Arguments* and especially Serge Mallet's articles.<sup>4</sup> It is a question of a changing—that is to say—a more affirmative attitude of the laborer not only towards the system as a whole but even to the organization of work in the more highly modernized plants. Mallet's field study of French workers in the Caltex establishment in France points up sharply the rise of a highly co-operative attitude and of a vested interest in the establishment.<sup>5</sup>

Now, what I should like to ask you is first, your own considered evaluation as far as the situation in this country is concerned, and secondly, if it isn't asking too much—reference to American literature on this problem pro

and contra. I know that your own evaluation runs counter to the thesis of reconciliatory integration of the worker with the factory but I would also like to know whether there is any sensible argument for the other side.

I hope that I do not intrude too much upon your time. How is your own work coming along?

With best wishes and greetings,

Sincerely,

HM

\* \* \*

August 16, 1960

Dear HM:

It was good to hear from you. (Your letter was delayed because you sent it to the old address; please note new one: 4482 - 28th St.)

Your letter of the 8th came at an auspicious time since the special issue of *News & Letters*, which will be issued as a special pamphlet, *Workers Battle Automation*,<sup>6</sup> has just come off the press and should be of value to you both because you will see the workers speaking for themselves on the conditions of labor and the alleged high standard of living. I know, from the time I last spoke to you, that you consider these views as being the result of my influence. While it is true that Charles Denby and some (by no means all) of the writers of this pamphlet are Marxist Humanists, you would make a serious mistake if you considered their views so exceptional that they did not represent the American proletariat. They represent a very important segment of the American workers and in all basic industries—auto, steel, coal—and the conditions they describe are what they experience on the line, not what some sociologists see in a “field study.” I would like to call your attention also or especially to p. 6, “Which Way Out” because, contrary to the monolith not only of Communists but radicals who think they must have a “united voice” when they face the public, workers here disagree openly. Angela Terrano, whom you may recall I quote in *Marxism & Freedom* because she has raised the question of what kind of labor in the true Marxist sense, and who then used the expression that work would have to be totally different, “something completely new, not just work to get money to buy food and things. It will have to be completely tied up with life” (p. 275)<sup>7</sup> here rejects Automation altogether whereas the editor<sup>8</sup> insists that if the workers managed the factory it would not be a House of Terror and works along the more traditional channels of workers’ control of production, shorter workday, etc.

Secondly, I happen to know a Caltex engineer who says some very different things than Serge Mallet. I had him add a special paragraph on the question you raised, but this study of "Oil and Labor" published in the FI in 1948<sup>9</sup> was quite a comprehensive one and as I doubt you have it I enclose that too. (But when you have finished please return at your convenience) At the same time I am not sure that you have my article in *Arguments* on "State Capitalism and Bureaucracy"<sup>10</sup> which deals with some of the sociologists you no doubt have in mind as, C. Wright Mills,<sup>11</sup> who speak on somewhat a higher level than the epiphenomenal "Organization Man,"<sup>12</sup> and contrasts that to a state capitalist analysis of the times we live in. Since it was simultaneously published also in English I am enclosing the *Socialist Leader* of January 2, 1960 which does so. I will also try to locate the "Two Worlds"<sup>13</sup> article at the beginning of the year which dealt with the American economy in the postwar years as it goes from recession to recession.

Now then the American literature on the subject: I have long since stopped paying attention to sociologists who have rather degenerated into the school of "social psychology" which the workers in the factory rightly call "head shrinking" so my list cannot be exhaustive but I can give you the major references. Since the class struggle was never accepted in American sociology as the framework of analysis, your reference to those who speak of alleged cooperative attitude of worker to management and even "organization of work"(!), must have in mind ex-radicals and near radicals whose recent toutings of the virtues of capitalism are sort of summed up in the person of Daniel Bell and his strung-out articles called a book, "The End of Ideology"<sup>14</sup> by which they mean, of course, the end of the class struggle. Certainly *they* are struggling no longer now that their philistinism cannot even assume the veneration of the West European ends of the class struggle (Not only the French but even the British "New Left") but the crassest apologia for State Department "culture." (Now, isn't that a better euphemism than "the line"?)

Perhaps the most solid of these is Seymour Martin Lipset. His "Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics"<sup>15</sup> is dominated by his attempt to "document" the attenuation of the class struggle: The modification of late capitalism by welfare legislation, redistribution by taxation, powerful unions and "Full Employment" legislation. Lipset's thesis is that "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved; the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in over-all state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions to economic problems."<sup>16</sup> (Even here the American is very different from the French who when he espouses the attenuation of the class struggle goes for the Plan with a capital P while the American remains "the free enterpriser" although the State Department itself when it is a question of *export* of ideology goes for "people's capitalism.")

A book that has recently gotten a lot of attention both because it is new and sort of summarizes in bright journalistic language some half century of sociology is "The Eclipse of Community" by the Princeton University sociologist, Maurice R. Stein.<sup>17</sup> There are all sorts of shouting on "The End of Industrial Man" (Peter Drucker),<sup>18</sup> the end of political man, "The Politics of Mass Society" by William Kornhauser.<sup>19</sup> Now none claim that the end of this economic, industrial, political man, even as his thinking too has been taken over by the electronic brain, is happy or content with his work. In that respect the ambivalence is seen clearest in Daniel Bell's "Work and Its Discontents" whose claim is that the attenuation of the class struggle has nevertheless occurred, if not in the factory, then by "the new hunger, the candied carrot."<sup>20</sup> How much have we heard of those TV sets and "occupational mobility" and David Riesman's flip side record from the Lonely Man to "Individualism Reconsidered"<sup>21</sup> of the need "to increase automatization in work—but for the sake of pleasure and consumption and not for the sake of work itself."<sup>22</sup> At least Bell has one good catch phrase that the descriptions that issue from the so-called "human relations" projects are "not of human, but of cow, sociology."<sup>23</sup>

If you take the economists, you also have a choice of the flip side so that Louis M. Hacker now touts "The Triumph of Capitalism"<sup>24</sup> and while everyone is ashamed of such past as "The Decline of American Capitalism" which, like all so-called Marxist books from Corey<sup>25</sup> to that Stalinist apologist who passes for "the" Marxist authority (even Joseph Schumpeter's monumental but quite lopsided or, as we say more appropriate in Jewish "tsidreit,"<sup>26</sup> work, "History of Economic Analysis"<sup>27</sup> refers to him as such) Paul Sweezy<sup>28</sup> are one and all underconsumptionist<sup>29</sup> so that, whether you take the period of the 1930s when "all" were Marxists to one degree or another and some serious works were done, or you take now when nearly the only works against capitalism are issued by the Stalinists, there really is no genuine Marxist analysis of the American economy either historically, sociologically or as economic works. But, at least, from the economists one does get figures and they do show that in "The Affluent Society"<sup>30</sup> some are very much more affluent than others. Otherwise the sociological works, even before McCarthyism for whom they lay prostrate, were specialized studies of one or another aspect, like occupational mobility by sociologists Reinhard Bendix and S. M. Lipset<sup>31</sup>, or the Lynds' "Middletown"<sup>32</sup> or Lloyd Warner's "Yankee City"<sup>33</sup> or Louis Wirth's "The Ghetto"<sup>34</sup> or Florian Znaniecki<sup>35</sup> on the Polish peasant in America. Even the more broad dislocations "Class and Caste in Southern Town" by Dollard<sup>36</sup> had no comprehensive view of American society as a whole. When both the muckrakers before World War I (Lincoln Steffens' "Autobiography" if you happen not to have read it will do for that) and the specialized studies of the 1930s and some in World War II stopped flowing, we then went into the most famous Elton Mayo's Haw-

thorne studies on "The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization," which were to replace, I suppose, the statistical studies of sharecroppers, breadlines, etc.

Now everything has moved to Automation. In addition to those I list in M&F<sup>37</sup> there is now "Automation and Technological Change," Hearings before the Joint Comm. on the Eco. Report, 84th Congress, Wash, D.C.<sup>38</sup> H. B. Jacobson and J. S. Roucek "Automation and Society" (Phil. Library),<sup>39</sup> C. Walker's "Toward the Automatic Factory"<sup>40</sup> and "Automation and the Worker" by Floyd C. Mann and L. Richard Hoffman,<sup>41</sup> which, despite its title, is not what the worker feels but a specialized study in power plants by the U. of Mich. There is a good bibliography, issued in 1959, called "Economic and Social Implications of Automation: A Bibliographic Review," Michigan State U., East Lansing, Mich.<sup>42</sup> I doubt any of these are really what you wish to waste your time on, but it is a fact that the new (since 1958) "The Society for the History of Technology" with its journal "Technology and Culture" (Vol. I, #1, Winter 1959) at least doesn't write with the guilt complex that the sociologists do and therefore can both be somewhat more objective as well as free from the attempt to identify the end of *its* ideology with that of the "masses". Not being concerned much with the masses (their outpost away from the publishing center here at Wayne State U. and its editor Melvin Kranzberg of Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, is really Chicago and the "Christian Humanism" of the sociologist-technologist U. Nef)<sup>43</sup> it can pay attention to the technological base as it impinges on other fields. For example, it would definitely be worthwhile if your book is not going to press right this minute to get its next issue which it promises to devote entirely to that monumental 5 volume study "A History of Technology," which is edited by Charles Singer<sup>44</sup> and which series of articles on it, critical and otherwise, will be prefaced by him.

Now then, as you see, I could not give you the listing of the American literature on the subject without giving you my views as well. I wish now to summarize my considered evaluation not merely of books but of the American society as I see, which differs very radically from your views. If I may, I would like to say that I hope at least that you have not, in your preoccupation with "the transformation of the laboring class" fallen into the trap of viewing Marxian socialism as if it were a distributive philosophy. I do not mean to insult you and put you in the underconsumptionist category but such great revolutionaries as Rosa Luxemburg were in it,<sup>45</sup> despite the fact that her "Reform or Revolution"<sup>46</sup> was based precisely on removing the question of the class struggle from its reduction to a question of "personal fortunes" to one of production relations. Engels certainly wrote many works on production relations and never was even conscious of any deviations, and yet by not being the dialectician and humanist Marx was, wrote tracts that were far afield. Hilferding had undertaken his "Finance Capital"<sup>47</sup> as a bring-

ing up to date of *Capital* yet the “organized capitalism” with its “stability” inclinations reduced socialism to a matter of “taking over” not reorganized from the ground up, least of all by the spontaneous actions of the workers. Of course, you may say that is exactly where Marx was “wrong” and you of course are not only entitled to your view but writing probingly for many years, and I may be doing you great injustice since I do not have your MSS at hand (I do hope you will send it to me so that view can be concrete instead of based on assumptions) but I just have a feeling that this preoccupation with the alleged high standard of living shifts the weight from what you yourself state in the Preface to my book as “the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy.” [M&F, p. xxi].

Therefore, allow me to recapitulate some fundamentals although all are familiar to you. First you no doubt recall that on p. 125 of M&F where I quote from *Capital, Vol. I* pp. 708–9 on law of accumulation I argue against the popular concept that now that the worker is “better off” etc., pointing to Marx’s statement that “in proportion as capital is accumulated, the lot of the laborer, *be his payment high or low*, must grow worse.” [MCIF, p.799; MCIK, p. 708–709]. (Emphasis added.) That his lot has grown worse is evidenced in the conditions of labor under Automation and in the unemployment it has produced. The “pockets of depression” may sound very incidental to those who do not have to live in them but when, in 1960, even a Jack Kennedy (now that electioneering is in the air) must stand appalled at conditions in West Virginia where actual cases of mothers selling themselves into prostitution to try to keep from starvation, isn’t it time for the exponents of higher standard of living to take a breather and look into the lot of the 5 million unemployed who with their families make up 13 million. And it isn’t only the unemployed, nor even the snail pace of the rate of growth of the American postwar economy which has produced 3 recessions, but the so-called normal conditions under Automation. I have seen miners’ shacks who had an outhouse instead of a toilet but had a TV on the installment plan but that did not signify either contentment or that they “chose” thus the “candied carrot,” but only that TV could be installed whereas before plumbing could be it would need a great deal more than a \$5 down payment—you’d have to root out altogether those hovels, including the miserable excuses for roads leading to them in this most road-conscious industrially advanced free land.

The answer of those who seem to take the opposite view is that, 1, they have never even bothered to build a LP,<sup>48</sup> 2, the labor leadership they have they “deserve” since they wanted for the Reuthers, Meanys, Hoffas,<sup>49</sup> and 3, that they are not “active” i.e., rechanging society this very movement. Striking, wildcats,<sup>50</sup> and organization of their own thinking seem not to count for very much. For the moment I’ll accept this non-acceptable view and ask

whether that is any more than the “bourgeoisification of the British proletariat” Marx and Engels so bemoan or “the aristocracy of labor” that Lenin saw as the root cause of the collapse of the Second Int.

This brings me to the second basic Marxian view, on the question of going to *ever deeper and lower* strata of the proletariat for its revolutionary essence. You may recall that on p. 187 of M&F I bring Marx’s speech of Sept. 20, 1871, after the collapse of PC<sup>51</sup> and the cowardly running even before then of the British trades union leaders. (I have seen that Speech only in Russian, but it may be available in German I don’t know.)<sup>52</sup> I there also show that Lenin hadn’t “discovered” this which he now called “*the quintessence of Marxism*” until he himself was confronted not only with the betrayal of the Second [International]<sup>53</sup> but with the *ultra leftism of Bukharin* who was there upon ready to castigate not only the Second’s leadership but the proletariat itself.<sup>54</sup> It is the last par. on that p. 187 where I deal with Lenin’s approach on two levels, the real and the ideal, that I would now like to call to your attention, if I may.

It is true that Automation and state capitalism are not only “quantitative” but qualitative changes in our contemporary society and that that predominant fact would also affect a *part* of the proletariat. But a part is not the whole. Indeed, the fact that gives the appearance of an affluent society not only in the bourgeois sector but in the masses—the millions of employed so that the 5 millions unemployed look “little”—does not show that those unemployed are *predominantly in the production workers*. No suburbia here. It is all concentrated in the industrial centers, among an organized but wildcatting proletariat and aggravated by the Negro Question which is by no means quiescent and among a youth that has shown that they are not rebels without a cause but with one. I know you do not accept my view that they are in search of a total philosophy and are not getting themselves ready for the dustbin of history. But it is a fact that not only among the proletariat and the million that were striking just when Khrushchev was visiting<sup>55</sup> and Eisenhower wanted him to show American superiority in industry, not industry at a standstill, it is a fact that in just the few months that Negro college youth began sitting in<sup>56</sup> the whole question of freedom and youth “coming up to the level of the West European” has been moved from the stage of the future to that of the present.

That will do until I actually see your book in manuscript and get the development of your thought. I should be very happy to write again then. Meanwhile, my work—and I still labor with the Absolute Idea despite the activist pressures you are free from—moves slowly, but I do hope after Labor Day to get more time to concentrate on the book. Perhaps I’ll get to Boston in winter—I did get there last March but I was there for only two days and two lectures and had no chance to try to contact you. If the invitation to speak will be repeated this fall, I will try to see and talk with you.

\* \* \*

August 24, 1960

Dear R. D.

It was wonderful to get from you such quick and good help. I read at once the issue of *News & Letters*.<sup>57</sup> Don't misunderstand me: I agree with practically everything that is said there, and yet, somehow, there is something essentially wrong here. (1) What is attacked, is *not* automation, but pre-automation, semi-automation, non-automation. Automation as the explosive achievement of advanced industrial society is the practically complete *elimination* of precisely that mode of labor which is depicted in these articles. And this genuine automation is held back by the capitalists as well as by the workers—with very good reasons (on the part of the capitalists: decline in the rate of profit; need for sweeping government controls, etc.; on the part of the workers: technological unemployment). (2) It follows that arrested, restricted automation saves the capitalist system, while consummated automation would inevitably explode it: Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*. p. 592–593.<sup>58</sup> (3) re Angela T.<sup>59</sup>: you should really tell her about all that humanization of labor, its connection with life, etc.—that this is possible only *through* complete automation, because such humanization is correctly relegated by Marx to the realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity, i.e., beyond the entire realm of socially necessary labor in the material production. Total *de*-humanization of the latter is the prerequisite.

But all this has to be discussed orally. I hope we can do so in the winter. And again, my great gratitude!

I am sending \$10—to help *News and Letters*

Cordially,

Herbert

\* \* \*

October 16, 1960

Dear HM:

I hope I may intrude upon you with some [thoughts] on the Absolute Idea. You may find it useful even for your present purposes since you are dealing with sociology and technology and Nikolai Bukharin is the father, though I



doubt he would like that strange progeny of Mills, Rossiter, Mallet,<sup>60</sup> of all mechanists, and these are my “enemies” as I proceed to work out the philosophic foundations (the Hegelian Absolute Idea and Marx’s Humanism for the present day struggles for freedom in the underdeveloped economies, a sort of counterpart to *Marxism and Freedom* which limited itself to the present-day descent from ontology to technology. It should help to sharpen up the edges.)

At once I must make so bold with historic background as to include both the African and Hungarian Revolutions, even as, suddenly, without anyone bothering to explain why, Latin America too is included among “backward countries,” although their populations are not African but of European stock, nor do they lack either an “educated class” or railroads or aeroplanes through “jungle country.” The one element of truth in the designation of “backward” pertains to the economy but since I take man, not the “economy as such,” as subject, I would like at once to make clear *what* is the “thesis” I use from Hegel’s final chapter [of the *Science of Logic*]. It is to be found on p. 467: “The self-determination therefore in which alone the Idea is, is to hear itself speak” [SLII, p. 467; SLM, p. 825]. The self-determinations of people are, surely, no less important than the self-determination of the Idea but even its [illegible word] is present in today’s [illegible words] is no accident that Nagy, the Petofi intelligentsia,<sup>61</sup> and the Hungarian Workers Councils all fought its ideological battles by unfolding Marxist Humanism and this same discovery appears in Senegal where Leopold Senghor, for all his apologia for De Gaulle, unfolds the same banner. (I do not recall whether I sent you my review of Senghor’s *African Socialism*,<sup>62</sup> but I’ll find a copy somewhere and send it to you.)

Now, in detail, to the unfoldment of the Absolute Idea in Hegel’s *Logic*, all the way glancing at which point in it, at the various historic stages in the development of the Marxist movement, the Marxists “got caught.” The significance of that first paragraph on p. 466,<sup>63</sup> for Lenin at end of 1914, was that the unity of the theoretic and practical idea applied not so much in action as “*precisely in the theory of knowledge . . .*” [LCW 38, p. 219]. You may recall that just five pages before he reached that chapter, where Hegel dealt with “The Idea of the Good,” Lenin stressed the actuality of the Idea and “non-actuality of the world” by writing: “Alias: Man’s cognition not only reflects the objective world but creates it” [LCW 38, pp. 212–13]. But Lenin did not develop precisely that aspect, as we shall see, when we reach the end of the chapter.

That same first paragraph of the A.I. contains the stopping point of today’s African intelligentsia. If you are versed in their constant reiteration of the “African personality,” you will recognize them easily enough in Hegel: “The Notion is not only *Seele* [soul] but also is free and subjective Notion, which is for itself and therefore has [personality . . . it is] not exclusive

individuality, but is, for itself, universality and cognition, and in its Other has its own objectivity for object.” Without that personality too would only be “error and gloom, opinion, striving, caprice, and transitoriness . . .” [SLII, p. 466; SLM, p. 824].

All the Marxists of the 2nd International (Lenin up to 1914 included) at the *very* best stopped on p. 467 (if even we give them credit that is of having grappled with Hegel himself instead of some tertiary summary of him) when Hegel speaks of “the universal element of its form—that is the *method*” [SLII, p. 467; SLM, p. 825]. As to vulgarization of that “method” Hegel surely had not only the Cynics and Sophists in mind [as] a few pages hence (p. 473) he says the dialectic “was often quite neglected by those who were fullest of him [Plato] in their speech” [SLII, p. 473; SLM, p. 831]. The Second International not merely neglected the dialectic, but perverted it into a sort of polish for their organic Kantianism.

Because all Marxists, not excluding Marx himself, do like to stress method rather than A.I., thus pinpointing the putting of Hegel “right side up,” it is necessary to linger a bit here. Although he stresses (p. 468) that “nothing is either conceived or known in its truth except in so far as it is completely subject to the method,” [SLII, p. 468; SLM, p. 826] he separates himself at once from those who would degrade method to a tool, as analysts do: “In inquiring cognition the method is likewise in the position of a tool, of a means which stands on the subjective side, whereby the method relates itself to the object. In this syllogism the subject is one extreme and the object the other... The extremes remain distinct because, subject, method, and object are not posited as the one identical Notion . . .” [SLII, p. 469; SLM, p. 827].

In contrast, therefore, Hegel proceeds to define method for true cognition: “it is the fact that the Notion is determined in and for itself and is the mean only because it equally has the significance of objective . . .” [SLII, p. 469; SLM, p. 827]. The transition here is to get back to the determination of the method. “First we must begin from the *beginning*. . .” [SLII, p. 469, SLM, p. 827] and the beginning, Hegel informs us to the consternation of philosopher and engineer alike, “must be inherently defective and must be endowed with the impulse of self-development” [SLII, p. 471; SLM, p. 829].

The self-determination of the Idea, as that of peoples, far from being worlds apart, cannot be seen in their fullness, “in and for itself” apart from each other. It is in this respect that I just get fed up with Marxists who keep harping on “method” as if it meant opposition to A.I., or, better put, want “to throw out God and the Absolute Idea” so that Idea (ideas) too is buried. In *Historical Materialism*, for example, Bukharin speaks of “society” as if indeed it was matter, dead matter. Perhaps I better follow the way of Hegel in this too and refuse to have anything to do with vulgarizers. His admonition that the vulgar refutation “be left to itself” ([SLII] p. 474 [SLM, p. 832]) reminded me of the Ghost of Hamlet’s father telling him all about the corrup-

tion of the court, the murder and the vengeance he should seek, nevertheless admonishes him against taking action against one of the conspirators, his mother: "Leave her to heaven." If only we had some "heaven" . . .

What is important, says Hegel, is the source of the "prejudice" against the dialectic, i.e., that it seems to have only negative results; and therefore what is of the essence is "To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition" ([SLII] p. 476 [SLM, p. 834]). It is here, where he deals with the second negative, or mediated determination, the negative "*of the positive*, and includes the latter," where Hegel stresses the subjective "for the transcendence of the opposition between Notion and Reality and that unity which is the truth, rest upon [this] subjectivity alone" [SLII, p. 477; SLM, p. 835].

We are entering the whole section where even the Lenin of post-1914 found "not clear" and I believe that the fact that we live in 1960, not in 1914, and the fact that we witness both the advanced proletariat's battles with automation as well as the colonial freedom struggles, can help us break it down. I am not underestimating Lenin's conception of "the positive in the negative" [LCW 38, p. 226; see also SLM, p. 834; SLII, p. 476]. One who led 1917 needs no minor league defenses. Long before he read Hegel on subjectivity, Lenin saw "Masses as Reason."<sup>64</sup> But if he saw that truth as long back as 1905, and was preparing to repeat that on a much grander historical scale, why then did this turning point of the movement of the Notion appear obscure to Lenin?

Hegel, on his part, hit out against the whole triplicity construction of the dialectic here, saying "If number is applicable, then the whole course of this second immediate is the third term . . . now, since the former (the first negative) is itself the second term, the third term may now be counted as fourth, and the abstract form of it may be taken as a quadruplicity in place of triplicity . . ." ([SLII] p. 478 [SLM, p. 836]). Lenin's note here: "The distinction is not clear to me; is not the absolute equivalent to the more concrete?" [LCW 38, p. 229].

Yes and no, says Hegel, as I read him. It is concrete but it is equally subject: "The beginning was the universal; the result is the individual, the concrete and the subject" [SLII, p. 479; SLM, p. 837]. It is subject he had in mind as soon as he had reached the turning point in the movement of the notion, 1st stressing that "transcendence of opposition between Notion and Reality, and that unity which is truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone" [SLII, p. 477; SLM 835]. He first stressed that transcendence of contradiction which "is the innermost and most objective moment of Life and Spirit by virtue of which a subject is personal and free" [SLII, p. 478; SLM, pp. 835-36]. And as Hegel moves to the climactic, after method is extended to system, and even though you must enter other spheres—Nature and Mind—

he cannot refrain from saying that we have ended with transitions, have entered “absolute *liberation*” ([SLII] p. 485 [SLM, p. 843]). “The transition here therefore must rather be taken to mean that the Idea [that] freely releases itself in form of its determinate[ness] is utterly free... the Notion arises as free existence that out of externality has passed into itself; arises to perfect its self-liberation . . .” ([SLII] p. 486 [SLM, pp. 843-44]).

Now all this “personal and free,” “individual,” “liberation,” “release,” “utterly free,” “self-liberation” cannot possibly mean only the philosopher finding his absolute, as he shows in the *Philosophy of Mind* when his own mind wanders to the struggles against slavery. (Nor do I feel like fighting with Hegel over whether Christianity or actuality brought freedom of man into the world; the Old Man was great enough and even if he did reside in ivory towers, they were awfully crowded ones—so much so that today’s freedom fighters in Africa find room there too.)

In all fairness to Lenin, I must here jump to Khrushchev and his state philosophers who are supposed to have, according to Wetter and Kline and all the specialists in *Soviet Survey*, “reconstituted the law of the negation of the negation, which had been thrown out as a feature of the dialectic” by Stalin.<sup>65</sup> No doubt it is true that “negation of negation” was too close for comfort to a totalitarian society—for Khrushchev as much as for Stalin, however. What is of more specific note is that Soviet science, in Stalin’s time, had not yet achieved that breakthrough that it had need of that law to justify “acceptance of theory of relativity and rejection of the idealistic interpretation in Bohr.” With missile thrust and automated production achieved, they have need of the law *for the natural sciences as they practice them*.

Science is not my forte, and in any case, subjectivity is not for the vulgarly materialistic. The self-developing “subject”—the proletariat—not just negation of negation “in general” is *the* enemy and when Karpushin<sup>66</sup> asked that the Early Essays of Marx be once again included in the Complete Works of Marx, it was *not to* “reestablish the law of the negation of negation,” but to attack, pervert, destroy if he can Marxist Humanism where Man, not Absolute Idea, became the subject of all humanity’s development and the *dehumanization* of Ideas be once and for all stopped when even so great a philosopher as Hegel must perforce return to positivism.

Now then to return to Lenin—the jump to Khrushchev’s Russia was only to show what can happen to a non-worked-out aspect of dialectics—Hegel made him see all the leaps where there was gradualness, all the self-movement where there was external reflection of the “International” or *established* socialist party. The value of a theory of knowledge that has within it “all the world-connections,” the motive force in the ideal as well as the real, the *individual*, the “personal and free,” how could that arise *as concrete* until *after* 1917 did not bring a new world social order? Something has to be left for our age, no?

In any case, where Bukharin remained in Teleology, Lenin passed on as saw Hegel laying the premises for historical materialism—the transformation of the subjectivity of purpose by means of working upon, negating object; opposition of subjective end to external object was only first negation, while second negation takes place *through the means*. In this relation between first and second negation, indeed, resides the relation between vulgar and dialectical materialism, for the vulgar materialist never gets beyond opposition of subjective end to external object. But the materialist in Lenin so overwhelmed him at this point of historic revelation that, you will recall, he wanted to *stop* where “Hegel stretched his hand to materialism” [LCW 38, p. 234] as he “ended” with Nature. Since that was so in the *Smaller Logic*, but there was another very important paragraph to go in the *Science of Logic*,<sup>67</sup> the dividing point for our epoch is precisely on this free, individual, total liberation who show, both in thought and struggles, what they are aiming us and thus compelling me in any case to read and reread that Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Idea, Absolute Mind as each developing struggle on the world scene deepens.

I'll stop at this point and tell you that if you are interested and wish to comment on this, I'll continue to forward various thoughts-in-process as I work on my new book—and am just “dying” to go to Africa.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

November 22, 1960

Dear HM:

Talking out loud alone is certainly no substitute for a dialogue, but the fact that you are in Mass. and I in Mich. is permitting me the illusion that some one is in listening. In any case I feel impelled once again to return to Nikolai Bukharin's “Historical Materialism.”<sup>68</sup> My phrase that Bukharin treated society as “dead matter” sounded slanderous and so I turned to his chapter (IV) on “Society” and there (p. 84) read: “We encounter not only simple bodies, which at once impress us as constituting units (for ex., a sheet of paper, a cow, John Smith), but also meet with compound units, intricate quantities.”

Incredible is it sounds when a revolutionary Marxist speaks in one and the same breath of “a sheet of paper” and a human being as a “unit,” but it is the actual, irresistible ultimate from one “who never quite understood the dialectic” (to use Lenin's phrase).<sup>69</sup> If society can be turned into such an abstrac-

tion, it shouldn't surprise us that science too is made into an abstraction under which human activity is subsumed. Hegel had the right word for that method: "For this reason determinism itself suffers from an indeterminate-ness which forces it to go on to infinity; at any point it may halt and rest satisfied, because the Object to which it has passed over is rounded in itself as a formal totality and is indifferent to determination by another." (Chapter on "Mechanism," *Science of Logic* II, p. 352 [SLM, p. 713]).

In place of self-activity, Bukharin, as all good determinists, looks for states of equilibrium, "laws" of development, uniformity. Indeed, his hostility to self-determination is so absolute that he conceives of 2 forms of uniformity, teleology and causality, and causality, for Bukharin, is one event, cause, being followed by another event, effect. His thinking is confined within intellectual planning or what Hegel would call "self-determination applied only externally" (Ibid, p. 391 [SLM, p. 750]).

Having defined science as objective content in and for itself, NB can classify "bourgeois" science and "proletarian" science according to the abstract universal of usefulness or what would nowadays be called "neutrality." His choice of "proletarian" science is therefore quantitative—it is more "far-sighted." Even as today's Soviet as well as American sciences, Bukharin keeps using categories of a lower order, particularly mathematical categories which preclude self-movement and transformation into opposite for he seems not very oppressively aware of the fact that specific contents have specific forms of movement, and man's self-activity cannot be subsumed under science, whether that is "near sighted" or "far sighted." Not only far distant but completely unapproachable with Bukharin's categories stands the young Marx: "To have one basis for life and another for science is *a priori* a lie" [M&F1958, p. 300; MECW, 3, p. 303].

I need not tell you that, in contrast to Bukharin's mechanical materialism (which characterizes present-day science), dialectics sees the subject as an in-and-for itself determinateness which has appropriated objectivity: "Consequently, the activity of the end is not directed against itself, for the purpose of absorbing and assimilating a given determination: it aims rather at positing its own determination, and by transcending the determinations of the external world, at giving itself reality in the form of external actuality" (Logic, II, p. 461 [SLM, p. 819]).

The fact that present-day scientists and sociologists cannot shine Bukharin's shoes only further emphasizes the fact that once you identify men and things you fall into the trap of the fundamental alienation of philosophers in class society from the ancient Greek dichotomy of form and apeiron,<sup>70</sup> philosophers and slaves to its culmination under automated capitalism where, as you put it, ontology has been transformed into technology.<sup>71</sup>

Lest you consider my contrary stress on subjectivity as “pure” idealism, will you permit me to sum up what it is I have been doing since 1953 when I became so preoccupied with the Absolute Idea?<sup>72</sup> The essence of those May letters was that there is a movement *from* practice to theory as well as from theory to practice. The reason that it stirred up such a fuss in the sectarian movements is that heretofore is that this statement of fact was made equivalent to *instinct*: workers, of course, had the “right instinct” and Marxism, “of course,” had correctly generalized this instinct into a revolutionary theory, but . . . without Marxist theory the revolutionary practice would get “nowhere.” Above all, it was stressed, only Marx could have seen this where Hegel’s idea of practice was for the theory of knowledge “only.” Therefore, to deduce this movement from practice from Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind*,<sup>73</sup> ran the argument against me, is sheer abandonment of the real world for that of ivory towers, a return from the world of action to that of talk of “philosophers.” The “philosophers,” on their part, were as little inclined to bend their ears to the earth and listen for any new impulses for theory. A short month after my letters were dispatched the first revolt from behind the Iron Curtain started<sup>74</sup> so that both the man on the street and the philosopher, not to speak of the vanguardists, had to change the question: *Can* man gain freedom from out of totalitarian stranglehold to *Will* he?

From 1953 to 1956 (Hungarian Revolution) we were confronted, on the theoretical front, by the sudden attacks of Russian Communism on Marx’s humanist writings<sup>75</sup> which turned out to have been used by “revisionist” Marxists as the banner under which they fought Communism not only in Western Europe but in far away Africa where, on the practical front, the most significant revolutions of our epoch were unfolding. As my ideas on the Absolute Idea got worked up in *Marxism and Freedom* they were quite general. It was clear I was walking gingerly *not* because I found myself outside any “recognized” movement but because I was dealing more with Marx’s age than ours. More than a 100 years divide our age from the period when the founder of Marxism first stood Hegel right side up and very nearly dismissed Hegel’s compulsion to go from the Absolute Idea in the *Logic* to Nature as “boredom, the yearning for a content,” on the part of “the abstract thinker who, made clever by experience and enlightened beyond its truth, has decided under many false and still abstract conditions, to *abandon* himself and to substitute his otherness, the particular, the determined, for his self-contained being, his nothingness, his universality and his indeterminateness.” (*Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic*).<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless the young Marx cannot stop there and does follow Hegel from Nature to Mind, breaking off, however, in very short order.<sup>77</sup>

From then on the Marxian dialectic is the creative dialectic of the actual historic movement and not only that of thought. The continuation therefore resides in the three volumes of *Capital*, the First International, the Civil War

in France and the Critique of the Gotha Program.<sup>78</sup> A rich enough heritage not to get mummified, but the objective world has its own way of magnetizing so to speak a single point in thought.

Only with the collapse of that world does Lenin feel the compulsion to return to the Hegelian origins of Marxism but the Russian Revolution has a world to remake and no time for abstract discussions on the Absolute Idea.<sup>79</sup> (Lukacs limits Hegelianism to the single field of consciousness *as organization*, or the party as the proletariat's "knowing").<sup>80</sup> In any case the period between 1923 and 1953 is a period of standstill in theory so that the movement from practice finds no theory to match it even as the new stage in production finds only in the workers battling automation any new points of departure for theory as for practice.

Now those who stop with "knowing," whether they are neutral partisans of a technology sans class nature or thought embodiment, or Communist adherents to *partinost*, (be it idealistically a la Lukacs or cynically a la Kadar<sup>81</sup>), fail to grasp that both in Hegel and in Marx the question of cognition is not an abstract question but a concrete, dialectical-empirical one of the *how* thought molds experience or gives action its direction. If the Whole governs the Parts even when the whole is not yet fact, then surely, whether Hegel knew it or not, the pull of the future on the present also tugged at his "system" with such overwhelming force that he could not escape it, ivory tower or no ivory tower, any more than personal capitulation to the Prussian State could compel his philosophy to stop there to genuflect instead of rising out of it and even out of religion into the absolute or the new society he as person could not envisage.

Somewhere D. H. Lawrence says of the relationship of artist to the work of art: Artists are the biggest liars and are not to be taken at face value. But that art, if it is really great art, is truth and will reveal both society and the vision of the artist he buries in his explanatory lies.<sup>82</sup> It is even truer of philosophers in general and Hegel in particular. Subjectivity as objectivity absorbed is not for the philosophers, but for the masses and it is they who are writing the new page of history which is at the same time a new stage in cognition. Even as every previous great step in philosophic cognition was made only when a new leap to freedom became possible, so presently the new struggles for freedom the *world* over will certainly shake the intellectuals out of the stupors so that they too can create freely a new "category." While I may not be waiting breathlessly for these ideologists, I am for the "developing subject" that is the "negative factor." You can't really mean that you are "giving up" the masses, can you?

Yours,

Raya



\* \* \*

December 22, 1960

Dear RD:

I do not want the year let go without thanking you for your letters. I read them several times, but I am unable to discuss them in writing—there is just too much to say.

To me, the most important passages are those in which you stress the need for a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice, and the notion of the new Subject. This is indeed the key, and I fully agree with your statement that the solution lies in the link between the first and second negation. Perhaps I would say: in the self-transcendence of materialism, or in the *technological Aufhebung* of the reified technical apparatus.

But again, although I am trying hard, I cannot see why you need the Absolute Idea in order to say what you want to say. Surely you do not need it in order to demonstrate the Marxian content of self-determination, of the Subject, etc. The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the *pre-technological* stage.<sup>83</sup> Certainly you can “translate” also this part of Hegel—but why translate if you can speak the original language??

Please don't mind my all too brief and inadequate reaction. I am still too much absorbed by these and other problems. But one day soon I hope there will be more.

With the very best wishes for the new year,

Yours,

HM

\* \* \*

January 12, 1961

Dear HM:

I was glad to get your note of December 22 and sorry you had no chance to develop your ideas in greater length. I am looking forward to seeing you and have you expand on this in person. The January lecture in Boston fell through, but I do have a series of three in Springfield the last week in February and the first week in March. Please let me know where I can reach

you by phone and when I get there I'll make it my business to come up to Boston for at least a day, and while that won't exhaust the Absolute Idea, will make a little dent in it.

I should like to divide what I have to say into two parts, the first dealing with your question as to why I "need the Absolute Idea. . . . Why translate if you can speak the original language?" I disagree with you when you say that "The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the *pre-technological* stage." It was not the *pre-technological* stage that impelled Hegel to the Absolute Idea. Although he certainly lived in a pre-technological era, it was the fact that the French Revolution had not brought about the millennium—Reason, Freedom, Self-Liberation—which impelled him towards the Absolute Idea. As we know from his First System, he couldn't accept the fledgling proletariat as that absolute negativity which would reconstruct society, but he didn't just "give up" when he stopped short with that work.<sup>84</sup> Insofar as he compromised with the Prussian State, he *seemed* to have accepted the State as the Absolute and the opportunist in him, no doubt, did. Marx, in fact, was transformed from the petty-bourgeois intellectual into the Marx we know by so profound a critique of the [Hegel's] *Philosophy of Right* that the materialist conception of history was born. But, in all fairness to Hegel the philosopher, he just couldn't stop either at the State or even Religion or its Art (Forms) of the Spirit, but proceeded on to the A.I. Why? Why, when you consider that he had broken with all preceding philosophy and had no use whatsoever for the empty Absolute of Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi?<sup>85</sup>

Let's approach this from another way—Marx's constant return to Hegel and constantly breaking from him. After Marx's Critique of the Philosophy of Right [1843] came the "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" [1844]. There, where he breaks with the Absolute Idea—and he *had* to break from it or the discovery of the Materialist Conception of History would have been just empirical, rather than dialectical, comprehensive, total and human—it is no longer just material foundation vs. super-structure; it is against the *de*-humanization of the Idea, and while he is at it, he rightly rejects the philosopher as the yardstick without forgetting, however, also to break with Feuerbach's anthropological materialism and vulgar communism.<sup>86</sup> By that time (he has barely mentioned Absolute Mind) the whole essay breaks off. With the 1848 Revolutions, Marx certainly has no further "use" for Hegel, and yet in 1859 he is back again. If you contrast the "copying" of Hegel in the form chosen for *The Critique of Political Economy* and in the language of the *Grundrisse* with his *recreation* of the Dialectic from the life of the historic period, 1861–67,<sup>87</sup> you see at once that [in] this break from Hegel, the final transcendence, the Absolute reappears but is this time split into two—for capitalism the general absolute law of capitalist accumulation, and for "the negation of the negation" the new passions and new forces.<sup>88</sup> And, when he returns to

*Capital* after the French Revolution (P.C.) [the Paris Commune] and inserts changes of independent “scientific value” both in Chapter One on the *Form* of value and in the part on Accumulation [concerning] its ultimate development in the concentration of capital in the hands of a single corporation, he at the same time makes the “purely technical” change of eliminating Part Eight as a separate part, subordinating it to a chapter following capitalist accumulation.<sup>89</sup> That is to say, the historical tendency, the whole movement from primitive accumulation through capitalis[m] to the expropriators being expropriated, now is not just a negation of the negation “in general” but the specifically self-developing subject, in its logical, philosophical, historical and individual development. You will remember that he makes some cracks at the “pre-technological” proletarian—the artisan—[compared] to the [“]fully developed individual[“] [MCIK, p. 534; MCIF, p. 618] who will have absorbed the technological achievements and we will get to this Subjectivity when we return to Hegel again.

Again, why the Absolute Idea, only this time tracing it through with Lenin's need. It would, of course, be nonsense to consider that without “a transformation into opposite” that he found in Hegel, Lenin wouldn't have known what to do about the betrayal of the Second International. That man never wavered for one second on what *to do* with or without Hegel. But the need to break with his own philosophic past, that vulgar materialism to which his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* [1908] gave the green light, the need for *self*-liberation in thought must have been overpowering for him to have felt so very much at home with that idealist Hegel. Indeed he learned that the freedom, the *leap* to freedom one gets from a generalization is a release from the empirical, the factual, the deed to where one truly reaches a new human dimension. Think of his writing, and all to himself at that, “man's cognition not only reflects the world, but creates it” [LCW 38, p. 212].

I will take only one single sentence from Hegel from the Absolute Idea chapter which so preoccupies my every waking moment, and “translate” it and you will see at once that though all translations are “correct” and surely historical, they are far from exhausting what *Hegel* meant, and therefore, the constant compulsion to return to him. The sentence is, “The self-determination in which alone the idea is, is to hear itself speak” [SLII, p. 467; SLM p. 825]. If any man understood self-determination in the Marxian sense of self-determination of nations, it certainly is Lenin. At least there you would have thought he would have no need for Hegel. Yet, if you contrast what the self-determination of nations meant to Lenin pre-1914, when it was merely a principle, to what it meant post-1914 when life and theory and philosophy combined, it will be clear that two different worlds, not contradictory perhaps, but different, are at issue there. For, by 1916 when the Irish Revolution had occurred, self-determination wasn't something that was being given by principled Marxists, but something that the masses were getting and giving *to*

Marxists, a new beginning for their revolution which had been betrayed, the bacillus that would bring onto the stage the proletariat in action once again; and after 1917, when it is the Bolsheviks who had to be doing the giving, and when a Bukharin was willing to take liberties with it, because now we were at a “higher” stage,<sup>90</sup> how that revolutionary dialectician, Lenin, hit out, and in the *Will* he was to remind the world that Bukharin never truly understood the Dialectic.<sup>91</sup> Isn’t that something for a reigning statesman to bother himself with on his dying bed? (Did you know that 1922 Lenin once again reread Hegel’s *Logic* and with it that religious philosopher Ilyin, who, in his commentary on the *Logic* was so illuminating on the question of concrete,<sup>92</sup> that he insisted that Ilyin, the reactionary, be freed from jail?)

Now all that meant self-determination in 1914–1924 and if I took only the political translation, how was I to have seen the humanism in the self-determination of the African Decade, 1950–1960: “The self-determination in which alone the Idea is to hear itself speak,” and it speaks with a different voice now, and to be able to hear it there is a necessity not only for the *practice* of hearing today’s masses, but the theory of Hegel’s philosophy.

If I must further justify myself, I would say that, frankly during the 1940’s, when I first became enamored with the Absolute Idea, it was just out of loyalty to Marx and Lenin; Hegel was still hardly more than gibberish, although by now the *music* of his language got to me even if I couldn’t read the notes. But once the new technological period of Automation got to the miners and *they* started asking questions about what kind of labor,<sup>93</sup> the return to the early Marx meant also the late Hegel. As I said, I do not agree with you that the Absolute Idea relates to a pre-technological stage. So long as classes still exist, the dialectic will, and A.I. will forever show new facets. What I do agree with is that once on the world scale we have reached the ultimate in technological development, then the responses of the masses in the pre-technological underdeveloped economies are the spur to seeing the something new in the Absolute Idea. Be it backward Ireland in 1916, or backward Russia in 1917, or backward Africa in 1960, somehow that absolute negativity of Hegel comes into play.

One final word on why “translation” is no substitute for Hegel. It has to do with the limits of the age one lives with, which creates the concrete, but also exhausts it[,] and there is need for return to the abstract, the new universal which will become the new concrete. For example, for Lenin’s age “transformation into opposite” was *the* category, while cognition, not only reflecting but creating, was left alone. To get to a new relationship of theory and practice, on a new foundation, *there was a new concrete in life to create a new stage of philosophic cognition*, a return to Hegel was necessary. Or at least I needed it.

Now to the second reason for this letter. I am glad you agree that a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice and the notion of a new Subject is the key. Without a new formulation, the second negation could be diverted as it is by the Stalinists, to mean a new object—a technique, a sputnik, even an ICBM—instead of the self-developing subject. Of course, technology means the conditions for universality, but without a new subject one would automatically relapse to the state or “Science” doing it. I do not know whether you happen to have read the latest issue of *Technology and Culture* (Winter 1961) where A. Zvorokine, the Editor-in-Chief of the *Russian Review of the History of World Civilization* is attempting to do the same thing with technology that Leontiev and Ostrovityanov did with value, that is to say, denude [it] of its class content.<sup>94</sup> I am writing the Journal [*Technology and Culture*] a letter, which I will enclose for you. The point I want to make here is that vulgar materialism, which rests upon a contemplative attitude toward reality, has, when it is in power, a very vindictive attitude to the self-developing subject. This it tries to hide, either by disregarding the subject or transforming the object Science into “Subject.”

A new beginning must be made, needless to say not from the Object but the Subject. That, I hope, is what you mean by “the self-transcendence of materialism.” Let me return once again to Hegel and that key-passage on the Second Negation and Subjectivity: (Page 477) “The negativity which has just been considered is the turning-point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone” [SLM, p. 835].

To overcome the empiricism of taking the given concrete to be the real one had to do more than just to contrast essence with appearance. Lenin, in his notebooks, is happy when he gets over the final section on Essence (Causality) because it permits him to break with inconsistent empiricism, which includes the limitations of the scientific method, that is to say, the category of causality to explain the relationship between mind and matter. The categories by which we will gain knowledge of the objectively real, Lenin sees, are Freedom, Subjectivity, Notion. These, then, are the transition, or better yet transcendence, of objective idealism into materialism, as well as of vulgar materialism into true subjectivity, which has absorbed the object. And yet, it is precisely from the passage of Hegel which I just quoted that Lenin writes that this play over whether there is a triplicity or quadruplicity in the dialectic, is unclear to him.

(Incidentally, quadruplicity, instead of triplicity, had also a special, though a secondary interest for me because I used to be quite at a loss to understand why Hegel, in the *Encyclopedia*, lists Three attitudes to Objectiv-

ity,<sup>95</sup> which excludes the Hegelian dialectic, since from Kant you go, not to Hegel, but backward to Jacobi. It would then mean that there is a retrogression in history and the famous triplicity of the dialectic must really become a quadruplicity before we finally reach the Freedom of the Absolute. But here, in the *Science of Logic*, we are dealing not so much with attitudes to objectivity as to self-development of self-activity. In any case, the real point to us here is the “immanent determination”—the “self-mediating movement and activity”) [SLII, p. 479; SLM, p. 837].

