Dream, Imagination, and Existence: An Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's *Dream and Existence*
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I

In these introductory pages we do not intend to retrace, according to the familiar paradox of prefaces, the path taken by Ludwig Binswanger himself in "Dream and Existence" (*Traum und Existenz*). The difficulty of this text suggests doing so, no doubt. But its difficulty is too essential to its line of reflection to be attenuated in a zealous foreword *ad usum delphini*, even if the "psychologist" remains always the dauphin in the kingdom of reflection. Original forms of thought are their own introduction: their history is the only kind of exegesis that they permit, and their destiny, the only kind of critique.

Yet it is not its history either which we shall attempt to decipher here. In another work we shall try to situate existential analysis within the development of contemporary reflection on man, and try to show, by observing the inflection of phenomenology toward anthropology, what foundations have been proposed for concrete reflection on man. Here, these introductory remarks have only one purpose: to present a form of analysis which does not aim at being a philosophy, and whose end is not to be a psychology; a form of analysis which is fundamental in relation to all concrete, objective, and experimental knowledge; a form of analysis, finally, whose principle and method are determined from the start solely by the absolute privilege of their object: man, or rather, the being of man, *Menschsein*.

The working dimensions of anthropology can thereby be circumscribed.[1] It is an undertaking which opposes anthropology to any kind of psychological positivism claiming to exhaust the significant content of man by the reductive concept of *homo natura*. It relocates anthropology within the context of an ontological reflection whose major theme is presence-to-being, existence (*Existenz*), *Dasein*.[2] Granted, an anthropology of this sort can validate itself only by showing how an analysis of human being can be articulated upon an analytic of existence. As a problematic of foundations, it must define in the latter the conditions of possibility of the former. As a problem of justification, it must set out the appropriate dimensions and the autochthonous meaning of anthropology.

Let us say provisionally (pending some later revisions) that human being (*Menschsein*) is nothing but the actual and concrete content which ontology analyses as the transcendental structure of *Dasein*, of presence-to-the-world. Thus, this basic opposition to any science of human facts of the order of positive knowledge, experimental analysis, and naturalistic reflection does not refer anthropology to some *a priori* form of philosophical speculation. The theme of inquiry is the human "fact," if one understands by "fact," not some objective sector of a natural universe, but the real content of an existence which is living itself and is experiencing itself, which recognises itself or loses itself, in a world that is at once the plenitude of its own project and the "element" of its situation. Anthropology may thus call itself a "science of facts" by developing in rigorous fashion the existential content of presence-to-the-world. To reject such an inquiry at first glance because it is neither philosophy nor psychology, because one cannot define it as either science or speculation, because it neither looks like positive knowledge nor provides the content of *a priori* cognition, is to ignore the basic meaning of the project.[3]

It has seemed to us worthwhile to follow *for a moment* this path of reflection, and to see whether the reality of any man may not prove to be accessible only outside any distinction between the psychological and the philosophical; whether man, in his forms of existence, may not be the only means of getting to man.

In contemporary anthropology, the approach of Binswanger seems to take us to the royal road. He outflanks the problem of ontology and anthropology by going straight to concrete existence, to its development and its historical context. Thence, by way of an analysis of the structures of existence (*Existenz*) — of this very existence which bears such and such a name and has traversed such and such a history — he moves continually back and forth between the anthropological forms and the ontological conditions of existence. He continually crosses a dividing line that seems so