The following and last pages are all on self-relation, “personal and free,” free release, self-liberation, and it is all done via the three movements of Universal, Particular, and Individual, which characterized the *Science of Logic* as a whole, as well as in each of its sections. Let me retrace my step once again to: “The beginning was the universal; the result is the individual, the concrete, and the subject” [SLII, p. 479; SLM, p. 837].

And yet, the dialectic method, “the method of truth,” has here extended itself into a *system*. Unless one fully holds on to the fact that it is only because the result has been “deduced and demonstrated” (page 480 [SLM, p. 838]), he is likely to give up at this point and say that’s where Hegel must really be stood on his head because he is nothing more than an idealist, after all, who has yet one other system to present as the “Absolute,” and his own at that. But, neither the “system” nor the foundation is any longer a mere assumption, and we have not stopped going to the objective for proof. It does not come out of the philosopher’s head at all, although “each new stage of exteriorization (that is, of further determination) is also an interiorization, and greater extension is also higher intensity” (page 483 [SLM, pp. 840–41]). No doubt, Lenin here again took heart and near the very next sentence, “the richest consequently is also the most concrete,” referred us back to *Capital*. Indeed, it is at this point most likely when he wrote so frantically to the *Granat Encyclopedia*, asking whether he couldn’t after all still add something on the dialectic,<sup>96</sup> even as he had concluded to himself what no Marxist in the past half-century had understood—Capital, which it is impossible to understand without the *whole* of the Logic. History, however, putting barriers even before a genius like Lenin, he remained happiest when he could “pretend” that the Logic ended with Hegel’s extending a “hand to materialism” [LCW 38, p. 234], because as a totality the unity of Notion and Reality, after all assumed the form of *Nature*, which Lenin “translated” as “Practice.”

I am certainly all for the practice of the 1917 Revolution. But even as Lenin had to live also with what “happens after,” 1917–1924, so we who have lived with what “happens after” for nearly four decades *must* find the self-developing subject, the new subject, and new, not only in a country and regarding a specific layer in the proletariat (as against our “aristocrats of labor” and for Marx’s deeper and lower “strata” that have continued the revolutionary impulse), but new that embraces the whole world. That is why

it is impossible to look only at the advanced economy; that is why it is necessary to look also at the most backward; and that is why the world must be our country, i.e., the country of the self-developing subject. Back then to that final paragraph of the A.I., the insistence that we have not just reached a new transition, that *this* determination is “an absolute *liberation*, having no further immediate determination which is not equally *posited* and equally *Notion*. Consequently there is no transition in this freedom. . . . The transition here, therefore, must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in absolute self-security and self-repose. By reason of this freedom the form of its determinateness also is utterly free—the externality of space and time which is absolutely for itself and without subjectivity” [SLII, pp. 485–86; SLM, p. 843].

You see I am not afraid either of the “system” of Hegelian Philosophy, or of the idealism of the Absolute Idea. The A.I. is *the* method of cognition for the epoch of the struggle for freedom, and philosophic cognition is not a system of philosophy, but the cognition of any object, our “object” being labor. The unity of object and subject, theory and practice, and the transcendence of the first negation, will come to realize itself in our time.

One minor word on the question as to why Hegel continued after he “ended” with Nature, which is the way he ended the Smaller *Logic* and which is the logical transition if you transform his *Science of Logic* into a system as he did in the *Encyclopedia* and move from Logic to Nature to Spirit or Mind. Marx, too, had three volumes to his *Capital* and likewise was going to end the first volume “logically,” i.e., without entering this sphere of Accumulation. When he decided, however, to extend the book to include the Notion, not as mere “summation” of all that preceded, but, to use a Hegelian phrase once again, “the pure Notion which forms a Notion of itself” [SLII, p. 486; SLM, p. 844], he also included an anticipation of what Volumes II and III would contain. Volume II, as we know, is far from being Nature; on the contrary, it is that fantastic, pure, isolated “single society” (“socialism in one country,” if you please, only Marx thought it was state capitalism). It was so pure and so logical and so unreal that it completely disorganized poor Rosa [Luxemburg] when she contrasted that phantasmagoria to the rapacious imperialism living off all those under-developed countries it conquered.<sup>97</sup> And, finally, he tells us also that he will indeed come down from those heights to face the whole concrete mess of capitalism and rates of profit and speculation and cheating, but we would only lose all knowledge of what society really is if we reversed the method. And even though Volume III stopped before he had a chance to develop the chapter on Classes, we know that it was not really the class but the full and free development of the individual that would signify a negation of a negation that was not merely destructive of the old, but constructive of the new. In this sense, and in this sense only, Hegel’s last sentence about the Notion perfecting “its self-liberation in the philosophy of

Spirit” [SLII, p. 486; SLM, p. 844] must be translated, stood right-side up. And Hegel will certainly help us a lot in that book as he goes on to describe freedom, not as a “have,” but as an “is” [PM, ¶482].

I hope we will get a chance to discuss all these ideas and more when I see you either the last week of February or first week of March. Let me know which is more convenient for you.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

March 6, 1961

Dear R. D.

Thanks for your letter and enclosures. *But* I must express my utter disagreement with your article on the Moscow Manifesto. This disagreement turns into out-right revulsion against your remarks on I. Deutscher.<sup>98</sup> They amount to a plain denunciation in the all too popular McCarthy style: Deutscher has “so organic a communist mentality that he might as well carry a party card instead of a scholastic one.” That is to say: although he is (probably) not a card-carrying member, he might well be one. Phoe! Pfui! That goes into Edgar Hoover’s file. I guess it is because I wrote the preface to your book that I still feel concerned with such things on your part: with the company you keep, from McCarthy to the FBI. Here too, the *Weltgeist* asserts itself. He is always on the right side and finds the right alliances. And since I am none of the *Weltgeist*’s boys, I wish to state that, in my view, Deutscher is not only a great scholar but also a great human being who dares to speak out of tune with the chorus of the lackeys on the Right and on the Left. . . . As to the substance: it is perfectly legitimate to compare the Leninist International and the present international organization, since an internal development connects the two. It is also legitimate, as you do, to contrast the two. But by no stretch and squeeze of the truth can one, as you do, contrast the two by presenting the former as the organ of a “workers’ state,” a paragon of revolutionary socialist democracy (in 1928!!) etc. To use your own language: “nothing can be further from the truth” (as you damn well know, or should know).

Is there still some chance that, some day, you might get over your emotional predilections and settle down to a genuine analysis—an analysis worthy of the names which you claim? It is the absence of such an analysis which, in your *News & Letters*, renders possible, among other horrors, the



lumping together of the “dictatorships of Castro and Trujillo”<sup>99</sup>—Marx and Hegel would turn in their grave if they would see this sample of “working class” in-sight. I wonder whether, sometimes, you are not slightly worried about the vicinity of such formulations with those of the State Department and CIA—but perhaps I am unjust to these agencies: I think they indeed see the difference (the essential one!).

Sorry! Shall I go to a psychiatrist to have my “organic communist mentality” diagnosed, or shall I swear that I do not, never have, never will be “just as well” carry a party card?

HM

\* \* \*

March 10, 1961

Dear HM:

Your amazing letter of the 6th was forwarded to me as I am still in New England on my lecture tour. The amazing aspect of your letter does not concern your politics, but your venom toward me, which does not even stop at slander “the company you keep from McCarthy to the FBI,” and rises on the crescendo of worrying about being “unjust” to the State Department and the CIA, but not caring a hoot about attributing to me worry “about the vicinity of such formulations with those of the State Department and the CIA.” Just to give you some fraternal help to get off that FBI kick, let me state for the record that I have made both the Attorney General’s and the GPU<sup>100</sup> list, not to mention the fact that *the people* in Deutscher you are so anxious to defend have greater access to both bourgeois publishers and university foundations and campuses than I have, and it is not because they are scholars and *I* am trying to shove them into “Edgar Hoover’s file”!

Don’t you believe that we are both old enough and have gone through enough experiences of concentration camps from Hitler’s Germany’s, Stalin’s Russia, (and the FBI leases on camps in Florida for *all* “subversives”) should at least give you pause to think before spreading yourself out quite in that manner with unrestrained name-calling to be able to discuss even “organic a communist mentality” as a subject for discussion instead of assault? Surely I had said enough in my book on state capitalist communist mentality, from Lassalle through Stalin to the “human relations projects” in American universities to warrant, on the part of an intellectual, consideration for my conception of State Planners, one and all, no matter how violently you disagree with that? But how can violent disagreement possibly make you *create expressions you never found in any of my writings or even be able to imagine*

as “dictatorships of Castro and Trujillo,”<sup>101</sup> although you have put in quotation marks? My dear Marcuse, there is no need to go either to a psychiatrist. But neither need you be inventive in what you attribute to my character and thought. You do need to reread that analysis I gave and then state your contrary position on: 1) the new role of Russia in Africa; 2) the defense of the African Revolutions outside of either pole of nuclearly armed world capital; 3) the self-activity of the masses that changed the map of Africa in less than a decade as it faces the imperialist struggle and the African stooges and the African intelligentsia and *its* administrative mentality. And if you must come to the defense of Deutscher’s explanation as the correct one, than at least consider the facts, if not the philosophic and political assumptions underlying them, that I could not really think Russia of 1928 “a revolutionary socialist democracy” not only because I go out of the way, even where I analyze the isolation of Russia of 1928 to Russia crowding others in 1960, if only because, in a far off Chicago slum one little Raya got treated to a sample of “revolutionary socialist democracy” when she was expelled from the YCL [Young Communist League] by being rolled down a dirty staircase. Enuf!

Here (the memo the students at Yale sent out) are my next three lectures—when it is over On Wed. the 15th I go to NY, thence back to Detroit on my way to L.A. By May all the lectures will be finished and I will escape to work on the outline of my new book. May I still consider you sufficiently interested in a Marxist analysis of the Absolute Idea as the struggles for freedom in the underdeveloped countries illuminate it for me to send the outline to you for submission to Beacon as you promised?

[Signature not preserved—Eds.]

## NOTES

1. An apparent reference to Dunayevskaya’s letters of April 18 and July 15, 1958.
2. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), hereafter ODM.
3. Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (1958).
4. See *Arguments*, no. 12–13, Paris, 1958. French sociologist Serge Mallet (1927–73) wrote on white collar and professional workers, as seen in *The New Working Class* (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman Books, 1975).
5. In *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), Marcuse quotes Mallet’s article on Caltex, “Le Salaire de la technique,” *La Nef* 25 (1959).
6. Charles Denby, *Workers Battle Automation* (Detroit: News & Letters, 1960). Denby, based in the auto industry, was the primary author, but he brought in other workers in steel and light manufacturing, as well as office workers, to share their own views of automation, which sometimes differed from his own.
7. Quoted in M&F, this originally appeared in Angela Terrano’s column, “Working for independence,” *News & Letters*, January 6, 1956.
8. Denby, also the Editor of *News & Letters*.

9. John Fredericks [pseud. of John Dwyer], "Oil and Labor," *Fourth International* (May-August-Sept. 1948), in RDC, pp. 1297-1310.

10. Dunayevskaya, "Bureaucratie et capitalisme d'état," *Arguments* (Paris) No. 17 (1960); also appeared in English as "State Capitalism and the Bureaucrats," *Socialist Leader* (Jan. 1960)—these texts can be found in RDC, pp. 2746-49, 9488-89.

11. In this article, Dunayevskaya briefly discusses C. Wright Mills (1916-1962), referring to his *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

12. Dunayevskaya refers to *The Organization Man*, by William H. Whyte (New York: Doubleday, 1956).

13. "Two Worlds," Dunayevskaya's regular column, contained an article on "Stagnation of U.S. Economy," *News & Letters* 5:1 (Jan. 1960).

14. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962, orig. 1960).

15. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1959).

16. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 406.

17. Maurice R. Stein, *Eclipse of Community: An Interpretation of American Studies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

18. See Peter F. Drucker, *The End of Economic Man: A Study of the New Totalitarianism* (New York: John Day Co., 1939).

19. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

20. Daniel Bell, *Work and Its Discontents* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956), an essay later incorporated into *The End of Ideology* (1960, orig. 1962). Bell argued that for American workers, "it is not physical hunger which is the driving force; there is a new hunger. The candied carrot, the desire for goods, has replaced the stick; the standard of living has become a built-in automatic drive" (*End of Ideology*, p. 254). He also wrote: "In industrial relations, as in large areas of American society, accommodation of a sort has replaced conflict . . . the problems of work are projected outward and swathed in psychological battling" (p. 251).

21. David Riesman, *Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954).

22. Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 319.

23. In *Work and Its Discontents*, Bell quoted management consultant Burleigh Gardner's succinct summary of the Durkheimian Elton Mayo's human relations school of the sociology of work: "the more satisfied [the worker] is, the greater will be his self-esteem, the more content he will be, and therefore, the more efficient in what he is doing." Bell added: "A fitting description not of human but of 'cow' sociology," comparing the human relations school to the dystopia portrayed in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (*End of Ideology*, p. 250).

24. Louis M. Hacker, *American Capitalism* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1957).

25. Lewis Corey [pseudonym of Louis Fraina, an early leader of the U.S. Communist Party], *The Decline of American Capitalism* (New York: Covici Friede, 1934).

26. Tsidreit (also transliterated as "tsedrait," "tsudrait," or "tzedrait"); Yiddish word denoting nutty, mixed-up, or confused.

27. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954).

28. Paul M. Sweezy (1910-2004), whose best-known work by then was *The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942).

29. See note 58 in Chapter 2.

30. John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960.

31. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.) *Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification*. (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1953).

32. Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown: A study in contemporary American culture*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929.

33. Lloyd W. Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *Yankee City*, Vol. I: *Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); Lloyd W. Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *Yankee City*, Vol. II: *Status System of a Modern Community* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1942); Lloyd W. Warner and Leo Srole, *Yankee city*, Vol. III: *Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1945); Lloyd W. Warner and J. O. Low, *Yankee city*, Vol. IV: *Social System of the Modern Factory, the Strike: A Social Analysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947); Lloyd W. Warner, *Yankee City*, Vol. V: *Living and the Dead: A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).
34. Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928).
35. W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an Immigrant Group* (Boston: Badger, 1918–1920).
36. John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New York: Harper, 1937).
37. In *Marxism and Freedom*, see the bibliography, Supplementary Material, Section C (“1924 to Today”), pp. 371–373.
38. U.S. Congress Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Subcommittee on the Economic Stabilization. *Automation and Technological Change*. 84th Cong., 1st Session, 1955.
39. Howard Boone Jacobson and Joseph S. Roucek, eds., *Automation and Society* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).
40. Charles R. Walker, *Toward the Automatic Factory: A Case Study of Men and Machines* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957).
41. Floyd C. Mann and L. Richard Hoffman, *Automation and the Worker: A Study of Social Change in Power Plants* (New York: Holt, 1960).
42. Michigan State University School of Labor and Industrial Relations. *Economic and Social Implications of Automation: Abstracts of Recent Literature*. East Lansing, 1958.
43. A reference to John Ulric Nef, co-founder of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, whose writings include *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1958).
44. Charles Joseph Singer, ed., *A history of technology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954–1984).
45. See note 58 in Chapter 2.
46. Rosa Luxemburg, *Social Reform or Revolution?* (1899), in Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson, eds., *The Rosa Luxemburg Reader* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004).
47. Rudolph Hilferding, *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development*, edited by Tom Bottomore from translations by Morris Watnick and Sam Gordon (London: Routledge, 1981, orig. 1910).
48. Labor party.
49. Walter Reuther (1907–70) was elected president of the United Auto Workers in 1946, a post he would hold until 1970; George Meany (1894–1980) was president of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO) from its founding in 1955 until his retirement in 1979; Jimmy Hoffa (1913–75) was president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters from 1957–1971.
50. Wildcat strikes are unofficial walkouts not sanctioned by the trade union leadership, especially common in the U. S. in the 1950s and 1960s. Discussed in M&F, Ch. 16, especially p. 271ff.
51. On the Paris Commune, see M&F, Ch. 6: “The Paris Commune Illuminates and Deepens the Content of *Capital*.”
52. Marx’s speech has been published in *Marx and Engels on the Trade Unions*, edited by Kenneth Lapidés (New York: Praeger, 1987).
53. See note 11 in Chapter 2.
54. Nikolai Bukharin (1888–1938) was the youngest leader and a major Marxist theorist in the early Soviet Union. Allied with Stalin against Trotsky in the mid-1920s, he was later purged and subsequently sentenced to death in the Moscow Trials of 1936–1938. Among Bukharin’s most notable writings are *Imperialism and World Economy* (1915–1917); *The ABC of Communism* (with Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, 1919); *Economics of the Transformation Period* (1920); *Historical Materialism* (1921), which defended “mechanical materialism;” and *Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital* (1924), a counter-rebuttal to the critique of Marx in Luxem-

burg's *Accumulation of Capital*. In other contexts, Dunayevskaya appreciated Bukharin as a Marxist economist, but here she is referring to his pessimism about the consciousness of the working class in light of the patriotic upsurge during World War I, something Lenin criticized as shortsighted. As will be seen below, Dunayevskaya also emphasized Bukharin's sharp differences with Lenin in public debates over the right of nations to self-determination, which Bukharin regarded as "utopian" and "harmful" because "it disseminates illusions" during the "imperialist epoch" (Bukharin et al., "Theses on the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" [1915], in John Riddell, ed., *Lenin's Struggle for a Revolutionary International* [New York: Monad Press, 1984], p. 363.) In addition, Dunayevskaya noted frequently that in his 1922 Will, in which he famously called for Stalin's "removal" as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Lenin also criticized Bukharin over the dialectic: "He has never learned, and I think never fully understood, the dialectic." (While he termed Trotsky the "best" of his co-leaders, he also characterized him as burdened by an "administrative mentality.") (A translation of the Will can be found in LCW 36, pp. 594–96). Other Hegelian Marxists, most notably Lukács and Gramsci, also criticized Bukharin's mechanical materialism.

55. In 1959, a nationwide strike in the steel industry lasted 116 days.

56. On February 1, 1960, Joseph McNeil, Franklin McCain, David Richmond, and Ezell Blair, Jr., Black students at the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College, walked into an F. W. Woolworth Company store in Greensboro, North Carolina, purchased some school supplies, then went to the lunch counter and were refused service. They remained seated until they were forced to leave when the store closed. By August 1961, such "sit-ins" had attracted over 70,000 participants and generated over 3,000 arrests. They continued in some areas of the South until and even after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declared segregation at lunch counters unlawful.

57. The special issued devoted entirely to "Workers Battle Automation," *News & Letters* (Aug.–Sept. 1960), was published later that year as pamphlet.

58. See Marx, *Grundrisse* (English edition), where he wrote in the section on technology: "Labor no longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself. . . . He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. . . . With that, production based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. The free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labor time so as to posit surplus labor, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labor of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them" (pp. 704–706; see also MECW 29, pp. 91–92). Marcuse discussed this passage in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), where he wrote that "Complete automation . . . would open the dimension of free time. . . . This would be the historical transcendence toward a new civilization" (p. 37). In *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), Dunayevskaya argued that this passage exemplified how "there is too much emphasis in the *Grundrisse* on machinery as providing the material basis for the dissolution of capital," this vs. "*Capital's* graphic description of the worker's resistance to the discipline of capital" (p. 70). In an implicit critique of Marcuse, she added that "some Marxist philosophers suddenly gave a new twist to Marx's *Grundrisse*," theorizing "technology as if it 'absorbed' the proletariat" (pp. 70–71).

59. In Denby's *Workers Battle Automation* (1960), Angela Terrano wrote: "Why do people assume that Automation is the way people will want to work in a new society? . . . For example, what happens to the question of *how* people will work? Won't work be something completely different? If work *will* be completely different—tied up with life itself—it *cannot be the same as Automation that uses men as part of its operations*" (p. 47). An earlier version of Terrano's views is quoted in M&F, pp. 274–275.

60. The left-wing sociologist C. Wright Mills, the liberal historian Clinton Rossiter, and the French left-wing sociologist Serge Mallet.

61. Imre Nagy, leader of Hungary's democratic revolutionary regime before the November 1956 Russian invasion, after which he was executed. The Petofi Circle united a variety of intellectuals opposed to the totalitarian regime and helped pave the way for the 1956 revolution. These intellectuals discussed Marx's humanism, especially his *1844 Manuscripts*.

62. Published in *News & Letters* (May 1960), where Dunayevskaya wrote: “At a time when the weary American intellectual has been so brainwashed by both the Cold War and the threat of Nuclear War between American and Russia, that he declares ‘The End of Ideology,’ the world that is fighting for its freedom at the cost of its very life—Africa—is charged with a dynamism of ideas.” Charles De Gaulle was France’s head of state from 1958–69. Léopold Senghor (1906–2001), who espoused a non-revolutionary version of socialist humanism, led Senegal to independence from France. Senghor’s essay, “Socialism Is a Humanism,” was the only contribution by an African included in Fromm’s *Socialist Humanism* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), for which both Dunayevskaya and Marcuse also wrote essays.

63. A reference to the first paragraph in the concluding absolute idea chapter of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, in which he writes: “The Absolute Idea has now turned out to be the unity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea; each of these by itself is one-sided” [SLII, p. 466; SLM, p. 824].

64. See Lenin, “The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of a Workers Party” (1906), LCW 10, p. 254.

65. See George Kline, “Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy,” *Survey* 20 (October-December 1959), p. 60, as well as Gustav Wetter, “The Soviet Concept of Coexistence,” *ibid.*, pp. 19–34. Wetter, a Jesuit specialist on Marxism, was the author of *Dialectical Materialism* (London: Routledge, 1958, orig. 1952). Kline, a U.S. philosopher, was co-editor of *Russian Philosophy*, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). *Survey*, initially called *Soviet Survey*, was an American academic journal devoted to Russian studies.

66. See note 34 in Chapter 2.

67. Hegel concludes the chapter on “The Absolute Idea” differently in the *Smaller (Encyclopedia) Logic* (also referred to as the Shorter Logic) than in the *Science of Logic*. The *Smaller Logic* ends with the phrase, “We began with Being, abstract Being; where we now are we also have the Idea as Being; but this Idea which has Being is Nature” [EL ¶244]. The *Science of Logic*, on the other hand, ends by posing “the next resolution of the pure Idea,” which follows Nature—the *Philosophy of Mind*. Whereas Lenin quoted the phrase from the *Smaller (Encyclopedia) Logic* in his *Philosophic Notebooks*, he dismissed the above-cited conclusion of the *Science of Logic* as “unimportant.”

68. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* (New York: International Publishers, 1925, orig. 1921).

69. See note 7 in Chapter 1.

70. Formlessness.

71. See Herbert Marcuse, “De l’ontologie à la technologie: les tendances de la société industrielle,” *Arguments* 4:18 (1960), pp. 54–9. This theme was to be central to *One-Dimensional Man* (1964).

72. A reference to Dunayevskaya’s 1953 “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes”; see note 7 in Chapter 1.

73. In her May 20, 1953 letter on Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind*, Dunayevskaya begins her discussions of Hegel’s final three syllogisms (¶s 575–577) with the following description of ¶575: “The movement is from the logical principle or theory to nature or practice and from practice not alone to theory but to the new society which is its essence” (PON, p. 28).

74. See Dunayevskaya’s analysis of the June 17, 1953 East German workers’ revolt (M&F, pp. 249–252; 257).

75. See *Marxism and Freedom*, pp. 62–66.

76. This is from Dunayevskaya’s translation of Marx’s 1844 “Critique of the Hegelian dialectic” (M&F, p. 322). Here, Marx analyzed Hegel’s *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, tracing Hegel’s system from the last chapter of the *Logic* (the first book of the *Encyclopedia*) to the *Philosophy of Nature* (the second book of the *Encyclopedia*) to the *Philosophy of Mind* (the third book of the *Encyclopedia*).

77. Dunayevskaya note: Curiously my letter on *Philosophy of Mind* began with par. 385 [PON, p. 26], without my having been aware that Marx had broken his Mss. off at par. 384. [A reference to Dunayevskaya’s 1953 “Letters on Hegel’s Absolutes”; see note 7 in Chapter 1. For Marx’s reference to ¶ 384 in his 1844 “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic,” see M&F1958, p. 325; MECW 3, p. 346.]

78. The International Workingmen's Association or First International, in which Marx played a leading role, lasted from 1864–1875. *The Civil War in France* (1871) is where Marx analyzed the Paris Commune (MECW 22). Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875) discusses concepts of revolutionary organization and the communist society of the future (MECW 24).

79. A reference to Dunayevskaya's 1953 "Letters on Hegel's Absolutes"; see note 7 in Chapter 1. There, Dunayevskaya argued that Lenin truncated the discussion of Hegel's absolute idea in his 1914 "Abstract of Hegel's *Science of Logic*" (LCW 38).

80. Georg Lukács (1885–1971) was a leading Marxist philosopher and literary theorist who was among the first to place Hegel and dialectics as well as commodity fetishism or reification at the center of Marxism, also criticizing what he saw as Engels's mechanical materialism as well as the positivist claim to scientific objectivity on the part of liberal social science. He covered these issues in his *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971, orig. 1923). Lukács remained in the Hungarian Communist Party, managing to survive both the Stalin period and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which he supported after years of conformity to Party orthodoxy. Among his other notable works are *The Theory of the Novel* (1916), *The Young Hegel* (1948), and his last work, written in the 1970s, *The Ontology of Social Being*. Here, Dunayevskaya was seemingly referring to Lukács's ultra-vanguardist chapter in *History and Class Consciousness*, "Toward a Methodology of the Problem of Organization," in which he wrote that the "iron discipline" of the party "tears away the reified veils that cloud the consciousness of the individual in capitalist society" (p. 339).

81. In the Hungarian revolution of 1956, Janos Kadar at first aligned himself with the rebels and joined the cabinet of the anti-Stalinist Imre Nagy. However, Kadar soon formed a counter-government aligned with Russia, as Russian troops crushed the revolt. In 1958, Kadar tried and executed Nagy and other leaders of the revolt, and he subsequently ruled Hungary until 1988.

82. The novelist D. H. Lawrence wrote: "Art-speech is the only truth. An artist is usually a damned liar, but his art, if it be art, will tell you the truth of his day. And that is all that matters. Away with eternal truth. Truth lives from day to day, and the marvelous Plato of yesterday is chiefly bosh today"—"The Spirit of Place," in *Studies in Classic American Literature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, orig. 1923), p. 14.

83. A point Marcuse developed in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), where "technological rationality" was said to eliminate the critical stance of pre-technological thought (as in Plato). The latter envisioned, albeit in elitist fashion, alternatives to the given social reality and was therefore two-dimensional. Marcuse contrasted this with modern positivist thought: "The ontological concept of truth . . . of pre-technological rationality . . . is the rationality of discourse which contrasts with the one-dimensional modes of thought and behavior that develop in the execution of the technological project" (p. 130).

84. Hegel's "First System" refers to the initial versions of his chief works, including the *Philosophy of Mind* (Spirit), from 1803/4. Discussed by Marcuse in *Reason and Revolution*, the full text is now available in English in *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox (Albany: SUNY Press, 1979). There, Hegel wrote: "The more machinelike labor becomes, the less it is worth, and the more one must work in that mode . . . the value of the labor falls; the labor becomes that much deadier, it becomes machine work, the skill of the single laborer is infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the single factory laborer is impoverished to the last extreme of dullness" (pp. 247, 248). This specific passage had been discussed by Marcuse in R&R (p. 79). Dunayevskaya later relied upon Marcuse's account to do so in *Marxism and Freedom* (pp. 33–34).

85. See note 17 in Chapter 1 on Schelling and note 96 in Chapter 1 on Jacobi. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) was a German idealist philosopher who posed the ego as the absolute principle of philosophy, and was considered a "subjective" idealist by Hegel.

86. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72) was an important Young Hegelian philosopher whose *Essence of Christianity* (1841) contained a materialist critique of Hegelian idealism and of religion. In *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), Dunayevskaya analyzed the affinities between Marx and Feuerbach, concluding that in 1844 these were not as great as is often assumed. In

addition to the opening paragraphs of the “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic” (1844), see Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), in MECW 5, pp. 3–5, for the types of critiques to which Dunayevskaya is referring here.

87. In *Marxism and Freedom* (1958), Dunayevskaya had characterized the *Critique of Political Economy* of 1859 as “an application of dialectics to political economy, instead of the creation of the dialectic that would arise out of the workers’ struggles themselves” (p. 87).

88. See note 99 in Chapter 2 on the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation and note 100 in Chapter 2 on new passions and new forces, both culminating points in *Capital*, Vol. I. At the end of the penultimate chapter of *Capital*, Vol. I (which many regard as the real conclusion of the entire book) Marx referred—without naming him—to Hegel’s concept of “the negation of the negation.” He did so as he characterized the anti-capitalist revolution that he anticipated, wherein “capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own negation. This is the negation of the negation” (MCIF, p. 929; MCIK, p. 837).

89. On the centralization of capital, see note 16 in Chapter 2. In fact, Marx created a separate part eight on “primitive accumulation” in the French edition of *Capital* (1872–1875).

90. This refers to Bukharin’s opposition, in 1916–1921, to the right of nations to self-determination—see also note 54 in Chapter 2.

91. See note 54 in Chapter 2.

92. Ivan Ilyin (1883–1954), author of *The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and of Man* (in Russian). Ilyin stressed that the word “concrete” included in its Latin origin the concept of growth and also described Hegel’s standpoint in a rather unusual fashion as the “empiric concrete.” For Dunayevskaya’s earlier treatment of this, see her letter of July 6, 1949 to C. L. R. James (RDC, p. 1670), also discussed in Anderson, *Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism*, pp. 205–06.

93. For a discussion, see Phillips and Dunayevskaya, *The Coal Miners’ General Strike of 1949–50* (1984), as well as *Marxism and Freedom*, pp. 266–68.

94. See note 3 in Chapter 1 on Dunayevskaya’s 1943–1944 *American Economic Review* articles on the law of value in the USSR.

95. In his (Smaller) *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel critiques three “attitudes toward objectivity”: (1) simple faith, (2) empiricism and Kantianism, and (3) Jacobi’s notion of immediate knowledge or intuition (EL ¶ 26–78). This had already been discussed within the Johnson-Forest Tendency in the 1940s. Dunayevskaya was to refer to Hegel’s “third attitude toward objectivity” in her critical analysis of Mao in Ch. 5 of *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), entitled “The Thought of Mao Tse-tung” and she also was to do so in discussions of her unfinished book, “The Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy,” as seen in her letter to Hegel scholar George Armstrong Kelly of Dec. 8, 1986 (PON, pp. 331–33).

96. While studying Hegel, Lenin asked the *Granat Encyclopedia*, in a letter of Jan. 4, 1915, if he could augment the section on “dialectics” of his article “Karl Marx” (LCW 36, p. 317).

97. A reference to Luxemburg’s *Accumulation of Capital* (1913); see also note 58 in Chapter 2.

98. Marcuse was referring to Dunayevskaya’s Two Worlds column, “The New Russian Communist Manifesto,” *News & Letters* 6:1 (January 1961), in which she attacked Isaac Deutscher (1907–1967), the well-known Anglo-Polish author of biographies of Trotsky and of Stalin. Deutscher’s own politics were generally Trotskyist, albeit with more than usual appreciation for Stalin as well, which placed him at sharp variance to Dunayevskaya, who had been a part of left-wing Trotskyism and who had criticized Trotsky’s own defense of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. In her column, Dunayevskaya characterized Deutscher as someone “who passes for an anti-Stalinist, semi-Trotskyist ‘independent’ thinker, but who has so *organic* a Communist mentality that he might as well carry a party card instead of a scholastic one.” She ridiculed Deutscher’s comparison of the 1960 meeting of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow to the Communist International of the 1920s, arguing that he had wrongly merged together “a counter-revolutionary, established state-capitalism, and a workers’ state newly born from the greatest spontaneous revolution in history.” The bulk of her column, however, was devoted to Russia and China’s attempts to influence anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World.



99. Marcuse was probably referring to the brief article, "Haiti," by Peter Mallory [John Dwyer] in his "Our Life & Times" column, *News & Letters* 6:2 (February 1961), which described student protests against the Duvalier regime, calling Haiti "a country, which lies between the dictatorships of Castro and Trujillo." Dunayevskaya had published her first major criticism of what she called the top-down "administrative mentality" of Fidel Castro in her "Two Worlds" column, "The Cuban Revolution One Year After," *News & Letters* 5:10 (Dec. 1960). After the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion later in 1961, Dunayevskaya defended Cuba in a signed editorial, "The Kennedy Administration and Castro's Cuba," *News & Letters* 6:5 (May 1961), in which she wrote that "Marxist Humanists opposed, and will continue to oppose any American imperialist invasion of Cuba," while also criticizing Castro's increasing ties to Russia and expressing worry that the Cuban Revolution was being strangled from within.

100. The U.S. "Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations" was set up during the McCarthy era; the GPU was part of Stalin's secret police.

101. See note 99.



## Chapter Four

# The Later Correspondence: Winding Down During the Period of the New Left

August 6, 1964

Dear H.M.:

The years have piled up since I last wrote you, and yet my new book is nowhere near completion. There have been trips, especially the one to West Africa, which I consider part of the book, and perhaps I ought to begin there to bring you up to date.

Enclosed are two articles on West Africa, one a journalistic one on the Gambian elections, which appeared in *Africa Today* July 1962; and the other, on the ideological front, which appeared in *Presence Africaine* Vol. 20, No. 48, 1963. But since I do not have an extra copy of the latter I enclose it in its original English, as it appeared in *News & Letters*.

Your *One Dimensional Man* was given to me for a review<sup>1</sup> to appear in the fall, and because, I like your critique of existentialism I felt you might be interested in my piece on Sartre,<sup>2</sup> which I enclose. Some friends of mine tried to have it translated into French and published in Paris.

It may be that neither the enclosures here nor the new paperback edition of *Marxism and Freedom* (sent you under separate cover) with its new introduction relating the Negro revolution to it,<sup>3</sup> and its new chapter on Mao<sup>4</sup> relating it to the Sino-Soviet conflict will disclose my underlying preoccupation with the Absolute Idea, the new relationship of theory to practice, the concept of a new Subject, but then I need to know whether you are still interested before writing to you in any greater detail.

How are you?

Yours,

P.S. My sister (Bessie Gogol) whose son is in Mississippi with COFO wrote me excitedly when she spotted Mrs. Herbert Marcuse's name in the letter she got from the Parents of Mississippi Freedom Summer volunteers. When I see my nephew (Eugene) back all in one piece, I will find out whether he met anyone from your family in that Magnolia Jungle.<sup>5</sup>

\* \* \*

October 7, 1964

Dear R. D.:

Thanks ever so much for your letter with its enclosures which I received after my return to the States: I was in Europe for almost half a year.

Again I read your papers partly with great joy and partly with great irritation. I have rarely come across a case where such a large area of complete agreement meets with such a large area of disagreement. I found particularly interesting your critique of Sartre, which is an urgently needed job, but here, too, I would take into consideration that Sartre today is one of the very few who knows and says what is going on.

All these things should be reserved for a future personal discussion. At your request I am returning the papers herewith.

With best wishes,

Yours cordially,

HM

\* \* \*

October 10, 1964

Dear HM:

Welcome home! Or is home considered to be elsewhere? Well, welcome back, then, and thanks for yours of the 7th. I was especially pleased that you found my critique of Sartre "particularly interesting." Since my friends abroad did not succeed in getting a French publication to print it, and I know

none in the US that would be interested in so doing, your suggestion about taking into consideration Sartre's speaking out presently becomes abstract. I note he has taken time out to write his autobiography rather than completing his *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*;<sup>6</sup> do you happen to know when he intends to return to the work?

I would like nothing better than to have a chance to talk with you at great length, but, since I have no paid lectures in Massachusetts this winter or spring, I'm afraid that too is out for the present. (You once spoke of seeing whether I could be brought to Brandeis, and if you should still feel you want to, I'm enclosing the brochure that both the publisher and literary agent use.)

The best thing that has happened to me recently is that a Japanese edition of *Marxism and Freedom* has appeared (under the unlikely "translation" of *Alienation and Revolution*)<sup>7</sup> and I have been invited to lecture there late next spring. But, again, the publisher is willing only to pay for expenses there, not the passage to Japan, so I do not know whether I can swing that trip either as I happen at the present to be as poor as a church mouse. If this is beginning to sound melodramatic, a veritable chapter in the Trials and Tribulations of Till the Toiler, it is because I'm rather on the disgusted side because I have tried and tried to get some foundation to give me a grant to be free to complete my book, but I have been unsuccessful.

Instead, on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation of Proclamation last year I "diverted" to the American scene and helped in putting out the enclosed *American Civilization on Trial*.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, off and on, I write outlines of odd chapters. For example, this, enclosed, on "The Algebra of Revolution" or the Dialectic of Thought and Action. I naturally would like your comments, but please return it to me. I've been working very hard at Hegel's Absolute Idea, especially on the second negation, second subjectivity, and new relationship of theory to practice in our day. It is to this I will return the next time I write you.

Yours,

\* \* \*

October 27, 1964

Dear HM:

Since you once asked me why I "translate" Hegel when I know "the original" (Marx) well enough I assume you thought that since my writings and activity were political my veritable obsession with Hegel's Absolute Idea was . . . an obsession. I am exaggerating, of course, but it is only because I hope you'll

permit me to write in this informal way an outline of a chapter of my new work (which I now lean to calling “Philosophy and Revolution”) that deals with “Why Hegel? Why Now?”<sup>9</sup>

The chapter is to have three subsections: Marx’s Debt to Hegel; Lenin’s Ambivalence toward Hegel and the Shock of Recognition; the philosophical problems of our age. The first subsection will connect with M&F [Marxism and Freedom] but greatly expand why Marx couldn’t “shake off” Hegel as easily as he shook off classical political economy; once he transcended it, then his “economics” became, not a new political economy, but Marxism, a philosophy of human activity. This was true in every single respect from the theory of value and surplus value, through rent as a “derivative” rather than making the landlord class as fundamental a one as the new capitalist class,<sup>10</sup> to capital accumulation and the “law of motion” bringing about its “collapse.” In all these, labor was seen as the living subject bringing all contradictions to a head and making socialism “inevitable”; at no point were economic laws independent of human activity. Regarding the Hegelian dialectic, on the other hand, despite its recreation in Marxism, or what you laughingly refer to as “subversion,” that is to say, transformation of dialectic from “a science of logic” to “a science” of revolution, his “attachment” to Hegel remained. This was not because Marx began as a “Left Hegelian,” nor even because the Hegelian dialectic speeded him on his own voyage of discovery (“thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism”).<sup>11</sup> Indeed, when his break first came from Hegel, he *used* classical political economy to counterpose reality to “idealism,” especially of the Proudhonian variety.<sup>12</sup> And yet the adieu to classical political economy was complete; the adieu to Hegelianism was not.

Take the very first, and most thorough and profound attack on Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*—the very critique which led to nothing short of his greatest discovery—the materialist conception of history<sup>13</sup>—a lesser man, a lesser Hegelian than Marx, would at that point have finished with Hegel. Marx, on the contrary, proceeded to the critique of the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopedia*, and when he broke off at the last section on the *Philosophy of Mind* [in his 1844 “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic”] to stick with what he called “that dismal science”—political economy—and engage in class struggle activities, revolutions, First International, which took the rest of his life, he still hungered to return to a presentation of “the rational form of the dialectic.” Indeed, at *every* turning point, he returned to “the dialectic.” You recall how happy he sounded, in 1858, in his letter to Engels when he explained that he “accidentally” came upon his library of Hegel’s works and there got some “new developments” which are helping him complete *Critique of Political Economy* (and of course you can see the results all through the *Grundrisse*).<sup>14</sup> Again, in 1861–1863 when he first reworked it as *Capital* and makes the most crucial decision on the economics presentation—not merely to break with Ricardo on land rent but to take out from Volume I all

that would become Volume III and thus eliminate all relations between landlords and workers, leaving them with “pure” capitalists alone.<sup>15</sup> And yet again, in 1866, when he restructured *Capital* to include [the chapter on] “The Working Day” and actually broke with the very concept of theory, both the move to the profound analysis of reification at the point of production and the fetishism of commodities, again illumined by the real Paris Commune, were still in the tightest wrappings of Hegelianism.<sup>16</sup>

This is exactly why Lenin wrote that it was impossible to understand *Capital*, “especially its first chapter” without the *whole* of the *Science of Logic*. And in that first chapter, when you need Hegel most is where Stalin, in 1943, decided to make his theoretical break by asking that that chapter be eliminated in the “teaching” of *Capital*.<sup>17</sup> And, again, the last writing we have from the pen of Marx (Notes on Wagner and the analysis of the critiques of his own economics)<sup>18</sup> the constant repetition is to “the dialectic.” In a word, Marx never forgot his indebtedness to Hegel because it was not a debt to the past, but a vital, living present expressing as well the pull of the future.

The new I wish to bring in here will bring in a justification for the abstractness of Hegel since there are points, critical points, turning points, when the abstract suddenly can become the concretely universal. *Capital* is concrete, an empiric study, a phenomenological as well as logical-economic analysis which “exhausts itself” in the one topic it is concerned with: capitalism. But [Hegel’s] *Logic* is “without concretion of sense” [SLI, p. 69; SLM, p. 58], “applies” to all sciences, factual studies, so that when a sudden new stage is reached, and the old categories won’t do, there is always a new set of categories in the *Logic* as you move from Being to Essence to Notion. That is why Lenin, who *long before* he knew the whole of the *Logic*, knew the whole of *Capital*, and wrote most profoundly of *all* the three volumes, nevertheless, suddenly, when the ground gave way before him as the Second [International] collapsed, found new “only” in *Logic*. That is to say, that abstract category “unity, identity, transformation into opposite,” and such others as “self-transcendence” meant something so new to him also in the understanding of *Capital* and its latest stage, imperialism, that he was willing to say none, including himself, had understood *Capital* at all before that specific moment of grasping the Doctrine of the Notion in general, and the breakdown of opposition between objective and subjective that he got from the Syllogism<sup>19</sup> in particular.

What I am trying to say is that the minute *the actual* cannot be expressed in old terms, even when these terms are Marxian ones, it is because a new stage of cognition has not kept up with the new challenge from practice which *only philosophy* seems capable of illuminating. Old, abstruse, abstract Hegelianism made [Lenin] see what the concrete terms in *Capital* did not—

that monopoly capital was not only a “stage” of centralization of capital, but a “transformation into opposite” which demanded a total reorganization and undermining of old categories, including that of labor.

This section that should lead to the second sub-section on Lenin’s ambivalence to Hegel, both before the shock of recognition in 1914 and, unfortunately, after that shock, at least publicly. The duality in Lenin’s philosophic heritage can no longer be put into a footnote, as I did in *Marxism and Freedom*. This ambivalence has allowed the Chinese as well as Russian Communists to pervert Marx’s Humanism by quoting *both* Lenins alongside of each other as if they were one unchangeable Lenin who never experienced a sharp break with his own philosophic past. Once, however, this is cleared, it is precisely Lenin, the Lenin of 1915–1924, who allows us to jump off from the 20th rather than the 19th century precisely because his most startling and most meaningful aphorisms were expressed in “Subjective” *Logic* and he is so enthusiastic as he equates (with literal equation signs) subjectivity with freedom. You’ll recall also that Lenin’s Notebooks stress that *philosophy* (*Logic*, 1813) expressed “the universal movement of change” [LCW 38, p. 141] first, and only afterwards (1847) did Marx express it in politics (*The Communist Manifesto*) whereas natural science ([Darwin’s] *Origin of Species*, 1859) came still later. And while it remains for our age to concretize Lenin’s restatement of Hegel’s appreciation of the Practical Idea “precisely in the theory of knowledge” for “Cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it,” it is Lenin who put out the marker: “The continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx consists in working out dialectically the history of human thought, science and technology” [LCW 38, p. 147].

It is obvious to you, I am sure, that I do not take your position on technology. I am so Hegelian that I still consider that subject absorbs object, and not object subject which then becomes *its* extension.<sup>20</sup> My preference of “ontology” to “technology” in the age of automation may be said to be due to the awe I feel when confronted with the dialectic of human thought, but this would not be the whole truth since human thought is inseparable from human activity and both result from the overpowering urge to freedom. Allow me, please, to express this within the range of the types of cognition in the dialectic itself:

In inquiring cognition we face an objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion. In synthetic cognition, the objective world and subjectivity coexist<sup>21</sup> (and like the fragility of “peaceful coexistence”<sup>22</sup> which fears movement, so in this laying of the objective world and subjectivity side by side, there can be no transcendence). But now watch: the idea of cognition and the practical idea no sooner unite, than we are ready for the plunge to freedom.<sup>23</sup> Hegel begins at the bottom of page 475 [SLII, p. 475; SLM, p. 833], to review again, not dialectic “cognition” but the Absolute Method, the form of the Absolute Idea, the new stage of identity of theory and practice



that we have reached as we leave behind the previous forms of cognition. (Don't forget, either, that two short pages after we view "the objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is the Notion," we reach "the turning point" and learn that the "transcendence [of the opposition] between the Notion and Reality . . . rests upon this subjectivity alone.") [SLII, pp. 465, 477; SLM, pp. 823, 835]

It appears to me also that Hegel is right when he feels it absolutely necessary that the Method begin with abstract universality, abstract self-relation, the in-itselfness of the Absolute (pp. 469–472 [SLM, pp. 827–30]), which leads, through "the concrete totality which . . . contains as such the beginning of the progress and of development," to differentiation *within* what I would call the achieved revolution. I might as well here continue politically for I see Hegel as he finishes with subjective idealism to be finishing with reformism for whom the goal is always in the future, and shifting all his attack on the intuitionists—Jacobi, Schelling, Fichte, especially Jacobi whom he calls a "reactionary" (*Encyclopedia*, par. 76)—or the type of *abstract* revolutionism for whom, once an "end," a revolution has been reached, there is no more negative development or mediation. All that, to *them*, that seems to be done is an organization of what has been achieved and they go at this organization in so *total* a way they choke the spontaneous revolution, and with it all further development, to death.

Hegel, on the other hand, moves from the overcoming of the opposition between Notion and Reality, resting on subjectivity alone, to paeans about "personal and free" [in the *Science of Logic*, SLI, p. 477; SLM, p. 835] and "self-liberation" in the *Philosophy of Mind*, which, to me, is the new society and not the return to metaphysics. I'm not saying that Hegel may not have consciously striven to return to metaphysics (he certainly did so personally in his apology for the Prussian state), but neither those who have tried to make him out a complete reactionary as a statist, nor those who have welcomed his glorification of "revealed religion" (Christianity in general, Lutheranism in particular, or, as Bochenski, the angry Thomist, to "deism" if not veritable atheism),<sup>24</sup> can explain away why his Absolute is always Idea and Mind and not *just* God. Very obviously, the ideal toward which humanity, the humanity of the French Revolution, was striving toward, and the ideal toward which the philosopher Hegel who wished thought to *be* so great a determinant in the transformation of reality, were not so far apart as either the ordinary or scientific mind wish to make out. For the Notion is revolutionary politics, not in the narrowly political sense as "the organizational vanguardists"<sup>25</sup> would have us believe, but in the sense of 1917: free creative power.

(When Marx is in the market he laughs at, and links, "Liberty, Equality and Bentham";<sup>26</sup> when he is in proletarian politics, it is "*thinking*, bleeding Paris," so flushed with excitement at the "incubation of a new society,"<sup>27</sup> that it fails to see the counter-revolution, etc. etc.)

The greatness of the “Absolute Method,” the Hegelian dialectic, is its universals, and their distinction from the generalizations of abstract understanding, so that each universal—Being as such, Essence as such, Notion as such—is a *new* category, a leap into individuality “purified of all that interferes with its universalism” [PM, ¶481]. As Lenin put it in his Notebooks [1914–15] “The forming of abstract notions already include consciousness of law so that the simplest forming of notions (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) signifies ever deeper knowledge of objective world connections. Here is the significance of the Hegelian *Logic*” [LCW 38, pp. 178–79]. The important point, it seems to me, is that the new categories arise at certain turning points in history when men have such overwhelming experience that they are sure also they have found “the truth,” so that, as Lenin put it, “the consciousness of the law of the objective world connections” becomes transmuted into “new categories of thoughts, or knots.”<sup>28</sup> In a word, the Doctrine of Notion is revolutionary politics, contains the categories of Freedom, overcomes the opposition between subject and object, theory and practice, notion and reality, reaches “the second negation,” not only “in general” as revolution against existing society, but in particular as the new society which has not merely the stigma of the old from which it came, but is too ready to transform the universal into a “fixed particular” (be that state property or plan or even soviet)<sup>29</sup> instead of *moving* forward to the abolition of the division between mental and manual work, the new *human* dimension.

That is why the polemic in the Doctrine of the Notion is so contemporary, so relevant to our day. When Hegel strikes out against transforming the universal into a fixed particular, it doesn’t really matter whether he has in mind, in one case, socialism, and in the other statified property, *we* gain an illumination when he speaks of the universal needing to be posited as particular, but if the particular is posited as the universal, it becomes isolated or, to use Marx’s expression, gains “the fixity of a popular prejudice” [MCIF, p. 152; MCIK, p. 69].

Even the bourgeois philosopher, John Findlay (whose book, despite its barbs against Marxists, I found fascinating) sees the revolutionary in Hegel as he concludes his praise of him “as the philosopher of ‘absolute negativity,’ the believer in nothing that does not spring from the free, uncommitted, self-committing human spirit” (*Hegel: A Reexamination* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1958], p. 354).

We certainly can no longer, as did Lenin, keep “our” philosophic notebooks private. We live in the age of absolutes, and freedom as the innermost dynamic of both life and thought demands the unity of philosophy and revolution.

Yours,

Raya

P.S. Please return that chapter 5, or whatever I called the dialectics of liberation. I seem to have misplaced my original copy—or had I sent it to you previously too? In any case I need it, though where that one concentrated on Africa, I am now all for the contradictions of Japan and the dream to get there.

\* \* \*

November 2, 1964

Dear RD:

Good for you that your physical and mental energies seem to be so much greater than mine. I did not yet have the time to digest your fourth chapter,<sup>30</sup> the return of which you now request. Here it is. And now comes your long letter on the Absolute Idea<sup>31</sup> and your strange application of it. I read it once, I read it twice and am afraid that my old criticism still holds. I would, however, appreciate it if you would give me a little more time to answer it.

As to your question whether and when Sartre will return to his book on dialectics, I do not know but no matter what he does I find his statement on his rejection of the Nobel Prize<sup>32</sup> most sympathetic.

Please have a little patience.

With best regards,

HM

\* \* \*

January 12, 1965

Dear R.D.:

Thanks for your letter.<sup>33</sup> In the meantime I have read your review of my book<sup>34</sup> which is probably the most intelligent one so far—as I expected it would be.

As to your prospective visit, the 12th of February unfortunately is not a University holiday, but I shall certainly reserve time Thursday afternoon or evening. It will be good seeing you.

Best regards and au revoir,

HM

\* \* \*

April 3, 1965

Dear HM:

“Our” new generation (and I don’t even have children!) are surely involved in similar work. First, it was your son and my nephew in Mississippi.<sup>35</sup> Now your niece, Susan Kress, came up to hear me yesterday—I have just returned from an insanely scheduled tour where one day at Berkeley I began at noon one day and didn’t finish till 2 a.m. the following morning. She is struggling with my book, and since I’m invited also to speak to her school, I’ll see her again, and then hope to have her over the house. The new generation of American youth is becoming radical in the best sense of the word of being both activists and concerned with ideas.

While at Oberlin college—the debate on Existentialism turned into a “discussion” since the philosophy professor—(Paul Schmidt) preferred it so. The reason I’m writing you about it is that he is transferring to Albuquerque, New Mexico and when he heard about you being in California, he thought it would be possible to make the trip to La Jolla.<sup>36</sup> He and his young wife Gail (she was a student of his, has travelled in East Africa and is generally active) were “Carpenters for Christmas” in Mississippi during the holidays last year. He evidently heard you once in Brandeis on *Science of Logic*, but doesn’t think you remember him, and I promised to let you know because you will need friends in California, even if they are in New Mexico.

Hurriedly, yours,

Raya

Your friend Hans Meyerhoff,<sup>37</sup> on the other hand, I didn’t see since he was most adamant to my nephew (Eugene Gogol) that he and no one else makes decisions about his class, etc. etc. I did speak on the UCLA campus under sponsorship of CORE and the Marxist-Humanist,<sup>38</sup> so whatever it is that he and the Administration suddenly saw alike about me, the students and the activists in the Negro revolt thought differently.

I should finally—by the end of the month—be able to get away to work on my book since the Japanese trip has been delayed till fall.

\* \* \*

September 7, 1965

Dear R.D.

Certainly I shall write to the Guggenheim people<sup>39</sup> as soon as I get their request, repressing my deviation from your line.

I was fascinated by your statement that Marx's "theory of rectification" was his most original contribution—I like that much better than "reification."

Furthermore: the 1844 manuscripts were not rediscovered in the mid-1940ies "by theological and secular existentialists" but in the very early 1930s by non-theological secular non-existentialists.<sup>40</sup>

And why is "Not Two Into One But One Into Two" a dialectical slogan?

But otherwise your project is indeed something to look forward to—even by me. . .

I am still swamped with socially necessary but individually alienating work.

Greetings!

HM

\* \* \*

September 9, 1965

Dear HM:

Thank you very much for yours of the 7th. What a fantastic typo—"rectification" (!) instead of "reification"; I don't know what I can do other than to expect them to understand the word; by now it has no doubt been sent out to their board. I am not the least bit worried however that I will be able to have the thesis hold for Marx who felt that his whole view of the dehumanizing work under capitalism was summed up in "Dead labor dominates living labor."

My reference to the rediscovery of the 1844 manuscripts by the mid-1940s was meant to contrast it to the belatedness of the work on them in the USA. I am, of course, well aware not only of their prior discovery of them by German Marxists in the 1930s but Riazanov's first publication of them in

1927.<sup>41</sup> Indeed, in a criticism of George Lichtheim's usually superior European air,<sup>42</sup> here is what I say in fn. 10, p. 75, (Fromm's symposium on *Socialist Humanism*),<sup>43</sup> practically transforming you into an American!

"I do not mean to say that I accept the West European intellectual's attitude on either the question of the degree of belatedness, or the low level of discussion in the United States. Four or five years before Europe's first rediscovery of Marx's early essays, when Europe was under the heel of fascism, Herbert Marcuse dealt with them in his *Reason and Revolution*. It is true that this was based on the German text of the essays, that no English translation was available, and that the discussion of Professor Marcuse's seminal work was limited to small groups. It is also true that I had great difficulty in convincing either commercial or university presses that they ought to publish Marx's humanist essays or Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*. I succeeded in getting both these writings published only by including them as appendices to my *Marxism and Freedom* (1958). Even then they did not become available to a mass audience. It was not until 1961, when Erich Fromm included a translation of the 1844 *Manuscripts* in *Marx's Concept of Man*, that Marx's humanism reached a mass audience in the United States, and received widespread attention in American journals. Nevertheless, I see no substantive reason for the intellectual arrogance of the European Marxologists since, in Europe as in the United States, it was only after the Hungarian Revolution that the discussion of humanism reached the level of either concreteness or urgency. When I refer to the belatedness of the discussion, I have in mind the long period between the time of the 1844 *Manuscripts* were first published by the Marx-Engels Institute in Russia, in 1927, under the editorship of Ryazanov, and the time they received general attention."<sup>44</sup>

"Not Two Into One But One Into Two"<sup>45</sup> is not my conception of dialectics; it is Mao's. It certainly does show how hard the Chinese Communists work at what they think a dialectical presentation. For any one, when referring to the Hegelian concept of contradiction, to sum it up, as Mao does, by saying: "As we Chinese say, opposites complement each other"<sup>46</sup> is neither a Hegelian nor a Marxist, but a good Confucian.

Judging by the sparkling humour of your letter the California air must be good for you despite "individually alienating work." I don't really expect to get the Guggenheim fellowship—I have neither the proper degrees nor the popular viewpoint to succeed. This will not stop my work, though it would greatly delay it, as it has all these years when I must constantly put the manuscript away for other work.

In mid-November I expect to leave for Hong Kong as I wish to do some research at the Universities Research centre there, and thence to Japan where they have just not only published *Marxism and Freedom*, but also my origi-

nal 1944 articles on the Russian economy<sup>47</sup> where I first developed the theory of state-capitalism. I was surprised how well these 21 year old writings stood the test of time.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

January 19, 1967

Dear HM:

Now that I have completed the draft chapter on Hegel's Absolutes<sup>48</sup> I am very anxious to get your views. It is no secret that we disagree on interpretation, but I trust you agree with me that the dialectic of debate is much to be preferred to a conspiracy of silence. May I send the chapter to you? Will you comment upon it? Please let me know at your earliest convenience and I will send it to you at once. Thank you very much.

Yours,

Raya

When I asked *New & Letters* to send you a copy of the special December issue on state-capitalism by a Japanese Marxist and myself, I found that you have not been on the mailing list since you left Massachusetts. Please let me know whether you wish to receive it regularly, and I will have you reinstated on the mailing list at once.

Did you know that Karel Kosik (one of the contributors to *Socialist Humanism*) will have his *The Dialectic of the Concrete* published in a German edition (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt) in February to be followed by an English translation (Dutch publisher!)?<sup>49</sup> There is some very interesting and lively discussions going on in East Europe: the other day I heard that your *Reason and Revolution* is being read avidly.

\* \* \*

January 25, 1967

Dear RD:

Thanks for your letter. I shall be glad to read your chapter on Hegel's concept of the Absolute, but you will have to have patience. At present I am so swamped with work here I will not get around to it.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Marcuse

\* \* \*

May 16, 1967

Dear HM:

Finally I have returned home after a very exhausting, though exciting, lecture tour. In Berkeley, One day alone, I spoke very nearly continuously from noon until ten P.M. with only time off for food, and by the end of the evening when I had already covered The challenge of Mao Tse-tung, the theory of alienation: Hegel, Marx and Sartre; and, the Barbarous United States war in Vietnam. I saw you listed on the latter subject in a different hall, and no doubt we both were marching in SF April 15th but somehow we never did meet.

I had hoped that when I returned to Detroit, I would find your criticism of the second chapter of Marx's *Transcendence of, and Return to Hegel's Dialectic*.<sup>50</sup> I know you did not promise it before June, but since you will by then be on your way to Europe, I hoped you would get to do this earlier.

I need not belabor the point of my appreciation of your stealing some time from yourself to do this. Thanks again.

Yours,

P.S. Did you know that you were still using my old, old address and the note to which you referred as having sent me and which I insisted I never received, finally caught up with me, some two months later. Please, its - 4482 - 28th, Detroit, Michigan. 48210.

\* \* \*

May 22, 1967



Dear RD:

Thanks for your letter. I am really surprised that you survived your lecture tour, but I know that your energy is inexhaustible, which is perhaps the most essential difference between you and me.

I am terribly sorry that I have to disappoint you. I could not read your chapters, and I shall not be able to read them before my departure early in June. Up to that date I have so much work to complete that I just can't help it. I am returning your chapters herewith.

With apologies and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

HM

\* \* \*

December 20, 1967

Dear R. D.

Sorry, it just doesn't work. I am in the midst of writing a larger theoretico-political essay;<sup>51</sup> in addition four ph.d. dissertations to supervise. I cannot take on any additional work. And you do not need my advice and criticism anyway. Good luck!

And the best wishes for another year of Johnson, Meany, and the long-shoremen and other workers, unionized or not, who so nicely beat up the anti-war demonstrators.

HM

\* \* \*

July 14, 1968

Dear HM:

My sister has just forwarded to me the report in the *LA Times* about the harassment of you;<sup>52</sup> not a word has appeared here, nor has TV reported it. No doubt nothing should surprise me about these USA which has always operated under a different white than that of the ivory towers. But I am shocked, and naturally wish to do whatever we can. Please let me know at once what we should do.

To begin with, I do wish it widely publicized and will make some photo offsets and send it out to some of the intellectuals like Erich Fromm. A few months back he asked me for your address as he was much concerned over the anti-Semitic overtones of the anti-intellectual campaign in Poland, especially in regard to Leszek Kolakowski and Adam Schaff.<sup>53</sup> It seems that both *Praxis* in Yugoslavia<sup>54</sup> and the newly appeared Left in Czechoslovakia were anxious to express their solidarity with the philosophers under attack for alleged “Zionism.” In any case, Fromm would be for organizing any sort of committee that may be needed for your defense.

Do you really mean that you would not return to the San Diego campus at all this fall? More than your students would greatly miss your presence and the dialectic of your thought. It may be as present in your writings, but there is still no substitute for live in-person dialogue, not even in the dialectic.

Eugene Gogol missed you both in West Germany and in Paris, but heard about you. He spent the whole of May at Sorbonne and you seemed to have left early. It was an experience he will not forget. No doubt you saw his report in N&L.<sup>55</sup> He, too, feels sure that the youth would wish to do what they can to make even Orange County livable by dissenters.

We will be getting an in-person report from someone in Czechoslovakia as to what is happening there as only an East European can know the situation, and so next month’s N&L will be devoted to it, and if you tell me where I can send it to you when it comes off the press in August, I will, of course, forward to you.

Do please give my warmest greetings to your wife; I’m sure she has courageously lived through more than one such situation, but it is never pleasant, always dangerous, and it is only the full confidence in the future that makes it possible to bear what bourgeois democracy has hidden in its darkest corners.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

July 24, 1968

Dear R.D.:

Thanks for your good note. Yes, the reports on the threats to my humble existence were correct.

I am about to leave for Europe—hope I can finish there a larger essay<sup>56</sup> on which I have been working.

Good luck!

HM

\* \* \*

October 6, 1976<sup>57</sup>

Dear Joe:

Recently a good number of documents have been released to the SWP under the Freedom of Information Act, as a result of your legal battle against the government's political surveillance. I have not been that successful in trying to get files held on me by the FBI, CIA, Attorney General and the NSA. The National Security Administration has acknowledged having a folder on me, but refused to reveal its contents "because it is classified and therefore exempt from access or release pursuant to Title 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (1). The record has been reviewed and is judged to be currently and properly classified in its entirety under criteria set forth in paragraph 2-303, DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, which implements Executive Order 11652." (Letter from NSA, Serial: N 9325, dated Sept. 7, 1976)

My attorney Neal Bush (Halpern, Mogill, Bush, Posner, Weiss, and McFadden, 1455 Centre St., Detroit, Mich. 48226) naturally appealed the decision. You know better than I what a tedious, long and bureaucratized road that is to travel. Neal Bush, who is handling all the inquiries, thought his job would be greatly facilitated if you would make available to me any of the documents you obtained which list me.

Here are the periods I thought most likely to include references to me:

1) 1937–1938 when I was with Comrade Trotsky in Mexico.<sup>58</sup>

2) In 1943, although I was no longer in the SWP, the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. applied pressure upon the *American Economic Review* to try to stop the publication of my translation of an article from *Pod Znamenem Marxizma* with an analysis by me called "A New Revision of Marxian Economics."<sup>59</sup> The Embassy wrote the AER that "Raya Dunayevskaya is very obviously a pseudonym, no doubt of a Trotskyist or a fascist, probably both." Since the U.S. and Russia were allies then, this was followed up by our State Department likewise pressuring the AER not to publish. The AER resisted, telling me that "everyone" knew I was a Trotskyist but it was so important an academic contribution they would publish it, and the Russians shouldn't object since they were giving the Russian view 30 pages as contrasted to the 6 pages for my commentary. Naturally, I do not know whether any of this—

and the international controversy that arose from it which hit the front page of the *New York Times* and lasted for an entire year—found its way to SWP files.

3) 1947, when I attended the Fourth International Conference in France. I do not know whether you know that on the very day I arrived, at a very cheap hotel on a side street in Paris, I was visited by a man from the American Embassy who had known me in the '30s when I worked for the government. I asked him how he could possibly know I was in Paris and where I was staying when I had no contact with him for years. I believe the name of Irving Brown<sup>60</sup> was cited by this man, after which he proceeded to tell me that the youth section of the Socialist Party which had just been won over by Trotskyism had openly advertised the conference, and since he was a “specialist on splits,” he wanted me to help him get into the adult conference for the sake of “scholarship.” I naturally told him off, reported it at once to Pablo,<sup>61</sup> and changed hotels. The harassment continued when I proceeded to England, allegedly because I was carrying the film of Trotsky in 1917 for “public show.” (The joke is that the authorities also inquired about me of Gerry Healy,<sup>62</sup> and he evidently assured them that he had never heard of me.) By the time I returned to New York, the Immigration and Naturalization Department confiscated a shorthand notebook of mine which they mistakenly thought contained the minutes of the Fourth International conference, but since they did not bother to acknowledge they absconded with it, I didn't bother to inform them that it was a lecture on Shakespeare. Rowland Watts of the ACLU was then my attorney.

4) After the Johnson-Forest Tendency left the SWP in 1951, it happened that the *Militant*<sup>63</sup> was carrying some articles written by someone named Adams. At that same time I was married to a man by the name of Adams (of the Bicentennial Adamses), who was Senior Economist for the government and who was being harassed for having married me.<sup>64</sup> Once again, the name of the SWP and the *Militant* came up. I went to see Comrade Cannon<sup>65</sup> and he assured me that the name Adams would no longer be used in the *Militant*.

I do not believe that there are any other periods of my life which might enter into the SWP surveillance documents. However, I was in considerable difficulty from both the British and the U.S. governments when I was in Africa in 1962; my passport was lifted on my return to the U.S. Rowland Watts, who was still my lawyer, finally got my passport back, but the Immigration Dept. offered no explanation, claiming it was “all a mistake.” But it was the same period when, because of our struggle against the labor bureaucracy in Detroit, a youthful son of a UAW leader informed me that the UAW likewise had a file on me which listed me as “a far-left split-off from the Trotskyists.” Finally, just last year, during my lecture tour in Berkeley, “Trotskyism” as a characterization of me was suddenly linked to a Chinese friend, whom I had met when I was in Hong Kong in 1965-66, where I was

doing research work for the Mao chapter in *Philosophy and Revolution*,<sup>66</sup> and when the Mao chapter for *Marxism and Freedom*<sup>67</sup> was translated into Chinese and smuggled into mainland China.

Besides Raya Dunayevskaya, the names I submitted when I demanded to see my files were: Rae Spiegel, Rae Adams, Freddie Forest. It goes without saying that I would greatly appreciate anything you can do to help me with my fight against the FBI, CIA, NSA and other surveillance agencies.

Comradely yours,

PS: [The person] who is delivering this letter to you in person is both a comrade and an attorney, will know the contents of this letter, and is authorized to receive your reply to me.

\* \* \*

November 1, 1976

Dear Raya:

Thanks for your greetings and the copy of your letter to Joe.<sup>68</sup> I return it herewith. I myself have requested my file a fortnight ago. I shall write you as soon as I have received it.

You will laugh when you hear that I am working on Marxist aesthetics: “doesn’t he have other worries?”<sup>69</sup> But perhaps we do meet again sometime somewhere for a good discussion and disagreement.

Best wishes

Herbert

\* \* \*

November 10, 1976

Dear HM,

Thank you very much for your note of the 1st. If you get your file, I certainly would be grateful to hear about your success. After all, our names also crossed, and I’m not only referring to your 1957 preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, but the 1943–44 dual pressure from both the State Department and the Soviet Embassy against the *A.E.R.* publication of my translation of Stalin’s revision of the law of value, and commentary upon it,<sup>70</sup> which seemed

at that time to touch upon some of the Frankfurt School that were in this country. It is true that this came to me second-hand, but one thing was sure—there were then many Luxemburgists who were looking for me in a very friendly way.

So you're into Marxist aesthetics, and Fromm of course has never left psychoanalysis, so us poor, "un-erudite" revolutionaries will have to keep fending for ourselves. Did I tell you, in 1974, that the H.S.A. [Hegel Society of America] had invited me to present a paper on Hegel's Absolute Idea as New Beginning? There must have been some from the Frankfurt School there too, since my talk contained criticism of Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* and I engaged in quite a discussion with them. Would you like to see a copy of my talk? The proceedings were supposed to be published by Nijhoff in 1975. Then I heard that Humanities Press instead will be the ones to publish it in 1976, but I have yet to see proof of it.<sup>71</sup> Do you suppose that since I promised the Society that I'm not really calling them to the barricades, time has become eternal?

Yes, it would be great to meet again for a discussion. Do you ever come east? I have been to the West Coast every year, but I have promised myself not to do so in order to create time for me to do some serious work on my projected new work on Rosa Luxemburg and today's women theorists.

Yours,

\* \* \*

January 31, 1978

Dear HM:

How are you? Do you know whether you'll have any free time April 21 or 22? My lecture tour this year calls for my speaking in San Diego those two days, and I thought I would like to talk with you on two matters.

As you know, I have been working for some time on a study of Rosa Luxemburg and today's WLM.<sup>72</sup> I've been concentrating on the period 1910-14, which is when Rosa broke with Kautsky, heightened her agitation not only on the general strike, but the opposition to imperialism, not only "in general," but most specifically the SD's<sup>73</sup> failure to carry on a campaign during the Morocco crisis,<sup>74</sup> and writing her greatest theoretical work, *Accumulation of Capital*. In all these, she was way ahead of all other international leaders, including Lenin. At the same time, I was most anxious to get a feel of the times and the person, from those who knew Rosa or participated in

Spartakus.<sup>75</sup> A few of the letters I did receive were quite illuminating. I was most anxious to get your reactions, but since you never write to me, I am looking forward to the opportunity of talking with you.

The other matter concerns those horrors in Washington that manage to compete with the tortoises in the lackadaisicalness with which they respond to requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Since I wrote you last on the question, I have received very little from them, and they have not moved an inch when it comes to not just censoring what they did send me, but refusing categorically under god knows what “special” laws to allow access to any part 1962–63, and 1964–65. In ’62–’63 I was in Africa, had quite a bit of harassment, especially from British and French imperialism, and . . . as well as the fact that here I “celebrated” the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation with my pamphlet *American Civilization on Trial* [1963] which in the very first paragraph challenged J. & R. Kennedy, J. Edgar Hoover, and a few other big names. In ’65, I was in Japan and Hong Kong, and I didn’t leave until the beginning of Mao’s Cultural revolution. Have you had any better results from your requests for information?

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

March 7, 1978

Dear Raya:

Of course you are right to complain that I never write. There is really no excuse for it and it does not mean that I don’t remain interested in what you are doing.

To make things more complicated, I have just been released from the hospital where I had to undergo surgery and am in the very slow process of recovery. I only hope that by the time of your visit here—end of April—I will be all right.

With best wishes

Herbert Marcuse

## NOTES

1. Dunayevskaya's review, "Reason and Revolution vs. Conformism and Technology," *The Activist* No. 11 (Jan. 1965), is reprinted in the appendix to this volume.

2. Dunayevskaya, *Sartre's Search for a Method to Undermine Marxism* (Detroit: News and Letters, 1963); see also Dunayevskaya's chapter 6 on Sartre, "Outsider Looking In," in *Philosophy and Revolution*. The French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) wrote novels and plays, as well as philosophical treatises like *Being and Nothingness* (1943). In 1957 he declared himself a Marxist, but argued that Marxism needed the additive of existentialism to overcome its dogmatism. This argument first appeared in his *Search for a Method*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York, Knopf, 1963, orig. 1957) and soon after at great length in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. I, trans. by Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: NLB, 1976, orig. 1960). Politically, Sartre was a critical supporter of the French Communist Party until the late 1960s, which meant in practice that he attacked members of the anti-Stalinist Left in France as themselves dogmatic. He also supported Third World anti-imperialist movements in Algeria and elsewhere, which led him to contribute a lengthy preface justifying anti-colonial and anti-racist violence to Frantz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* (1961).

3. M&F, "Introduction to the Second Edition" (1964).

4. M&F, Ch. 17, "The Challenge of Mao Tse-tung," pp. 288–330

5. Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), the civil rights coalition that organized Mississippi Freedom Summer 1964; Inge Marcuse (1910–1972), Herbert's wife; Eugene Walker (Gogol), a longtime member of News and Letters Committees, later the co-author—with Mario Savio and Dunayevskaya—of *The Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution* (Detroit: News & Letters, 1965).

6. Sartre's autobiography, *The Words*, trans. by Bernard Frechtman (New York: George Braziller, 1964); Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960), part of which appeared earlier than the full Critique in English as *Search for a Method* (1957), with Vol. 2 of the Critique published posthumously.

7. Tokyo: Modern Thought, 1964.

8. Dunayevskaya was in fact the author of *American Civilization on Trial: Black Masses as Vanguard* (Chicago: News and Letters, 2003, orig. 1963). The subtitle was added in 1970.

9. In its 1973 published form, part one of *Philosophy and Revolution*, comprising chapters on Hegel, Marx and Lenin, was entitled, "Why Hegel, Why Now?"

10. This refers to Marx's critique of British political economist David Ricardo, who argued that rent is based on differential rates of fertility of land. Marx argued that rent also exists independent of such differential rates of fertility (i.e., "absolute rent") in that rent under capitalism is derived from the movement of capitalist production as a whole.

11. Marx, "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic," M&F1958, p. 313; see also MECW 3, p. 336.

12. On Proudhon, see note 3 in Chapter 2.

13. See Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, edited and introduced by Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

14. See Marx's letter to Engels of January 14, 1858, MECW 40, p. 249.

15. While Marx takes up rent in his very long 1861–1863 Manuscript (now published in English in MECW, Vols. 30–34), he never seems to have intended this material for the first volume of *Capital*. In 1894, Engels published some of it in *Capital*, Vol. III.

16. For Dunayevskaya's more detailed discussion of the changes in the various drafts of *Capital* as a deepening of Marx's concretization of the Hegelian dialectic, see *Marxism and Freedom*, Chs. 5–7 and *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*, Ch. 10.

17. See note 3 in Chapter 1.

18. See *Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner's Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie*, MECW 24, pp. 531–62. For Dunayevskaya's early translation of this from the 1940s, see RDC, 1899–1937.

19. This refers to the syllogism of "Universal-Particular-Individual."



20. An apparent reference to Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), where he wrote of the "integration" of labor with capital under automation: "The organized worker . . . is being incorporated into the technological community of the administered population" (p. 26). Dunayevskaya cites and critiques this passage in her review, reprinted in the appendix to this volume.

21. "Synthetic cognition" is discussed in the second section of the penultimate chapter of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, "The Idea of Cognition."

22. A reference to Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" among the superpowers during the Cold War.

23. The "Idea of Cognition," the penultimate chapter of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, includes discussion of the "Theoretical Idea" and the "Practical Idea," which come together as a unity of opposites in the work's final chapter, "The Absolute Idea."

24. I. M. Bochenski, a Thomist Sovietologist and author of numerous works on Marxism and European intellectual history, such as *Contemporary European Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), was also a founder of the journal *Studies in Soviet Thought*.

25. Dunayevskaya note: The finest attack on organizational vanguardists I have read anywhere is in Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, in his attacks on the Church—& what a totalitarian, monolithic party medieval catholicism was! Whoever it was who said that he who turns his back on history is doomed to relive it must have our age in mind!

26. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I (MCIK, p. 195; MCIF, p. 280); Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), British utilitarian philosopher, a major influence upon modern liberalism.

27. See Marx's *Civil War in France*, MECW 22, p. 341.

28. This apparently refers to Lenin's comment, near the start of his 1914–1915 *Philosophical Notebooks*, that "Logic is the science not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development 'of all material, natural and spiritual things,' i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the *History of knowledge of the world*" (LCW 38, pp. 92–93). Lenin then quoted Hegel's comment, "In this web, strong knots are formed now and then, which give stability and direction to the life and consciousness of spirit" (SLI, p. 46; SLM, p. 37; LCW 38, p. 93).

29. A reference to Trotsky's theorization of Stalinist Russia as a worker's state, though bureaucratically "deformed." See also note 33 in Chapter 1.

30. In her October 10 letter to Marcuse, Dunayevskaya enclosed a draft chapter for what would become *Philosophy and Revolution*, entitled, "'The Algebra of Revolution,' or the Dialectic of Thought and Action."

31. In her October 27 letter to Marcuse, Dunayevskaya had enclosed an early draft of what became part one of *Philosophy and Revolution*, comprising chapters on Hegel, Marx and Lenin, entitled, "Why Hegel, Why Now?"

32. In October 1964, Sartre was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature but declined it, criticizing the pro-Western bias of the Prize.

33. This letter, which is missing, apparently discusses Dunayevskaya's plans to visit Boston.

34. Reprinted in the appendix to this volume.

35. Peter Marcuse, later Professor of Urban Planning at Columbia University; Dunayevskaya's nephew Eugene Walker (Gogol).

36. In 1965, Marcuse moved from Brandeis University to the University of California, San Diego in La Jolla, California.

37. Hans Meyerhoff (1914–65), a German émigré intellectual who worked with Marcuse for the U. S. government during the 1940s, later a literature professor at UCLA who spoke out against the Vietnam War. Marcuse's remarks at the 1965 memorial service for Meyerhoff (who died in a car accident on Nov. 20, 1965) have been published in *Towards a Critical Theory of Society*, edited by Douglas Kellner (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); elsewhere in the latter volume Marcuse describes Meyerhoff as "my closest friend" (p. 111).

38. Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was a national civil rights organization with branches on many campuses; *The Young Marxist-Humanist* was a student publication at UCLA organized by Eugene Walker (Gogol).

39. Dunayevskaya had applied for a Guggenheim Fellowship to complete *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), and apparently had asked Marcuse to support it.

40. Probably a reference to Marcuse's discussion in pre-Hitler Germany of Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*, one of the earliest in any language: "New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism," trans. by John Abromeit and Joris de Bres, in Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, edited by Richard Wolin and John Abromeit (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005, orig. 1932), pp. 86–121. This essay was not widely circulated until 1972, when an initial English translation appeared, now revised; it was reprinted in German in 1978.

41. David Riazanov (1870–1938) produced editions of Marx and Engels in Russia in the 1920s, most importantly the first version of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (Complete Writings or MEGA), which published the *1844 Manuscripts* and the *German Ideology* for the first time in their original German; Riazanov later perished in Stalin's forced labor camps.

42. George Lichtheim (1912–73), author of *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger, 1961); reviewed the second edition of Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* in the *New York Review of Books* in 1964.

43. Dunayevskaya note: Has Doubleday your Calif. address to send you this volume since you too are included and, as usual, with a view differing from mine.

44. Dunayevskaya, "Marx's Humanism Today," in Fromm, ed., *Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium* (Garden City: Doubleday: 1965), p. 75 n. 10.

45. Dunayevskaya is referring to Marcuse's question, in his previous letter, about this phrase, which Dunayevskaya had quoted from Mao's "On Contradiction" (1937).

46. In "On Contradiction" Mao wrote, "We Chinese often say: 'Things opposed to each other complement each other'" (cited in M&F, p. 306).

47. See note 3 in Chapter 1.

48. An early version of "Absolute Negativity as New Beginning," later published as Ch. 1 of *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973).

49. A reference to noted Czech Marxist humanist Karel Kosik's *Die Dialektik des Konkreten* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967). The English edition was delayed by a decade: *Dialectics of the Concrete*, trans. Karel Kovanda and James Schmidt (Boston and Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976). It appeared in the series Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Dunayevskaya's friend Robert S. Cohen.

50. An early version of Ch. 2 of Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973): "A New Continent of Thought, Marx's Historical Materialism and Its Inseparability from the Hegelian Dialectic."

51. Possibly refers to Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), which included some new essays as well as translations from the German of older ones.

52. In 1968, when Marcuse was teaching at the University of California, San Diego, a campaign began, supported by the American Legion and other right-wing groups, to revoke his university contract. In July, Marcuse received a death threat from the Ku Klux Klan and went into hiding before leaving on a planned trip to Europe.

53. Philosophers in Poland who contributed essays to Fromm's *Socialist Humanism* (1965) included Leszek Kolakowski (1927–2009), author of *Towards a Marxist Humanism* (1967), then the most prominent Polish Marxist humanist and long a target of the authorities; he later moved toward liberalism after going into exile in the West. Adam Schaff (1913–2006), author of *A Philosophy of Man* (1963) and a frequent correspondent of Erich Fromm, was far less critical of the Stalinist system, but Schaff too came under attack in 1968 during the purge of Jewish intellectuals and was forced off the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party.

54. The Yugoslav journal *Praxis* (1964–74) featured the writings of Marxist humanist philosophers—among them Gajo Petrovic, Mihailo Markovic, Svetozar Stojanovic, Zagorka Golubovic, Pedrag Vranicki, and Rudi Supek—who were also dissidents with respect to Tito's internationally independent but internally authoritarian regime. Many of these philosophers contributed essays to Fromm's *Socialist Humanism* (1965). As will be seen below, both Fromm and Dunayevskaya kept in touch with the *Praxis* philosophers, particularly Markovic. In 1974–1975, *Praxis* was suppressed and most of its leading lights banned from teaching. In 1981, some members of the *Praxis* group founded, together with U.S. philosophers Richard Bernstein and Seyla Benhabib, the journal *Praxis International*. In the 1990s, after the deaths of both Fromm and Dunayevskaya, that journal fell apart as some of the Yugoslav philosophers, especially Markovic, adopted a stridently Serbian nationalist stance during the Bosnian

War of 1992–1995. In 2002, in one of his last public appearances, Markovic, who died in 2010, testified as a character witness for Serbian nationalist ruler Slobodan Milosevic at his trial for genocide before the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

55. Later published as a pamphlet: Eugene Walker (Gogol), *France Spring 68: Masses in Motion, Ideas in Free Flow* (Detroit: News & Letters 1968).

56. Possibly refers to Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

57. This letter is addressed to Joseph Hansen (1910–79), a leading figure in the U.S. Socialist Workers' Party (SWP), which Dunayevskaya and the rest of the Johnson-Forest Tendency had left in 1951. It is included here because Dunayevskaya sent copies of it to both Marcuse and Fromm.

58. Dunayevskaya was Trotsky's Russian language secretary during this period.

59. See note 3 in Chapter 1.

60. Irving Brown (1911–1989), an important CIA official, who channeled support to anti-Communist trade unions in Europe during the postwar period.

61. Michel Pablo (pseudonym of Michel Raptis, 1911–96), was a leader of the Trotskyist International Secretariat of the Fourth International, who advocated surreptitiously joining the Stalinist Communist Parties as a way of breaking the Trotskyists' isolation; later an adviser to Third World governments in Algeria and elsewhere.

62. Very sectarian leader of the Trotskyist Workers' Revolutionary Party in Britain, who later slandered Trotsky's colleagues in Mexico by accusing them of having been in on his assassination.

63. Newspaper of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers' Party in the U.S.

64. Bernard Adams, who died in a plane crash soon after World War II.

65. James P. Cannon (1890–1974) was the National Secretary of the Socialist Workers' Party until 1953.

66. "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung," Ch. 5 of P&R.

67. "Cultural Revolution or Maoist Reaction?," Ch. 18 of M&F, added for the 1971 Pluto Press edition.

68. Joseph Hansen.

69. This was to be Marcuse's last book, first published in German: *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics*, trans. Herbert Marcuse and Erica Sherover (Boston, Mass., Beacon Press, 1978, orig. 1977).

70. See note 3 in Chapter 1.

71. Dunayevskaya's "Hegel's Absolute as New Beginning" was eventually published in the conference proceedings, *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, ed. by Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth L. Schmitz (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), pp. 163–77. It has since been reprinted with editors' notes in PON, pp. 177–190. Theodor Adorno (1903–69) was one of the leading lights of the Frankfurt School and a major philosopher, sociologist, and musicologist. Along with the Frankfurt School's director, Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Adorno returned from exile after World War II to Frankfurt University. Among his most notable writings are *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (with Horkheimer, 1947), which includes a famous essay on "The Culture Industry;" *The Authoritarian Personality* (with numerous co-authors, 1949), and the work at issue here, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973, orig. 1966). In the conclusion of her essay for the Hegel Society, which traces Hegel's discussion of absolute negativity in the final chapter of the *Science of Logic*, Dunayevskaya takes issue with Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*: "From the very beginning of the Preface of his work (p. xix), Adorno informs us that the positive in the negative—'the negation of the negation'—is the enemy. . . . Naturally, Adorno keeps his distance from 'positivists' and the vulgarisms of the knighted Karl Popper and his infamous 'Hegel and Fascism' school. Nevertheless, Adorno, almost out of nothing, suddenly brings in Auschwitz and introduces some sort of kinship between it and absolute negativity. . . . Why, then, such a vulgar reduction of absolute negativity? Therein is the real tragedy of Adorno (and the Frankfurt School). It is the tragedy of a one-dimensionality of thought which results when you give up Subject, when one does not listen to the voices from below—and they were loud, clear, and demanding

between the mid-fifties and mid-sixties. . . . The next step was irresistible, the substitution of a permanent critique not alone for absolute negativity, but also for ‘permanent revolution itself’” (PON, pp. 186–87).

72. WLM was Dunayevskaya’s abbreviation for the Women’s Liberation Movement. The book appeared four years later: *Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution* (1982), hereafter RLWLKM.

73. German Social Democratic Party.

74. On July 1, 1911 the German gunboat *Panther* sailed into Morocco; Luxemburg attacked the Social Democratic leadership for not mounting an immediate campaign against this imperialistic act.

75. Rosa Luxemburg was a leader of the revolutionary socialist Spartacist movement that opposed World War I. Despite her warnings that the movement was still too weak, they launched the 1919 Spartacist Uprising in Germany. Afterwards, Luxemburg and other left-wing socialists were hunted down and assassinated by proto-fascists, with the complicity of the reformist Social Democrats, who had joined the provisional government. For more on Luxemburg, see note 55 in Chapter 2.

*Part 2*

**The Dunayevskaya-Fromm  
Correspondence, 1959–1978**



## Chapter Five

# The Early Letters: On Fromm's *Marx's Concept of Man* and His Socialist Humanism Symposium

June 6, 1959 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm invites Dunayevskaya to translate Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* for a selection of Marx's writings on philosophy and historical materialism, which Fromm was to publish two years later as *Marx's Concept of Man*.<sup>1</sup> Fromm closes the letter by writing that he had recently read Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (1958), commenting that he considered it an exceptionally important work].

\* \* \*

June 17, 1959

Dear Erich Fromm:

Thank you for your letter of the 6th which Bookman's<sup>2</sup> has just forwarded to me. I would be most happy to be associated with the translation of any of Marx's works, none of which (including *Capital*) has had a seriously accurate rendering into English.

Unfortunately, I do not know enough German to be able to do so from the German. Only people as foolishly brave (or perhaps just foolish) as I translate Marx from the Russian. As I stated in the translator's note to the Appendices of my *Marxism and Freedom*, I believe that the knowledge of Marxian-Hegelian philosophy is greatly obstructed by available translations which are

intended exclusively for philosophic circles. It is true the Russian language does not have as precise a philosophic idiom as the German. However, there is an overwhelming advantage to a language not rich in specialized expressions and compelled to operate through addition of prefixes and suffixes to its words of action and emotion. It is this: when the words of doing and feeling are made to say something philosophic, they say it so simply that the man on the street understands *and* the man in the ivory tower can no longer cover up his surface understanding of it by involved phraseology. Like a revolving light, the simplicity of expression illuminates thought both in its depth and breadth.

I'm sorry to burden you with my philosophy on the work of translation, but I could not see refusing a translation of Marx without a substantial why. To convince my German friends that I do not really know German seems to be the hardest thing in the world to do. To this day I do not believe that Herbert Marcuse believed it. No doubt he thought it would be adding insult to injury to have the American ignorance of languages grafted on the backward Russian suddenly in love with Hegel's Absolutes, so he kept a goodly distance away from the horrid truth that I am not German. Yet he was sufficiently free of the mores of the academic world to be willing to associate his name with mine, despite our violent disagreements of interpretation of the modern era.

I am delighted to hear that you intend to publish Marx's writings on philosophy and historical materialism which, in my view, is more accurately described as humanistic materialism. I hope you will not consider me presumptuous to ask to read your essay on it. Naturally I'm proud of the fact that I was the first to bring the Humanism of Marxism to the attention of the American public. Since the publication of my book the Communists have redoubled their attacks on Humanism<sup>3</sup> because it is the form of the actual movement against their totalitarian rule in Russia itself and in the Soviet zone. This much I can do for your work—keep you up to date on the latest in the Russian press on the philosophic writings of Marx.

Yours sincerely,

Raya Dunayevskaya

P.S. Is your residence in Mexico a permanent one? That beautiful land holds some precious memories for me, although presently all it seems to do is to say "No" (very florid, very Latin "No's" that have a touch of "Yes" but not in matter of here and now, but only there and mañana) to bringing out a Spanish edition of *Marxism and Freedom*.<sup>4</sup>



October 11, 1961

Dear Dr. Fromm:

In reading your "Marx's Concept of Man"<sup>5</sup> I noted that you referred to the works of Herbert Marcuse as if there were no difference between the period when he wrote his wonderful "Reason and Revolution" [1941] and that in which he wrote his whitewash of Communist perversions in his "Soviet Marxism" [1958].<sup>6</sup> I will not go into my views on the latter since I wrote about them extensively, and enclose herewith my review.<sup>7</sup> The reason I mention it is that it illuminates the pitfalls awaiting one if the Humanism of Marxism is treated abstractly—and the dialectic of the present development is analyzed on a totally different basis.

If you'll permit me to say so, I would like to state that one aspect of this relates to your own work. Whereas in my *Marxism and Freedom*, in speaking of the three volumes of *Capital* (Chapters VII and VIII), I carry through the humanism of his early works (Chapter III) and finally, both in Chapter I and in the final chapter, show its urgency for our day in the concrete terms of Russia, on the one extreme, and independent Marxism, at the other end,<sup>8</sup> you dealt with these magnificent essays in altogether too general terms. It appears to me that, for that reason the criticism of your work began to concentrate on who first published Marx's Early Essays. To me that matters very little. What matters is their present cogency and the need to discuss the Humanism of Marxism *concretely*. I do not mean to reduce philosophy to what Trotsky used to call "the small coin of concrete questions."<sup>9</sup> I mean the discussion must be in terms of what Marx called the "abolition" of philosophy through its "realization,"<sup>10</sup> that is to say, by putting an end to the division between life and philosophy, work and life, and the different intellectual disciplines and work as the activity of man, the whole of man, the man with heart, brain and physical power, including the sensitivity and the genius of the arts. It is this which Marx literally pounds at in the Essays both when he deals with the five senses and when he deals with the limits of psychology which excludes "industry," or the workshop where a man wastes most of his time but also gains from it the spirit and cohesiveness of revolt.

The key turns out almost invariably to be the headlines of the day and since our state-capitalist age has the two nuclear giants fighting to the end, it compels those intellectuals who do not wish to base their theory on what the proletariat does, thinks, says, to attach themselves to one or the other pole. So Marcuse goes to Russia which he most certainly knows is not the Humanism of Marxism which he has proclaimed to be the true Marxism, and Daniel Bell goes to American capital, if even he must force "work and its discontents" into the head-shrinking agency called the plant psychoanalyst.<sup>11</sup> I do hope

you can exert your influence to bring these type of serious discussions into the open, and will invite me to participate in them. Let us not become part of the “bourgeois conspiracy of silence” against works like my *Marxism and Freedom*.

May I expect to hear from you? I have not heard from you ever since, in 1959, you first asked me to translate the Essays of Marx?

Yours sincerely,

Raya Dunayevskaya

I enclose a review of your book that appeared in *News & Letters*.<sup>12</sup>

\* \* \*

October 25 1961 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm responds to Dunayevskaya’s critique in her October 11 letter to him to the effect that his essay introducing Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts* was too general—the essay did not discuss Marx’s humanism “concretely.” Fromm explains that the essay was introductory and limited by available space. Fromm says he agrees with Dunayevskaya that Marx’s humanism was “concrete” as well as with her critical remarks about Daniel Bell’s *End of Ideology*. However, Fromm expresses some reservations concerning Dunayevskaya’s critique of Marcuse’s *Soviet Marxism*. Fromm writes that his initial impression had been that Marcuse had been appropriately critical of the Soviet system, but he indicates he is willing to take another look. Finally, Fromm rebuts recent reviews of *Marx’s Concept of Man*, including the one from *News & Letters* that Dunayevskaya had sent him and another in the *New Leader* that suggested it was unfair of Fromm to say that Bottomore’s translation was the first English-language translation published in the United States.<sup>13</sup> Fromm pointed out that the chapters of the *1844 Manuscripts* that Dunayevskaya had published in *Marxism and Freedom* were a little less than half of the length of those by Bottomore’s published in *Marx’s Concept of Man*. Fromm also acknowledged that he had not been fully aware of how much of Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts* Dunayevskaya had published in 1958. Fromm concluded with the assurance that he had not intended to ignore Dunayevskaya’s translation; he further noted that he just written the publisher to make a reference to Dunayevskaya’s translation in a planned new printing.<sup>14</sup>]

\* \* \*

December 8, 1961

Dear Dr. Fromm:

Thank you for yours of Oct. 25th—I've just returned from a very exhaustive but exhilarating tour to find your letter waiting for me. It seems that the 50-megaton explosion<sup>15</sup> has finally awakened even some of the bourgeoisie to recognize that, without Marxist-Humanism, the opposition to communism is rather empty. In any case I got invited even to the Iowa cornbelt—and the students burst into spontaneous applause when, in dealing with Khrushchev's actual explosions and Kennedy's threats to do same, I said, "If this isn't madness, it is only because madmen rule our world and they decree their irrational behavior as the rational and sane thing to do."

Now then once again on those Early Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, especially since I note that Harrington in *New Politics* compounds the mistakes (in part, again, I'm sorry to say, because he has deliberately and with malice aforethought in his case, decided not to mention my work).<sup>16</sup> Of course, it is not a question of "first-edness," and I am confident you meant no effort to avoid my work as you mention it; I was *compelled* to be "first" to make that English translation (the 1st and more full one I made from those essays was a mimeographed version in 1947) because, for 15 long years, I tried in vain to get a publisher and couldn't, and only after that did I decide to include them as Appendix to my own book [M&F1958, pp. 290–325]. When I first turned to them at the time I broke with Trotsky,<sup>17</sup> I moved very cautiously since philosophy was not my field. I asked a friend then (1939) to intercede with Hook<sup>18</sup> and see whether he wouldn't do it; his answer was: he was acquainted with those humanist essays and "there was nothing of value" in them for our era. But in 1961 I note that the *New Leader* announces he will have a special essay in the Christmas issue on them.<sup>19</sup>

But why should Harrington speak of a "Russian delay"?<sup>20</sup> There was no such delay for the good and sufficient reason that when they were 1st published in 1927 Ryazanov was at the head of the Marx-Engels Institute.<sup>21</sup> It took a successful revolution *plus* money to pry them loose from the 2nd International. When they were published, the discussion on them was very short lived since it was the year of Stalin's victory over Trotsky. By the time they were published in German (1932) Hitler was on the way to power, and so once again those Essays remained "hidden"; the "delay" by the Russians to issue an English translation was due merely to the fact that all Europeans think the American movement to be rather "backward." In any case, the *attack* on them began before that publication in English, and when it began (in 1955) I wrote that it was not an academic debate; that it must mean that the East German Revolt had only been driven underground, and we better

look at “the negation of the negation” to happen somewhere in East Europe as an actual revolution against Russia; in 1956 came the Hungarian Revolution.<sup>22</sup>

What I am trying to say is that “first-edness” makes sense only when it is related to actual historic events. Right now I am more interested in a counterpart to *Marxism and Freedom*, this time tracing the dialectical relationships between ideologies, historical actualities and mass movement, not through Western civilization, but on the African scene. Did you see my first venture into that? Under separate cover I’m sending you my “Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions.”<sup>23</sup> I wondered whether you could help with that African trip I plan for spring at least in so far as accreditation is concerned with universities or publications.

Season’s greetings!

Yours,

\* \* \*

November 21, 1963

Dear Dr. Fromm:

There has been such a long lapse since we last corresponded that I am not sure the above is still your address, and I’m therefore sending this via registered mail.

Two matters of unequal importance prompt this letter. One is purely informational. A paperback edition of my *Marxism and Freedom* will be out early next year with a new chapter (“The Challenge of Mao Tse-tung”<sup>24</sup>) and a new introduction which makes reference to your “Marx’s Concept of Man.”<sup>25</sup> In order to make room for the new chapter the publisher has made me sacrifice my translation of Marx’s Early Essays. I therefore refer them to your book and its translations, calling attention to the fact that the Moscow translation is marred by footnotes which “interpret” Marx to say the exact opposite of what he is saying,<sup>26</sup> whereas in your work they have both an authentic translation and valuable commentary.

The second, and central, reason for this correspondence is a sort of an appeal to you for a dialogue on Hegel between us. I believe I once told you that I had for a long time carried on such a written discussion with Herbert Marcuse, especially relating to the “Absolute Idea.” With his publication of *Soviet Marxism* [1958], this became impossible because, whereas we had never seen eye to eye, until his rationale for Communism, the difference in viewpoints only helped the development of ideas, but the gulf widened too

much afterward. There are so few—in fact, to be perfectly frank, I know none—Hegelians in this country that are also interested in Marxism that I'm presently very nearly compelled “to talk to myself.” Would a Hegelian dialogue interest you?

I should confess at once that I do not have your sympathy for Existentialism, but until Sartre's declaration that he was now a Marxist, our worlds were very far apart. With his *Critique de la Raison Dialectique* (the Introduction of which has just been published here under the title, *Search for a Method*)<sup>27</sup> I felt I had to take issue. I enclose my review of it, which is mimeographed for the time being, but I hope to publish it both in English and French.<sup>28</sup> In any case, it was in the process of my work on this that I reread the section of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* which deals with “Spirit in Self-Estrangement—the Discipline of Culture.”<sup>29</sup> Not only did I find this a great deal more illuminating than the contemporary works on Sartre, but I suddenly also saw a parallel between this and Marx's “Fetishism of Commodities.”<sup>30</sup> With your indulgence, I would like to develop this here, and hope it elicits comments from you. (On p. 6 of my review you'll find Sartre's critique of Marx's theory of fetishisms.)

The amazing Hegelian critique of culture relates both to the unusual sight of an intellectual criticizing culture, the culture of the Enlightenment at that; and to the historic period criticized since this form of alienation *follows* the victory of Reason over self-consciousness. Politically speaking, such a period I would call “What Happens After?,” that is to say, what happens after a revolution has succeeded and we still get, not so much a new society, as a new bureaucracy? Now let's follow the dialectic of Hegel's argument:

First of all he establishes (p. 510) that “Spirit in this case, therefore, constructs not merely one world, but a twofold world, divided and self-opposed.” [PhGB, p. 510; PhGM, p. 295].

Secondly, it is not only those who aligned with *state power*, “the haughty vassal” (p. 528 [PhGM, p. 307]) from Louis XIV's “L'etat c'est moi” to the Maos of today—who, now that they identify state power and wealth with themselves, of necessity enter a new stage: “in place of revolt appears arrogance.” (p. 539 [PhGM, p. 315]) who feel the potency of his dialectic. It is his own chosen field: knowledge, ranging all the way from a criticism of Bacon's “Knowledge is power.” (p. 515 [PhGM, p. 298]) to Kant's “Pure ego is the absolute unity of apperception.” (p. 552 [PhGM, p. 323]) Here is why he is so critical of thought: (p. 541)

“This type of spiritual life is the absolute and universal inversion of reality and thought, their entire estrangement the one from the other; it is pure culture. What is found out in this sphere is that neither the concrete realities, state power and wealth, nor their determinate conceptions, good and bad, nor the consciousness of good and bad (the consciousness that is noble

and the consciousness that is base) possess real truth; it is found that all these moments are inverted and transmuted the one into the other, and each is the opposite of itself" [PhGM, p. 316].

Now this inversion of thought to reality is exactly what Marx deals with in "The Fetishism of Commodities," and it is the reason for his confidence in the proletariat as Reason as against the bourgeois "false consciousness," or the fall of philosophy to ideology. Marx insists that a commodity, far from being something as simple as it appears, is a "fetish" which makes the conditions of capitalist production appear as self-evident truths of social production. All who look at the appearance, therefore, the duality of the commodity, of the labor incorporated in it, of the whole society based on commodity "culture." It is true that the greater part of his famous section is concerned with showing that the fantastic form of appearance of the relations between men as if it were an exchange of things is the *truth* of relations in the factory itself where the worker has been transformed into an appendage to a machine. But the very crucial footnotes all relate to the fact that even the discoverers of labor as the source of value, Smith and Ricardo, could not escape becoming prisoners of this fetishism because therein they met their historic barrier.<sup>31</sup>

Whether you think of it as "fetishism of commodities" or "the discipline of culture," the "absolute inversion" of thought to reality has a dialectic all its own when it comes to the rootless intellectual. Take Enlightenment. Despite its great fight against superstition, despite its great achievement—"Enlightenment upsets the household arrangements, which spirit carries out in the house of faith, by bringing in the goods and furnishings belonging to the world of the Here and Now . . ." (p. 512 [PhGM, p. 296])—it remains "an alienated type of mind": "Enlightenment itself, however, which reminds belief of the opposite of its various separate moments, is just as little enlightened regarding its own nature. It takes up a purely negative attitude to belief" (p. 582 [PhGM, p. 344]).

In a word, because no new universal—Marx too speaks that only true negativity can produce the "quest for universal[ity]" [MECW 6, p. 190]<sup>32</sup> and *hence* a new society—was born to counterpose to superstition or the unhappy consciousness, we remain within the narrow confines of "the discipline of culture"—and this even when Enlightenment has found its truth in Materialism, or Agnosticism, or Utilitarianism. For unless it has found it in freedom, there is no movement forward either of humanity or "the spirit." And what is freedom in this inverted world where the individual will is still struggling with the universal will? Well, it is nothing but—terror. The forms of alienation in "Absolute Freedom and Terror" [PhGB, pp. 599-610; PhGM, pp. 355-364] are so bound up with "pure personality" that I could hardly keep myself, when reading, from "asking" Hegel: how did you meet Sartre?

“It is conscious of its pure personality and with that of all spiritual reality; and all reality is solely spirituality; the world is for it absolutely its own will.” (p. 600 [PhGM, p. 356]) And further:

“With that freedom contained was the world absolutely in the form of consciousness, as a universal will. . . . The form of culture, which it attains in interaction with that essential nature, is, therefore, the grandest and the last, is that of seeing its pure and simple reality immediately disappear and pass away into empty nothingness. . . . All these determinate elements disappear with the disaster and ruin that overtake the self in the state of absolute freedom; its negation is meaningless death, sheer horror of the negative which has nothing positive in it, nothing that gives a filling” [PhGB, p. 608; PhGM, p. 360].

This was the result of getting itself (“the pure personality”) in “the rage and fury of destruction”—only to find “isolated singleness”: “Now that it is done with destroying the organization of the actual world, and subsists in isolated singleness, this is its sole object, an object that has no other content left, no other possession, existence and external extension, but is merely this knowledge of itself as absolutely pure and free individual self” (p. 605 [PhGM, p. 360]).

I wish also that all the believers in the “vanguard party to lead” studied hard—and not as an “idealist,” but as the most farseeing realist—the manner in which Hegel arrives at his conclusions through a study that the state, far from representing the “universal will” represents not even a party, but only a “faction.” (p. 605 [PhGM, p. 360], Hegel’s emphasis). But then it really wouldn’t be “the self-alienated type of mind” Hegel is tracing through development of the various stages of alienation in consciousness, and Marx does it in production and the intellectual spheres that correspond to these relations.

It happens that I take seriously Marx’s statement that “*all* elements of criticism lie hidden in it (*The Phenomenology*) and are often already *prepared* and *worked out* in a manner extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint. The sections on ‘Unhappy Consciousness,’ the ‘Honorable Consciousness,’ the fight of the noble and downtrodden consciousness, etc. etc. contain the critical elements—although still in an alienated form—of whole spheres like Religion, the State, Civic Life, etc.”<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, I believe that the unfinished state of Marx’s Humanist Essays makes imperative that we delve into Hegel, not for any scholastic reasons, but because it is of the essence for the understanding of today. Well, I will not go on until I hear from you.

Yours sincerely,

Raya Dunayevskaya

February 14 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[After explaining the delays in responding to Dunayevskaya's recent letters, Fromm raised two questions for Dunayevskaya's consideration: her writing an essay "on a topic of humanist socialism" for a symposium he was editing to be published by Doubleday;<sup>34</sup> and, whether she would agree to translate into English two German pieces for the proposed book, one by Ernst Bloch, from his *Naturrecht*, and another by Irving Fetscher.<sup>35</sup> Fromm also enclosed a list of contributors, and asked Dunayevskaya if her article could be ready in four weeks].

\* \* \*

February 20, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm refers to a February 17 letter from Dunayevskaya (missing), confirming Dunayevskaya's agreement to write an article "on Freedom and Marxism," and to translate the essays by Fetscher and Bloch for the same volume. Fromm also thanks Dunayevskaya for a copy of a letter she had sent to Marcuse, indicating that he would read it and respond later].

\* \* \*

March 9, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm responds to a February 25 letter from Dunayevskaya (missing), in which she apparently comments on his strict deadlines for her translations and her article for Fromm's volume on socialist humanism. Fromm assures Dunayevskaya that he has not become a "disciplinarian," but that inadequate English translations and the length of the submissions coming in to him for the symposium had been nearly overwhelming. Fromm also discusses the royalties, for which he assumed the responsibility of distributing to the symposium's contributors.]

\* \* \*

March 17, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[In reference to a March 12 letter from Dunayevskaya (missing), Fromm acknowledges Dunayevskaya's inquiry about a report of the International Philosophical Congress. He writes that if he obtained a copy, he would send it to Dunayevskaya.]



\* \* \*

March 18, 1964

Dear Erich Fromm:

Enclosed is my article, "The Todayness of Marx's Humanism."<sup>36</sup> As you see, the title differs from the one originally suggested by you and accepted by me before the dialectic of writing "prompted" the new title. It never fails: my passion for the concrete demands that freedom too be real instead of merely theoretic or abstract.

The Fetscher translation<sup>37</sup> is being typed and will go forward to you within a day or two.

Now as to the letters and material that has suddenly arrived from you. First your letter dated the 9th, postdated by Mexican postal authorities the 12th, and in Detroit the 17th, and which I just this minute (1 p.m. of the 18th) received. (It had no check enclosed as your secretary noted indeed she wasn't enclosing.) It surprised me since yesterday's mail brought a very lengthy and extra article by Abendroth<sup>38</sup> and I therefore assumed that, at least, I'd be freed from Bloch.

It happens it also comes at a very poor time indeed since I am about (April 1) to leave on my lecture tour, and in general am overwhelmed with work. Nevertheless I will do my best to do both translations since I know exactly what you mean by your plight. But you will have to give me extra time. How about promising you the Abendroth around April 4-5?

Hurriedly yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

March 20, 1964

Dear Erich Fromm,

Here is the Fetscher translation. You will note that the footnotes have some translator notes in square brackets to direct the reader to existing English sources. Mr. Fetscher did not make it easy for the translator to find the corresponding sources, since his references were only to specific German editions unavailable here, without mentioning section headings or titles of articles. Thus, footnote 9 (Tr p.8, IF p.7) is from Marx's article "On the

Jewish Problem.” There is another quotation on the same page that is also from that article, but since Fetscher did not annotate it, I didn’t presume to do so.

*Please* do me the favor of inserting a negative in my manuscript, sent you the other day, which was inadvertently left out. It is on page 6, line 12, in the paragraph beginning “This holy of holies—the need for an ideology to cover up the exploitation of the laborer—has not changed its essence. The “has not” is what must be inserted. Thank you very much.

The Bloch piece, I hope will be done by the end of the week.

The Abendroth piece will be a headache—in every respect.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

April 15, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm expresses appreciation for Dunayevskaya’s translations of the Bloch<sup>39</sup> and Fetscher pieces, indicating that he had made a few minor corrections where he felt something could be better expressed. In addition, after saying that he had read Dunayevskaya’s own paper, “The Todayness of Marx’s Humanism,” “with great interest and great pleasure,” and that it was an “excellent and really an important contribution to the volume,” most of the letter consists of fairly detailed editing points. Fromm begins with general suggestions, which he says he had offered to other writers as well: that language critical of the Soviet Union not be so polemical as to risk retribution against the more vulnerable contributors to the volume (a number of whom lived in Eastern Europe). In making this point Fromm acknowledged that in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia state capitalism and communist bureaucracy prevailed. But he writes that he wanted to clearly recognize the strong movements to transcend those negative features to arrive at a genuine humanist concept of socialism. Fromm concludes the letter by expressing his wish that Dunayevskaya not see his editing suggestions as an attempt to determine the substance of her article. He indicated that he had read her piece very thoroughly and meant his remarks to clarify her thought, with which he mainly agreed.]

\* \* \*

April 23 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm confirms that he had received Dunayevskaya's translation of Wolfgang Abendroth's essay for the socialist humanism symposium. Fromm expresses appreciation for the work Dunayevskaya had put into the symposium, noting that she had been the most reliable of the contributors. Fromm also takes note of Dunayevskaya's apparent displeasure with the Abendroth contribution, which she had translated. Fromm indicated that he would read that piece carefully in light of Dunayevskaya's remarks that were apparently critical of what she saw as Abendroth's overly sympathetic approach to Stalin and Mao. In regard to this, Fromm agrees to comply with Dunayevskaya's request to drop her name as translator of Abendroth's piece, and even to consider taking some action with respect to the piece itself].

\* \* \*

April 23, 1964

Dear EF:

Your letter of the 15th is at hand. I am glad to hear you say that your suggestions for changes in my manuscript are in no way "an attempt to interfere with the substance of your thought. They are, after two thorough readings, meant to clarify your thought . . ." Let me say at once that insofar as your suggestion for modifying the manner in which I use the word, "communism," in order "to avoid making trouble for the writers of the Eastern bloc," is concerned, I have done so. Where I could—and that is most places—I have substituted the word, "theoretician," where I couldn't do so, I specified the Communist as Russian (and, in one case, Chinese). In all cases I left out the word, "orbit."

I appreciate the care with which you have read my manuscript. I needn't tell you that a writer, particularly one whose subject is as complicated and urgent as ours, always appreciates suggestions in wording and style which can help clarify the complexities in content. I have carefully studied all your suggestions, and decided to edit fully and retype the article in toto. The two copies of the revised version are herewith enclosed, clearly marked on p. 1 in red, and on all other pages as "Revised" so that there be no confusion between the copy you have of the previous version. (It happens also that the type is different since I didn't have the elite and had to use the large type.) Please use this revised version, and I do very much appreciate your promise of sending me the galley proofs.

Naturally I was glad to hear that you consider my paper an important contribution to your symposium, and was especially happy to read that you "essentially agree" with my thought. Just as naturally you are, of course, in no way responsible for my views. Both as a socialist humanist and as an

editor of a symposium by a varied group of writers, I am sure you do not wish all contributions to be of a single mold, and that you do understand my preference for editing my own work.

You will also forgive me, I trust, if I give you some background about myself. The press always plays up my having been Trotsky's secretary as if that experience is what put me on the GPU black list.<sup>40</sup> (50 per cent of the Trotsky secretariat from the time of his exile were murdered, and I naturally did not care to increase the percentage, and therefore went around armed.) The truth is that the outright interference with my writings began after my break with Trotsky,<sup>41</sup> and, for a time, as in 1944, had the collaboration of our State Department (that has its own reason for keeping me "listed"). Thus, when the *American Economic Review* submitted to the Soviet Embassy my translation of the Russian article on the law of value,<sup>42</sup> not only did the Embassy refuse "to collaborate" (check the translation) with who who did not, they wrote, have "a correct position on Russia," but our State Department also put pressure on the periodical not to publish any violent language against "an ally." I am glad to report that Dr. Paul T. Homan, editor of that scholarly review, refused to be intimidated by either view of what was "a correct position or thought" and published both my translation and commentary. I am sorry to report that, with McCarthyism however, not only the two poles of world capital, but also the left, has helped create a conspiracy of silence around my writings. I am truly pleased to know that my working with you on the translations helped, as you so generously say, really to save the deadline.

Sincerely yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

July 15, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm mentions a recent letter from Dunayevskaya (missing), and acknowledges her apparent dissatisfaction with some additional editing of her contribution to the socialist humanist symposium, which Fromm apparently completed at the suggestion of the publisher, Doubleday. Fromm also mentions Dunayevskaya's correspondence with Marcuse, of which Dunayevskaya had apparently made him aware (see Fromm's February 20, 1964 letter to Dunayevskaya, this volume). Fromm concludes the letter by asking Dunayevskaya if she had read Marcuse's latest book,<sup>43</sup> adding that though he had begun reading it, he had been left "somewhat puzzled."]

## NOTES

1. Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Continuum, 1961). This volume contained a translation by Tom Bottomore of Marx's *1844 Essays*, three years after two of the main essays had been published in the appendix to Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (1958).

2. Bookman Associates, the publishers of her *Marxism and Freedom* (1958).

3. In her introduction to the second edition of *Marxism and Freedom* (1964), Dunayevskaya wrote, "the official Moscow publication (1959) [of Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*] is marred by footnotes which flagrantly violate Marx's content and intent" (p. 17).

4. The Spanish translation finally appeared in 1976, with the help of Fromm.

5. Fromm's *Marx's Concept of Man* had just appeared.

6. In *Marx's Concept of Man*, Fromm wrote of "Marcuse's brilliant and penetrating book, *Reason and Revolution*, and the same author's discussion of Marx's theories vs. Soviet Marxism" (p. 3).

7. Dunayevskaya's sharply critical review is reprinted in the appendix to this volume.

8. Chs. 7 and 8 of M&F are entitled, respectively, "The Humanism and Dialectic of *Capital*, Volume I, 1867 to 1883," and, "The Logic and Scope of *Capital*, Volumes II and III" (pp. 126–149). Ch. 3 is entitled, "A New Humanism: Marx's Early Economic-Philosophic Writings." In Ch. 1 of M&F, in the part on "Hegel's Absolutes and Our Age of Absolutes," Dunayevskaya develops a critique of the dismissal of the young Marx by Russian philosophers (see this volume, note 34 in Chapter 2). In Ch. 16, "Automation and the New Humanism," the final chapter of the original edition of M&F, Dunayevskaya discusses Marx's humanism in relationship to automated production/workers' revolt, and the 1955–1956 Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott.

9. Trotsky, *In Defense of Marxism* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970, orig. 1939–1940), p. 104.

10. In his "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction" (1844), Marx wrote that "the practical political party in Germany demands the negation of philosophy" and that it wants to do so "by turning its back on philosophy and with averted face uttering a few trite and angry phrases about it." The problem with this attitude, Marx concluded, was that "you cannot abolish [*aufheben*] philosophy without realizing it" (MECW 3, pp. 180–81, trans. altered).

11. On Bell, see notes 20 and 23 in Chapter 3.

12. Larry Cusick, review of Fromm's *Marx's Concept of Man*, *News & Letters* 6:7 (August–September 1961). Cusick wrote that while Fromm's book was "neither as concrete nor as original" as Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (1941) or Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (1958), "it is excellent as an introduction to Marx's philosophic thought." Cusick also chided Fromm for not mentioning Dunayevskaya's earlier translation of a large portion of the *1844 Manuscripts* in the appendix to M&F. Cusick additionally criticized Fromm's "abstractness and his sentimentality" and his linking of Marx's humanism with Zen Buddhism, existentialism, and Christianity. At the same time, however, Cusick concluded that *Marx's Concept of Man* "is really an excellent work," not only because it contained the *1844 Manuscripts*, but also because "Fromm presents very lucid explanations of historical materialism and Marx's concept of the problem of consciousness." This review appeared in the same issue of N&L that carried Dunayevskaya's scathing review of Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism*, the latter reprinted in the appendix to this volume.

13. Tom Bottomore's English translation of Marx's *1844 Essays* formed nearly half the text of *Marx's Concept of Man*. This polemical review, "Fromm's Concept of Marx," *The New Leader*, October 2, 1961, was written by Richard Bernstein, later a well-known Habermasian and pragmatist philosopher. Bernstein wrote that Fromm "falsely claims... that this is the first American publication of selections from the Manuscripts," mentioning Dunayevskaya's earlier translation. Bernstein dismissed the *1844 Manuscripts* as "a series of jottings," also averring

that Fromm's talk of human "self-realization" in Marx was a "dangerous" form of "absolute humanism," adding ominously that "as history has taught us," this "can by subtle gradations turn into an absolute totalitarianism."

14. Fromm did so, in a footnote to his preface for that second printing, published later in 1961.

15. On October 30, 1961, Russia detonated a 50-megaton bomb, the world's biggest nuclear explosion to date, nearly 4,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

16. Apparently refers to the prominent social democrat Michael Harrington's "Marx Versus Marx," *New Politics*, Vol. 1:1 (Fall 1961), pp. 112–123.

17. See note 33 in Chapter 1.

18. Sidney Hook (1902–89), the American Marxist and pragmatist philosopher, was in the 1930s author of two widely read books on Marx: *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx: A Revolutionary Interpretation* (New York: John Day, 1933); *From Hegel to Marx; Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1936). Virulently anti-Hegelian, Hook attacked Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* mercilessly in 1941, when it first appeared. By the 1950s, Hook moved to the right, and he subsequently became a harsh critic of the student Left of the 1960s and a supporter of Ronald Reagan.

19. See Sidney Hook, "Marx and Alienation," *The New Leader*, December 11, 1961, Vol. XLIV, no. 39, pp. 15–18, also published as part of the introduction to a new edition of his *From Hegel to Marx*. In this article Hook attacked not only Fromm but also the whole idea of taking the young Marx seriously. He wrote that "an extraordinary amount of nonsense is being written these days" concerning "Marx's theory of human 'alienation,'" concluding that the real question of the day was the political one of Western democracy vs. Communist dictatorship.

20. Dunayevskaya note: Not to mention that his attributing the "rediscovery" of Marx to the theologians in the post-war West European world only shows his own predilection, even as Tucker's [illegible word] reveals more of Tucker than of Marx. [Probably refers to Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961.)

21. See note 41 in Chapter 4.

22. See M&F, pp. 62–63 and note 34 in Chapter 2 on Russian philosophers and the young Marx.

23. Dunayevskaya, *Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism, and the Afro-Asian Revolutions* (Chicago: News and Letters, 1984, orig. 1959).

24. Dunayevskaya note: In 1961 I first analyzed "Mao Tse-tung: From the Beginning of Power to the Sino-Soviet Conflict." [*News & Letters* 7:1 (January 1962).] It is this which I brought up to date as the new chapter in my book. I do not have a copy of this, but I do have a copy of the original article and will be glad to send it to you, should you be interested.

25. See M&F, "Introduction to the Second Edition," p. 17.

26. Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Martin Milligan and ed. by Dirk K. Struik (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959).

27. See note 2 in Chapter 4.

28. Dunayevskaya, *Sartre's Search for a Method to Undermine Marxism* (1963).

29. "Spirit in Self-Estrangement: The Discipline of Culture and Civilization" is a section in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* [PhGB, pp. 507–610; PhGM, pp. 294–364].

30. Section 4 of the first chapter of *Capital*, Vol. I.

31. See Ch. 1 of *Capital*, "The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret," MCIF, pp. 163–177, ftns. 31, 33, 34, and 38; MCIK, ftns. to pp. 88, 92, 93, and 95.

32. See also note 45 in Chapter 2.

33. See "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" in Marx, *1844 Manuscripts*, M&F1958, p. 309; MECW 3, p. 332.

34. Later appeared as Fromm, ed., *Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium* (1965).

35. Ernst Bloch's "Man and Citizen According to Marx" (pp. 220–227) and Irving [German: Iring] Fetscher's "Marx's Concretization of the Concept of Freedom" (pp. 260–272) appeared in Fromm's *Socialist Humanism*.

36. Published as Dunayevskaya, "Marx's Humanism Today," in Fromm's *Socialist Humanism*.
37. Dunayevskaya had already agreed to translate contributions from Fetscher and Bloch.
38. Wolfgang Abendroth.
39. It appears that Fromm eventually used another translation of Bloch's chapter, "Man and Citizen According to Marx," as Norbert Guterman was listed as the translator in the published version of *Socialist Humanism*.
40. The GPU was part of the Stalin's secret police.
41. See note 3 in Chapter 1.
42. See note 33 in Chapter 1.
43. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (1964).





## Chapter Six

# Dialogue on Marcuse, on Existentialism, and on Socialist Humanism in Eastern Europe

July 21, 1964

Dear EF:

On second thought, and with heat wave having come down a few points, I decided I missed “a golden opportunity” yesterday “to commit you” to a discussion on Hegelian philosophy the minute you made any comment on Marcuse’s *One Dimensional Man*, so I’m coming back for a second try.

As I stated, all too briefly yesterday, Marcuse seems preoccupied with the idea that an advanced industrial society has replaced ontology with technology and very nearly transformed us all into one dimension men. We have lost the power of “negative thinking” (dialectic), become so much a part of the status quo that “technicity” easily swallows up what minor modes of protest we are capable of like “Zen, existentialism and beat ways of life. . . . But such modes of protest are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer negative. They are rather a ceremonial part of practical behaviorism, its harmless negation, and are quickly digested by the status quo as part of its healthy diet.”<sup>1</sup> This likewise affects our *literature* and all one has to do is to compare [Leo Tolstoy’s] *Anna Karenina* to [Tennessee Williams’s] “A Cat on a Hot Tin Roof,” not to mention, as *character*, the former to the “suburbia housewife. . . . This is infinitely more realistic, daring, uninhibited. It is part and parcel of a society in which it happens but nowhere its negation. What happens is surely wild—obscene, virile and tasty, quite immoral—and, precisely because of that, perfectly harmless” (p. 77).

You may disagree on the question of Zen, and an existentialist may disagree that his field has been so affected—as a matter of fact, HM [Herbert Marcuse] himself in his introduction to my book, seemed to hint that the modern French philosophers had added something to philosophy,<sup>2</sup> with which, as you know, I happened to disagree—but, on the whole, HM is absolutely right when he points to the deterioration of thought, which later (p. 170) he further defines as “the therapeutic empiricism of sociology” of behavior, of going along with the mainstream. However, while he attacks the status quo, he himself has very nearly given in to technology by attributing to it truly phenomenal powers. Feeling that this may be true, he tries for a way out, to find “absolute negativity,” but since he has turned his back on the proletariat as the revolutionary force, he looks elsewhere; very nearly on the last page he finds the third underdeveloped world to modify his overwhelming pessimism.

Now, in his previous discussion on Hegel’s Absolute Idea, which he rejected, he stated that it was no more than the proof of the separation of mental and manual labor in the *pre*-technological stage of history.<sup>3</sup> If this is so, if Hegel, after all his valiant striving to extricate philosophy from theology, retreated from concrete history to abstract absolutes not because he was, as a person, an opportunist; or, as a visionary, lacked the belief that the *human* embodiment of that keystone of his dialectic—“absolute negativity”—could possibly be that “one-dimensional man” working a single operation in a factory; but that Hegel’s historic barrier was the *pre*-technological state of society, then how can HM maintain that this is our fate? If the *pre*-technology and the *forcible* leisure needed for intellectual thought sends you back to abstractions, then how could it also have achieved the highest stage of human thought for HM does believe that Hegelian dialectics and Marxian revolutionary philosophy are the very modes of thought we now lack, and were achieved at a less than advanced industrial pace?

My contention had been that, irrespective of what retreat Hegel *consciously* hankered for, when confronted with the contradictions in his society making havoc of his beloved field of philosophy and *philosophic chairs*,<sup>4</sup> the *objective compulsion* to thought came from the French Revolution, not from *pre*-technology or *post*-technology, and the logic of this, *just this*, revealed the pull of the future, the new society which Hegel named “Absolute Idea” but which we first can understand in its material and most profound implications and therefore our age must work out *that* absolute.

I was glad to see that in his latest book HM is neither as totally pessimistic nor as tainted with a tendency toward “Soviet Marxism,”<sup>5</sup> and that, as usual, most profound insights are when he discusses thought, not when he discusses the objective world. “Philosophy originates in dialectic . . .” (p. 125) and in general the section on “One Dimensional Thought”) [ODM, pp. 123–199].

From another point of view I thought you might also be interested in the way in which I try to apply dialectics to politics, not in general, but on the specific horror “philosophy” of Goldwater, so I enclose also a talk I addressed to Marxist-Humanists, “The Turning Point.”

On a very different level, I wondered whether you could be of help either with foundations or individuals who are sufficiently interested in ideas to want to help “finance them.” What I mean is that I’ve been working on my new book so haphazardly because I cannot afford the time off—a full six months it would take to complete my work—nor can I afford a trip to Japan which I consider essential to that completion. When I first began working on the relationship of world ideologies to underdeveloped countries—in 1958, just as soon as *Marxism and Freedom* was completed—I felt I must go to Africa. A few intellectuals I know helped finance that trip, but when I tried some foundations—all the way from Ford to Rabinowitz<sup>6</sup>—I found doors more than shut tight. Meanwhile I continued both with the actual writing and research and this, in turn, brought me into contact with a Japanese group who, after reading my book, broke with the Communist Party—they were in the Zengakuren<sup>7</sup> but were dissatisfied with its non-comprehensive philosophy and, on their own, found their way to the Humanist Essays of Marx. They did succeed in getting a small bourgeois publisher to undertake the publication of M&F (which, incidentally, is due off the press next month; they are busy proofreading now)<sup>8</sup> but, while he sees that it would help the sales of the book, if I were in Japan lecturing on it, will not finance the trip. I’m not sure I ever sent you a copy of the introduction I wrote for the Japanese edition,<sup>9</sup> so I enclose that too now, so that you could see why I consider that country, or rather its youth, so essential to the development of Marxist-Humanism, especially the Hegelian philosophy aspects. In any case, whether it is for the purposes of just allowing me some time to do the actual writing, or whether any see the importance of a Japanese trip and wish to help finance that, I’m in need of aid. I need hardly belabor the point that those who have the money hardly feel the necessity to spend it for such purposes, but still I felt you may know some, or may have other ideas on the subject, and be willing to pass them on to me. In any case, I trust you do not consider this “low level” an imposition for I feel sure you have encountered it in your own life more than once.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

November 6, 1964

Dear EF:

Have you received a manuscript, *A Doctor's Notebook*, that I sent you on October 16th?<sup>10</sup> I enclose a copy of the letter that went with it which will both remind you of the request I made—for a possible introduction by you if you thought its content as important as I did—and yet first tell you about it if you haven't yet received it.

Here is my problem: I sent it air mail-registered (Receipt No. 227809) on October 16th. Although I know you travel widely and are very busy I was surprised I had had no acknowledgment from you. Therefore I called the Post Office to check about the return receipt, whereupon they began to tell me a tale they did not tell me when I mailed it and paid \$2.70 for postage. It was all to the effect that they cannot, by law, trace it since it is in another government's hands, *and*, since it was so bulky, it might very well have landed in the Custom Office, although it was manuscript, not goods. It seems therefore that the only way to trace its whereabouts, if you did not receive it, is from your end. Please! Thank you very much.

Did I tell you that I "made up" with Herbert Marcuse? There are so few Hegelian-Marxists and I need his views, philosophically, though I disagree with his political conclusions, hence I wrote him. Obviously he "missed me" as much since I received, by return mail, a letter, which, judging by our correspondence over the years which was always formal and "cold," was quite "personal." That is to say, he said, although some of my writings cause him "great irritation," others cause him such "great joy" that he is very happy to resume the dialogue on the Absolute Idea. Whereupon I straightaway send off a new 5-page letter on the Doctrine of the Notion, part of my new book which I'm tentatively entitling now "Philosophy and Revolution," and today got this letter: "Good for you that your physical and mental energies seem to be so much greater than mine. I did not yet have the time to digest your fourth chapter. . . . And now comes your long letter on the Absolute Idea and your strange application of it. I read it once, I read it twice . . . I would, however, appreciate it if you would give me a little more time to answer it."<sup>11</sup>

So all is well that ends well—or begins well.

Yours,

\* \* \*

November 13, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm's form letter includes a contract for Dunayevskaya to sign, authorizing the use of her translation of Fetscher's essay in *Socialist Humanism*].<sup>12</sup>

\* \* \*

November 13, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm's form letter includes a contract for Dunayevskaya's signature, indicating that *Socialist Humanism* would be published in both a hardcover and a paperback edition.]

\* \* \*

November 14, 1964

Dear EF:

Finally I received the card from the post office that the manuscript had been received by you. Naturally I am waiting anxiously to see whether you would consent to introduce "A Doctor's Notebook," which, incidentally, we now call "To Be A Whole Man." I need not belabor the point of the anxiety since you are surely aware of the fact that your Introduction would make the difference to the publisher. Doubleday is now reading it (Eugene Eoyang)<sup>13</sup> and I am to let them know your decision.

Meanwhile I thought you may still be interested in my review of Herbert Marcuse's book which will appear in the journal on Oberlin campus,<sup>14</sup> and so I made a copy for you; here it is. I'm always concerned, even when I disagree, that the youth, in particular, be exposed to radically different views that would break in both on their conformism and on any beat ways of protest that do nothing really to undermine the *status quo*. Hence, I was more enthusiastic, perhaps, in this review than in my personal letter to you [of July 21], but, fundamentally, it is the same. And I dare say that the dualism in our relationship will continue so long as HM is HM and RD is RD. He asked to discuss with me in person my ideas on the Absolute Idea, and so I may try to get down to Boston before this year is out.

Did you know that Dell Books is trying to rush through an anthology on Humanism, Marxism, and Existentialism before Doubleday gets your book out?<sup>15</sup> When is its present probable date of publication?

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

December 6, 1964

Dear EF:

You will allow me, I trust, to summarize briefly, *A Doctor's Notebook*, which I have tentatively subtitled, "To Be A Whole Man." I am confident that you understand that, although Louis Gogol<sup>16</sup> meant a great deal to me, I am interested in the publication of these notes, covering a period of 10 years, only because they have great significance, and can impart a humanist view to many more thousands of readers, than can the involved works of philosophers, economists, "specialists."

The 4 parts into which the manuscript is divided—Our Age of Anxiety, Who Will Educate the Educators?, The Individual Doctor and the AMA,<sup>17</sup> Freedom and the Truly Human Society—comprise a synoptic and yet very individualized view of the strains and stresses, alienations and frustrations, drives and goals of our industrial civilization, as seen both from the intimacy of a doctor-patient relationship, and the philosophical, comprehensive totality.

Beginning, simply, with "The Air We Breathe," "Night and day, awake and asleep, almost 20 thousand times every 24 hours," the author proceeds to analyze the lungs of modern city dwellers, coal miners, factory workers, and finally all of us, including infants who, with birth, must contend with atomic fallout: "This new poison in our atmosphere seems to be the one to end all poisons" so that death is present "before he has become alive."

This is no propaganda book, however. Dr. Gogol goes into descriptions of the good radio activity, which has been used in medicine, for a half century, has achieved the great advances made in medicine with its help. But, since this manuscript is also no textbook, the evil to which the splitting of the atom has led, cannot be dismissed: "The Nazis, in their attempt to do away with races of people they considered inferior, directed heavy doses of X-rays from a concealed source to the region of the sex glands of their victims, while they were being questioned. Unknown to them, these victims of the sadistic Nazis, were sterilized and thus prevented from having children." (Louis came to Heidelberg with the American army to head the hospitals there and the sight of these victims never left him.)

It is not evil, as evil, that preoccupies the author, but the need to put "an end to the separation of science from humanity." For this reason he moves from the analysis of atomic radiation and atomic fallout to the one-dimensional work that most of us, especially those who labor manually, do, and the relationship of this to disease. Whether he deals with high blood pressure, heart disease, cancer—or loss of sexual power, it is never separated from the

internal stresses that pile up: "We cannot exist in chronic contradiction. We cannot live a lie. . . ." How closely cancer resembles totalitarianism; each can grow only through devouring the innocent." And here he also deals with the effects of segregation of Negroes, isolation of Indians on reservation, too many borders all around us: "Today we hear a lot of talk about an Iron Curtain and the misery behind it. Any border that fences in a human being does the same thing. I cannot get enthused about boundaries between people. Isolation never created anything. What is the result of Indian isolation on reservations of our own Southwest? . . . The Bureau of Indian affairs reports the following. The average life span of the Navajo Indian is less than 20 years. Death from tuberculosis is 10 times that of the whites, from dysentery 13 times, from measles 29 times, from gastroenteritis 25 times."

A unique feature of the book as a whole, and of this Part I—Our Age of Anxiety, in particular, is that a dialogue has been established with rank and file workers on automated production. Thus, he quotes one letter he received: "Just how much fresh air does a man require in his body every day? In an auto plant we don't get very much. We get dust and exhaust—how much exhaust is a man's body supposed to withstand? . . . <sup>18</sup> One young guy, just about thirty, works on the heavy frame job, lifting the frames unto the machine. He came out of the wash room one day and told me he was feeling so bad and that when he urinated he felt a sharp pain and his urine ran red like blood. These are everyday occurrences in automated factories today. I would like to know what does all this do to a man, if he can stand it?"

Part II—Who Will Educate the Educators?—also starts out simply and elementally, this time talking of food, and not without humour, as the author asks, "What Do You Put In Your Stomach?," and describes "a rupture of the lower end of esophagus (the tube carrying food from the mouth to the stomach). The rupture was due to the pressure induced by the sudden release of a large quantity of soda gas (carbon dioxide). In the chest was found particles of a Pastrami-Dip sandwich that the patient had eaten a short while earlier."

Here, however, the author moves from discussing illness, such as, hepatitis, piecemeal and ulcers, dope addiction in youth and fear in the middle aged woman reaching menopause, to linking decay of age with decay of society and the "Intellectual Assembly Lines": This may be part of the reason why there is a shortage of good students of science in our colleges today. . . . Perhaps there is a connection between this and the controversy around Einstein, who, some months before his death and during the discussion of the H-bomb, appealed publicly, with a few other scholars, that more freedom—in determining the direction and purpose of his work—be given the scientist. Actually, this was an attempt to abolish the separation between science and the people as a whole. In reply, newspaper columnists and government officials ridiculed these scientists as impractical dreamers not to be trusted with 'politics.'"

Dr. Gogol then takes up the politics of education in “Admiral Rickover’s Straightjacket.” (Incidentally, Admiral Rickover<sup>19</sup> and Dr. Gogol came from the same Chicago slum. He had some funny stories to tell me how the Congressman from that district came to choose the two best students in the class—Rickover and Gogol. Unfortunately, Louis never wrote these up, and this piece on Rickover’s stupidities on education is all the reference I find.)

Interestingly enough, the final section of this part which deals with the elderly and retirement, various medical plans, he suddenly sounds a personal note in “A Feeling of Alienation,” which is the transition point to Part III: “Like others, I am in competition to sell my ability to work. Looking on from the sidelines (as he lay ill), temporarily free from pressure this activity to use up labor time can be seen from what it truly is—self-destruction. . . . The monstrosity of living only when away from work, instead of in and through the kind of activity which, in itself, can make work and living a oneness, a wholeness and a unity, is the most serious disease of our life and times.”

Part III—The Individual Doctor and the AMA—begins with a beautiful piece of a doctor who was also a revolutionist—Benjamin Rush, who was a signatory to the Declaration of Independence, feuded with George Washington and wrote to Thomas Jefferson: “I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of men.” So opposed to war was Dr. Rush that he proposed the following inscriptions be placed on the door of the office of the Secretary of War: “An office for butchering the human species;” “A Widow and Orphan Making Office,” “A Wooden Leg Making Office”; “An Office for Creating Public and Private Vices”; . . . “An office for creating poverty, and destruction of liberty and national happiness.” Dr. Gogol then adds: “Because of this, Alexander Hamilton blocked his appointment to the medical faculty of Columbia University . . .”

His criticism of the AMA and its fight against “socialized medicine” is tempered by what the individual doctor and medical student thought medicine would be as they ideally embarked on it. At the same time he not only exposes Big Business’s relation to the AMA but also indifference of the doctors as a whole to the hospital workers who “get the short end of the stick,” who have therefore gone on strike because “they will no longer wait for help from the medical profession to organize their own.”

“The Need For More Self-Awareness” serves as the transition to the final part of the manuscript: “The abnormal system of production we have created separates the activity of man—his labor—from living man, and thus makes true human growth impossible. Millions of men today lead incomplete and impotent lives, unable to use their heritage. . . .”

Part IV—Freedom and the Truly Human Society—is so beautiful that one is tempted to quote all 39 pages. The theme everywhere is freedom and the all-dimensional man, the individual and the creative act, the biological mean-



ing of freedom inseparable from the philosophical: "The newer knowledge emerging from studies of the individual cell and the nature of the cell's relations with other cells, tissues and organs of our body, reveals an almost unbelievable complexity of structure and function of amazing sensitivity and adaptability. This is creativity in the fullest sense and we all possess it."

And yet freedom is not made into an abstraction, not torn from history: "It was the ancient Greek philosopher Plato who introduced to civilized man the distinction between the brain and the hand. Thinking, he said, was man's highest activity; and perhaps he wanted to justify a slave society. For work in Greece was left largely to slaves; and manual labor was looked upon as servile. . . . The way of life Marxist-Humanism tries to spell out is rooted in the quality of freedom—being free, not as something we have, but as something we are. . . . The growth of the objective world, science, has become the creation of more capital; it is not the self-realization of man, the merging of the objective world in his own subjective being. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. now seek to grow into giants through automation and atomic energy power, but one basis for life and another basis for science can lead, not to growth, but to death."

In dealing with the fragmentation of man, which the worker feels daily on the production line, but the scientist and intellectual think it does not apply to them, Dr. Gogol says: "For a nation whose foundations were laid by outcasts, misfits, the dissatisfied and, above all, the non-conformists, some of us have become too smug." He then takes up "Homeostasis and Marx's Humanism," contrasting organic wholeness to the collective whole: "The collective whole means the entire sum of the parts composing a substance. The organic whole refers to the organic unity of function. A man can be organically whole even after he has lost a leg. Organic wholeness is a behavior pattern that is complete, physiological and homeostatic. It is the essential ingredient of the humanism that is the axis of the life of Karl Marx. He knew that being a member of a collectivist society does not automatically lead to living in wholeness. He would have been repelled by today's Communists. . . . The only weapon Marxist-Humanists have is the truth that is the whole, and we must continue to uncover it in its fullness."

I do not know whether this summary can be a help to you in cutting down the time you need to write an introduction. I hope so. As I wrote to you last week, there is no deadline for you. But what I do need to know is whether I can use your name, that is to say, tell the publisher that you will preface it. Please let me know.

Yours gratefully,

Raya

\* \* \*

December 14, 1964 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm acknowledges receiving Dunayevskaya's summary of the late Louis Gogol's book manuscript, "A Doctor's Notebook." Fromm states his intention to review it and decide whether to write an introduction for it within the next few days. Fromm also mentions he was just at the moment going to meet Heinz Brandt<sup>20</sup> and his wife, who were visiting the U.S. from Germany. Fromm mentions that Brandt had been kidnapped by the East Berlin communists three years before in West Berlin, sentenced to 13 years, but recently released as a result of pressure of socialist and pacifist groups. Fromm also mentioned the philosopher Bertrand Russell's key role in Brandt's release.]

\* \* \*

January 16, 1965 Fromm Letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm mentions two recent letters from Dunayevskaya (missing), including her greetings to Heinz Brandt (who had been visiting with Fromm). The bulk of Fromm's letter provides an assessment of the manuscript of Louis Gogol's *A Doctor's Notebook*, which Dunayevskaya had summarized in a previous letter, asking him to write an introduction for it. After expressing his views about the work, most of which were not enthusiastic, Fromm reminded Dunayevskaya that he rarely wrote introductions. However, because Dunayevskaya made the request, he agreed to write a short (1-page) introduction that would highlight the humanist and internationalist viewpoint of the author, which he considered to be "a radical socialism with an anarchistic trend." In addition, Fromm mentions that the manuscript of *Socialist Humanism* had gone into production, and was scheduled to come out in June. Finally, Fromm expresses interest in Dunayevskaya's planned trip to Japan, which she had apparently briefed him on in a previous (missing) letter; she had indicated that she would try to find out about the political thinking of the left-wing and anti-Stalinist Japanese socialists, in the context of the lure of Maoism. Fromm concludes with a word of support, writing that Dunayevskaya's work in Japan would be very important, and mentioning his own upcoming travels to Norway, Austria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland.]

\* \* \*

May 23, 1965

Dear EF:

Have I written to you that during my recent lecture tour in British Columbia I found an “adherent” of yours in Vancouver—a very unusual man named Lefty Morgan, a railroad worker who is presently (after an industrial accident) at work on a book on the conditions of labor which lead to spontaneous actions, workers’ control of production, self-development quite other than those the managers of production planned as they worked out those conditions of labor?<sup>21</sup> Lefty quotes from your works, especially *The Sane Society* [1955], and wanted to know whether he could get your permission. I told him that I felt sure you would grant such permission. Have you heard from him?

Are you still here or are you in Europe? I’ve misplaced your schedule. Because of the objective situation—both as it related to the US bombing of North Viet Nam and the Maoist taking over the JCP<sup>22</sup>—my trip to Japan has been delayed from spring to fall. The comrades there felt also uneasy about my safety as I speak both against US imperialism and Maoism and felt I should not travel without a “guard” and since that would mean more money I cannot have, I thought I better think more about it, while they work more with the Japanese edition of the work<sup>23</sup> to expand Marxist-Humanist grouping there. So I am still here, but, instead of having time to work on my new book, I’m rushing to completion a pamphlet on The Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution, which will also include a contribution by Mario Savio.<sup>24</sup>

I thought you might also be interested in an appendix to it which will reproduce the lecture that was so popular with the students and which I printed on my return: “The Theory of Alienation: Marx’s Debt to Hegel.” Also included because I think it may interest you is “Remembrance of Things Past in the Future Tense” in *The Activist*;<sup>25</sup> it’s rather out of my usual mold for me to review Sartre’s autobiographical work but it did impinge on philosophical and political problems—and, in any case, I always “capitulate” to youth requests and the Oberlin College students asked me to review *The Words*.<sup>26</sup>

Thus far I have not had luck in convincing a bourgeois publisher to undertake issuing MD’s [Louis Gogol’s] “To Be A Whole Man,” but since I haven’t given up hope, may I ask you please to repeat your summer schedule; when do you leave for Europe; when do you return? Thank you.

Yours,

Raya

September 13, 1965 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm refers to a September 8 letter from Dunayevskaya (missing). In her letter Dunayevskaya had apparently responded to Fromm's query about the Guggenheim Foundation. Fromm also wrote that he was looking forward to reading Dunayevskaya's review of Sartre's autobiography.<sup>27</sup> Fromm elaborated his own views on Sartre, suggesting that he expressed the mood of a decaying bourgeoisie. Fromm drew a parallel between what he termed Sartre's "egocentric individualism" and Max Stirner,<sup>28</sup> holding, however, that Stirner represented the bourgeoisie in the progressive stage of its development, and Sartre its decaying phase. Fromm contrasted Sartre with Marx, pointing to Sartre's hopelessness and despair, a theme that emerged even more prominently in the autobiographical writings of Simone de Beauvoir, whom Fromm characterized as less talented but franker than Sartre.<sup>29</sup>]

\* \* \*

September 23, 1965

Dear EF:

As you saw from my review of Sartre, I did, of course, utilize Mme. de Beauvoir's autobiography. I don't know whether she is more frank deliberately or only more dumb. But she is not the one who had a whole generation of post-war youth bamboozled; he did. You are, of course, right about his egocentricity and his thoroughly bourgeois nature. But that, too, does not explain the pull he exercised over many who thought themselves revolutionary. The very fact that it was not even held against him that he studied in Hitler Germany<sup>30</sup> and was never abashed about the fact that his philosophy had its origin in the reactionary Kierkegaard<sup>31</sup> and the Nazi Heidegger<sup>32</sup> shows the decadence of our so-called revolutionaries as well as of the bourgeoisie. No, I think closer to the truth resides in Hegel's profound analysis of the Unhappy Consciousness which he further defined as "the giddy whirl of a perpetually self-creating disorder," [PhGB, p. 249; PhGM, p. 125] "a personality confined within its narrow self and its petty activity, a personality brooding over itself, as unfortunate as it is pitiably destitute" [PhGB, p. 264; PhGM, p. 136]. The irony is that this section of the *Phenomenology of Mind* was Sartre's favorite, though he failed to recognize himself in it, even as he failed to recognize himself in the attribution of "bad faith" to all others, including Freud's discovery of the sub-conscious.

Finally I got from Doubleday your *Socialist Humanism*; it's a beautifully produced job in form as it is in content. Such a rich house surely doesn't need free ads from such poor ones as us, but I am anxious for workers to read it, and so I put an ad in *News & Letters*, herewith enclosed, and already we had 6 orders.

Yours,

Raya

I trust you are well; what made you ill in Europe?

\* \* \*

October 1, 1965 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm writes appreciatively of Dunayevskaya's review of Sartre's autobiography. He also expresses agreement with Dunayevskaya's point that it was Sartre rather than de Beauvoir who misled an entire generation. Fromm concluded the letter by saying he appreciated the ad for *Socialist Humanism* Dunayevskaya had included in *News & Letters*, which he had mentioned to Doubleday.]

\* \* \*

May 16, 1966

Dear EF:

You may consider the intrusion into your thinking on your new work as a bit far-fetched, but I trust not irrelevant. Somehow, ever since you mentioned developing the ideas of Marx's Humanism in the psycho-analytic field,<sup>33</sup> I have felt (and I trust not only because I do not know psycho-analysis) that certain historical-philosophical analyses by Marx and Hegel could serve not only to illuminate the field, but actually to inspire opening new avenues. The work of Marx that I was thinking about in this relationship is one that is hardly ever mentioned and has not been translated. However, a good selection of quotations does appear in Lowith's *From Hegel to Nietzsche*.<sup>34</sup> I am referring to Marx's doctoral thesis on the difference [between] the philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus.<sup>35</sup> Marx's profound insights there relate not only to the two philosophies, but to those turning points in history where a great philosophy having "perished," the epigone arise *because* they have been unable to establish altogether new beginnings and so must chip away

(interpret) at the last great philosophy. I'm sorry to say I don't own this work of Marx, but I feel sure that if you don't have it, the quotations you will find in Lowith will stimulate you sufficiently to want to read it in relationship to your specific work now rather than as part of Marx's development. I'm sure also that you will not be the least diverted from this pleasant task by the fact that Communists, Trotskyists, and such other old radicals hold this thesis to have been "the bourgeois Marx."

Now the section in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* which I consider indispensable to any serious analysis of people in power and those who hunger to get there is entitled "Spirit in Self-Estrangement—The Discipline of Culture." [PhGB, pp. 507–610; PhGM, pp. 294–364]. The "Unhappy Consciousness" [PhGB, pp. 251–267; PhGM, pp. 119–138]: is much more famous than the "Spirit in Self-Estrangement" but in fact this "higher" stage of alienation is the most interesting for the analysis of characters like Mao Tse-tung or Fidel Castro, for that matter. What I'm trying to say is, that whereas the "Unhappy Consciousness" comes at a time when the world is going to pieces and the *individual* cannot find his place in society, either with the old or the new, the "Spirit in Self-Estrangement" comes at a time when the person has gotten power and should be most happy, but, but, but—just listen to Hegel himself:

"Spirit in this case, therefore, constructs not merely one world, but a two-fold world, divided and self-opposed." (p. 510 [PhGM, pp. 296–297]) "The noble type of consciousness, then, finds itself in the judgment related to the state-power. . . . This type of mind is the heroism of service . . . The result of this action, binding the essential reality and self indissolubly together, is to produce a two-fold actuality—a self that is truly actualized and a state-power whose authority is accepted as true." (p. 526–27 [PhGM, p. 306]) "Such a type is the haughty vassal" (p. 528 [PhGM, p. 307]). "This estrangement, however, takes place in language. . . . Speech, however, hides<sup>36</sup> this ego in its purity; it alone expresses I, I itself." (p. 529–30 [PhGM, p. 308]). "This type of spiritual life is the absolute and universal inversion of reality and thought, their entire estrangement the one from the other" (p. 541 [PhGM, p. 316]).

For a man as erudite as Hegel to have this merciless attack on "culture" is one more of those paradoxes which show the duality in Hegel as man, as a Prussian, and Hegel, the genius, who could step across class and historic barriers—and with very good humor at that.

Yours,

Raya

P.S. I don't know whether the letter above could pass as a congratulatory note for your getting the Guggenheim grant, but I was diverted from sending regular congratulations by the fact that, as expected, I did not get it or any other foundation to sponsor my "subversive" study and thus I must do it and work and scrounge for pennies at the same time. Anyway, I know you'll understand.

\* \* \*

September 8, 1966 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm responds to a letter from Dunayevskaya (missing) in which she apparently had asked Fromm about an upcoming paperback edition of *Socialist Humanism*, and also what permission she would need to reprint her essay from it, "Marx's Humanism Today." Fromm assures Dunayevskaya that as far as he was concerned she could reprint her essay but that she should also get Doubleday's permission].

\* \* \*

October 29, 1966 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm informs Dunayevskaya that he has received an invitation from "the Japanese Radio" to give a series of lectures over three weeks starting in early April (1967). Fromm asks Dunayevskaya for contact information on people he might meet to discuss ideas, asking also about any such people's command of English. Fromm also describes lectures he delivered in Czechoslovakia the previous spring, where he felt reservations about their interest in the West and the U.S. in particular. He also finds a larger existentialist influence in Czechoslovakia than in Poland or Yugoslavia. Fromm also worries over the growing resort to material incentives, which in his view amounted to a defeat for socialism. At his lecture at the Institute of Philosophy in Prague, a "stony silence" ensued when he noted that constantly increasing consumption has its roots in capitalism. Fromm concludes by asking Dunayevskaya whether she had seen the Yugoslav publication *Praxis*, edited by Marxist humanists.<sup>37</sup> Fromm offers to get Dunayevskaya a subscription, and suggested she write for *Praxis*.]

\* \* \*

November 7, 1966

Dear EF:

How exciting that you are going to Japan! I love that land and so will you and, although it is heavily Communist in its Left, there is enough independence to make it very worthwhile to carry on dialogues with so vital a land. I shall be most happy to write to some in Japan who would be ready to make some meetings for you, but they are not the kind that have money to pay for lectures. Please let me know whether you'd be willing to speak to some working class groups and I will ask them, and if you [know] the precise dates of your lectures in Tokyo on radio, they would see whether some extracurricular activities could be fit in. The most knowledgeable in English is the one who was my translator during the lecture tour; he speaks fluent English and since he is learned in both politics and philosophy, he'd be great for you, if he is free. His name is: Tohru Kurokawa [gives address]. He is the international secretary of a splitoff from that marvelous 1960 Zengakuren student movement that broke with Stalinism and Trotskyism, leaning toward Marxist-Humanism; their paper is Zenshin, and they are the ones who made my trip possible. He is also a personal friend and I am sure he would be glad to do what he could for you. All I'd have to do is write him, and I'd find out his phone at the same time so you can call him when you arrive.

The one who translated *Marxism and Freedom* is not that good in speaking English, though he understands the written word, but he too would be most useful I'm sure; he is a professor and his name is: Yoshimasa Yukiya-ma [gives address and telephone]. He knows others who can speak English better than he, and perhaps something could be worked out there too, although, he fits your description exactly of one whose conversation is incomplete since they just do not understand the spoken word; the language of the Orient is so different, musically, that it's impossible to get the rhythm as it is in any of the Romance languages.

There is one professor at the Nagoya University who speaks English fluently and who arranged a talk for me there, and if you either go to Nagoya, or he happens to be in Tokyo during that period, you'd find him most interesting to talk to; he has been in the U.S. and is hoping to get back here again and was the one who introduced the New Left of England (late 1950's there). His name is:

Professor Hiroshi Mizuta  
Faculty of Economics, Nagoya University  
Chikusa, Nagoya, Japan

I'll no doubt think of others and write you again as soon as I hear from you where you are to stay in Japan, and whether you're to do any traveling there.



Yes, I would greatly appreciate 6 copies of the paperback *Socialist Humanism*; I already bought 12 copies & I'm absolutely broke, my usual state, but I always think of a new adverb, and now that I have used "absolutely" where can I possibly go that is "higher"?

Yes, please send me *Praxis*; I would appreciate it if I could write for them. I did send the book there and followed carefully the dispute, but I have not heard from them. From Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, I do continue to get excellent letters, but it is not from those who participated in the symposium;<sup>38</sup> indeed, those are busy telling my friends that what I wrote in *Socialist Humanism* in "only an abbreviated version of *Marxism and Freedom*, which is too hostile to the Soviet Union." Did you hear the latest on Kolakowski?<sup>39</sup>

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

November 16, 1966 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm asked for the contact information of a couple more of the Japanese intellectuals Dunayevskaya had suggested that he meet on his planned trip to Japan, but he expressed doubt that he would find time to speak for some of the working class groups Dunayevskaya had also mentioned. He also said he would get her a subscription to the Yugoslav journal *Praxis* and ask them to invite her to write for the journal. Additionally, he agreed get Doubleday to send her more copies of *Socialist Humanism*. In reply to Dunayevskaya's query about Kolakowski, Fromm responded that it seemed, considering the uncompromising nature of Kolakowski's critical remarks, that he was prepared to be expelled from the Party. Even more crucial, Fromm concluded, was whether he would be penalized in any other form].

\* \* \*

November 25, 1966

Dear EF:

Why not play it by ear? My friends will certainly not impose any lectures on you. If you feel after you have met Kurokawa that you wish to speak to a small group rather than just an individual, it can easily be arranged right on the spot. However, I took it from your letter of the 16th that you would rather

meet and talk individually with Kurokawa in Tokyo and Prof. Mizuta.<sup>40</sup> Therefore I wrote that you were not available for lectures beyond those arranged for you by those who have invited you to appear on TV-radio. If you will tell me when and where your lectures will occur, I will inform them and they can attend if they wish to and have others listen. Otherwise, either they will call you or you will call them. You alone will be the judge if you wish to develop the relationship beyond that.

I was surprised that you did not mention Hiroshima as one of the places you intend to visit. I dare say I should not recommend a visit since, after seeing the Peace Museum, I had the most abominable nightmare. And yet it has an attraction that is absolutely irresistible. The students at the University there are the ones who wrote to the White House asking Lucy<sup>41</sup> not to get married on the day the Americans dropped the bomb on Hiroshima but that stupid and insensitive girl not only went through with her marriage, but said "How would it be if I get married on the day they attacked Pearl Harbor?" As I told the Hiroshima students "the day of infamy," historically, will be August, not December, although no one wishes to excuse any imperialist war act. But, can you imagine any in our old USA having a mass meeting in honor of the war dead by the hand of their own rulers as the students there had for me on December 7th?<sup>42</sup>

Thank you for both the act of writing to Praxis and Doubleday.

Yours,

Raya

You never did answer me on the question I once posed regarding Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* and the particular aspects of Humanism that you were working on for your new book.<sup>43</sup> I wondered whether you ever got that letter quite a few months back.

\* \* \*

July 10, 1967 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm refers to a prior letter from Dunayevskaya (missing) in which Dunayevskaya had discussed some of Fromm's friends in Berkeley, California, where he had occasionally lectured. A longer section of the letter refers to the Venice-based Society of European Culture, which had held its recent meeting in Spain. Given Dunayevskaya's interest in Catholic/Marxist dialogue as apparently expressed in that missing letter, Fromm remarks that both Catholics and Marxists were involved in the Society. He also offers to elicit more

information about the Society from the Director of the Fondo de Cultura Economica in Mexico, a friend of Fromm's who directed a publishing house, with connections in Spanish-speaking countries, including Spain.<sup>44]</sup>

\* \* \*

July 23, 1967

Dear EF:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of the 10th. When I first asked about the relationship of the Marxists and Catholics in Spain, it was a purely abstract question, but since then something concrete has arisen, and perhaps your friend from the Fondo de Cultura Economica in Mexico who directs his own publishing firm could help, so here are the new developments, and you be the judge.

Out of nowhere—to this day I do not know how they got a copy of *Marxism and Freedom* and how from that they had written to an English publisher and who, besides, is not the one who did pirate the American edition—via a further unknown source in England, there finally reached me a letter from an *Editorial Ciencia Nueva, Preciados 23, Madrid 13, Tel. 2315497*. The editors asked how much would the rights to my work cost if I granted them the Spanish (and Latin American) rights. I replied that it was simple—and cheap in view of the fact that I was indeed very interested in a Spanish edition: a mere \$100 for copyright and 10% of wholesale price of books sold, and I sent them a 1965 edition since it was clear they had available only an early edition which did not have the Chinese chapter, but did have the appendices that did not reappear in the latter edition, i.e., 2 of the Early Marx's Essays, and Lenin's Philosophic Notebooks.<sup>45</sup>

I then received another letter which said they were studying my book most seriously and are interested, but I must understand that everything published in Spain must pass censorship. And my work does have a reference to specific Spanish fascism and the destruction of the 1937 revolution. Since then I have not had a single word for them, which need not mean that the censor already said a categorical No, but, of course, it may mean that. Several times in these years I have had inquiries from Mexico and once from Argentina where they actually translated the work, but it didn't get published, and indeed I only heard of the existing Spanish translation, but had never seen it, and since then those interested in it—one of the Frondizis<sup>46</sup>—has landed in jail. So if your friend either knows the *Ciencia Nueva* in Madrid or the relationship of this publisher to Latin America, or how "to put over" a new translation and this time actual publication of M&F, I'd naturally be most grateful.

I'm glad to hear that you are travelling in Europe which must mean you are well. Hurrah! The Japanese friends who were interested in you and so disappointed that you could not come were to a youth conference in Prague and Ulan Bator and finally found their way to USA for three days and are now back in Tokyo and still hoping some day you will be able to visit them.

Yours,

Please note my address: 8146 Ward St., Detroit, Mich, 48228

\* \* \*

July 31, 1968 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm thanks Dunayevskaya for a July 15 letter (missing) and refers to her question about organizing a support committee for Marcuse in light of the recent death threats against him. He expresses willingness to help, but notes that he had heard just recently that, despite threats to remove him, Marcuse planned to be back at the university in the fall.<sup>47</sup> Most of Fromm's letter elaborates that he had just decided to drop a chapter criticizing Marcuse in a book he was writing, because it might help Marcuse's right-wing enemies.<sup>48</sup> He elaborates his critique of Marcuse, expressing "shock" at what he calls Marcuse's incompetent, distorted treatment of Freud in both *Eros and Civilization* (1955) and *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). More important to criticize were Marcuse's ideas (irrational, according to Fromm) about how people might live in a future society. Granting Marcuse's philosophical abilities, Fromm holds nonetheless that Marcuse expresses alienation and despair "masquerading" as radicalism. He views Marcuse's idea of a future society as a regression to infantile egotism, and he rejects Marcuse's espousal of a "polymorphous sexuality" as example of such a regression. Fromm then mentions a "committee of solidarity" with philosophers and students of Poland he had been involved with. He indicates that his efforts did not get far, due to his other activities, including those with Eugene McCarthy's 1968 presidential campaign,<sup>49</sup> and because of efforts to complete his *Revolution of Hope* (1968). Fromm expresses interest in Dunayevskaya's work with Ivan Svitak, particularly with regard to his efforts to unite workers and intellectuals in Czechoslovakia.<sup>50</sup> He concludes the letter by indicating that he might run into Marcuse in Europe in the coming weeks at a peace conference in Salzburg, but expresses doubt there would be much of a basis for a fruitful conversation.]

\* \* \*

August 10, 1968

Dear EF:

HM [Herbert Marcuse] is off in Europe, working on a new essay, and thus far the university is defending him, so there is nothing for us to do.

I do hope you will not scrap any chapter of criticism you have written. If every time the Right attacked, we felt that our defense of the Left required self-censorship, it would be awful, that is to say, more self-defeating than censorship imposed by outside authorities. Naturally, the language has to be modified; I assume you would not use words like storm trooper and I happen not to be particularly fond of subjective terms like “masquerading” since I think that for a radical it is such more damning to *express* alienation and despair and yet be truly radical than to “masquerade” as radical. HM most certainly would like to see a revolution, but he absolutely cannot escape his own pessimism. We (he and I) fight like cats and dogs all the time, but that doesn’t mean I would either not defend him, or keep my criticism of him to myself. I cannot say as much for him since he really goes in for a string of ridiculous adjectives when one does not agree with him, which was the case when I once criticized Isaac Deutscher and he very nearly called me an “agent” (I think he never could make up his mind about my “ultra-leftism” and “romanticism” so he never knew whose “agent” I would be!)<sup>51</sup>

The reason I am encouraging you not to discard your criticism (though I doubt that I in turn would agree with you and in any case I know nothing of Freud and keep far away from any field I am not competent in) is that I feel very strongly on the *historic* blunders made when revolutionaries feel that martyrs must never be criticized, not even theoretically.

Ivan Svitak did not reply, but I did get a magnificent report of what is happening in Czechoslovakia from a lesser known figure, who also sent me some of Svitak’s speeches which seem magnificent both on the question of plurality of parties and the need for unity of worker and intellectual. In any case, the Prague report, “At the Crossroads of Two Worlds” by Stephen Steiger, I am having published in *News & Letters*.<sup>52</sup> I shall send you a copy, and if you agree with me that it is as worthwhile of publication as I do, you might see that it gets published in other journals, and perhaps translated into Spanish.

Yours,

Raya

Incidentally, to get back to Marcuse for a moment, I do not quite know who is responsible for the extraordinary publicity he has gotten recently, but his influence on the West European youth is greatly exaggerated. It isn't only as Daniel Cohn-Bendit<sup>53</sup> put it, that there aren't more than a dozen students who have studied his works (unless, he added, it be *Eros and Civilization*) but that they sharply disagree with his politics when they do hear him.

One student in this country, Richard Greeman, who happens to be a friend of mine has written a critique of his philosophic works, which will appear in the next issue of *New Politics*.<sup>54</sup> Since you are listed as a sponsor of the magazine, I assume you do get the journal. Did you happen to see my piece there, "Cultural Revolution or Maoist Reaction?" in the Spring issue?<sup>55</sup>

\* \* \*

November 7, 1968

Dear EF:

Ivan Svitak is now with the Russian Institute and, thus, can be reached at Columbia University. Generally, it is Brzezinski's<sup>56</sup> secretary who takes all of the calls since Svitak, both for security reasons and because he is working on a book on Czechoslovakia rather than a regular member of the faculty.

You have your differences with Marcuse on psychoanalysis and I have mine with Svitak on Hegel. I was quite surprised, considering that he is both a humanist and a Marxist (which, to me are one) that he was so "hostile" to what he considers "going backwards." As you know, I have been working on the relationship of philosophy to revolution, from Hegel and the French Revolution through Marx and the European Revolution of 1848 and 1871 to our own epoch. I feel that it is absolutely the most neglected field which only looks overworked because Marxists felt it necessary to say that they are dialecticians like a Catholic feels it necessary to cross himself when he passes a church. In any case, because I have been unable to get any foundation funds and, naturally, both Communists and Socialists and even Marcuse who has really become a great deal more "political" than philosophic in his attitudes considers me "romantic," the work is progressing extremely slowly as I must continue to earn a living. But, I do hope to complete it, at least in full draft form, by the end of this year. There is one thing that I always did appreciate in Marcuse and that is that he tried to rescue me from being an unperson by lending his name, that is to say writing a preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, though I doubt he would do as much now. We may even get to

debate in public—some of the student youth are very interested in getting us on a single platform, thus far without success—when I get to California on my Spring lecture tour next year.

Thank you for sending me your latest book;<sup>57</sup> I assume I will receive it soon, and if I feel at all competent (which I doubt) I shall write you my reaction.

New Politics seems to be following an independent road so I would not imagine you would want to break with it. As you know the spring issue carried my piece on the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the fall issue carries the Critique by Richard Greeman on Marcuse's philosophic works. If you do not have it, I shall be glad to send it to you. Will you remain in the states?

Yours,

RD:dmg

\* \* \*

November 30, 1968 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm responds to Dunayevskaya's November 7 letter, writing that he is reluctant to contact Ivan Svitak at the Columbia University Russian Institute. Fromm expresses surprise that Svitak stays at "Brzezinski's Institute," and suggests that the absence of Svitak's outreach to him may indicate that he wished not to be in contact. The second part of the letter expresses sympathy for the slow pace at which Dunayevskaya's work on "Philosophy and Revolution" was proceeding due to financial constraints. Fromm indicates that he has no connections to funding sources, but he volunteers to help with finding a publisher, and assures her that he believes she has something important to say. Fromm affirms his interest in receiving the articles Dunayevskaya had mentioned in her November 7 letter and closes by telling her that he would personally send a copy of *The Revolution of Hope*].

\* \* \*

December 10, 1968

Dear EF:

Here are the articles on Marcuse, and Mao.<sup>58</sup> (Come to think of it, the accidental nearness of the names is not quite as shocking as I thought it to be when I reached the name of Mao since Marcuse, with a straight face and not really with tongue in cheek, said to me that there wasn't anything wrong in

going to bed with “Quotations from Chairman Mao” under their pillow as all good Maoists are said to do). You may keep the articles; I have other copies and tore them out of the magazine, only to make it possible for me to send it to you air mail.

Thank you very much for your very kind and warm letter. I may take advantage of your offer to intercede with a publisher when (or should I have said if ever) I complete my work on *Philosophy and Revolution*. I have given myself a deadline—the end of next year—but then my self-discipline holds only when there aren’t overriding objective compulsions, and who can say there will not be still one other lost, crushed, aborted revolution?

As I believe I wrote you, I couldn’t find it in me to be able to say to Ivan Svitak that he shouldn’t accept the post at Brzezinski’s Institute when I knew that he had only \$2.00 in his pockets, the clothes on his back and two brief cases stuffed with manuscripts. The fact that he asked my view shows that he hasn’t been brainwashed yet. I believe he would be glad to hear from you. The real hold-up is Brzezinski’s Secretary through whom everything “clears.” Your judgment may be best on that after all.

Yours,

Raya

P.S. I shall be looking forward to getting your book in paperback.<sup>59</sup> As a matter of fact, I generally prefer it that way. There was only one time when I jumped out of my skin in anger to see the very cheap paperback which the French publisher used to get out the original Russian edition of Trotsky’s *History of the Russian Revolution*. So, on his birthday, which is November 7th,<sup>60</sup> (he told very few people that fact since it had all the earmarks of a birthday made to order), I had it bound in sharp red leather. He was as happy as a child; it would have been difficult for anyone to recognize “Man of October” in that childlike glee.

\* \* \*

July 25, 1971

Dear EF:

How are you? We seemed to have disappeared for a whole year.<sup>61</sup> Where you, however, have a new work published,<sup>62</sup> I’m still laboring on the same one—*Philosophy and Revolution* has been “in progress” for 10 long years! Now that the final draft is finished, it will take another 2–3 months to edit and have it professionally typed. Nevertheless, I thought you might wish to



see it unedited<sup>63</sup> so that if you still are willing to help me find a publisher, then I would not need to resubmit to you, but could send it directly to which ever publisher you designate or write to or whatever. Do, please, let me know whether you wish the edited version sent through you. May I expect an answer from you by October? That is when I expect to have it finished. It will number about 350 pages and will include one appendix not here included: a first English translation of 30 pages of the pages on labor under the “automaton” from Marx’s *Grundrisse*.<sup>64</sup>

You no doubt felt as sad as I at the news of Lukacs’s death. It took nearly a half century for him to return to a strictly philosophic work—*Ontology of Social Being*—and now he is gone, and there are hardly any Hegelian Marxists left of his stature.<sup>65</sup> Every time Marcuse tries to bridge the divisions within himself—between the desire for instant revolution to the point of depending on “biological solidarity” and the deep down pessimism about mankind having become one-dimensional in thought, in body (eroticism included?) and, above all, in labor becoming thing [*sic!*]—it is as if he willed the death of the dialectic!<sup>66</sup>

Luckily, new passions and new forces<sup>67</sup> abound and the recreated dialectic becomes *Reason and Revolution* even where the author does not recognize the progeny.

Yours,

## NOTES

1. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, p. 14. Further page references in this letter directly in the text.

2. In his preface to *Marxism and Freedom* (reprinted in this appendix to this volume), Marcuse wrote, “With some notable exceptions (such as Georg Lukács’s *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* and the more recent French reexaminations of Marxism), dialectical materialism was minimized as a disturbing ‘metaphysical rest’ in Marxian theory, or formalized into a technical method, or schematized into a *Weltanschauung*. Raya Dunayevskaya’s book discards these and similar distortions and tries to recapture the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy” (see the Appendix).

3. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, pp. 163–164; see also Marcuse’s letter to Dunayevskaya of December 22, 1960, in this volume.

4. In 1818, Hegel was given a chair (professorship) of philosophy at the University of Berlin. According to Marcuse this marked “the end of his philosophical development. He became the so-called official philosopher of the Prussian state and the philosophical dictator of Germany” (R&R, p. 169).

5. A reference to Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (1958).

6. The liberal Ford Foundation and the left-wing Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation.

7. Large Japanese student movement of the 1960s.

8. Dunayevskaya, *Marxism and Freedom* (Tokyo: Modern Thought, 1964).

9. The English version of the Introduction to the Japanese edition of *Marxism and Freedom* appeared in *News & Letters*, August/September, 1964.

10. This letter – about a collection of articles by M.D. (Louis Gogol), the “A Doctor Speaks” columnist for *News & Letters*—is missing.

11. See the letters between Dunayevskaya and Marcuse from August 6 to November 2, 1964.

12. Probably another (missing) form letter refers to Dunayevskaya’s translation of the Wolfgang Abendroth essay for *Socialist Humanism*. The published version of the Ernst Bloch essay carried the name of a different translator, Norbert Guterman.

13. Later a Professor of Comparative Literature and East Asian Languages and Cultures at Indiana University, Bloomington.

14. Dunayevskaya’s review, “Reason and Revolution vs. Conformism and Technology, which is reprinted in the appendix to this volume, appeared in *The Activist*, a student journal at Oberlin College.

15. Edited by the Trotskyist philosopher George Novack (1905–92), this volume was entitled *Existentialism vs. Marxism: Conflicting Views on Humanism* (New York: Dell, 1966). It included contributions by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Georg Lukács, Leszek Kolakowski, and Marcuse. The volume’s editor at Dell was Dunayevskaya’s old friend Richard Huett, the future publisher of her *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973).

16. Louis Gogol had died in the summer of 1964. For more background, see note 7 in Chapter 2.

17. American Medical Association.

18. Ellipses in original here and below in this letter.

19. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (1900–1986) led the effort to develop the first nuclear-powered submarine in 1955; also an advocate of tougher science and math requirements for schools in the United States.

20. Fromm’s cousin Heinz Brandt (1909–86) was a German Jewish leftist and Auschwitz survivor. Brandt went to East Germany after 1945, but became a dissident at the time of the 1953 workers’ uprising in East Berlin. He fled to West Berlin in 1958, but in 1961 he was kidnapped, returned to East Germany, and sentenced to 13 years in prison. Freed in 1964 after an international campaign, Brandt remained a socialist humanist until his death.

21. Lefty Morgan (1914–87) was a writer for *News & Letters* and the author of *Workers’ Control on the Railroad* (St. John’s, Nfld: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1994).

22. Japan Communist Party.

23. The 1964 Japanese edition of *Marxism and Freedom*.

24. Mario Savio, Eugene Walker, and Raya Dunayevskaya, *The Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution* (1965).

25. Raya Dunayevskaya, “Remembrance of Things Past in the Future Tense,” *The Activist* (Oberlin College, March 1965).

26. Sartre, *The Words* (1964).

27. As discussed in her May 23 letter to Fromm, this review of Sartre’s *The Words* had appeared in *The Activist*.

28. Max Stirner (1806–56), Young Hegelian and author of *The Ego and Its Own* (1844), was critiqued by Marx and Engels at great length in *The German Ideology* (1846).

29. The French existentialist philosopher—and longtime companion of Sartre—Simone de Beauvoir (1908–86), best known for her pioneering feminist study, *The Second Sex* (1949), published five autobiographical volumes: *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* (1958); *The Prime of Life* (1960); *The Force of Circumstance* (1963, two volumes); and *All Said and Done* (1972).

30. Sartre studied in Berlin and Freiburg, Germany from 1933–35, supported by a stipend from the Institut Français.

31. Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), Danish existentialist philosopher.

32. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), author of *Being and Time* (1927), served as Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933–34. During this period, Heidegger not only cooperated with the educational policies of the Nazi government but also offered his enthusiastic public support. He also remained silent about the barring of his mentor Edmund Husserl from the University because of Husserl’s Jewish background. As a result, Heidegger was suspended from teaching from 1945 to 1950 as part of the de-Nazification policies in postwar Germany. Marcuse studied with Heidegger before joining the Frankfurt School.

33. Fromm evidently mentioned this in a previous letter to Dunayevskaya that is missing.
34. Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*, trans. by David E. Green (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).
35. Karl Marx, *The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* (1841), MECW 1.
36. Should read “contains this” rather than “hides.”
37. See note 54 in Chapter 4.
38. Fromm’s *Socialist Humanism* (1965).
39. In 1966, Kolakowski was expelled from the Polish Communist Party and fired from his university position, this after he told the Socialist Youth that there was nothing to celebrate in the 10th anniversary of the 1956 anti-Stalinist uprising in Poznan, because no real reforms had been instituted. On Kolakowski, see also note 53 in Chapter 4.
40. As described in the November 7, 1966 Dunayevskaya letter to Fromm.
41. A reference to the August 6, 1966 wedding of Luci Baines Johnson, daughter of President Lyndon B. Johnson.
42. December 7, 1965. Dunayevskaya visited Japan during the winter of 1965–66. Her “Lecture on Hegel in Japan” has been published in PON, pp. 137–44.
43. See Dunayevskaya’s letter to Fromm of May 16, 1966 (this volume).
44. Nearly two decades later, in 1985, Fondo de Cultura Economica published a second edition of the Spanish translation of Dunayevskaya’s *Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution*.
45. See notes 4 and 35 in Chapter 1.
46. This was Silvio Frondizi (1907–74), a Marxist theoretician and political activist who corresponded with Dunayevskaya. His left-liberal brother, Arturo Frondizi (1908–95), served as president of Argentina from 1958 until 1962, when he resigned under military pressure. Silvio Frondizi was assassinated by right-wing death squads in 1974.
47. See note 52 in Chapter 4.
48. Fromm’s *The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), published a few months later, has a long footnote criticizing Marcuse along the lines of this letter (pp. 8–9). Fromm later published a somewhat more extensive critique of Marcuse in *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1970), pp. 25–31. But he never published his 6,000-word chapter, “The Alleged Radicalism of Herbert Marcuse,” written mainly in 1968. It appeared posthumously in Fromm, *The Revision of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Rainer Funk (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 111–129. Fromm and Marcuse also engaged in a public debate over these issues at an international conference on “Theory and Strategy for Peace,” held in Salzburg, Switzerland in September 1968, in which other well-known intellectuals like the American political scientist Hans Morgenthau and the French sociologist Lucien Goldmann also took part.
49. In early 1968, liberal antiwar candidate Eugene McCarthy defeated President Lyndon Johnson in the New Hampshire presidential primary, which prompted Johnson to withdraw as a candidate in the 1968 election.
50. Ivan Svitak (1925–94) contributed an essay to Fromm’s *Socialist Humanism* (1965). A major figure in the Prague Spring experiment of “socialism with a human face” in the first eight months of 1968, he emigrated to the U.S. later that year. Some of his key writings on Marxist humanism can be found in *Man and His World: A Marxian View* (New York: Dell, 1970). Svitak dedicated this book “to Marxist humanists everywhere who believe in the idea of socialism with a human face.” Once in the U.S., he also published *The Czechoslovak Experiment, 1968–69* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). After teaching at Chico State University for over a decade, Svitak returned to Czechoslovakia after the fall of Communism in 1989, where he remained part of the Left.
51. See Marcuse-Dunayevskaya correspondence of March 6 and March 10, 1961.
52. Stephen Steiger’s essay, “At the Crossroads of Two Worlds: Direct from Prague,” appeared in *News & Letters* (Aug.–Sept. 1968). Due to the Stalinist repression that followed the Russian invasion on August 21, Steiger’s essay was published under the pseudonym “X.” Dunayevskaya also wrote an editorial, “All Eyes on Czechoslovakia, All Hands Off!” She soon

re-established contact with Svitak, whose essay on Prague Spring, “The Current Crisis,” was also published in *News & Letters* (Oct. 1968). Later that year, all of these texts were brought together as a pamphlet, *Czechoslovakia: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (Detroit: News and Letters, 1968), with a foreword by Dunayevskaya.

53. Daniel Cohn-Bendit was a prominent student leader in the May-June 1968 student-worker uprising in France; later a Green Party leader in Germany and France.

54. Richard Greeman, “A Critical Re-Examination of Herbert Marcuse’s Works,” *New Politics* 4:4 (Fall 1968), pp. 12–23, published later that year by News and Letters as a pamphlet.

55. Dunayevskaya, “Mao’s China and the ‘Proletarian Cultural Revolution,’” *New Politics* 4:2 (Spring 1968), reprinted under the title “Cultural Revolution or Maoist Reaction?” as Ch. 18 in *Marxism and Freedom* (London: Pluto Press, 1971) and included in subsequent editions.

56. Zbigniew Brzezinski, later the National Security Adviser during the Carter administration (1977–81).

57. This and the next paragraph refer to a missing letter from Fromm, apparently mentioning that he intended to send her a copy of his *The Revolution of Hope* (1968).

58. Greeman, “A Critical Re-Examination of Herbert Marcuse’s Works” and Dunayevskaya, “Mao’s China and the ‘Proletarian Cultural Revolution,’” both from *New Politics*.

59. Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope* (1968).

60. The Bolsheviks came to power in Russia on November 7, 1917 (Gregorian calendar), October 25, 1917 (Julian calendar).

61. Since the last letter we have in their correspondence is Dunayevskaya’s letter to Fromm of December 10, 1968, several letters may be missing in this period.

62. Probably Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (1970).

63. Dunayevskaya note: In its unedited version you must suffer through not only my unending sentences, but the secretary’s mis-spellings, but you must be used to “rough drafts.” I should also explain that the two versions of the Lenin chapter will be made into one and not be so repetitious as they of necessity were when one was written for *Telos* quarterly, while the other was spoken at a philosophic conference of both *Telos* and a Canadian group as well as some international luminaries from Italy and England while student listeners were most unhappy about academia. Finally, Ch. 8 on East Europe I kept hoping an East European would do it and thus made it very brief. I have heard both from Czechoslovakia (some are still alive) and Yugoslavia as well as one Russian and Pole and will feel braver in expanding. Did you know *Praxis* did finally publish me—that chapter on Lenin is now in Serbo-Croatian.

64. This planned appendix was not included in Dunayevskaya’s work, as the first full English translation of Marx’s *Grundrisse* appeared in 1973.

65. Georg Lukács died on June 4. See note 80 in Chapter 3 for more on Lukács.

66. This paragraph refers mainly to Marcuse’s *An Essay on Liberation* (1969), where, as discussed in our introduction, he had portrayed the radical youth movement of the 1960s as stemming from a “biological” need for survival against a repressive society, something that was “a far cry from the ideal humanism” (pp. 51, 52). There are also references here to Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) and *Eros and Civilization* (1955).

67. See note 100 in Chapter 2.

## *Chapter Seven*

# **On Hegel, Marxism, and the Frankfurt School in the Period of Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution***

January 8, 1973 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm refers to a Dunayevskaya's New Year's greeting (missing). Fromm assures Dunayevskaya that he is willing to write "a very warm appraisal" of the manuscript of *Philosophy and Revolution* as a blurb for the publisher's use. Fromm explained that he is reading Dunayevskaya's manuscript while also revising one of his own.<sup>1</sup> Fromm also alludes to the fact that Dunayevskaya had informed him some time ago that she had also asked Marcuse to do the same, which Marcuse had not done.]<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \*

February 10, 1973 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm encloses the note he had sent to Richard Huett, Editor-in-Chief of Dell Publishing Company.<sup>3</sup> He also mentions how much he enjoyed reading her manuscript, commenting that he admired *Philosophy and Revolution* whole-heartedly. Fromm suggests that Dunayevskaya consistently cite all the sources from which she quotes, as an aid to serious readers.]

\* \* \*

March 6 1973 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm thanks Dunayevskaya for a letter (missing) he had received from her after he had written to her and to the publisher of *Philosophy and Revolution*. Fromm tells Dunayevskaya that he had not had time to add a more personal note and goes on to congratulate her and again express admiration for her work. Fromm adds, however, that the text could be improved in places, offering to assist in such editing if Dunayevskaya wished him to do so. Fromm concludes by noting that he had recently seen a book by Gajo Petrovic in German, also titled *Philosophie und Revolution*, but that it was quite different from Dunayevskaya's work.<sup>4</sup>]

\* \* \*

March 25 1973 Fromm telegram to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm offers a couple of further editing suggestions before Dunayevskaya's manuscript went to press].

\* \* \*

June 11, 1973

Dear EF,

After returning from an exhausting lecture tour (one leaflet encl.) and plunging into page proofs of P&R and Index. (I never trust bourgeois publishers to know revolutionary philosophy sufficiently to be able to construct Index on their own), I'm ready to start worrying all over again.

The stench of Watergate reminded me all over again of McCarthyism and worse when *Marxism & Freedom* came out and I was given an American version of Russian unperson treatment. I do not believe they will succeed doing this with *Philosophy and Revolution*. Still—Do you suppose I could once again impose on you and ask you to review it? Will you be in Mexico in mid-Sept—book is due off press in mid-Oct., but review copies get sent out a month in advance and, of course, your copy should reach you then. What do you think?

Prof. Hiroshi Mizuta who was so anxious to get you to Nagoya University (the year you cancelled your trip to Japan) passed through on his way to Scotland for Adam Smith memorial—and asked to be remembered. He was proud of fact that he helped elect a left mayor who ran against Tanaka's man<sup>5</sup> this year.

Yours

\* \* \*

July 12, 1973 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm stresses his involvement in correcting the galleys for his own book, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, due in two weeks, as well as his travel and lecture plans in Chile.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, he accedes to Dunayevskaya's request that he write a review of *Philosophy and Revolution*. Fromm says that he could write such a review if the book could be sent to him by the middle of September. Even then, he writes, his review would have to be somewhat general, because time constraints would make going into much detail impossible. Fromm concludes the letter with a reference to the possibility of Dunayevskaya travelling to Mexico, and his wish that the two of them might have an opportunity to meet and talk.<sup>7</sup>]

\* \* \*

July 17, 1973

Dear EF:

You're wonderful! No wonder you remain so young—you do not allow even real time problems to weigh you down enough to say No to nuisances like me.

Your name is way too big to consider that, not having any connections with newspaper and magazine publishers, any review-essay by you would not get into print. On the other hand, editors do not like to be told by publishers whom to invite to do the review. In a word, the very fact that you had read the book and been asked for advice ahead of publication and thus presented them with a review ahead of official publication date, October, will give them a double scoop. Either *N.Y. Review of Books* (Editors: Robert B. Silvers and Barbara Epstein), 250 W. 57th St., NYC 10019, or *NY Times Book Review*, or, in magazines, *The Nation*, or *Commentary* (165 E. 56th St., NYC 10022; I'm sure you knew its editor, Norman Podhoretz when he wasn't quite as rightwing as now) or nearly any magazine you like to read. I didn't mention quarterlies because, for the impact I'm hoping for, they cannot exercise. Since the book will not be off the press before October by which time you'll be off to Chile (Bon voyage!), I've sent air mail the uncorrected proofs in book form. Not many changes were introduced after the publisher experimented with that sloppy form of book for his trade purposes, price, (\$8.95 hard cover, \$2.95 ppb).

Do you happen to know Professor Louis Dupre, the author of *Philosophic Foundations of Marx*,<sup>8</sup> one of the early humanist religious interpretations of Marx? He is now the president of the Hegel Society of America and, to my surprise, quite friendly to me who wants to review the book for *Journal of the History of Ideas*, and, despite the society's conservatism, he has invited me to their next conf. in 1974, and their *very* tiny publication, *The Owl of Minerva* carried a par. on it, encl. He wrote me that it is time the unperson status of myself were ended and "they" (I have no idea whom he meant by that except some other elite philosophers) consider my contributions on Hegel "significant."

What will your seminars in Chile be on? Wish I were there with you. I had been very anxious to see as they appeared to me to start something very new but with P&R taking so many years out of my life and the rest of the year I'll practically become a New Yorker all over again. I can see no time for traveling.

Yours, ever so gratefully,

Raya

\* \* \*

August 31 1973 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm opens with an apology for not having responded sooner, having been travelling and ill with the flu. He writes that he plans to pick up reading Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* in order to review it. He warns that he is pressed for time, as he continues to work on a new book.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Fromm expresses some doubt as to whether he could find an appropriate journal for which to submit a review of Dunayevskaya's book. He rules out some possibilities, including *Commentary*, noting his bad relations with its editor, Norman Podhoretz. Fromm writes that he got into an argument with Podhoretz after he rejected one of Fromm's articles because it contradicted the majority opinion of American Jews. Fromm suggests the *Nation* as a possibility and requests information. Fromm also responds positively to Dunayevskaya's writing him about Louis Dupré's appreciation of her work, terming it a break-through for her. Fromm concludes with a reference to the ongoing unrest in Chile, writing that at the request of the sponsors of his planned lectures in Chile he had postponed his trip there.<sup>10</sup>]

\* \* \*

September 6, 1973



Dear E.F.,

So Chile thinks its best to postpone your seminars just when I got you a *Bon Voyage* [card].

Well, I'm glad you do not endanger your health and if I weren't such an ignoramus on psychology I would gladly offer to help with your book—<sup>11</sup>

Dropped a note to ed. of Dell—Huett. So you may hear some suggestions from him re for whom to write book review you so generously promised despite pressure from your own work—

Here is editor (whom you must certainly know from way back in the 1930s when he wrote *Factories in the Field*):

Carey McWilliams, Ed.

*The Nation* [gives address]

Yours,

Raya

P.S. Thought you'd like to see what Black Christian chose to quote from P&R in advertising talk for this Sun.<sup>12</sup>

\* \* \*

November 26, 1973

Dear EF,

At long last *P&R* is off the press and while I believe the publisher sent you a hb [hardback], I do not have all their confidence—and so I enclose a pb [paperback].

Are you in Mexico? I've "lost" schedule, since I do not know what or where you were to be once Chile is in the throes of a counter-revolution.

Did you create time to review book? Where? I see your work<sup>13</sup> is getting full pr treatment. I haven't yet gotten a copy but of course will—too few left with any memory of revolution.

Yours,

P.S. The post office ordered me not to put into book (*P&R*) (though it was being sent via air mail) the brief note. So here it is separated.<sup>14</sup> Never knew that even in such small matters alienation enters. Do let me hear from you.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

[Early 1974]

Dear EF,

Thought the review Prof. Dupré had written would interest you, so here is section he sent me—I'll get the journal when that appears.<sup>15</sup>

In any case, the Christians are more objective than either the “Jews” or “Radicals,” judging by your difficulty thus far to get a review published and the tardiness of the regular bourgeois press to concern themselves with P&R.

How are you? I keep thinking of Cuernavaca as is where LT's [Leon Trotsky's] household “escaped” after those horrid Frame-Up Trials—and it was at their conclusion in 1938 that, along the paths of bougainvilleas, began my series of doubts in purple!<sup>16</sup>

Do you know the Spanish translator who translated *Socialist Humanism*? Would he be interested in P&R?

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

February 12 1974 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm responds to Dunayevskaya's most recent correspondence concerning Dupré's review of *Philosophy and Revolution*. Fromm was sending the review to Dr. Arnaldo Orfila, the director of what Fromm calls the best and also left-oriented publishing house in Spanish.<sup>17</sup> Fromm also agrees with the point Dunayevskaya had made that “it was easier to get an understanding and positive response from ‘bourgeois scholars’ than from Jews and Leftists.” Fromm asserts that these groups had become mired in dogma. Fromm mentions his new work, which he had tentatively titled *To Have or To Be*. Contrasting it with Gabriel Marcel's book of the same title,<sup>18</sup> Fromm explains that although the two of them had written on similar concepts, their viewpoints differed, given Fromm's Marxism and Marcel's Catholicism. Fromm concludes by saying that *To Have or To Be* was stimulated by Marx's frequent use of the dichotomy.]

\* \* \*

February 20, 1974

Dear EF:

You're wonderful! Naturally I at once sent P&R to Dr. Orfila<sup>19</sup> and while I'm not as optimistic in analysis of "left-oriented publishing house" (not when it comes to my works who have too much concrete in the most abstract statements, especially "negation of the negation," to attract money) as you are, still I hope your word and Dupré's review help. In any case, many, many thanks.

One thing may especially interest you re Dupré and Marcel: The announcement of Marcel's death<sup>20</sup> happened when I was in NY and Dupré was in Conn. (He teaches at Yale now). I felt moved and my memory was of 1947 when I was furious as all get out in Paris at Sartre whose fellow-travelling at the time was disorienting the youth and influencing, or trying to influence the Renault workers on their very first strike *not* under the leadership of CP [Communist Party] to return to CP leadership. Though I shared little with Marcel, not only not on Catholicism but Existentialism, I felt he was both more objective and whole. I never had any belief in death when it comes to ideas and I began to feel strongly that I wished death wouldn't quite so sadden us, no matter how deep the pain, and that it wouldn't if we could keep thinking of the continuity of ideas. So, like the nut I am, and also because I knew no one of my colleagues would care of Marcel's death, I suddenly dropped Dupré a "note of condolence," saying I'm sure the Humanism of Marcel would be carried through in his works and dialectics, and that I hoped he didn't think it was presumptuous for an atheist to so address a man of religion but that man Hegel (who so far as I am concerned never died) has always succeeded in making strange bedfellows, and he was continuing it to this day. When Dupré forwarded me the copy of his review and its covering note to "Raya" signed "Louis," he thanked me for that other note.

Now then, titles, of course aren't copyrighted and To Have/To Be is older than Shakespeare (whose beautiful attack on gold in Troilus and Cressida Marx quoted directly in *Capital*<sup>21</sup>) who was older than Marcel etc. etc. Yet it took nearly a full century before what Marx wrote on the never-ending To Be to be recognized as the second negativity to come *after* vulgar communism. May I presume to send you the original translation I made of Marx's Private Property and Communism—the passages on to have/to be—which I happened to have found from 1958 Marxism and Freedom<sup>22</sup> (you always find the opposite of what you're looking for; I was looking for something on the Absolute I have to send to Hegel Society of America). It happens that that is

when you first started a correspondence with me and you needed a translation for what you were writing on Marx's Concept of Man. You may find it useful at the moment of writing.

I do hope you are well. Will you remain in Switzerland which is now all flutter with Solzhenitsyn<sup>23</sup> long? The reviews of P&R are hardly flooding the market, and I sure wish you still would review it. But then you are very much more productive than I; I couldn't think of starting a new book so soon after your massive work has appeared, but I'm a slow and tortuous writer.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

March 6, 1974 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm thanks Dunayevskaya for sending him her translation of "Private Property and Communism" from Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*. Fromm also asks Dunayevskaya for information on the source for Marx's use of Having and Being as central categories.]

\* \* \*

March 13, 1974

Dear EF:

Your question regarding "the sources for Marx's use of Having and Being as central categories" has set me thinking: how does one single out sources or categories when the subject is that discoverer of a whole new continent of thought which was so plentiful, so multidimensional, so continuously developing both in relationship to the history of thought, the objective situation and the living reshapers of history—the masses in motion—that he never even stopped to give his discovery a name; as you know it was not Marx but first Engels and then Plekhanov who named that philosophy of liberation Historical Materialism, Dialectical Materialism?<sup>24</sup>

Nevertheless, though Marx wrote nothing on "categories," the concept of To Be/To Have is so pivotal to his life's work from the moment he broke with bourgeois society in 1843 until the day of his death in 1883 that it is a challenge to pin down, if not the sources "as such," the historic moment when a turning point was reached by the developing subject-matter and Subject: (1) The by-now most famous first moment is 1844, and the obvious

sources for the theory of alienated labor are Hegel's theory of alienation, especially as developed in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, and Adam Smith's concept of labor as source of all value. But when one says that, the most important thing they forget is that he was not only critical of the quantitative measurements of classical political economy, but criticized *Hegel* for standing on the same ground.<sup>25</sup> In a word,

Marx criticized Hegel, not for idealism so much as for dehumanizing ideas. The only bourgeois writer who caught the fact that Marx wasn't under the impression that Hegel knew only mental labor, but was criticizing him for building the *Phenomenology* on that concept is Nicholas Lobkowitz: "In short, Marx does not accuse Hegel of having treated labor as if it was thought activity. Rather, he accuses him of having in the *Phenomenology* described human history in terms of a dialectic of consciousness, not in terms of dialectic of labor." The quotation appears on p. 322 of his *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*,<sup>26</sup> which you will find indispensable not only because he traces back all the sources to very nearly everything Marx read, but because, being a Jesuit and hostile to Marx and trying to establish that the Middle Ages weren't all that dark and both the appreciation of the being of man as an artisan and his thought was first recognized by religion and not by Marx, by Bacon<sup>27</sup> and not by Hegel, he develops the whole concept of Having and Being through the ages.

(2) Another facet of Having/Being that is not given due recognition is that Marx developed them not only re class struggle but that fundamental relationship of Man/Woman. I never have, I believe, written to you on the subject, and so I enclose an article by me to which is also appended the quotes from the 1844 Manuscripts which directly relates to the concept.<sup>28</sup>

(3) The 1850 period when Marx was supposed to have turned "economist" is when he summed up his whole philosophy as "the absolute movement of becoming." That quotation that appears on the frontispiece of *Philosophy and Revolution* is from the *Grundrisse* which has finally appeared in English (Pelican Marx Library) and you'll find it on p. 488. (If you prefer following the German edition, it's from Notebook V, January 22 to February of 1858.) To me, the whole excitement of that whole section on the pre-capitalist formations of society is how the total concept of the Oriental society is directly tied to a new concept of man because he was reshaping history with the Taiping Revolution as against the view he had of the Oriental "vegetating in the teeth of barbarism" that was part of the *Communist Manifesto* when Marx's sources were the written ones of Western thought as against the active Eastern masses that were so creative at the very moment when the European proletariat, having suffered the defeats of the 1848 revolutions, were pausing while the Orient was "making revolutions" "pour en-

courager les autres.”<sup>29</sup> (That’s the footnote to the section on commodity fetishism in Chapter I of *Capital* that the underconsumptionist translators of *Capital* left out from the English edition.) [MCIF, p. 164]<sup>30</sup>

(4) In the 1860s, in *Capital* (Kerr edition [MCIK], p. 148 [MCIF, pp. 229-30]), there are two important footnotes, (1) Act IV, Scene 3, “Gold, yellow, glittering, precious gold!” from *Timon of Athens* by Shakespeare. And of course that’s not the only reference to Shakespeare nor to the Greek tragedies, both of which Marx not only was constantly rereading in the original, but romping every Sunday with his children all through Hampstead Heath who had to listen and learn the recitation. (2) The other reference on that page is to history, “Henry III, most Christian king of France, robbed cloisters of their relics, and turned them into money. It is well known what part the despoiling of the Delphic Temple, by the Phoenicians, played in the history of Greece.... It was, therefore, quite in order that the virgins, who, at the feast of the Goddess of Love, gave themselves up to strangers, should offer to the goddess the piece of money they received” [MCIK, p. 148; MCIF, p. 229–30.] But of course the history that most influenced him was not the erudite knowledge of all that has been written but history in the making. Which is why I seem not to be answering your question by listing sources.

May I also include a critique I wrote of that horrible Martin Nicolaus who finally translated the *Grundrisse*;<sup>31</sup> the translation is, however, excellent.

Yours, hurriedly,

P.S. I never got an acknowledgement from the publisher you recommended in Mexico, to whom, of course, I sent a copy of P&R and a letter.<sup>32</sup> On second thought, I remember that this was the same one, wasn’t it, who not only refused translation and publication of M&F but was rather rude on the subject. My impression then was that he was somewhat Stalinist-tinged and while he was “loving” you because you weren’t as concrete as I in the attacks of the “socialist states,” he would have nothing to do with someone who was going in for “statistics.” Am I right?

\* \* \*

March 26, 1974 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm indicates that he has ordered a copy of Nicholas Lobkowitz’s *Theory and Practice*, which Dunayevskaya had recommended for its discussion of “to have or to be.” Fromm refers to Dunayevskaya’s article on women’s liberation, affirming her view that the man/woman relationship was an important concept in Marx’s theory. Fromm also mentions Bachofen.<sup>33</sup> Fromm stresses that if the women’s liberation movement learned more about Marx,

they would find their “greatest ally” in him. Fromm also responds to Dunayevskaya’s concern that Arnaldo Orfila, director of the Mexican publisher Siglo Veintiuno, may not have been favorably disposed to publishing *Philosophy and Revolution* in a Spanish translation because of his possible Stalinist tendencies. Fromm disagrees somewhat with the Stalinist characterization, saying that Orfila had definitely been anti-Stalinist—but that their relationship broke off after Fromm criticized Cuba.]

\* \* \*

May 1, 1974

Dear EF—

Thank you very much for the recommendation to 21st c. publishers [Siglo Veintiuno] and I must apologize for doubting Arnaldo Orfila Reynal’s interest in *Philosophy and Revolution*. I’ve just signed a contract with them.

How is your new work proceeding?

Just returned from a most exhausting national lecture tour . . . I literally hadn’t stopped talking from January 15–May 5! So I escaped for one week to rural route #3—Wallaceburg [Ontario] where there is nothing but River, unpaved roads, milk houses—and I know no one—

May I impose for one more favor? Could you tell me which German publishers might be interested in receiving a copy of the work (P&R) with request for possible publication? Naturally I would love nothing more than being published in the homeland of Marx and Hegel—and some living friends like you—

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

May 24, 1974 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm is glad to hear that Arnaldo Orfila of Siglo Veintiuno had given her a contract for a Spanish edition of *Philosophy and Revolution*. For a German edition, he recommends Suhrkamp Verlag, suggesting that she use his name in writing to its Director, Dr. Siegfried Unseld. Fromm also mentions Marx’s reference in the *1844 Manuscripts* to “21 Bogen” [printer’s sheets] by Moses Hess<sup>34</sup> and asks her if she knows how to find that text.]

\* \* \*

May 30, 1974

Dear EF:

I'm not absolutely sure but I believe (since the original "21 Bogen by Moses Hess" were published in 1843 and would be impossible to get hold of) that where you'll most of them is in A. Cornu and W. Mönke edition of Moses Hess's *Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837-50*, which were issued in 1961 in East Berlin. Remember, also, that Cornu has written *Moses Hess et la Gauche Hegelienne* in 1934 which may not easily obtainable, but the 1958 edition of *Les 'Annales Franco-Allemandes' 1843-44* should be easily obtainable in Paris and would likewise have included at least some of the material on "Have" by Hess that Marx was referring to. Also in the Hague, 1959, Hess's *Briefwechsel* which is edited by E. Silberner. *Quellen un Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Deutschen und Oesterr.* Hope this helps as I do not have any of Hess's writings or I would immediately forward it to you.

Thank you very much for the German publisher's name; I will write at once, send *Philosophy and Revolution*, and inform you of results.

Did you receive the copy of my article for the Hegel Society of America on "Hegel's Absolute Idea as New Beginning"<sup>35</sup> that I sent you while I was in Canada?

Hurriedly, yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

July 24, 1974 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[From expresses thanks for the suggestions about sources for the term "having." With apologies for not acknowledging it earlier, he writes that he was overburdened but will take her article on Hegel with him on his vacation.]

\* \* \*

July 24, 1974

Dear EF—



In the attacks on me, you are being dragged in—in *China Quarterly* (review encl). For an Establishment quarterly to get such a Maoist-tinged scholar to take issue even with refugees I interviewed in Hong Kong is funny but not unexpected.<sup>36</sup>

Dr. Unseld of Suhrkamp Verlag never acknowledged my letter re any German edition but Feltrinelli in Italy<sup>37</sup> cabled me acceptance.

Did you get those “21 Bogen of Moses Hess” in the books I thought might have this?

How are you?

Yours—

Raya

\* \* \*

Dec. 1, 1974

Dear EF:

So happy to hear from you finally; ever so often you “disappear” and I begin to worry; I don’t believe it is the July 24th letter you didn’t answer for you did drop me a note that you would write re my projected talk at Hegel Society of America, but I did not hear from you after that. In any case, let’s forget about Dr. Unseld whose secretary did say “No” to publishing *P&R*. I do hope you have the opportunity to write List Verlag and will let me know so I can send copy to them; a million thanks.

As usual, I’m in the midst of fighting; this time with the young “New Left” (*Telos*) who gave a 1950 work of Adorno on Occultism 50 pp. of their magazine,<sup>38</sup> but couldn’t find any space for reviewing *Philosophy and Revolution*. When I’m dead, I’m sure they will “discover” me—and pervert. The Hegelians, orthodox, have actually been more serious about my work than the so-called Left. I have just returned from the conference where I read my paper on Hegel’s Absolutes as New Beginnings and almost got a standing ovation; they were falling asleep over their own learned theses, and here I was not only dealing with dialectics of liberation—Hegel as well as Marx tho the former was, by his own design, limited to thought—but ranging in critique of all modern works from “their” Maurer to Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics* which so erudite they didn’t quite dare attack until they found I was merciless in my critique.<sup>39</sup> On the other end, they were amazed that 200 came out to hear me—to them that was “endless mass.” Whereupon Sir T. M. Knox, on *Aesthetics*, who followed me, began with a remark that he would not try to compete with “so charming a lady.” He hardly expected this from

me “I suppose Sir Knox thinks he complimented me, but, in fact, that is a typical male chauvinist escapism from dealing with The Idea.” (We did happen to end up as almost-friends.)<sup>40</sup> In any case, beside permitting me to deliver a paper (which Nijhoff will publish along with all papers of the HSA [Hegel Society of America] conference), reviewed the book (The copy of *The Owl of Minerva* enclosed);<sup>41</sup> also its president, Louis Dupré, included review of book in the survey of recent works on Marxism, in *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Oct.-Dec. 1974, excerpt included here).

How is your work coming? I met one more admirer of yours—Studs Terkel whose *Working* that has become a best seller<sup>42</sup> and has quite a bit, from interviews, on “Having/Being,” so if you wish a copy I’ll be glad to send to you—who has a radio program in Chicago and in his interview both brought in your [Marx’s] “Concept of Man” and related it both to my “Woman as Force and Reason” and to *P&R*.

I have not had a single word from the Mexican publisher after he signed contract and did send \$300, which I thought meant surely he will publish, he must be translating and yet have not heard a word, tho I promised to collaborate with translator and help him find Spanish editions for any references I make in English.

Don’t keep yourself so distant for so long a time.

Yours,

Raya

Sorry, the enclosed excerpts from my own talk are so messy, but I think you have the whole for I sent it long, long ago.

\* \* \*

Jan. 20, 1975

Dear EF,

How are you? Somehow I always seem to expect a letter from you—or is it just that I imagine you “owe” me one because I do like to hear from you.

Did I tell you that it wasn’t a question of misfiling or the mail not arriving, but that Dr. Unseld,<sup>43</sup> or rather his secretary, refused and refused very categorically? In any case, Germany still remains absolutely closed to me, and Germany is the one country that I want most to be published in. I thought that now—since my talk to the HSA [Hegel Society of America]—and the fact that Nijhoff would publish the papers of that Conference—that *P&R* will

be published both in Mexico and Italy, and parts of it in the Hague, that perhaps finally, with your help, get to the homeland of Marx and Hegel. You mentioned List Verlag, did you get a chance to drop them a note?

How is your work progressing? Were you interested in Studs Terkel's *Working*? I had a most successful and very hefty lecture tour last year that led me to the South for the first time, so I ended up with an awful cold.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

February 13, 1975 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm continues a discussion around possible German publishers for *Philosophy and Revolution*, assuring Dunayevskaya that he would alert her to any possibilities in Germany that might come to his attention. He also mentions reading with pleasure some parts of Studs Terkel's *Working*. Fromm then turns to Stephen F. Cohen's new book on Nikolai Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution.<sup>44</sup> He notes that the work is sympathetic to Bukharin and Lenin, and that Bukharin had developed a plan for guerrilla warfare against Germany during World War I. In addition to some other themes, Fromm cites Cohen's conclusion that centralization of power in the Soviet Union, unintended by Lenin and Bukharin, was driven by the Russian civil war. Fromm concludes by asking for Dunayevskaya's views on these issues.]

\* \* \*

February 19, 1975

Dear EF:

Thank you for yours of the 13th and also for showing your willingness to try once again to see whether a German publisher could be gotten for *Philosophy and Revolution*. I do not think that a smaller publisher is harder to convince, especially now that I have signed contracts both with Feltrinelli for Italian publication and El siglo veintiuno for Spanish-speaking audience *plus* the paper, "Hegel's Absolute Idea as New Beginning", that I read the Hegel Society of America<sup>45</sup> last November will be published by Nijhoff of The Hague who publishes all the papers of the Hegel conferences. Since each foreign publication helps the other, and Nijhoff's has a very wide German audience, List Verlag may be impressed. Thank you very much.

Now, as to Stephen F. Cohen's work on Bukharin, I naturally was glad to read an objective study that helps right the record on terror in general and Bukharin in particular. Since the dialectic<sup>46</sup> is the center of my attention, and that is exactly where Bukharin went amiss, I do not have as high a view as [he] does of Bukharin and just in case you do not have P&R at hand, I enclose one of the versions of the chapter on Lenin where Bukharin figures.<sup>47</sup> As to the specific points you singled out, it is true that partisan warfare is not as new in Marxist thought as either Mao or Fidel [Castro] have made it out to be, but it isn't only Bukharin who antedated them, that is to say, the specific dispute between Lenin (and then including Trotsky) and Bukharin on guerrilla warfare was not on principle—guerrilla vs. "regular" army. Rather, it was on the concrete WW I which, beside the Kaiser's Army, Russia was attacked on many fronts, the Red Army could hardly be called "regular" but it had a chance precisely because it did unite the call for proletarian revolution and a whole body in a centralized place, etc, etc. Partisan warfare, whether Makhno's army,<sup>48</sup> or whatever, (Incidentally, USA is credited as first, outside of Spain, with having developed guerrilla warfare as revolution vs. armed-to-the teeth imperial army and Churchill had his laughs against the "irregulars" in the trees they knew well killing with a slingshot the beautiful British red coats) is neither a substitute for social revolution, nor a way "to make revolution" for all times, leading to elitism and isolation from the masses. It is good to give Bukharin credit for "discussing", but to substitute discussion for the concrete conditions where a truth is to be tested and lives won or lost is hardly the way to show that theory lives.

Regarding the economic plan, that is even more proof of the mechanical rather than dialectical form of development than Bukharin's mechanical *Historical Materialism*. Yes, Bukharin thought economic even before Trotsky and Trotsky did long before Lenin. Lenin so feared planning as leading to bureaucratism that he wished, when finally convinced, not a national plan, but experimentation, "Soviets plus electrification."<sup>49</sup> And Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*,<sup>50</sup> even more than Bukharin's siding with Trotsky on trade union debate<sup>51</sup> led Lenin to write that sharp summation of Bukharin as being "major theoretician" and "not understanding dialectic."<sup>52</sup> The one thing that I loved most of all of Bukharin is both his audacity and "correctness" in daring the damned Congress where Trotsky who was empowered by Lenin to act in his behalf on the Georgian question "conciliated."<sup>53</sup> Moreover, it is not only the bravery, it is the depth of his understanding the National Question, the very question which he hadn't previously understood, fought Lenin on the Irish question in 1916 when he didn't think the Easter Revolt was any "bacillus" of proletarian revolution, and continued fighting Lenin on the right to self-determination after they got power.<sup>54</sup> But,

suddenly, once Bolsheviks were involved, and still Stalin displayed “Great Russian chauvinism,” Bukharin caught it as both principle and national life and culture and revolutionary—all three together.

Finally, if I may say something on where I’m really totally unknowledgeable, Cohen practices some “bad psychology”<sup>55</sup> when he cannot “answer” questions in dispute, then Lenin’s revolutionary intransigence becomes “cantankerousness.” Really! Here is the first world war in full holocaust with “Marxist” Second International in as many pieces; here are the Irish, the only ones braving British imperialism and showing the way to the proletarians who are shooting each other across national frontiers, and here is the most beloved Bolshevik reading lectures on the fact that “National” self-determination is “backward” as compared to internationalism, etc. etc. And it is at that point that Cohen finds gossip as to which factions Bukharin associated with that Lenin didn’t like. No, such “analysis” will not do.

Yours,

\* \* \*

March 18, 1975

Dear EF,

Hope this reaches you on the day of your birth<sup>56</sup> —which every day is in your life, so I was most glad to year that your 75th one will be honored. Wish I was there with you—but capitalism likes greenbacks too much so that “measure” I cannot meet, so I embrace you from here.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

March 27, 1975 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm thanks Dunayevskaya for her birthday note and apologizes that the organizers of his birthday party had—inadvertently—asked her to travel such a long distance to participate.]

\* \* \*

May 16, 1975

Dear EF,

Do you suppose that now that Nijhoff is going to publish my paper, "Hegel's Absolute Idea a New Beginning," in the Hegel Society of America Conference documents, 1974 meeting,<sup>57</sup> that you could get your friend in the German publishing field to be interested in *Philosophy and Revolution*?

May I ask his response?

How do you feel? I cannot see why any apology was needed for your friends asking me to come to your birthday gathering that they arranged. I only wish I could have gotten there. How is your new work coming along?

I'm still on tour as you can see from enclosed leaflet. Loyola University had invited me last week on Marxist-Christian dialogue. It was rather interesting. But if I don't stop chasing the clock *and losing* that race with time—

Yours,

Raya

Will be home in Detroit May 25th

\* \* \*

June 8, 1975

Dear EF and Mihailo:<sup>58</sup>

Aren't you magnificent personages! Still, it is good to be as active as I am, chasing time and new societies, so that such complimentary thoughts as yours cannot go to my head, but thank you ever so much. One of the greatest things that abound is having friends, and one at this moment is so anxious to see *Philosophy and Revolution* published in the birth-land of Marx that he thought I would stand a better chance of getting it published if it were translated into German, and he contributed \$500 to see what I can do about that.

Do you, dear Fromm, know a translator who would "know" both Hegel and Marx and the "new passions and new forces" so that translating my work into German would appeal to him/her? I'm rather dumb on money matters (I'm supposed to be an economist but my husband insists I don't even know the price of groceries!) and have no idea whether that \$500 would be all or nothing at all, but once we would agree philosophically, I'm sure we could work out an agreement. It wouldn't really matter whether it was from Germany or Switzerland or wherever, but I would want one in whom you'd have

confidence. I also don't know whether knowledge that Nijhoff will be publishing the proceedings of the Hegel Society of America, 1974, which includes my piece on "Hegel's Absolute Idea as New Beginning," would serve as an inducement either to translator or possible publisher. May I hope to hear from you on that matter soon?

Is Mihailo still in Switzerland? I was trying to convince him not to return to his homeland, but he says that I, being Russian, just see forced labor camps everywhere. Ah, well, perhaps I should have accepted the invitation, in 1970, to come to the Hegel conference in Yugoslavia, but I also know that Tito, like any Stalinist and that is way back from 1937 in Spain, was as proficient in shooting or ordering the shooting of Trotskyists first, and, *perhaps*, asking questions later.<sup>59</sup> In Mexico I was in constant fear over my being a poor shot and, instead of getting the GPU agents, would be "gotten," not so much about me (though no one likes the prospect of death) as about the Old Man [Trotsky].<sup>60</sup> And yet I know that is not for "my children" but for me that I am working so determinedly for that humanist world.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

June 9, 1975 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm cites a broken arm as the reason for not responding sooner to her February letter on Bukharin, and also mentions his recent meeting with Mihailo Markovic, referring to the postcard the two of them had jointly sent to her. Concerning Bukharin, Fromm noted he had read the *ABC of Communism*<sup>61</sup> fifty years earlier, and did not have a favorable opinion because of its narrow and mechanistic outlook; Cohen's book,<sup>62</sup> however, showed Bukharin's to be a much richer personality than he had expected. Fromm also mentions plans to meet with a representative from List Verlag about a German translation of Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution*. Fromm concludes by expressing satisfaction that Dunayevskaya's work will appear in Italian, as well as in Spanish, the latter in Mexico.]

\* \* \*

June 20, 1975 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[In response to Dunayevskaya's query, Fromm doubts that the translator into German of his *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973) would be knowledgeable enough about Hegel and Marx to do a good job with Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973). He suggests consulting people who have written on these topics and who have been translated into German like "your friend Marcuse." Fromm also wonders if it is good idea to commission a translation before finding a publisher. He mentions additionally that he is trying to speak to Mr. Reif<sup>63</sup> from List Verlag about publishing her book. Finally, he writes that he enjoyed the day he spent with Mihailo Markovic and that Markovic would have enjoyed reading Dunayevskaya's letter addressed to both of them, but given what she said there about Tito, he did not think it a good idea to mail it to Yugoslavia.]

## NOTES

1. Probably Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

2. That earlier letter from Dunayevskaya to Fromm is missing, as is any Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence on *Philosophy and Revolution* in 1972 or 1973.

3. As mentioned above, Dunayevskaya had known Huett since the 1950s. As excerpted by Dell Publishers for the back cover of *Philosophy and Revolution*, Fromm's blurb read: "an extraordinary work which I deeply admire . . . of great theoretical and political importance. The author combines originality, great scholarship, deep theoretical penetration of the subject, incorruptible critical thinking, absence of partisan clichés and a deep passion for the freedom and growth of man. I have learned much from the book and so, I believe, will most seriously interested readers."

4. A reference to the Yugoslav Marxist humanist Gajo Petrovic's *Philosophie und Revolution* (Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1971).

5. Kakuei Tanaka, conservative prime minister of Japan in 1972–74.

6. This was during the last months of the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende (1908–1973), a democratically elected Marxist who was overthrown and murdered on September 11 of that year in a military coup that was led by General Augusto Pinochet and backed by the Nixon administration.

7. Fromm and Dunayevskaya never managed to meet in person.

8. Louis K. Dupré, *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966). Dupré, who corresponded with Dunayevskaya in the 1970s and 1980s, later wrote the preface to the 1989 Columbia University Press posthumous reprint of her *Philosophy and Revolution*. Dupré is also the author of another work on Marx, *Marx's Social Critique of Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), and of a multivolume study of the intellectual foundations of Western modernity, still in progress.

9. Probably Fromm's *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973), a study of aggression, destructiveness, and Nazism.

10. This was less than two weeks before the September 11 coup that toppled Allende.

11. Probably a reference to her lack of competence to review Fromm's *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*.

12. Dunayevskaya encloses the flyer for her lecture in Detroit on Sunday, September 9 on "The Black Movement as Philosophy and Revolution," sponsored by the Michigan-Lowndes County, Alabama, Christian Movement, a civil rights organization in which *News & Letters* editor Charles Denby was a leading figure. The paragraph quoted from *Philosophy and Revolution* reads: "Black was the color that helped make the 1960s so exciting a decade. At one and



same time, we became witness to both the African Revolutions and the Black Revolution in the U.S.A. By their self-activity, self-organization, self-development, the Black youth struck out against white supremacy in the quiescent South, and with unparalleled courage took everything that was dished out to them—from beatings, bombings and prisons to cattle prods, shootings and even death itself—and still, unarmed, continued fighting back. They initiated a new epoch of youth revolt, white as well as Black, throughout the land. There was not a single method of struggle, from sit-ins, teach-ins, dwell-ins, wade-ins, to Freedom Rides, Freedom Marches, Freedom Schools, and confrontations with the Establishment, the Bull Connors' bulldogs and whips in Alabama, or the smartly uniformed soldiers on the steps of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. that did not have its origin in the Black movement. Moreover, this was so not only as strategy and tactic but also as underlying philosophy and perspectives for the future" (P&R, pp. 267–68).

13. Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973).

14. This postscript was written on a postcard that carried a photograph of Leroy Foster's mural featuring Frederick Douglass for the Detroit Public Library.

15. This letter is written underneath a photocopy of an undated note from Louis Dupré enclosing his discussion of *Philosophy and Revolution* from his larger review essay, "Recent Literature on Marx and Marxism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35:4 (Oct.–Dec., 1974), pp. 703–14. See note 8 for more on Dupré.

16. This refers to the Moscow Trials of 1936–38. Dunayevskaya broke with Trotsky the following year, at the time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

17. Siglo Veintiuno publishers, Mexico City.

18. The French Christian existentialist Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), author of *Being and Having*, trans. by Katharine Farrer (Boston, Beacon Press, 1951, orig. 1935).

19. Arnaldo Orfila, Director of Siglo Veintiuno Publishers.

20. Gabriel Marcel died October 8, 1973.

21. Actually, Marx quotes Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens* [MCIF, p. 229–30; MCIK, p. 148].

22. Marx, "Private Property and Communism," *1844 Essays* [M&F1958, pp. 296–7; MECW 3, pp. 299–300].

23. Dissident Russian novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008) was deported from Russia on February 12, 1974. He was recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970.

24. Friedrich Engels (1820–95), Marx's closest collaborator, coined the term "historical materialism" nearly a decade after Marx's death in his 1892 introduction to a new edition of his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (MECW 27, p. 283). Georgi Plekhanov (1857–1918), generally recognized as the founder of Russian Marxism, coined the term "dialectical materialism" in his article, "For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel's Death" (1891), which appeared in *Neue Zeit*, the leading Marxist journal of the time.

25. Marx, "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" (1844): "Hegel stands on the basis of modern political economy. . . . He sees only the positive side of labor and not its negative side" (M&F 1958, p. 310; MECW, 3, p. 333).

26. Nicholas Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

27. Francis Bacon (1561–1626), British philosopher and scientist.

28. Dunayevskaya, "The Women's Liberation Movement as Reason and as Revolutionary Force," first published, along with one page of excerpts on gender from Marx's "Private Property and Communism" (1844) in *Notes on Women's Liberation: We Speak in Many Voices* (Detroit: News and Letters, 1970); reprinted without the appended Marx passages in WLDR.

29. The peasant-based Taiping Rebellion in China lasted from 1850–64. With the phrase "vegetating in the teeth of barbarism," Dunayevskaya merges two passages from Marx: In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels referred to China as among the world's "most barbarian nations," which the expansion of capitalism was drawing "into civilization" (MECW 6, p. 488). In "The Opium Trade," a September 20, 1858, article for the *New York Daily Tribune*, Marx wrote of China as a "semi-barbarian" land that was "vegetating in the teeth of time," while at the same time defending Chinese resistance to British colonialism during the Second Opium War (MECW 16, p. 16). Marx's footnote to the fetishism section of *Capital* reads: "One

may recall that China and the tables began to dance when the rest of the world appeared to be standing still—pour encourager les autres [to encourage the others]” (MCIF, p. 164). The “dance” of the tables is an allusion to the Taiping Rebellion.

30. See note 58 in Chapter 2.

31. Dunayevskaya’s unpublished “Dear Friends” letter, circulated within *News & Letters*, critiqued Martin Nicolaus’s Foreword to his translation of Marx’s *Grundrisse* (1973)—see RDC, p. 12435ff. Excerpts were published under the title, “The Dialectics of Marx’s *Grundrisse*,” *News & Letters* (Sep.–Oct. 2005).

32. Siglo Veintiuno, which published a Spanish transition of *Philosophy and Revolution* in 1977.

33. Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815–87), Swiss anthropologist who wrote of early “matriarchal” societies. See *Myth, Religion and Mother Right: Selected Writings of J. J. Bachofen*, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Fromm discussed Bachofen at several junctures, as can be seen in his *Love, Sexuality, and Mariarchy: About Gender*, ed. Rainer Funk (New York: Fromm International, 1997).

34. Moses Hess (1812–75) was an early German communist and advocate of “True Socialism,” a doctrine attacked by Marx and Engels for its nostalgia toward feudalism in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848). *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz* [Twenty-One Printer’s Sheets from Switzerland] was the title of an 1843 collection in which Hess published three articles. In his “Private Property and Communism” (1844), Marx refers to Hess: “On the category of having, see Hess, *Einundzwanzig Bogen*” (MECW 3, p. 301; M&F1958, p. 297).

35. See note 71 in Chapter 4.

36. This review took strong exception to Dunayevskaya’s criticisms of Mao, especially concerning China’s rapprochement with the Nixon administration as Vietnam was being bombed, also linking Dunayevskaya to Fromm: “Like Erich Fromm, Raya Dunayevskaya comes across, for all her philosophical astuteness, as one of the elitist, Marxist-Humanist representatives of the anti-Nixon lobby in America.” See Phil Billingsley, review of Dunayevskaya’s *Philosophy and Revolution*, *China Quarterly* 58 (April-June 1974), p. 398.

37. Feltrinelli, Italy’s large leftist publisher, later issued a translation: Dunayevskaya, *Filosofia e rivoluzione*, with a preface by Mariachiara Fugazza and Amedeo Vigorelli (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977).

38. See the Editor’s “Introduction to Adorno” (pp. 2–6); Theodor Adorno, “Theses Against Occultism” (pp. 5–12); Adorno, “Stars Down to Earth: A Critique of the *Los Angeles Times* Astrology Column” (pp. 13–90), all published in *Telos* No. 19 (Spring 1974). John O’Neill’s review of Dunayevskaya’s *Philosophy and Revolution* appeared in *Telos* No. 22 (Winter 1974–75), pp. 163–71.

39. For more on Dunayevskaya’s paper and its critique of Adorno, see note 71 in Chapter 4. Reinhart Klemens Maurer is a German philosopher and the author of *Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte: Interpretationen zur Phänomenologie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965).

40. Sir T. M. Knox (1900–80), a noted British Hegel scholar, was the editor and translator of the following works by Hegel: *Early Theological Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), the *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), and the *Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

41. Raymond Plant, review of *Philosophy and Revolution*, *Owl of Minerva* 5:4 (June 1974), pp. 5–6.

42. Studs Terkel, *Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do* (New York: Pantheon, 1974).

43. Of Suhrkamp Verlag in Frankfurt.

44. Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution; A Political Biography, 1888–1938* (New York: Knopf, 1973).

45. Dunayevskaya note: *This* “gossip” may interest you regarding those conservatives who nevertheless did see their way to invite me where the “Left” still busy helping Stalinism-Trotskyism turn me into an unperson. But they remain conservative, so when Sir T. M. Knox [translator of several of Hegel’s works] followed me on the podium, he said he would not “compete” with the “charming lady.” I said that he may think he is complimenting me, but it is

the most sexist remark I heard that day, and he cannot use such male chauvinism to evade arguing on the content, which is revolutionary. Since everyone was “shocked to death” that I so addressed the knight, I was allowed to get away with it.

46. Dunayevskaya note: Adam B. Ulam is another scholar trying a little to right the record, and again they go in for “psychology”; when it comes to the dialectic, so in his *Stalin*, (p. 218, fn. 37) he “interpreted” Lenin’s Will on Bukharin not being a dialectician as “Read: not a politician.” That made me so mad that, though I seldom address bourgeois scholars, I did write him, and he “thanked” me, without taking any step to correct his interpretation. [See Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin; The Man and His Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1973). At issue here was Lenin’s statement in his Will to the effect that Bukharin did not fully understand the dialectic, quoted below in this letter. For more on Bukharin, see note 54 in Chapter 3.]

47. Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), Ch. 3, “The Shock of Recognition and the Philosophic Ambivalence of Lenin.”

48. Nestor Makhno (1888–1934), an anarchist who organized a peasant army in Ukraine during the Russian Civil War of 1918–21, at times fighting against the Reds (Bolsheviks), at other times the Whites (conservatives).

49. In 1920, Lenin wrote, “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” (LCW 31, p. 516).

50. Nikolai Bukharin, *Economics of the Transformation Period*. With Lenin’s critical remarks (New York, Bergman: 1971, orig. 1920).

51. In 1920–21, Bukharin sided with Trotsky’s view that since Soviet Russia was a workers’ state, the trade unions could be incorporated into the state, as discussed *Marxism and Freedom*, Ch. 12, “What Happens After”, pp. 196–201.

52. In Lenin’s Will, as discussed in note 54 in Chapter 3.

53. In *Philosophy and Revolution*, Dunayevskaya argued that Trotsky “conciliated” Stalin: “As Lenin lay dying, he entrusted the struggle against Stalin on the question of national minorities to the hands of Trotsky. But as was characteristic of Trotsky throughout his life, he once again went for ‘conciliationism.’” He failed to unfurl the banner of struggle against Stalin at the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Party as he promised Lenin he would do” (pp. 136–137). See also, Moshe Lewin, *Lenin’s Last Struggle* (New York: Random House, 1968).

54. A reference to the Easter 1916 Uprising in Dublin, which paved the way for Irish independence, and about which Bukharin argued with Lenin. For more background, see note 54 in Chapter 3.

55. Dunayevskaya note: I’m using “bad psychology” not psychologically, but philosophically, that is, as Hegel used the expression “bad infinity” [SLI, p. 155; SLM, p. 142], someone like Schelling running to the absolute “like a shot out of the pistol” [PhGB, p. 89; PhGM, p. 16] instead of suffering though absolute negativity, “the patience, labor, suffering of the negative” [PhGB, p. 81; PhGM, p. 10].

56. March 23, 1975 was Fromm’s seventy-fifth birthday.

57. See note 7 in Chapter 4.

58. In response to a joint postcard (missing) sent to Dunayevskaya by Fromm and Mihailo Markovic, a Yugoslav Marxist humanist philosopher, later a Serbian nationalist. Markovic participated in a symposium organized around Fromm’s 75th birthday in May 1975. For more on Markovic, see note 54 in Chapter 4.

59. Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) was the Communist ruler of Yugoslavia from 1943–80. He distanced himself from Russia in 1948 and soon after helped to found the Non-Aligned Movement, but maintained an authoritarian one-party state at home.

60. A reference to the years 1937–38 when Dunayevskaya was Trotsky’s Russian-language secretary during his exile in Mexico.

61. Nikolai Bukharin and Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism*, trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969, orig. 1919).

62. Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (1973).

63. Adelbert Reif, the editor for the German translation of Dunayevskaya’s *Philosophy and Revolution*, which was issued by another, larger publisher: *Algebra der Revolution: Philosophie der Befreiung von Hegel bis Sartre*, trans. by Oskar Itzinger (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1981).



## *Chapter Eight*

# **The Final Letters: On Critical Theory and on Rosa Luxemburg, Gender, and Revolution**

June 21, 1975

Dear EF:

How and why would you get a broken arm? Don't you know Marxist-Humanism is totally opposed to any sickness? Even absolute negativity is but new beginning, and age especially demands creativity away from pain. I do hope you are well now, and will take better care of yourself, for you are very precious to all of us!

We must have crossed in the mail. Yes, I did get that beautiful card from you and Mihailo, and either I or he must have told you about my excitement seeing him walk in to a meeting when I feared he was in jail, and my "anarchism," or at least wildness was "proven," by my stopping in the middle of a sentence at a public meeting to run over to him to embrace—and thereby turn the meeting into one on E.E [Eastern Europe].

What crossed in the mail must also have been the news that one German excited about the Idea has contributed \$500 to get *Philosophy and Revolution* translated. If the representative of List Verlag is coming to see you, no doubt he would know translators, and also know whether that would suffice to get it going as an inducement to him to publish. I will have another copy of P&R sent to you, and include in it the latest reviews—Professor O'Neill of York University in *Telos*, and one in Spanish in Puerto Rico, and perhaps I'll also include the one by Dupré from *Journal of the History of Ideas*.<sup>1</sup> I'll be looking forward to hearing on that subject.

Here is something that might interest you and you may not know about it; I'm a nut for tracing roots of Marxism and Hegelianism in USA where pragmatism likewise was an outgrowth of dialectic. Presently, what I had as mere footnote in *Marxism and Freedom*—a reference to the 1st Hegelians—the St. Louis Movement in pre and post Civil War days, with that mechanic Brokmeyer teaching the *Science of Logic* to that Yankee Harris [M&F, p. 350, fn. 53], and women included, though, “naturally,” only as auxiliaries.<sup>2</sup> Well, Susan Blow who first began the kindergarten movement, as well as higher education for women, and did a great deal of translating of Hegel had a nervous breakdown, and went to Dr. Putnam who was the first psychoanalyst who followed the Freudian method.<sup>3</sup> It was no one-way relationship, and she so interested him in Hegelian dialectics, that he wrote Freud, and sent him one of their products—I don't know whether Brokmeyer's translation (which certainly Freud would have known in German) or Harris's “interpretation.” Evidently Freud was so opposed to what he considered “mysticism” that he wrote to someone else that Putnam would be great if only he wouldn't “divert” to philosophy. Ah, well, at least somewhere in the archives he left there would be something of St. Louis Hegelians at the end of the 19th century. The world has never been all that distant in ideas even when technology had not made this “one world.” Do take care of yourself.

Yours,

Raya

Did I tell you that I'll be giving a series of 6 lectures this Int. Women's Year (where were you men these millennia before you “discovered” we existed as Reason as well as Force?).<sup>4</sup> At Wayne State University Adult Education those Women as Reason as Well as Force will be spelled out as: 1) Russia, 1917; Germany, 1919; Portugal, 1975 2) Working Women in USA: From Abolitionism to Women's Liberation. 3) Present day Women Theorists—Simone de Beauvoir, Sheila Rowbotham, Maria Barreno (I have established communication with one of the Three Marias<sup>5</sup> 4) Literature and Revolution 6) Philosophy and Revolution.

And I'll also tell you what I discovered in the 1st Maid's Petition, 1647—they asked for the right “to enjoy liberty every second Tuesday” Beautiful!<sup>6</sup>

\* \* \*

June 30, 1975

Dear EF—

Thank you very much for your speedy and helpful answer on translation.

Not in the beheaded dialectics of Adorno where naïve is the deepest insult, but in the poetic sense in which naïve stands for most genuine, unspoiled by technology, you show naivety when you refer to Marcuse as if he were my dear friend. Not only had he refused to introduce *Philosophy & Revolution* but ever since he had introduced *Marxism & Freedom*, he has felt so very uncomfortable in my “extreme” “anti-Russian” attitudes that by the time the mid-1960s and his espousal of “biological solidarity” which “Christened” 4-letter words as “revolutionary,”<sup>7</sup> there has hardly been any contact. Angela Davis,<sup>8</sup> even when she was freed and yet totally refused to sign against Russia invading Czechoslovakia and *all* East European revolts, is his new heroine. I attribute it to his impatience of wanting any revolution before his days are over, or so he fears –

You are right that I should not contract for translation unless I do have hopes for German publishers. And you are my only hope there. If *List Verlag* should be interested then I would ask him/her for translator. My German is poor and I could hardly edit, but I would check for accuracy of thought though not of formulation.

Incidentally, for your *To Have/To Be*, would you be interested in seeing some of my talks on Women’s Liberation? Some have been transcribed—very poorly as I talk without notes but they may interest you.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

July 8, 1975 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm acknowledges Dunayevskaya’s recent letters and the reviews of *Philosophy and Revolution* she had enclosed. Fromm begins by taking up several topics, including Dunayevskaya’s notes concerning James Jackson Putnam, the American Freudian, and his patient, the Hegelian Susan Blow. Fromm volunteers to assist her in publishing these as a note in a psychoanalytical journal. Fromm also comments on a first “Maid’s Petition” that Dunayevskaya had mentioned she had found, and on Dunayevskaya’s plans for a lecture series during International Women’s Year (1975) on women’s liberation topics.<sup>9</sup> Fromm expresses particular interest about Dunayevskaya’s projected lectures, suggesting that her views on the topic were especially needed. Concerning Dunayevskaya’s relationship to Marcuse, Fromm concludes, with some apparent relief, that it had not been as completely “friendly” in terms of jointly held views as he had once assumed. Fromm then offers

what he says are “characterological remarks,” in which he forms ideas about the character structure of a person based on a theoretical model of various types of personality. He writes that he agrees with Dunayevskaya’s criticisms concerning Marcuse’s political attitudes. Fromm then writes of Marcuse’s “egotism” and Marcuse’s concern with his own “image.” Fromm compares Marcuse to Jean-Paul Sartre, whom he views as even more egotistical. Sartre, Fromm writes, is also mainly concerned with keeping his image as the philosopher of the revolution. Fromm expands his remarks by writing that bourgeois egotism and a disbelief in life distinguish Sartre’s and also Simone de Beauvoir’s personalities. Their despair is covered over by a revolutionary philosophy, however. Fromm concludes with some comments on his work-in-progress, “Having and Being.”<sup>10</sup> He writes that his work is proceeding slowly, primarily because of difficulty locating the sources for some of Marx’s ideas he wished to include. He offers as an example Marx’s observation that today the passions are without truth and the truth without passion.<sup>11</sup> He asks Dunayevskaya for assistance in locating the exact quotation.]

\* \* \*

July 16, 1975

Dear EF:

What you summarized from Marx on passions and truth being opposites sounded what he wrote before the *1844 MSS* where he writes of them as a unity: “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a *suffering* being—and because he feels what he suffers, a *passionate* being. Passion is the essential power of man striving energetically toward his object” [M&F1958, p. 315; MECW 3, p. 337; also in Fromm’s *Marx’s Concept of Man*, p. 183].

Therefore I thought it sounded more like his *The Holy Family* or Critique of Critical Critique.<sup>12</sup> Since I could not find anything exactly as you remembered I thought I’ll cite several quotations on same subject and see whether it strikes a familiar note. (I’m quoting from official Moscow translation, Moscow, 1956): Mostly Ch. VI, against Herr Bruno, especially “Spirit” and “Mass,” p. 106: “For Herr Bauer as for Hegel, truth is an *automaton* that proves itself.” [MECW 4, p. 79].

Man must *follow* it. As in Hegel, the result of the real development is nothing but the truth *proven*, i.e., brought to *consciousness*.

And a few pages down he criticizes their love of bourgeoisie for its (p. 110) *effective* success however much the “‘pathos’ of it evaporated” [MECW 4, p. 81]. And again (p. 124): “Staggering after its victories, Absolute Criti-



cism breaks out in *Pythian* violence against philosophy. Feuerbach's *Philosophy of the Future* is the congealed cauldron whose fumes inspire Absolute Criticism's victory-inebriated head" [MECW 4, p.92].

That chapter is especially magnificent because so much of history gets into it as he approaches "Critical Battle against the French Revolution" pp. 160–166 [MECW 4, pp. 118–124] where he speaks of "self-alienated natural and spiritual individuality."<sup>13</sup> And then, *Critical Battle Against French Materialism*, pp. 167–179 [MECW 4, pp. 124–134] where he speaks of "17th c. *metaphysics*, beaten off the field by the French Enlightenment"<sup>14</sup> and "Descartes in his *physics* endowed *matter* with self-creative power and conceived *mechanical* motion as the act of its life" [MECW 4, p. 125].

On the other hand, the quote may have been part of either doctoral thesis<sup>15</sup> and 1842 where there are more generalizations on truth.<sup>16</sup> The first new volume of Marx's Collected Works has just been published in German and Russian and English, all from Moscow, and has some additional letters and early articles.<sup>17</sup> I don't know whether you're acquainted with a new translation of Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, which has a very learned Introduction (and Notes) by a Jesuit Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge Univ Press)<sup>18</sup> and he quotes earlier works, especially from *Anekdoty*,<sup>19</sup> again on subject of truth, and the quotation I just cited above on Feuerbach, O'Malley rephrases as "Marx called Feuerbach the purgatory through which speculative philosophy would have to pass if it was to attain the status of truth."<sup>20</sup>

Sorry, I cannot cite the exact quotation you looked for, but I hope the above helps some.

Thank you very much for trying to get German publisher for *Philosophy and Revolution*, and if publisher wants the choice of translator, he can still be paid from that contribution I got for that purpose.

I would never think of writing anything on something I know nothing about—psychoanalysis. However, I'll suggest to the young woman I'm encouraging to work in the field of the first American Hegelians—Therese Littman.<sup>21</sup> It is she who found the reference to Freud and Dr. Putnam in *James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis*, edited by Nathan G. Hale (Harvard U. Press, 1971). I'll ask her to find out to whom Freud wrote that letter on Putnam and Hegel and Susan Blow, and will drop you a note.

You must have gotten the impression about my friendship with Marcuse either from fact he did introduce *Marxism and Freedom*, and once when I asked your help in publishing an M.D. Speaks, Dr. Gogol seemed to have sided with HM [Herbert Marcuse] on *Eros [and Civilization]*. I always am very cautious in my criticism if I feel that the Government or other reactionaries (perhaps Birchers<sup>22</sup> in San Diego) are after a dissident. But in fact I was always at odds even before we came to total parting of the ways at the end of the 1960s when I was working on *Philosophy and Revolution*, and he was

going haywire on “biological solidarity.”<sup>23</sup> Even then I was ready to bend backwards because I felt that, at his age, the idea that he may not live to experience revolution was too much and he was looking for shortcuts.

What I thought was the greater tragedy was the collapse of the whole Frankfurt School. You may know or you may not that when Stalin first openly revised the law of value, in 1943, and I both translated the article for *American Economic Review*, and analyzed it, when both the State Department thought I had no right to criticize “an ally, Russia,” and the Russians called me “a Trotskyist or fascist, probably both,” the news hit the *NY Times*, p. 1,<sup>24</sup> I met many, many German intellectuals. They searched me out because their views of American intellectuals were so low that they were shocked to find one knew Marxism. But even then we fought because they were working through State Department against Nazism, yes, but I felt differently as to how to work. In any case, WW II ends, and some Marxists get out alive, and it was my turn to be shocked to find that here they had gone through concentration camps, and still remained Stalinist! Specifically, Rosdolsky<sup>25</sup> who had been head of Austrian Marx’s Archives. And what all those elitists, especially Adorno did to the poor dialectic, really decapitated it.<sup>26</sup> Whereupon they call me “the mad Russian,” and since I was never in academia, preferring to work with workers, and Blacks, and women who are not careerists, I believe that not only did they not collaborate with me; I believe they actually advised some German publishers to pay no attention to my work. Ah, well, each to his own.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

July 22, 1975

Dear EF,

This is in the nature of a post-script as I failed to give you the particulars on two concrete questions. I’m not sure whether Freud’s letter on Putnam is from the letter of Dec. 16, 1910 in Jones’ *Sigmund Freud*, II, 165, or whether it is from the reference in a footnote, “James J. Putnam” (1919), SE, XVII, 271; “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement” (1914); SE, XIV, 31–32; “Advances in Psychoanalytic Therapy” (1918), SE, XVII, 165; “An autobiographical Study” (1925), SE, XX, 51.<sup>27</sup> Both footnotes appear in Nathan G. Hales Jr.’s *James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis*, p. 43,<sup>28</sup>

where Freud is referred to as having criticized Putnam for wishing to place psychoanalysis “in the service of a particular philosophical outlook on the world.”

Yes, the First Maid’s Petition was in England.<sup>29</sup> Christopher Hill has the most profound study of the early periods of the English Revolution, his latest being *The World Turned Upside Down* (The Viking Press).<sup>30</sup>

Yours,

Raya

P.S. Did you ever hear from Arnaldo Orfila Reynal about the Spanish translation of *Philosophy and Revolution*? More than a year has past since I signed that contract, and I’ve yet to see any sign of it being translated, or any date for publication.

\* \* \*

July 28, 1975 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Concerning Marcuse, Fromm thanks Dunayevskaya for clarifying her relationship to Marcuse and also expresses some differences of opinion with Dunayevskaya concerning him. Fromm asserts that Marcuse was motivated by hate, even if against the “right people,” as well as by fantasy and romantic thinking—an ideal of a completely eroticist life, including sadism and coprophilia, that of a child at play. Fromm concludes that Marcuse’s form of radicalism has been much more harmful than beneficial. Concerning the Frankfurt School, Fromm attacks its leading spirit Max Horkheimer<sup>31</sup> for concealing his Marxist ideas in a cowardly manner. Fromm writes that after emigrating to the U.S. Horkheimer and Adorno wanted so much to avoid being considered “radicals” that they censored themselves.<sup>32</sup> After his return to Frankfurt, Fromm writes, Horkheimer ended up as a pillar of society, praising religion and the virtues of capitalism. Fromm concludes the letter by offering to write to the Mexican publisher of Dunayevskaya’s *Philosophy and Revolution* to inquire about how its translation and publication were progressing. The letter ends rather dramatically, with a note from Fromm’s secretary indicating that since dictating the letter Fromm had suffered an attack of appendicitis with his condition uncertain. (Fromm recovered.)]

\* \* \*

August 11, 1975

Dear EF,

You know *very well* Marxist-Humanist must not be ill—so get well *hurriedly* and stay well all the time.

With love

Raya

Though, just in case you wish to while the time away—I'll gift you O'Malley's ed. of Marx's *Critique [of Hegel's Philosophy of Right]*. Please forgive its "murder"—I can't seem to read any Marx without doodling.

\* \* \*

Postcard from Dunayevskaya to Fromm—postmarked August 25, 1975—seems to be missing main body of message

P.S. Have you heard from German publisher?

\* \* \*

August 20, 1975

Dear EF,

How are you? Are you home or in hospital? Are you in pain or can you continue with your work? Or is deep concentration the very element that gets your ulcers to act up? Until I hear from you that you are well, I will not raise questions that may disturb—would talk of Frankfurt School and/or HM [Herbert Marcuse]?

I don't know whether Russian Revolution means to you the *personal* elation its meant to me though I was a child not entitled to go to grade #1 because of being a Jewess.<sup>33</sup> In any case I heard some magnificent stories from Natalia Trotsky, and one of these concerned Maria Joffe whose husband committed suicide on eve of Trotsky's expulsion and yet she came to see him and told the GPU where to go when they told her "only family" could accompany him to rrd [railroad]. Well, like a ghost come from the grave, suddenly I read this, after 20 years in Stalin's forced labor camps she is out and got permission to go to Israel. She must be in the 70's somewhere, and I felt I wanted to embrace her—wrote her and just received a warm response.<sup>34</sup> Isn't life wonderful?

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

October 28, 1975

Dear EF,

How are you?

Please forgive me for imposing my problems on you, but I had assured myself, through correspondence with your secretary, Ms. Joan Hughes, that you were making satisfactory progress in your recuperation, before deciding to write you about this which is so crucial to me, as you see from the letter of Oct. 22 that I have received from Adelbert Reif of List Verlag that you had recommended to me as possible publisher of a German edition of *Philosophy and Revolution*.

Very clearly you are the key to any such German edition. For that matter, I had hoped our names could be associated in the American edition, but since you were kind enough to comment on it before publication and Dell was using the commentary for publicity purposes I let it go at that. But for the German edition that is no longer a question of either/or, but most specifically the decisive point only if you introduce it. Mr. Reif, aware of your physical condition writes: "This introduction does not need to be very extensive but should be of substantial importance." Are you willing to write an introduction? Will you communicate directly with Adelbert Reif, or do you wish me to do so? There is a possibility that I will be in New York in December and if you will still be there, perhaps I could act as your secretary for that purpose? A million thanks.

Yours,

Raya Dunayevskaya

As for the other question Mr. Reif poses—money—that is no problem as I am altogether too anxious to see a German translation. As a matter of fact, as I told you and repeated to Mr. Reif when I sent him P&R, my literary agent, Olga Domanski,<sup>35</sup> has that contribution of \$500 given me, toward a German translation some time back.

\* \* \*

November 3, 1975 Fromm telegram to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm responds affirmatively to Dunayevskaya's request to write the introduction to the German edition of *Philosophy and Revolution*, assuming he would not have to do so until May 1976.]

\* \* \*

[Valentine's Day Card]

February 14, 1976

Dear EF,

Since St. Valentine supposedly forgives all for love, I'm permitted, am I not, to ask: how are you? The long silence has me both worried and wondering about that German publisher for P&R.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

February 18, 1976 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm responds to Dunayevskaya's Valentine card of a few days earlier. He reports he had received a call from Adelbert Reif, the German editor of *Philosophy and Revolution*. Reif thanked Fromm for having put him in touch with Dunayevskaya, also stating that the contract would be sent to her shortly. Fromm concludes with an update on his progress toward finishing *To Have or To Be?* by May. He indicates that he might soon be asking Dunayevskaya again for assistance in locating some references to Marx's works.]

\* \* \*

February 24, 1976

Dear EF,

Please feel free to ask for any Marx quotation you're missing and if I have it, you'll get it by return mail, though if it gets me on lecture tour, there may be a delay of a few days.

Do get well by not overworking yourself.

Yes, I did get contract from Europe Verlag—Reif’s new publishing connection. So I will be with you and Marx—and that’s such great relationships that I “shep naches”—is that transliteration of Jewish or did I thereby kill both languages.<sup>36</sup>

Yours,

Raya

Did you by any chance read or are the least bit interested in the absolutely worst allegedly woman liberation material—*Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape* Simon & Schuster by Susan Brownmiller. That pseudo-researched 472 pp. thesis that “all men keep all women in a state of fear”<sup>37</sup> is racist, *sexist* (and when women are that, they really outdo men), anti-Marxist, anti-Left has been picked by bourgeois press as nothing short of dozen best of year! Which all goes to show that, just as Afro hairdo has gotten whites scared out of their wits, so women with<sup>38</sup> have men “scared to death.” After all, she has the “answer”—police force must be 50% women!

\* \* \*

March 14, 1976

Dear EF

In quoting Hegel’s very familiar Lordship/Bondage passage in *Phenomenology* in a new way, however (re Women’s Liberation) I came across Having/Being expression and therefore thought you might appreciate it (p. 239, English tr.): “Thus, precisely in labor where there seemed to be merely some outsider’s mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, through the rediscovery of himself by himself, of having and being a ‘mind of one’s own’” [PhGB, p. 239; PhGM, p. 119].

The lecture tour I’m on now has gotten me to the Chicano movement here, including two Mexican-American professors who are debating other Mexicans who call themselves Spanish instead of Mexican Indians. But they were thrilled to hear of you and the fact that both of my books are coming out in Mexico, with M&F being translated by Dra. Navarro, Allende’s Sec’y.<sup>39</sup>

Hurriedly,

Raya

\* \* \*

[May, 1976?]

Dear EF,

On Marx's birthday [May 5] I spoke at University of Wisconsin on Rosa Luxemburg—I chose the date most deliberately both to hit academia with it and decided, instead of writing only on Today's Women Theorists—who aren't much—to combine Women's Liberation Movement with Rosa.<sup>40</sup> What do you think?

Have just recovered from a most exhausting 2-month long national lecture tour, and various letters from Europa Verlag were waiting for me. Evidently there is concern about your preface to my work, *Philosophy and Revolution*.<sup>41</sup> No doubt all will get straightened out soon as Adelbert Reif expects to meet with you.<sup>42</sup>

How do you feel? How is your work progressing? Did you get my note from the road—I believe I sent you one on Hegel on Having/Being mind of one's own<sup>43</sup> from LA.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

June 20, 1976

Dear E.F.,

Are you in New York with your new work finished<sup>44</sup> —and thus free as a bird even when working as hard as a proofreader-editor? Great!

Am in Canada where I received a note from Adelbert Reif who is evidently concerned with the fact he has not received from you the Introduction to German edition of my *Philosophy and Revolution*, as publisher plans to have translation ready *and* published in time for Frankfurt Book Fair.<sup>45</sup> Naturally, I'm very excited and slightly worried. Would you please let me know what is what?

Yours,

Raya



Will be back in Detroit Friday.

\* \* \*

July 8, 1976 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm assures Dunayevskaya that he had remained in touch with Reif about his Foreword to the German edition of Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution*, which Reif did not need until September. But in order that she would not worry about it, Fromm had finished writing it that day, and planned to send it off to Reif the following day. He would be sending her a copy and he would also try to incorporate before publication any suggestions Dunayevskaya might have after reading it.]<sup>46</sup>

\* \* \*

July 15, 1976

Dear EF:

Thank you very much for sending me the Foreword to P&R, and inviting my commentary. Because Mr. Reif informed me that there is an interest on the part of the publisher also to bring out a German edition of *Marxism and Freedom* (which Marcuse introduced), and because I am working on a new study of Rosa Luxemburg and Today's Women's Liberation Movement,<sup>47</sup> I wondered whether you would be willing to write two brief additions to what you say about me. Could the reference you make to the fact that P&R concerns itself with the Women's Liberation Movement be extended to call attention to the fact of the relationship between Rosa Luxemburg and the Women's Liberation Movement? If I may explain, here is what concerns me:

For years I have carried on polemics with<sup>48</sup> Rosa Luxemburg on Marx's theory of the accumulation of capital.<sup>49</sup> Nothing has maddened me so much, however, as the complete disregard that today's so-called theoreticians of the women's movement display towards Rosa, as if only that woman who writes on Women (with a capital W) "*as such*" merits attention. I have also been feeling very strongly on the reason why there has been a lack of camaraderie between Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky in the period of the 1905 Revolution in which they were all participants, and after which they did collaborate on an amendment to the Resolution on war at the 1907 International Congress.<sup>50</sup> Could there have been, if not outright male chauvinism, at least some looking down on her theoretical work, because she was woman? In any case, between the Stalinist slanderous misinterpretation of her position, and the new breed of theoreticians among women, who disregard her, I am very anxious to find

some way *before* my study of her is completed to call attention to the interrelationship between great revolutionary theoreticians like Rosa Luxemburg and the present Women's Liberation Movement. I would therefore greatly appreciate it if you could invent some way to single out her name for commentary, either at the point where you speak of Women's Liberation, or wherever you choose. (I enclose what I wrote about her critically in M&F, and excerpts from my recent lecture where I anticipate my next work on Rosa.)

The other question I wondered about was that of Hegel himself in regard to what I consider the overly-praised Frankfurt School Hegelians like Adorno. Last year, when I was asked to speak at the Hegel Society of America, I developed some points that brought about a quite heated discussion.<sup>51</sup> Where you mention that it is impossible to understand Marx without understanding Hegelian philosophy, I wondered whether you couldn't call attention to my contribution to Hegelian dialectics—that Chapter One on Absolute Negativity as New Beginnings—as being cogent for a German-speaking public, well-versed in Hegelian dialectics. (Enclosed is that part of the lecture that deals with Adorno.) Thank you warmly for anything you do on either or both of these suggestions.

Yours,

\* \* \*

October 2, 1976 Fromm Letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm apologizes for the delay in replying and agrees to elaborate for his Foreword to the German edition of *Philosophy and Revolution* the points Dunayevskaya described in her July 15 letter (on Rosa Luxemburg as well as on Hegel). Fromm also picks up on Dunayevskaya's reference to Adorno. Writing that his remarks are based both on personal knowledge and a reading of some of Adorno's work, Fromm portrays Adorno as arrogant and overrated. As to "critical theory," it itself was an unoriginal invention to avoid mentioning Marxism. Fromm then announces that his *To Have or to Be?* is now out. He promises to send her a copy, although he expresses some concern that Dunayevskaya will disagree with it at some key points. He concludes that he does not mind criticism so long as it is not ill intentioned and dishonest, like Marcuse's criticisms of his work.]

\* \* \*

October 17, 1976

Dear EF:

First, a rather unusual aspect of our relationship as I never before introduced “legal” matters, but presently I have some difficulty with the US Government from whom I cannot pry loose a folder on me, despite the Freedom of Information Act. Hence, the copy of the enclosed letter I wrote Joe Hansen of SWP [Socialist Workers Party] who had succeeded to get documents my lawyer would like to see since they probably involve me.<sup>52</sup> There is nothing for you to do, but I consider you a friend who should know if ramifications suddenly reveal defense needs. Please read and return directly to me since I do not wish these floating about loosely.

Secondly, I was naturally very glad to hear that you did (will?) make additions to your Preface to German edition of P&R. The “structure” of your sentence did not make it clear whether you have already done so, or will do so in the near future. In August Adelbert Reif visited me and told me that upon his return to Germany he would visit you in Switzerland, and carry with him his copy of the Preface. Was he there? Did you expand his copy, or the one directly for Europa Verlag? Mr. Reif had also informed me that an announcement of Philosophy and Revolution with your Preface would there (Frankfurt Book Fair) be announced as next year’s publication.<sup>53</sup> I am most anxious that there be no delay. My view of the dialectics of liberation never separates thought from act, and Mao’s death has given even a greater urgency, I think, to my work as all “Alternatives” are put through the wringer of events.

I will look forward to getting your new book. I always felt total confidence regarding your attitude to criticisms as your whole life is deeply rooted in what, ever since Karl Marx hyphenated critical-revolutionary, serious thinkers have lived by as the essence of their own self-development.

You may laugh, or at least smile, when I tell you that in Spring when I was lecturing at Boston University, Prof. Robert Cohen who had brought me there and had seen Prof. Marcuse the week before, told me of his “message” to me. It said: “Hello.” When Cohen kept pressing him, he said, Raya Dunayevskaya will understand; just say, “Hello.” And that is about the extent of his relationship to me since the 1960’s. What you had said of Adorno and Horkheimer and the whole Frankfurt School is what I always knew, especially since 1943, when my critique of the Stalinist revision of the law of value appeared in *American Economic Review* and then hit the front page of the *NYT* [New York Times].<sup>54</sup> Many of the Frankfurt school then looked for me as they had so low a view of American “erudition,” they could not believe any one would know Marx that “eruditely” (a word I absolute abhor). But when I demanded why their collaboration with US State Dep’t, it turned out that “you don’t understand at all.” Then, by the end of World War II, one person I really looked forward to meeting—Rosdolsky who had headed the

Marx-Lenin Institute in Austria and landed in the concentration camps, and now was supposed to help re-establish those Archives. To my shock he still was a Stalinist as there was no other “existing Communism.”<sup>55</sup> There are more involved ways of escaping the Humanism of Marxism than “erudition,” but I know of none.

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

November 25, 1976 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm reassures Dunayevskaya that he will soon amend his Foreword to the German edition of *Philosophy and Revolution*. Fromm also wonders why Marcuse had spent so much time in the State Department after the War.<sup>56</sup> Fromm cites Marcuse’s theoretical ambitions and abilities, concluding that Marcuse’s stint in the State Department seemed inconsistent with those attributes, although he dismisses the accusations being spread by Marcuse’s enemies that it was about spying on the radical movement. Fromm comments on other figures of the Frankfurt School: he would not have been puzzled if Horkheimer had gone to the State Department, because he was more conservative. As to the Frankfurt School more generally, he has encountered many inquiries by younger scholars. While Horkheimer is now being referred to as the creator of Critical Theory, Fromm holds that what was really involved was Horkheimer wanting to avoid mentioning Marxism even before 1933. Moreover, the talk of Critical Theory was merely an attempt at self-censorship. Fromm concludes that that was all that was behind the creation of Critical Theory by Horkheimer and Adorno. In a postscript, Fromm indicates that he did not receive Dunayevskaya’s enclosure to her last letter concerning her “freedom of information” request to see the files on her held by U.S. security agencies.]

\* \* \*

November 30, 1976

Dear EF:

Thank you very much for yours of the 25th which speaks of presently enlarging your Preface to P&R in its German edition. You must understand that I need [neither] have your popularity, nor even the publisher’s view that you

will make money for him, so that even though Mr. Reif said there was lots of time before ever it will be published, you will not wait for other deadlines. As it is, I'm in pieces with all these delays both on Mexican and German editions, but since both have now been heard from as I rushed an Appendix on Mao's death.<sup>57</sup> I hope the currency, if not the Hegelian dialectics, will finally make 1977 the year, *early*, when it will get off the press. (I enclose a "Letter" I wrote on that, should you be interested in what I think the fighting heirs over Mao's Mantle plus the Mantle itself.)

I doubt I'm the one who could answer the question as to why Marcuse remained with State Dep't. after WWII since I opposed any such collaboration even during,<sup>58</sup> and when the vitriolic attacks by the Maoists in America on his years in State Dep't. as if he were a "spy," and I offered to help, he said, they were so far-fetched that *they* are the recipients of a boomerang. He surely is no coward, and his *Reason and Revolution* surely did not hide his Marxism, as he understands it. Also, once he was out, and I was in great trouble because at the very height of McCarthyism, I had decided to "discover" Marx's Humanist Essays, that is to publish them in English translation, (I believe, as a matter of fact, that is the first our correspondence likewise began) he helped. What was strange in those years, the 1950s, is that our fights were over my "optimism" and "romanticism" over proletariat and Black; he used to argue that they only want a "piece of the American pie," and while he doesn't oppose that, it couldn't be called "revolutionary," as I insisted. He also opposed my view of the East German Revolt of 1953 as revolution from under totalitarianism, saying it was only because Germans couldn't stand Russians, etc. And I got nowhere with him when I tried to convince him that he shouldn't use "Marxism" when he is speaking of Russian Communism.

What was important and may shed light was that, to my shock, he was so heated a defender of Israel in the 1950s that he even defended Suez war.<sup>59</sup> In a word, could the fact that the end of WWII led also to the creation of Israel lead him to remain with state department? It would seem that his specialty of both Germany and East Europe could have no direct relationship to the other. But then I remember some very contradictory developments. Anyone who had ever heard of the Holocaust, much less knew what was like, to which a pogrom of which I lived through many, was as nothing, did follow "Exodus" with great passion. But so many of the German comrades who had escaped to Palestine found it impossible to function there since neither the Arabs nor the Jews would permit "crossing of the lines," and a socialist state was hardly what resulted. So, in 1947, in France, I met some who had left Israel, and I must have had no less than a dozen different versions of what was occurring there. It is just when such barbarism as Nazism emerges, people very nearly literally go crazy.

Yes, when last year I talked to the Hegel Society of America, and I dared criticize Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, it appeared as if the whole Frankfurt School was there in person sharpening their knives at my expense.<sup>60</sup>

Yours,

\* \* \*

January 19, 1977

Dear E.F.

Thanks for the check on my contribution to *Socialist Humanism*. I had a good laugh when I read that \$100 went out of your own pocket to Althusser—not that I laugh *at* you, but at the idea that any such *anti*-Humanist would have volunteered to write for such a symposium.<sup>61</sup> Ever since his *For Marx* which should have been entitled *Against Marx* had the gall to characterize Marx's *Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic* as “the prodigious ‘abreaction’ indispensable to the liquidation of his (the young Marx's) ‘disordered’ consciousness,”<sup>62</sup> I have directed quite a few sharp knives toward him, as you may recall from *P&R* (pp 302–3 especially). It has always amazed me on how many had not fully read him and mistook him for an “independent.” My friend George Lichtheim<sup>63</sup> had made just that error by just reading an article by him on what his book *would* be—then when *For Marx* finally appeared in full, poor Lichtheim fairly keeled over.

How are you this New Year?

Yours

Raya

\* \* \*

October 20, 1977

Dear EF:

Instead of trying to explain the long silence (especially since the German edition of *P&R* has once again been delayed), may I start right off by asking you whether I may engage in a dialogue with you on Rosa Luxemburg? There is a very specific field that I thought you would be most profound in—the difference between correspondence, especially with women, and the writings (very nearly non-existent) on that very subject, Women. I'm not refer-

ring to the fact that they were on flowers, cats, or other small talk. Rather I am referring to the very sharp attacks on their reformist husbands, there using many references to mythical or long-ago historical characters—Penthesilea, the queen of the Amazons. The letter I have in mind is the one to Mathilde Wurm on New Year's Day, 1917.<sup>64</sup> I was so surprised at that particular reference that I went to the trouble to look up, which, specifically, event she was referring to and it was Achilles who slew Penthesilea when she took the side of the Trojans—and then praised her bravery, etc. Russell, in his work on the Oriental Heritage as well as the Greek, mentions that the Greek Urn that Keats wrote that magnificent ode to (which he, Durant,<sup>65</sup> prefers above the urn) may have been the other one where Achilles spears Penthesilea. Now, my question is: what has all this to do with the Second International's betrayal, 1914, and how does it happen that whereas she kept away from the "Woman Question" other than what all Marxists were for—equal wages, suffrage, etc.—would certainly go to mythology and the roles of women as greater than life? Was it common to show that one's interest in literature, in character building, in self-development of idea though one kept strictly to economics-politics in books, pamphlets? Did you by any chance know people who knew her? I remember Marcuse (who was evidently a young Spartacist<sup>66</sup> in Army at the time Rosa was murdered) speaking gloriously of her as orator? There seems a great contradiction between her awareness that there is more to the "Woman Question" than economics in letters as contrasted to books, pamphlets, etc. I would love to get the feeling of the times—Germany, women, intellectuals between WWI and WWII.

How are you? What is new?

Yours,

Enclosed is mini-pamphlet on Sexism, Politics and Revolution in Mao's China which, by cutting off reference to the Huang-Ch'ing battle, may become title of my work on Rosa Luxemburg and Women's Liberation today.<sup>67</sup>

\* \* \*

October 26 1977 Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya

[Fromm opens by informing Dunayevskaya that he had been hospitalized after a heart attack at the time he received her letter on Luxemburg. Although he is not supposed to write letters, he was fascinated with the topic of Luxemburg and gender; thus his response. Fromm agrees with Dunayevskaya that the male Social Democrats never could understand Rosa Luxemburg, and also with her point that she did not receive the influence due her because she was a woman. Moreover, the men failed to develop as full revolutionar-

ies because they were held back by their patriarchal and domineering character structure. Fromm mentions the original exploitation of women by men and concludes that human liberation is impossible without a radical change in gender relations. As to Luxemburg, Fromm thought of her as a really developed human being, an example of human possibilities for the future. He also agreed with Dunayevskaya's point that this was so even though Luxemburg was not directly concerned with the "woman's question," as was her friend Clara Zetkin.<sup>68</sup> Fromm laments that he knew of no one still alive who knew Luxemburg personally, terming this an unfortunate rupture between the generations.]

\* \* \*

November 3, 1977

Dear EF,

Do hope you are well—don't you know Marxist-Humanists are opposed to sickness! Do take care of yourself—for you're too precious to us to get yourself hospitalized.

It was great to get your note on Rosa—though I have often disagreed with her, especially on her strange stance on national liberation struggles.<sup>69</sup> I have always felt that until male revolutionaries emancipate themselves we won't have a new humanist society—What's going on now in Mao's China is one more proof on how incomplete even social revolutions that leave out the sexual revolution have been.

All the best,

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

December 29, 1977

Dear EF,

It was great to hear from you [missing letter] that you are well and the New Year will start with new work by you. But please, *please* don't overdo, we need you whole!



Under separate cover I sent you my latest on Marx's *Capital* and Today's Global Crises<sup>70</sup> against all those who try to truncate it. This is one time I'm as proud of form as content. It is first time I designed cover by having Lenin's 16-point definition of dialectic [LCW 38, pp. 220–22] as background of Marx's head—not a picture—a genuine old engraving. As an amateur, what do you think?

Did you by any chance see Adelbert Reif recently? Suddenly not one word from him. German translation of *P&R* was to have come out last October, delayed till this year *then*, but I have had not one word. Happy New Year!

Yours,

Raya

\* \* \*

November 30, 1978

Dear EF:

How are you? I sure miss not hearing from you for so long a time, but I dare say that a good part of it is my fault, since I am so deep in the work on Rosa Luxemburg, and it is moving so slowly that I haven't had any free time whatever. As you can see from the enclosed galley proofs of a chapter in that work, I've suddenly plunged into anthropology as well, which is not what I intended to do. I felt that the discovery of Marx's Ethnological Notebooks<sup>71</sup> (which brings us up to four months before his death) are so very important in the reconsideration of how deep and total a revolution must be to uproot this alien, class society, that we actually should follow Marx's route in returning to that most fundamental relationship, Man/Woman. If you can take time out of your own work and write me a critique of the enclosed, I would greatly appreciate it.

Yours,

Raya

P.S. I don't know whether you are aware of the fact that Adelbert Reif is quite a faker. I do believe that *Philosophy and Revolution* will, after all these delays, finally be published in Spring 1979, but that belief is due only to the fact that I have confidence in the very fine translator, that Oskar Itzinger.<sup>72</sup> But Reif, himself, who showed such great interest that he also got my signa-

ture to bring out *Marxism and Freedom*, sent me a rubber check for confirming the contract. I felt compelled to cut off the agreement. I have not heard from him since, and all this has beclouded the relationship with Europa Verlag.

## NOTES

1. John O'Neill, review of Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution*, *Telos* No. 22 (Winter 1974–75), pp. 163–71; Jose Emilio Gonzalez, review of *Filosofia y revolucion*, in *Sin Nombre* (January–March 1975)—excerpts of the latter appeared in English under the title “Philosophy and Revolution: ‘Tempered with the Fire of Battle,’” *News & Letters* (October 1975).

2. Henry Clay Brokmeyer (1828–1906) and William Torrey Harris (1835–1909) were leading members of the St. Louis Hegelians, the first followers of Hegel in the U.S.

3. Susan E. Blow (1843–1916), St. Louis Hegelian and educator; James Putnam (1846–1920), first U.S. follower of Freud.

4. Dunayevskaya gave a series of lectures, “Women as Thinkers and as Revolutionaries,” at Detroit’s Wayne State University in fall 1975 (unpublished, but see Olga Domanski, “Summary of Six Lectures for International Women’s Year,” in Dunayevskaya, *Women’s Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution*, pp. 91–101). These lectures constituted a very early version of Dunayevskaya’s next book, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution* (1982, hereafter RLWLKM). Domanski served as Dunayevskaya’s secretary for many years and was also a key figure in *News & Letters*.

5. On de Beauvoir, see note 29 in Chapter 6. Sheila Rowbotham is a British feminist and the author of *Women, Resistance, and Revolution* (New York: Pantheon, 1972). A Marxist feminist, Maria Isabel Barreno (together with Maria Velho da Costa and Maria Teresa Horta) coauthored a feminist novel, *The Three Marias: New Portuguese Letters* (New York: Doubleday, 1975, orig. 1971). Their prosecution under the fascist regime for their “erotic” book—and the international campaign by feminists in response—helped touch off the Portuguese Revolution of 1974–75; discussed by Dunayevskaya in RLWLKM and WLDR.

6. In the first of her lectures, on working women, Dunayevskaya discussed the English “Maid’s Petition” of 1647, which had asked for a day off “every second Tuesday of the month.” The text of the petition is cited in Rowbotham, *Women, Resistance and Revolution*, pp. 15–16.

7. Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (1969).

8. Angela Davis, African-American philosopher and activist, was a leading member of the U.S. Communist Party during this period. She had been a student of Marcuse during the 1960s.

9. See notes 3 and 4.

10. Later published as Fromm, *To Have or to Be?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).

11. This quote had appeared in Fromm’s 1961 work, *Marx’s Concept of Man* (p. 46), in his long essay that begins the book, with a not too precise footnote indicating it was taken from Marx’s *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

12. Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism* (1845), MECW 4, pp. 3–211.

13. The full passage reads: “What a terrible illusion it is to have to recognize and sanction in the *rights of man* modern bourgeois society, the society of industry, of universal competition, of private interest freely pursuing its aims, of anarchy, of self-estranged [self-alienated] natural and spiritual individuality, and at the same time to want afterwards to annul the manifestations of this society in particular individuals and simultaneously to want to model the political head of that society in the manner of antiquity” (MECW 4, p. 122).

14. "Seventeenth century metaphysics, driven from the field by the French Enlightenment, notably by French materialism of the 18th century, experienced a victorious and substantial restoration in German philosophy, particularly in the speculative German philosophy of the 19th century," MECW 4, p. 125. "Seventeenth century metaphysics" refers to Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

15. Marx, *The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* (1841), in MECW 1.

16. In 1842, Marx wrote a number of articles for the liberal newspaper *Rheinische Zeitung*, becoming its editor-in-chief until he was forced out under Prussian government pressure the following year.

17. This could refer either to the Marx-Engels *Collected Works* (MECW), begun in 1975, or to the more extensive Marx-Engels *Gesamtausgabe*, also begun in that year and still ongoing.

18. Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, and edited by O'Malley (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, orig. 1843). While he taught at a Jesuit institution, Marquette University, O'Malley was not a Jesuit.

19. Arnold Ruge, Marx's friend at the time, edited *Anekdoten zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publizistik*, a collection of miscellaneous writings, in which Marx published two articles, "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction," and "Luther as Arbiter between Strauss and Feuerbach," in Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 67–95. In the same journal, of which only one volume appeared, Ludwig Feuerbach published "Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy," which influenced Marx's early writings.

20. Joseph O'Malley, editor's introduction to Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (p. xxviii).

21. Later discussed in the pamphlet, Terry Moon [Littman] and Ron Brokmeyer, *On the 100th Anniversary of the First General Strike in the U.S.* (Detroit: News and Letters, 1977).

22. The far right John Birch Society.

23. A reference to Marcuse's *Essay on Liberation* (1969).

24. See note 3 in Chapter 1.

25. Roman Rosdolsky (1898–1967), author of *The Making of Marx's 'Capital'*, trans. by Pete Burgess (London: Pluto Press, 1977, orig. 1968), one of the first major studies of Marx's *Grundrisse*. Rosdolsky, who also lived in Detroit after World War II, was actually linked more to orthodox Trotskyism (with its doctrine of defense of the Soviet Union) than to Stalinism.

26. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (1969).

27. SE refers to Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1995).

28. See July 16, 1975 Dunayevskaya letter to Fromm (this volume).

29. See note 6.

30. Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1972).

31. Fromm's reference is to Max Horkheimer, who in 1930 became director of the Frankfurt School.

32. Fromm here alludes to the term "critical theory," adopted by Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School in the 1930s to veil their Marxism.

33. This anti-Semitic barrier fell after the 1917 revolution.

34. Adolph Joffe (1883–1927), a close colleague of Trotsky and an early Soviet diplomat, committed suicide to protest Trotsky's expulsion from the Communist Party. Maria Mikhailovna Joffe (b. 1900) later published *One Long Night: A Tale of Truth*, trans. by Vera Dixon (London: New Park, 1978), an account of her imprisonment, where she discussed the well-organized strikes spearheaded by anti-Stalinist prisoners in the fall of 1936.

35. See note 4.

36. The Yiddish term *shep naches* can be translated as "receive joy." The Yiddish language itself is sometimes referred to as "Jewish," the literal meaning of the word "Yiddish."

37. Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 15.

38. Here Dunayevskaya draws an arrow pointing to an image in the postcard depicting a butterfly drinking the nectar of a flower.

39. Dr. Fernanda Navarro Solares (1941–2005), Mexican Marxist scholar who was at that time secretary and interpreter to Hortensia Bussi de Allende (1914–2009), widow of Chilean President Salvador Allende. Dunayevskaya's book appeared under the title *Marxismo y Libertad* (Mexico, D. F.: Juan Pablos Editor, 1976), with Alejandro Moran listed as the translator.

40. This indicated a change of focus for Dunayevskaya's next book, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982).

41. Fromm had earlier indicated that he would be able to write his introduction to the German edition of P&R by May 1976.

42. See summary of Fromm letter to Dunayevskaya, February 18, 1976 (this volume).

43. See Dunayevskaya letter to Fromm, March 14, 1976 (this volume).

44. A reference to Fromm's *To Have or to Be?*

45. Held annually in October.

46. Fromm's Foreword is reprinted in the appendix to this volume.

47. The title at that time of Dunayevskaya's next book, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982).

48. Dunayevskaya note: I'm forever carrying on dialogues "with" revolutionaries who are no longer alive, since I do not consider anyone dead whose thought remains our heritage to pursue and develop.

49. On Dunayevskaya's earlier critique of Luxemburg's *Accumulation of Capital* (1913), see note 58 in Chapter 2.

50. This International Socialist Congress, attended by representatives of Socialist parties from around the world, was held in Stuttgart in July 1907. In the name of internationalism, it famously passed a resolution on war that committed socialists to mobilize the workers against war and against their respective governments, should an imperialist war be declared. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, this pledge was widely broken, leading Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky and other left Marxists to declare the Socialist Second International dead.

51. See note 71 in Chapter 4.

52. A copy of Dunayevskaya's letter to Joe Hansen of the Socialist Workers Party was also sent to Marcuse (see Chapter 4 in this volume) and is therefore not reproduced here.

53. In fact, Europa Verlag did not publish the book until 1981, and without Fromm's Foreword.

54. See note 3 in Chapter 2.

55. See note 25.

56. Marcuse continued to work for the State Department until 1951.

57. Mao Zedong died on September 9, 1976. See Dunayevskaya, "Post-Mao China: What Now?" published in English in *New Essays* (Detroit: News & Letters, 1977). This essay was included in the Mexican (1976) and Italian (1977) editions of *Philosophy and Revolution*.

58. Dunayevskaya note: PS: In part, that is what the enclosures I sent you are essentially about. Perhaps, it escaped your attention since it was sealed in an inside envelope, marked "letter to Joe, to be returned," and it detailed, in a letter to SWP [Socialist Workers Party] that was more successful than I in prying loose from NSA [National Security Agency] my folder, how, since 1937–38 when I was with Trotsky in Mexico, and in 1943, when both State Dep. and Russian Embassy fought not to have *American Economic Review* publish my critique of the Russian revision of Marx's analysis of the law of value, all the way to this year when a friend in Berkeley was still being pursued because of my interviews with mainland Chinese refugees in Hong Kong.

59. In 1956, Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt, which had nationalized the Suez Canal, but were forced to withdraw under pressure from both the U.S. and Russia.

60. See note 71 in Chapter 4.

61. This refers to a missing letter from Fromm, enclosing the royalties for *Socialist Humanism*. Fromm had commissioned for *Socialist Humanism* (1965)—and then rejected—a contribution from the French Structuralist Marxist, Louis Althusser (1918–90), a harsh critic of both

the young Marx and Hegel. This incident was recounted by Althusser in *The Humanist Controversy and Other Essays* (London: Verso, 2003). Althusser's most important works were *For Marx* (1965), *Reading Capital* (with Étienne Balibar, 1965), and *Lenin and Philosophy* (1969).

62. Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. by Ben Brewster (New York: Vintage, 1970, orig. 1965), p. 35.

63. See note 42 in Chapter 4.

64. This letter of December 28, 1916 is translated in, *The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg*, edited by Stephen Eric Bronner (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 170–73. Mathilde Wurm (1874–1934) was a German left-wing socialist and feminist.

65. Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1968).

66. See note 75 in Chapter 4.

67. Dunayevskaya's pamphlet, *Sexism, Politics and Revolution in Mao's China* (Detroit: News and Letters, 1977) was later reprinted in *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (1985). It discusses the sidelining of Mao's widow, Chiang Ch'ing (also transliterated as Jiang Qing, 1914–91), in the succession struggle after Mao's death.

68. Clara Zetkin (1857–1933), close friend of Luxemburg, longtime leader of the German Social Democratic women's movement, and the editor of *Gleichheit* [Equality], the mass circulation women's newspaper. Later joined the Spartacist group and then the German Communist Party.

69. See note 55 in Chapter 2.

70. Dunayevskaya, *Marx's Capital and Today's Global Crisis* (Detroit: News and Letters, 1978).

71. Dunayevskaya refers to a very early draft chapter of *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982). The draft chapter was in galley form prior to its publication under the title of "Marx's and Engels' Studies Contrasted: The Relationship of Philosophy and Revolution to Women's Liberation," *News & Letters* (Jan.–Feb. 1979), later reprinted as Ch. 24 of *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (1985). Dunayevskaya's draft chapter centered on differences between, on the one hand, Engels's *Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884) and those Marxists who had followed him on gender, and on the other hand, the 1880–82 notebooks by Marx that Engels claimed as his inspiration, which had been finally published: *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*. (Studies of Morgan, Phear, Maine, Lubbock), transcribed, edited and introduced by Lawrence Krader (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972).

72. In fact, it appeared still later: Dunayevskaya, *Algebra der Revolution* (1981).



# Appendix

## MARCUSE'S PREFACE TO DUNAYEVSKAYA'S *MARXISM AND FREEDOM* (1958)

The reexamination of Marxian theory is one of the most urgent tasks for comprehending the contemporary situation. Perhaps no other theory has so accurately anticipated the basic tendencies of late industrial society—and apparently drawn such incorrect conclusions from its analysis. While the economic and political development of twentieth-century capitalism shows many of the features which Marx derived from the inherent contradictions of the system, these contradictions did not explode in the final crisis; the “era of imperialism” has seen an intercontinental re-grouping but also an intercontinental stabilization of the Western world—in spite of or because of a “permanent war economy.” And while the socialist revolution was prepared and began under the guidance of rigidly Marxist conceptions, the subsequent construction of socialism in the communist orbit exhibits hardly any of the substance of the Marxian idea. However, for the reexamination of Marxian theory, nothing is accomplished by merely pointing up the contrast between reality and the Marxian “predictions.” Inasmuch as Marx’s and Engels’s notion of the development of mature capitalism and of the transition to socialism was elaborated prior to the stage at which its “verification” was envisaged, Marxian theory may be said to imply predictions. But the essential character of this theory denies such designation. Marxian theory is an interpretation of history and defines, on the basis of this interpretation, the political action which, using the given historical possibilities, can establish a society without exploitation, misery, and injustice. Thus, in its conceptual

structure as well as in its political practice, Marxian theory must “respond” to the historical reality in process: *modification* of the theoretical concepts and of the political practice to be guided by them is part of the theory itself.

However, if such modifications were merely added to the original conception in order to correct it under the impact of new, unexpected facts, the theoretical structure itself would be destroyed. The latter is retained only if the modifications themselves are derived from the original conception, as the historical alternatives inherent in it. The modifications must be demonstrably related to the theoretical basis, that is, to the dialectical-materialistic concept of industrial society. This concept unifies the various layers of Marxian theory: the most general philosophical as well as the most specific economic categories, the doctrine as well as the political action of Marxism must be validated by it.

Failure to elucidate the function and the full content of dialectical materialism has marred much of the Marxist and non-Marxist discussion of Marxian theory. With some notable exceptions (such as Georg Lukács’s *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* and the more recent French reexaminations of Marxism), dialectical materialism was minimized as a disturbing “metaphysical rest” in Marxian theory, or formalized into a technical method, or schematized into a *Weltanschauung*. Raya Dunayevskaya’s book discards these and similar distortions and tries to recapture the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy.

It has often been emphasized that Marx’s philosophical writings which preceded the *Critique of Political Economy* prepared the ground for Marxian economics and politics. After a long period of oblivion or neglect, these philosophical writings became the focus of attention in the twenties, especially after the first publication of the full text of the *German Ideology* and of the *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts*. However, the inner identity of the philosophical with the economic and political “stage” of Marxian theory was not elucidated (and perhaps could not be adequately elucidated because a most decisive link was still missing, namely, the *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie* of 1857-1858, first published in 1939 and 1941). Dunayevskaya’s book goes beyond the previous interpretations. It shows not only that Marxian economics and politics are throughout philosophy, but that the latter is from the beginning economics and politics. Marxian theory emerges and develops under the impact of the historical dialectic which it expounds. The starting point is the comprehended situation of capitalist society. Its “notion” derives from the philosophical insight into the capitalist economy: this society creates the preconditions for a free and rational human existence while precluding the realization of freedom and reason. In other words (since the prevalent abuse of the word “freedom” all but prohibits the



use of the term), Marx holds that capitalist society creates the preconditions for an existence without toil, poverty, injustice, and anxiety while perpetuating toil, poverty, injustice, and anxiety.

The “value” of such a goal is not questioned by Marx. He accepts “humanism” not as a philosophy among others but as a historical fact or rather historical possibility; the societal conditions for the realization of the “all-round individual” can be established by changing the established societal conditions which prevent this realization. He accepts the “value” of a humane society (socialism) as standard for thought and action as one accepts the value of health as standard for the diagnosis and treatment of a disease. Marxian theory does not describe and analyze the capitalist economy “in itself and for itself” but describes and analyzes it in terms of another than itself—in terms of the historical possibilities which have become realistic goals for action. As *critical* theory, Marxism is two-dimensional throughout: measuring the prevailing society against its own, objective-historical potentialities and capabilities. This two-dimensional character manifests itself in the union of philosophy and political economy: Marxian philosophy is critique of political economy, and every one of the economic categories is a philosophical category. This union is well brought out in Dunayevskaya’s discussion of *Capital*, which shows that the most technical economic analyses of the process of production and circulation are just as firmly committed to the humanistic philosophy as are the critique of Hegel and the theses on Feuerbach.

Once the humanistic idea is seen not merely as origin and end but as the very substance of Marxian theory, the deep-rooted anarchistic and libertarian elements of Marxian theory come to light. Socialism fulfills itself not in the emancipation and organization of labor, but in its “abolition.” As long as man’s struggle with nature requires human toil for procuring the necessities of life, all that can be attained in this sphere is a truly rational societal organization of labor. Its establishment at the stage of advanced industrialism is “only” a political problem. For Marx, it is to be solved by a revolution which brings the productive process under the collective control of the “immediate producers.” But this is not freedom. Freedom is living without toil, without anxiety: the play of human faculties. The realization of freedom is a problem of *time*: reduction of the working day to the minimum which turns quantity into quality. A socialist society is a society in which free time, not labor time is the social measure of wealth and the dimension of the individual existence:

The true economy—saving—consists in the saving of labor time . . . ; but this saving is identical with the development of productivity. Therefore certainly not *renunciation of enjoyment*, but development of power, of the faculties of production and thus of the faculties as well as the means of enjoyment. The

faculty of enjoyment is the condition for enjoyment, consequently the primary means for enjoyment. And this faculty is development of individual ability, productivity. Saving of labor time is increase of free time, i.e., time for the full development of the individual. This is the greatest productive force, which in turn reacts upon the productivity of labor. . . . It is evident that labor time cannot remain in abstract opposition to free time—as it appears from the point of view of bourgeois economics. Labor cannot become play. . . . Free time—which is leisure time as well as time for higher activity—transforms its possessor into a different subject.<sup>1</sup>

This is the image of a society in which the individual's "occupation" is the shaping of his free time as his own time, while the process of material production, organized and controlled by free individuals, creates the conditions and means for the exercise of their freedom for "enjoyment."

If socialism is conditional upon a reduction of "merely necessary" labor to such an extent as to reverse the relationship between labor time and free time, between earning a living and living—in other words, if free time is to be the content of the individual existence, then socialism is conditional upon advanced industrial production with the highest possible degree of mechanization. Therefore the Marxian concept of the socialist revolution as the final event of mature capitalism. But the relation between socialism and advanced industrialism is not merely a technical-economic one. It involves the development of those human faculties which make for the free (in Marx's words—the "all-round") individual, especially the development of "consciousness." In Marxian theory, the term has a specific connotation, namely, awareness of the given potentialities of society and of their distortion and suppression, or, awareness of the difference between the immediate and the real interest. Consciousness is thus *revolutionary* consciousness, expressing the "determinate negation" of the established society, and as such proletarian consciousness. The development of consciousness in this sense requires institutionalized civil and political rights—freedom of speech, assembly, organization, freedom of the press, etc., to the extent to which the mature capitalist society can afford them. The Marxian insistence on democracy as the preparatory stage of socialism, far from being a cloak or "Aesopian language," pertains to the basic conception and is not minimized by the equally strong insistence on the difference between "bourgeois" and socialist democracy.

The historical dialectic which joins theory and practice, philosophy and political economy, also joins capitalism and socialism. The unifying force is, as Dunayevskaya reiterates, not that of a dogmatic system but that of the comprehended historical dynamic. But then, the development of Marxism itself, in theory and in practice, is subject to this dynamic. Social Democracy on the one side, Leninism and Stalinism on the other, must then be discussed in terms of the historical interplay between theory and reality. The last parts of Dunayevskaya's analysis are devoted to this discussion.

The key for the understanding of the development of Marxism since about the turn of the century is the transformation of “free” into organized capitalism on an international scale, its economic and political stabilization, and the ensuing increase in the standard of living. This transformation affected the laboring classes of the advanced industrial countries in a decisive way. Under the leadership of their successful bureaucracy, the situation of a major part of these classes changed from one of “absolute negation” to one of affirmation of the established system. With the reduction of the revolutionary potential in the West, socialism was losing its classical historical agent and area and was subsequently constructed in the backward areas of the East in a way essentially alien to the Marxian conception. The growth of the communist orbit in turn welded the capitalist countries closer together and created a firmer basis for stabilization and internal unification. Neither wars nor depressions nor inflations nor deflations have arrested this trend. It presents the greatest challenge to Marxist theory and to the Marxist evaluation of contemporary communism.

To meet the challenge, Dunayevskaya uses the full arsenal of the concepts which she had assembled in her interpretation of Marxian theory in the first parts of her book. While the author of this Preface agrees in all essentials with the theoretical interpretation of the Marxian *oeuvre* in these first parts, he disagrees with some decisive parts of the analysis of post-Marxian developments, especially with that of the relationship between Leninism and Stalinism, of the recent upheavals in Eastern Europe, and, perhaps most important, with the analysis of the contemporary position, structure and consciousness of the laboring classes. Marx’s concept of the proletariat as “revolutionary class in-itself (an sich)” did not designate a merely occupational group, i.e., the wage earners engaged in the material production—as a truly dialectical concept, it was at one and the same time an economic, political, and philosophical category. As such it comprised three main elements—(1) the specific societal mode of production characteristic of “free” capitalism, (2) the existential and political conditions brought about by this mode of production, (3) the political consciousness developed in this situation. Any historical change in even one of these elements (and such a change has certainly occurred) would require a thorough theoretical modification. Without such modification, the Marxian notion of the working class seems to be applicable neither to the majority of the laboring classes in the West nor to that in the communist orbit.

July 1957

DUNAYEVSKAYA'S REVIEW OF MARCUSE'S *SOVIET MARXISM*  
(1961)

[Originally appeared under the title, "Intellectuals in the Age of State Capitalism," *News & Letters* (June-July and Aug.-Sept. 1961)]

We live in an age of state capitalism which, at one end, Russia, persists in calling itself "Communist," and at the other end, America, still designates itself as "free enterprise." Not only are the conditions of production hardly distinguishable from each other, however, but so is the administrative mentality of the intellectuals at both poles of world capital. As befits one who chooses to defend the American side, a Daniel Bell will speak of "The End of Ideology" to mark the alleged end of a "proletarian cause." As befits one who chooses to whitewash the other power, an Isaac Deutscher will proclaim the near-identity of interests of the proletariat and the Russian state.

*In each case the scholarship of the writer gets sucked into the veritable conspiracy between the two nuclear titans to force an identity between those two opposites, Marxism and Communism, although Marxism is a theory of liberation from capitalism while Communism is the practice of state capitalist enslavement. While, in origin, the administrative mentality dates back to the 1929 world crash that signaled the end of rationality of capitalist production relations, it is only with the nuclear age that the administrative mentality became the all-pervasive phenomenon it is now.*

Take the Hegelian-Marxist philosopher, Herbert Marcuse. In the 1940s he produced the profound study, "Reason and Revolution," which established a continuity of analysis by the young and mature Marx which went beyond the economics of production to the human relations. In the 1950s, however, he was impelled to the fantastic notion of establishing a "continuity" between Marxism and Stalinism.

**Herbert Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism*<sup>2</sup>**

Prof. Marcuse begins reaching for this feat with the very title of his book. While "Soviet" stands for councils of workers and peasants that achieved the Russian Revolution, and now exists in name only, the use of the word allows the author to cover Stalin with the same mantle as Lenin. At the same time the loose use of the word, Marxism, for the entire post-Marxist period makes it possible for Prof. Marcuse to straddle the historic fence.

We feel impelled to review the book now since it has just been published in a new paperback edition which, quite obviously, aims at a popular audience. Without explanation, this new edition leaves out the original introduction which explained his method of analysis as an "immanent critique." That

stated “The critique thus employs the conceptual instrument of its object, namely, Marxism, in order to clarify the actual function of Marxism in Soviet society and its historical direction.” (p. 1).

Furthermore, “the immanent critique,” we were assured, can give us the “cue” not only to the causes of the “theoretical deficiencies,” but also the “objective trends and tendencies which are operative in history and which make up the inherent rationality . . .” (p. 1) At least these are Prof. Marcuse’s assumptions.

*There is no end to the magical qualities of that instrument, “the immanent critique”: “For what is irrational if measured from without the system is rational within the system” (p. 86). This writer cannot guarantee that the irrational can appear rational anywhere outside of a madhouse, but Prof. Marcuse has not only undertaken that feat, but also its opposite, that of endowing the rational with irrational features.*

### “The New Rationality”

Although Prof. Marcuse admits that “Neither the rise of the Soviet intelligentsia as a new ruling group, nor its composition and its privileges are any longer disputed facts . . .” (p. 107) he nevertheless dubs the totalitarian, state-capitalist society of Russia as “The New Rationality.”

The reader must restrain his interest in motivation, and judge the author only by what he holds to be “the truth”: (1) Marx’s concept of the revolutionary nature of the proletariat is supposed to have “exploded” (p. 13) at the point of transition from capitalism to socialism, that is to say, the October Revolution. On the other hand, Soviet Marxism’s hypostatization of that tenet into a ritual (p. 91) is judged to be nothing short of “an instrument for rescuing the truth.” (p. 88)

The resulting play on words beggars rational description: “it (Soviet Marxism) is not ‘false consciousness’ but rather consciousness of falsehood, a falsehood which is ‘corrected’ in the context of the ‘higher truth’ represented by objective historical interest” (p. 91) *And, of course, when all else fails, an intellectual can always blame “the backward population”: “The new form of Marxian theory corresponds to its new historical agent—a backward population which is to become what it ‘really’ is: a revolutionary force which changes the world.” (p. 89)*

(2) Lenin’s attempt to confront the post-Marxist phenomenon of imperialism by “redefining” capitalism, and attempting “to draw the peasantry into the orbit of Marxian theory and strategy” [p. 29] is alleged to have suffered from “The refusal to draw theoretical consequences from the new situation” (p. 30). This, Prof. Marcuse concludes, “characterizes the entire development of Leninism and is one of the chief reasons for the gap between theory and practice in Soviet Marxism.” (p. 30)

Not only is the unbridgeable gulf between Marxism and present-day Russian Communism blamed on the “theoretical deficiencies” of Lenin, the latter is made the author of the one original contribution of Stalin—the theory of “socialism in one country.” Prof. Marcuse does not even bother to tell us that that is what he is doing; he merely quotes the one or two isolated statements as if these had never been called into question and that Stalin built on that. There is not a single reference to the voluminous writings of Leon Trotsky precisely on that one point over which so much blood flowed between Stalinism and Trotskyism over the meaning of Leninism.

Quotations out of context from Vol. IX of Lenin’s “Selected Works” are used “to prove” that Lenin was for industrialization “without liberation.” Nothing is said about Lenin actually inventing words to describe how “mortally sick” he was of “Communlies” (Communist lies.) Yet this is in that same profound Vol. IX (p. 346). As Lenin warned there: “History proceeds in devious ways . . . (Soviet state) has taken the road that will lead to the ordinary bourgeois state.”

(3) While none of Lenin’s castigation of the Communists’ “passion for bossing” now that they had power comes through in Prof. Marcuse’s “Soviet Marxism,” Stalin comes off with fairly clean hands. Even the reign of terror is very nearly justified: “The height of Stalinist terror coincided with the consolidation of the Hitler regime.” (p. 75)

This, in this writer’s view, is an inaccuracy. The height of Stalin’s terror came during the First Five Year Plan which began with the expulsion of the Left Opposition and the exile of Leon Trotsky, and ended with forced collectivization, the institution of forced labor camps, the ruin of millions of human beings who, in turn, slaughtered thousands of heads of cattle and brought such havoc an the countryside and actual famine conditions that the whole regime nearly collapsed. At the same time Stalin’s international policies did nothing to stop the coming of fascism. Insofar, however, as the Stalin period was one continuous reign of terror one could, in truth, designate very nearly any year as “the height of terror.”

*Obviously Prof. Marcuse prefers to substitute for the years, 1930–33, the period of 1936–39. But in that case the “immanent critique” must come face to face with the Stalin–Hitler Pact as something inherent in, not “outside of” Russia. But there is no time for a critique when the overriding compulsion is “to prove” the thesis stated in the Introduction (missing from the 1961 edition): “There is theoretical continuity from the early Marxian notion of the Proletariat as objective truth of capitalist society to Soviet Marxist conception of partinost (partisanship).” (p. 9)*

## The Party, The Party

The loose translation of the word, *partinost*, party-ism, as “partisanship” is inexcusable in the crucial content of the Stalinist concept of the Party, the Party, which is alleged to be synonymous with Marx’s concept of the proletariat as the gravedigger of capitalist society. To the extent that Marx developed any concept of a proletarian party it was, (and Prof. Marcuse admits this) of a party as the *self-organization* of the proletariat. The proletariat was the historic force which would establish “an association of free men.” Under the circumstances how could Marcuse become party to the Stalinist sleight of hand substitution of their monolithic monstrosity for “the self-organization of the proletariat?” *Yet this is the inescapable consequence of this method of blaming everybody—Marx, Lenin, the proletariat, above all, the proletariat—in order to avoid facing the reality of the new stage of world capitalism—state-capitalism—which manifested itself first on the historical stage in the Stalinist counter-revolution in Russia.*

No wonder the promise of the “immanent critique” to reveal “the historic direction” just “perished,” to use a Hegelian phrase, in the explosive contradictions of the new rationality. The reader of the new as of the old edition must be content with the last paragraph: “Ideological pressure there seems to tend in the same direction as technical-economic pressure, namely, toward the relaxation of repression . . . these forces, though unformed and unorganized, may well determine, to a considerable extent, the course of Soviet developments.”

Truly the mountain has labored and given birth to . . .

## The Flexible Dialectic

Although Prof. Marcuse admitted that “The difference between the first years of the Bolshevik Revolution and the fully developed Stalinist state are obvious” (p. 74), he has refused to admit that Stalinism, far from being a “continuation” of Marxism-Leninism is a break from it.<sup>3</sup> Indeed he puts the word, break, in quotation marks, and explains: “But if the dialectical law of turn from quantity to quality was ever applicable, it was the transition from Leninism (after the October Revolution) to Stalinism.” (p. 74)<sup>4</sup>

Obviously, Prof. Marcuse has been greatly influenced by the irrational becoming rational “within” a certain context. Here he is doing nothing less magical than equating *counter-revolution* with revolution!

Nothing can stop him now. He concludes the one chapter (“Dialectic and its Vicissitudes”) which still shines with some fine Hegelian-Marxian perceptions with this astounding statement: “The Soviet Marxist ‘revision’ is ‘orthodox.’ Since Soviet Marxists maintain that Soviet society is a socialist

society, they consistently invest it with the corresponding dialectical characteristics. What is involved is not so much a revision of dialectic as the claim of socialism for a non-socialist society.” (p. 154)

*In a word, all that is wrong are—the facts! Prof. Marcuse might at least have remembered what Hegel called the method of assuming what one should prove. The word was “barbarous.” The method hasn’t improved with age. Barbarous it is.*

Jean-Paul Sartre has recently (“Critique of Dialectical Reason”) shown anew that which has long characterized Existentialism—that all is fair not only in war and love, but also in the use to which the dialectic is put. But even a Sartre had to separate himself from Russia’s brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, and hail the Hungarian Freedom Fighters for breaking loose from all brainwashing. Not so Marcuse. So organic is his conception of the backwardness of the proletariat that, where he does admit that Russian rulers have “arrested” the dialectic in its classical Marxist sense of liberating “the subjective factor,” he concludes that “the ruled tend not only to submit to the rulers but also to reproduce in themselves their subordination.” (p. 191)

### **The Majesty of “The Ruled”**

This vilification of the masses appears nearly a decade after the forced laborers struck in Vorkuta inside Russia itself, following the June 17, 1953 East German Revolt against Russian imperialistic rule there, and 5 years after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 had demonstrated for all the world, even “the learned,” to see that the courage, the fortitude, the humanism of “the ruled” can break through not only Russian brainwashing but Russian steel tanks!

Though the ivory towers remain impervious to the self-activity of the masses, the majesty of “the ruled” beckons for all to join their life-and-death struggles for freedom.

#### DUNAYEVSKAYA’S REVIEW OF MARCUSE’S ONE- DIMENSIONAL MAN (1965)

[Originally appeared under the title “Reason and Revolution vs. Conformism and Technology,” *The Activist* (Oberlin) No. 11 (Jan. 1965), pp. 32–34]

Professor Marcuse’s new and highly original book, *One-Dimensional Man*, is not, as the title might suggest, just one more journalists work on the alienation of modern man. Again, despite its subtitle, “Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society,” Professor Marcuse, far from limiting his study to that of ideology, tries to go to the root of positivistic one-dimension-



al philosophy in the automated productive process itself. Indeed, in his attempt to restore the great power of “negative thinking,” and to center attention on the dialectical development in the objective world, as well as in the field of thought, Marcuse “subverts” conformism both in being and in thought. In his introduction, entitled “The Paralysis of Criticism: Society Without Opposition,” he states his aim modestly enough: “My analysis is focused on tendencies in the most highly developed contemporary societies . . . I am projecting these tendencies and I offer some hypotheses, nothing more.” Nevertheless, no one who has read the book can put it aside without hearing a ringing challenge to thought to live up to a historical commitment to transform “technological rationality” into a truly real, rational, free society.

A dualism, however, pervades the book’s three major parts: “One Dimensional Society,” “One-Dimensional Thought,” and “The Chance of the Alternatives.” On the one hand, the author is weighted down by full awareness that the transformation of reality cannot be achieved in thought; it must be consummated in practice: “In other words, society would be rational and free to the extent to which it is organized, sustained, and reproduced by an essentially new historical Subject.” (p. 252) On the other hand, Professor Marcuse stresses over and over again, the *totality* of the conditions that “militate against the emergence of a new Subject.” (p. 252) His pessimism is not merely psychological; it is deeply rooted in his concept of “technological rationality,” in his attitude that the proletariat has not lived up to its historic task, in his questioning, where not rejecting outright Marx’s concept of the proletariat as the “Subject” that would negate “the advanced industrial society.” No wonder that Marcuse’s studies were developed outside of the range of workers’ voices opposing the one-dimensional condition of automated labor.

There is one single exception to this pervasive condition of Professor Marcuse’s book: worker’s pamphlet, *Workers Battle Automation* by Charles Denby, who happens at the same time to be the editor of *News & Letters*, to which Marcuse likewise refers in the Introduction. In referring, however, to the inhuman labor conditions Denby describes, Professor Marcuse not only stresses that “this form of drudgery is expressive of *arrested, partial* automation” (p. 25), but he leaves out entirely the central point of the pamphlet, the *division* between the rank and file and the labor leadership in their attitudes toward Automation. Had Marcuse not followed his reference to the pamphlet by many references to bourgeois studies which maintain the exact opposite—that “the organized worker . . . is being incorporated into the technological community to the administered population” (p. 26), that labor and management alike have become part of a “technological rationality”—the absence of

any illustrations of a division *within* labor could have been dismissed as irrelevant to the development of Marcuse's thesis. But this is not the case. Quite the contrary.

To demonstrate that there are no negative forces, at least none that challenge the new forms of totalitarian administrative control, Professor Marcuse marshals quotations from Charles R. Walker's study, *Toward the Automatic Factory*, to the effect that the workers themselves allegedly "desire to join actively in applying their own brains to technical and production problems which clearly fitted in with the technology" (p. 30); he cites Jean-Paul Sartre to demonstrate his own point as to the manner in which "The machine process in the technological universe breaks the innermost privacy of freedom and joins sexuality and labor in one unconscious, rhythmic automation—a process which parallels the assimilation of jobs." (p. 27) No less than forty-one footnotes in this one sub-section, entitled "The Closing of the Political Universe," go to prove that "in the most successful areas of automation, some sort of technological community seems to integrate the human atoms at work" (p. 26) so that "Domination is transfigured into administration" (p. 32) and "containment of social change" (pages 22–48) is effected.

It should not be necessary to add that it is not a question of the veracity of any scholars, least of all that of Professor Marcuse. It is a question of the voices one hears, the sights one sees, the feelings one experiences depending on which side of the production line you stand. In the case of Marcuse, the failure to hear this powerful oppositional voice at the point of production itself, has led to the view that the new forms of control have indeed succeeded in containing workers' revolt, to the point of so transforming the antagonistic structure of modern industrial society that "A comfortable, smooth reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails . . ." (p. 1) without opposition.

To this reviewer, the brilliance of Marcuse's analysis rests rather, in the sections dealing with thought, literature, and Beat ways of protest. Listen, for example to this: "The reign of such a one-dimensional reality does not mean that materialism rules, and that the spiritual, metaphysical and bohemian occupations are petering out. On the contrary, there is a great deal of 'Worship together this week,' 'Why not try God,' Zen, existentialism, and beat ways of life, etc. But such moles of protest and transcendence are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer negative. They are rather the ceremonial part of practical behaviorism, its harmless negation and are quickly digested by the status quo as part of its healthy diet." (p. 14) Professor Marcuse further demonstrates that the one-dimensional thought which is "systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information" is by no means limited to the United States, although that is the main focus of his study. This totalitarian logic of accomplished facts

has its Eastern counterpart," he writes. "There, freedom is the way of life instituted by a communist regime and all other transcending modes of freedom are either capitalistic, or revisionist, or leftist sectarianism." (p. 14)

What Marcuse calls "the language of total administration" shows itself forth nowhere more tragically, and yet hilariously, than "in productive union . . . of the Welfare State and the Warfare State." (p. 19) Its end result is the "institutionalized desublimation . . . achieved by the one-dimensional society." (p. 79) Marcuse then describes the ghoulish nuclear war games simulated a la instructions by the "Game Director" of the Rand Corporation: "The rockets are rattling, the H-bomb is waiting, and the space flights are flying, and the problem is 'how to guard the nation and the free world.' It is comforting to hear that the game had been played since 1961 at RAND 'down in our labyrinthine basement—somewhere under the Snack Bar.' . . . Obviously, in the realm of the Happy Consciousness, guilt feeling has no place, and the calculus takes care of conscience" (pp. 81, 82)

It becomes clear that, taken as a whole, *One-Dimensional Man* tries to synthesize philosophy, economics and literature—indeed, the whole realm of culture (linguistics included)—with the categories of experience. That is to say, instead of relating economic structure to "ideology," or false consciousness" (in the strictly Marxian meaning), as substance and manifestation, Professor Marcuse wishes to deal with epistemology, with the whole theory of knowledge and its categories. Toward that end, he proceeds from the "One-Dimensional Society," which occupies nearly a half of the book, and which already has analyzed the superstructure as well as the structure of society, directly to "One-Dimensional Thought," which focuses on modern philosophy separately.

We had already been introduced to the emergent pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior: "The trend may be related to a development in scientific method: operationalism in the physical, behaviorism in the social sciences." (p. 12) Now Marcuse restates his critique within the process of the development of philosophic thought itself from its origins, in the dialectics of Plato to the science of Whitehead and the absurdities of Wittgenstein. "The totalitarian universe of technological rationality is the latest transmutation of the idea of Reason . . . the process by which logic becomes the logic of domination." (p. 123) As against this, dialectics would reveal the true antagonistic structure of reality and of thought trying to grasp this reality: "If man has learned to see and know what really *is*, he will act in accordance with truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics and ethics epistemology. . . . To the extent to which the experience of an antagonistic world guides the development of the philosophical categories, philosophy moves in a universe which is broken in itself (*déchirement ontologique*)—two-dimensional. Appearance

and reality, untruth and truth (and, as we shall see, unfreedom and freedom) are ontological conditions. . . . Philosophy originates in dialectics: its universe of discourse responds to the facts of an antagonistic reality.” (p. 125)

Professor Marcuse presumes a goodly amount of knowledge on the part of his readers. But it appears to this reviewer that this part is especially important to the college students daily exposed to (if not brainwashed by) the pragmatist, vulgarly empiric, positivistic, not to mention the success philosophies of the day. As against Wittgenstein’s language games, where ordinary language “is really sterilized and anesthetized” (p. 198), and as against “pure” science, science without telos, Marcuse does appeal to the transcendent view, but from first to last, he stresses that his critical theory is “opposed to all metaphysics by virtue of the rigorously historical character of the transcendence.” (p. xi) The transcendent is not in heaven, but on earth: the historic is *transitory, human, actual* as against only the potential and inherent. It is precisely, however, when Marcuse reaches the stage of freedom where he once again questions Marx’s concept of the proletariat as the liberating force, and where pessimism once again overcomes his view of “The Chance of the Alternatives” which forms the last part of his work. He thus returns to what he stated at the beginning, which was very nearly a built-in presupposition: “Today’s fight against this historical alternative [Marx’s concept of the “abolition of labor,” RD] finds a firm mass basis in the underlying population and finds its ideology in the rigid orientation of thought and behavior to the given universe of facts. Validated by the accomplishments of science and technology, justified by its growing productivity, the status quo defies all transcendence.” (p. 17)

Two elements—one from theory, and from the objective world—save the critical philosophy that Professor Marcuse expounds. One is that the critical theory refuses to abdicate and leave the field “to an empirical sociology which, freed from all theoretical guidance except a methodological one, succumbs to the fallacies of misplaced concreteness” (p. 254). If even the philosopher should see only the hopeless, Marcuse maintains, he would nevertheless, wish “to remain loyal to those who, without hope, have given and give their life to the Great Refusal.” (p. 257)

The other moment of hope is of much greater import since it is both objective and subjective and has the *force* to undermine the status quo: “underneath the conservative popular basis is the substratum of the outcasts, and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable . . . their opposition is revolutionary even if, their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system: it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game.” (pp. 256–57)

There are those who think that the time for the all-dimensional man passed with the Renaissance. There are others, like this reviewer, who think his time is first coming. And there are the conformists whose total indifference to discussion of anything pluri-dimensional is likely to bury *One-Dimensional Man* without ever getting a serious dialogue around it started in the academic world. I trust the youth will not let this happen. Thereby they will become part of history-in-the-making in the realm of thought.

FROMM'S FOREWORD TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF  
DUNAYEVSKAYA'S *PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION* (CIRCA  
1976)

[First published as a Preface to *Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre, and from Marx to Mao* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. xxi–xxii]

Few thought systems have been as distorted and sometimes even turned into their opposite as that of Karl Marx. The great conservative political economist Joseph Schumpeter once expressed this distortion with a hypothetical analogy: if one had discovered Europe at the time of the Inquisition, and had surmised from that that the Inquisition reflected the spirit of the Gospels, then one would have behaved as those who see the ideas of Marx expressed in Soviet Communism.

If this distortion were only to be found among opponents of Marxism, that would scarcely be surprising. The amazing thing is that it emanates from his “proponents,” who convince the rest of the world that their ideology expresses the ideas of Marx. Thus it has finally come to the point that in North America and Europe, so effective has Soviet propaganda become, that one not only believes that one sees the realization of socialism in the Soviet system, but also that one is dealing with a revolutionary state which aims at world revolution, instead of with a bureaucratic reactionary form of state-capitalism.

Marx's ideas can only be understood if one knows at least the fundamentals of Hegelian philosophy. But only a very few people know them even approximately, and in the best situation take only a couple of slogans as substitutes for genuine knowledge. And what is the situation with the followers of Marx who speak in his name and who make a more serious claim than Stalin: Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, or even the “outsider” Sartre? There is little that will aid an objective understanding of this question; most of what can be read about it is biased according to the political views of the author.

All of this results in the fact that individuals who want to get an idea of the theories which influence a great part of the world today have great difficulties forming a correct image.

Raya Dunayevskaya is unusually qualified to fill this gap in our knowledge. Not only because of her great knowledge and competence in this area—these qualities alone are rare, but not unique—and not only because of her incorruptible objectivity which is the characteristic of every scholar, or should be. What, however, is far rarer is the fact that within herself she combines this objectivity with a passionate political attitude—a passion which, at the same time, is not irrational and not fanatical. But the important factor is, perhaps, that the author is permeated by the conviction that socialism and freedom are indivisibly united, and can only exist together. She is a radical Humanist who deeply believes that the betterment of the welfare of all humanity can be achieved without the loss of individual freedom, through a new Humanism.

This book is much enriched by discussion of the African revolutions, the East European revolts, the youth movement, and the Women's Liberation Movement.

For everyone who is seriously interested in the forces which form—and deform—the present and the future, this book is to be most warmly recommended.

#### DUNAYEVSKAYA'S "IN MEMORIAM" TO MARCUSE (1979)

[Originally appeared under the title, "Herbert Marcuse, Marxist Philosopher," *News & Letters* (Aug.–Sept. 1979)]

The death of Herbert Marcuse on July 29 marks a sad day on the historic calendar of young revolutionaries as well as old Marxists. How great is the void death has created can be gauged from his mature life-span which covered the 1919 German Revolution, the U.S. New Left in the mid-1960s, to the very month of his death in Germany—the country of his birth, the land of both Hegel and Marx—where he was preparing a paper on "The Holocaust" to be delivered both there and in Spain. Marcuse's life-span was by no means one upward spiral. But the fact that the mass media, in their obituaries, choose to dwell on his *One-Dimensional Man*, as if that were the focal point of his life, tells a great deal more about decadent capitalism than it does about Herbert Marcuse.

The truth is that, as a young man completing his military service in Germany, he was active in the revolutionary Soldiers' Council in Berlin. Marx's philosophy of liberation and the revolutionaries, Rosa Luxemburg-

Karl Liebknecht, were the real determinants of Marcuse's life. It is true that when the Social Democracy beheaded that 1919 revolution and Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were murdered, Marcuse left political activism for the study of philosophy. It is not true that he wavered in his commitment to Marxism.

In the very period when he wrote his first major work, *Hegel's Ontology and the Foundation of a Theory of History*, which still bore the traces of his teacher, Heidegger, he penned what remains to this day one of the most profound analyses<sup>5</sup> of *Marx's Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, which had just then (1932) been published in Germany. Not only does Marcuse there call Marx's early essays the "philosophical foundation of a theory of revolution," but he adds presciently for our times:

All attempts to dismiss the philosophical content of Marx's theory or to gloss over it in embarrassment reveal a complete failure to recognize the historical origin of the theory: they set out from an essential separation of philosophy, economics and revolutionary praxis, which is a product of the reification against which Marx fought and which he had already overcome at the beginning of his critique (p. 10).

Just as the bourgeois press is trying to reduce the historic legacy of Marcuse to the writing of *One-Dimensional Man* (to which I'll return later), so the Stalinists and Maoists did everything to slander Marcuse in the 1960s when, by no means a youth, he nevertheless identified with the New Left in the anti-Vietnam War movement, in the Black revolution, in the student movement which rose to a climax in May, 1968, in Paris.

What those state-capitalist practitioners, calling themselves Communists, don't explain is why they chose the mid-1960s to pre-occupy themselves with "exposing Marcuse's role" of working for the U.S. Government two decades earlier, in World War II. What they hide is that while Marcuse, even then, did not compromise with Marxism *as theory*, they have totally revised Marxism both as theory and in practice. The reason is twofold: First, by the 1960s, for different reasons, both Russia and China refused to approve any but their own method of opposing U.S. imperialism—that is to say, actually carrying out secret negotiations with it to make sure there would be no successful social revolution in their own lands. Second, Stalinists and Maoists alike hoped to make the "exposé" of Marcuse so slanderous that none would want to look at what Marcuse had published in that crucial year of 1941.

That was the year *Reason and Revolution* appeared. In that seminal work, Marcuse established the Humanism of Marxism, and re-established the revolutionary dialectic of Hegel-Marx, for the first time for the American public.<sup>6</sup> It is impossible to forget the indebtedness we felt for Marcuse when that breath of fresh air and vision of a truly classless society was published—and

we were actively opposing that imperialist war. It was the year I embarked on the study of the nature of the Russian economy and the role of labor in that state-planned economy, and came upon Marx's Humanist Essays and the famous Frankfurt School. While I deeply disagreed with these German refugees who were under the illusion that one way of fighting Nazism was to work for the U.S. Government, I felt a kinship to those opponents of Nazism. One thing that distinguished Herbert Marcuse, a theoretician in that famous Frankfurt School (officially Institute for Social Research), was that he did not hold himself apart from the people in the country in which he now lived; and his friends were not the rulers, but the revolutionaries.

Thus at the height of McCarthyism, when the Humanism of Marxism about which I was writing in *Marxism and Freedom*—its American roots as well as its world dimension—was hardly the most popular theory to propound in these United States, Marcuse volunteered, when I sent him the manuscript, to write the Preface to it.<sup>7</sup> He also tried to find a publisher for it. Neither in private nor in public did we ever hide the sharp differences that divided us. But that did not keep him from practicing his strong belief in a continuous, open, serious battle of ideas as more than mere bourgeois democracy. As he was to put it in that Preface:

The Marxian insistence on democracy as the preparatory stage of socialism, far from being a cloak, or "Aesopian language" pertains to the basic conception and is not minimized by the equally strong insistence on the difference between "bourgeois" and socialist democracy (p. 11).

Fairly recently (Nov. 1, 1976), the differences surfaced in a new form as Marcuse had not only moved away from any belief that the proletariat was the revolutionary force, but bestowed that revolutionary role on art. Here is what he wrote would be my attitude: "You will laugh, when you hear I am working on Marxist aesthetics: 'Doesn't he have other worries?' But perhaps we will meet again sometime, somewhere, for a good discussion and disagreement."

The determining division between us, of course, came in 1961 with the publication of *One-Dimensional Man*. As against the Marxian concept of labor as the revolutionary force *and* reason for transforming society, which Marcuse had held not only in his 1932 essay on Marx but also in his 1941 *Reason and Revolution*, and as a departure (or development if you wish) of the 1957 Preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, when Marcuse began questioning the role of the proletariat, he now pronounced nothing short of capitalism's "integration" of the working class in mind as well as body—and even, à la Sartre's analysis of automation, in sexuality. I held, instead, that, far from the proletariat having become one-dimensional, what the intellectual proves when he does not see proletarian revolt, is that *his* thought is one-



dimensional. I sent him my review, and when next we met, what happened discloses how great is the philosophic void that his death brings and how hard it will be to fill that void.

He laughed at my review<sup>8</sup> and called me a “romantic.” Those gentle eyes of his had a way of smiling even when he was *theoretically* shouting at you—as if he were saying: “It really is good to have one who still believes; for, without revolution, what is there?”

This was the attitude I sensed again as he suddenly engaged me in a discussion of a phrase Marx used in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*: “labor, from a mere means of life, has become the prime necessity of life.” When he asked what I thought that meant, it need hardly be stressed that Marcuse knew very well what Marx meant. He wasn’t asking for any sort of definition about how different from alienated labor under capitalism would be labor as self-activity and self-development when, with the abolition of “the antithesis between mental and physical labor,” the new society could write on its banner: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”

No, what he was saying was: since we “cannot know” when labor will become creative as united mental–physical, any more than we can know *when* the state will “wither away”—and we are surely living in a “repressive monolith,” be it the U.S. or Russia—what *can* we, “a very tiny minority,” do? If you think it is more than the Great Refusal—well!

Marcuse always had a strong streak of pessimism in him. I don’t mean pessimism in any “psychological” sense—he enjoyed life too much for that. I mean this constant veering between loving utopias and not believing in them; some sort of cloud was always appearing at the very moment when he thought he saw farthest. Ah, there goes that smile in those gentle eyes. Oh, no, he is dead!

One final, personal word. Last year when I saw him in California, where I was on a lecture tour, we of course disagreed again; and again it was on the nearness or distance of revolution. Suddenly he asked me why I didn’t stop “running around,” (that is, being active), and concentrate instead on finishing the manuscript on *Rosa Luxemburg and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution*.

When the news of Marcuse’s death came this July 29, just 10 days after his 81st birthday, and I remembered the last discussion, I thought: the 1919 German Revolution and Marx’s philosophy of liberation were precisely the points of the birth of Herbert Marcuse as Marxist philosopher. How sad that he is gone! How great that the revolutionary legacy lives on!

Detroit  
Aug. 2, 1979

## DUNAYEVSKAYA'S "IN MEMORIAM" TO FROMM (1980)

[Originally appeared under the title, "Erich Fromm, Sozialistischer Humanist," in Lutz von Werder, ed., *Der Unbekannte Fromm* (Frankfurt: Haag & Herchen, 1987), pp. 55–58. The English version is published here for the first time. A somewhat shorter English version appeared under the title, "Erich Fromm, Socialist Humanist," *News & Letters* (April 1980). We have reproduced the last paragraph from the *News & Letters* publication, absent from the English-language typescript for the version that appeared in *Der Unbekannte Fromm*]

The many articles that poured forth in 1980 when Erich Fromm died on March 18 all praised him only as a "famous psychoanalyst." The press, by no accident at all, failed to mention that he was a Socialist Humanist. Moreover, in writing *Marx's Concept of Man* (which succeeded in introducing Marx's Humanist essays to a wide American public), in editing the first international symposium on *Socialist Humanism*, he did so, not as an academician, but as an activist. In inviting me to participate in that dialogue between East and West as well as North and South, he stressed that "it took quite a bit of courage on their (East European) part to write something for this volume, for no matter how diplomatic the language, they were open attacks on the Soviet Union." Erich Fromm was an original. In attempting to fuse Marx and Freud, it wasn't so much the audaciousness of such a move in the 1920s that needs to be stressed, but the fact that even when he was a most orthodox Freudian, it was social psychology that interested him; his use of psychoanalytic mechanisms were as a sort of mediating concept between the individual and the social. In any case, as he moved away from orthodox Freudianism to elaborate his own version, it was clear that he was breaking not only with Freud but with the famous Frankfurt School and its "Critical Theory," and that, not because he was moving away from Marxism, but coming closer to it. Here is how he put it in his intellectual autobiography:

"I consider Marx, the thinker, as being of much greater depth and scope than Freud . . . But even when all of this is said, it would be naive to ignore Freud's importance . . . his discovery of unconscious processes and of the dynamic nature of character traits is a unique contribution to the science of man which has altered the picture of man for all time to come" (*Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, by Erich Fromm).

On Fromm's initiative (and to my great surprise since I kept far away from any psychoanalysts even when they laid claim to Marxism), I received a congratulatory letter from him on the publication in 1958 of my *Marxism and Freedom*. The period of the 1950s was a most difficult one for Marxists,

what with McCarthyism as well as nuclear bomb development permeating the land. Dr. Fromm had helped organize the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy in 1957, but that was not what he wrote to me about. Rather, the subject that then aroused his passionate interest was the restoration of Marxism in its original form of “a new humanism,” cleansed of the perversion of Russian and Chinese Communism. So magnificently an objective human being was he that he refused to be deterred either by the fact that I let my hostility to psychoanalysts show by telling him that workers in Detroit shops referred to them as “head shrinks,” or even by the fact that I criticized his own essay on “Marx’s Concept of Man” as abstract. Here is what he answered me:

As to your criticism of my essay that it is too abstract and does not discuss the humanism of Marxism concretely, I cannot offer any argument. . . . As to the substance of the points you make about the concrete nature of Marx’s humanism, I naturally entirely agree with you. Also about what you write of the role of the plant psychoanalyst and Daniel Bell’s position.<sup>9</sup>

Our correspondence continued for two decades. It also gave me rare glimpses into the whole subject of the famous Frankfurt School, of which he was, after all, one of its most famous personages, the one who influenced them all on the “integration” of Psychoanalysis into Marxism. The lengthy, unabating, sharp debate with Herbert Marcuse in the pages of *Dissent* over 1955 and 1956 was not the main issue. He retained too much regard for Herbert Marcuse’s *Reason and Revolution* as the seminal work it was. No, what did arouse his ire most was the duality of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s departure from Marxism on the one hand, and the attraction that that held for the “New Left.” Here is how he summed it up in a letter to me dated Nov. 25, 1976:

I get quite a few questions from various people who study the history of the Frankfurt School. It’s really a funny story: Horkheimer is now quoted as the creator of the critical theory and people write about the critical theory as if it were a new concept discovered by Horkheimer. As far as I know, the whole thing is a hoax, because Horkheimer was frightened . . . of speaking about Marx’s theory. He used general Aesopian language and spoke of critical theory in order not to say Marx’s theory. I believe that that is all behind this discovery of critical theory by Horkheimer and Adorno.

As against the movement away from Marx that he sensed in the Frankfurt School, he himself tried in every possible way to disseminate Marxist-Humanism into all fields, including his own—psychoanalysis. Consider his attempt to convince me—who was in no way involved in psychology—to write a piece for a psychoanalytical journal. That suggestion came after I had told him the story about Susan E. Blow—a Hegelian and one of the very first

women educators—who was a patient of Dr. James Jackson Putnam, an American pioneer of Freudian psychoanalysis. She aroused Putnam’s interest in Hegelian philosophy to such a great extent that he, in turn, tried to interest Freud. Freud, on the other hand, was so opposed to introducing philosophy into psychoanalysis that he criticized any attempt to place psychoanalysis, as he put it, “in the service of a particular philosophical outlook on the world.”<sup>10</sup>

Here is what Dr. Fromm wrote me:

What you wrote about Dr. Putnam who became interested in Hegelian dialectics through his patient I did not know, and find it of considerable historical interest, and Freud’s reaction to Putnam’s philosophical remarks is also an interesting historical footnote to Freud and the history of the psychoanalytic movement. Why don’t you write a note on this and publish it somewhere? I have no connections with psychoanalytic journals except *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, which is published in New York. I am sure they would be glad to publish a note on this historical datum, and it should at the same time be published in the Spanish psychoanalytic journal, *Revista*, of which I am still formally the director. If you would be inclined to do this, I would be happy to send it myself to the New York and the Spanish journals. I shall also look up Freud’s letters to find the remark in which he comments on Putnam’s letter, or do you know to whom Freud wrote this remark about Putnam?

Fromm’s eyes always were on the future and a new class-less society on truly human foundations. Least known of his multi-dimensional concerns was the relationship of Man/Woman and by no means on just a psychological scale. Rather it was the need for totally new human relations in the Marxian sense: a global vision of the future meant also a look back into the past. Thus, he found Bachofen’s studies into matriarchal society very congenial, not because he believed in the existence of matriarchal society, but because it, at least, allowed one a vision of an alternative society to this patriarchal, class, alienating society in which we live. In relating patriarchy to class domination, he had invented the magnificent phrase for it: “patricentric-acquisitive.”

Far from remembrance of things past being a question merely of memory, it brings into view the unity of Man/Woman; the human being as a totality, being not just a quantitative measure but something dialectical, showing movement, a movement forward. It was what Fromm stressed when, in creating an international forum for his *Socialist Humanism*, he emphasized that Humanism was not just an idea, but a movement against what is, a glimpse into the future. Listen to what he wrote me when he heard I was relating Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution:

I feel that the male Social Democrats never could understand Rosa Luxemburg, nor could she acquire the influence for which she had the potential because she was a woman; and the men could not become full revolutionaries because they did not emancipate themselves from their male, patriarchal, and

hence dominating, character structure. After all, the original exploitation is that of women by men and there is no social liberation so long as there is no revolution in the sex war ending in full equality. . . . Unfortunately I have known nobody who still knows her personally. What a bad break between the generations.

That letter was written on Oct. 26, 1977. It is now March 19, 1980, and Fromm is dead. And I say, dear Youth, let's not let another "bad break between generations" occur. To prepare for the future one must know the revolutionary past. Getting to know Fromm as a Socialist Humanist is a good way to begin.

## NOTES

1. Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*. Berlin, Dietz. 1953, p. 599. [Here and below in this appendix, our editors' footnotes are given in brackets. All other footnotes in this appendix are by the authors. See Marx, *Grundrisse* (1973), trans. Martin Nicolaus, pp. 711–12. In the second sentence above, Marcuse translates *Genuss* as "enjoyment," while Nicolaus translates this word, with equal validity, as "consumption." See also the version of the *Grundrisse*, trans. Yuri Schnittke, in MECW 29, p. 97, where *Genuss* is again rendered as "enjoyment." It should also be noted that the final sentence is cut short by Marcuse, leaving out the passage "and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject" (*Grundrisse* [1973], p. 712; see also MECW 29, p. 97).]

2. 1961 edition, Vintage Russian Library, Random House, New York; 1958 edition, Columbia University Press, N.Y. Page references in this review are to the original edition.

3. Professor Marcuse has much to say on Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," which gave the green light to vulgar materialism and which is now used as "the" philosophic text, without once mentioning Lenin's break with his own philosophic past emanating from his later, profound "Philosophic Notebooks." Yet this quintessential work is available in Russian, German, French and Italian, and, in an abbreviated version, appears in a first English translation as an appendix to my *Marxism and Freedom*. We saw above that Prof. Marcuse also failed to consider the Trotsky-Stalin controversy over "socialism in one country." One other word must be stated on Prof. Marcuse's selection of sources in the war and post-war periods. He makes a reference to the "spectacular public controversies" which are supposed to be less cogent than the more fundamental analysis he makes. But, while he manages not to make a single mention of either the 1943 reversal of all previous teachings of the Marxian law of value, or of the 1955 attack on the humanist essays of Marx, he does find space for the lesser linguistic controversy.

4. Here too there is a looseness of expression. It is true that, after quality is transformed into quantity, the analysis continues "conversely." In strict Hegelian terminology, however, transcended quality is quantity, but transcended quantity is measure. Is Stalin now to be taken as "the measure" of the "new" society?

5. In English this essay; "The Foundation of Historical Materialism," was not published until 1972, when it was included in a collection of his essays, *Studies in Critical Philosophy*, New Left Books, London.

6. It is true that Marx's Essays themselves were not published in English until I included them as Appendices to *Marxism and Freedom* in 1957. But analysis of them, as well as the attitude to the Hegel-Marx dialectic as revolutionary, set forth in *Reason and Revolution*, sent many students who knew other languages to seek them out.

7. It was also the period when he had just finished *Eros and Civilization* and, while I had kept my distance on the whole question of trying to combine Freud with Marx, I did turn the book over for review to a Marxist-Humanist physician who held that "It is to the great credit of Marcuse that he clearly and persistently points out the dynamic revolutionary core of Freudian psychoanalysis: that the life instincts . . . required not compromise but rejection of the present society, not sublimation but confronting the sickness that is disturbing modern life." ("A Doctor Speaks," *News & Letters*, Feb. 5, 1957.)

8. See "Reason and Revolution vs. Conformism and Technology" in *The Activist*, Jan. 1965 [reprinted in this Appendix].

9. In another letter Fromm wrote: "My relations with *Commentary* are not good. Years ago Mr. Podhoretz rejected something I had written because it contradicted the majority opinion of American Jews. I wrote him a sharp letter about his concept of freedom."

10. Hale, Nathan G., editor, *James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 43.

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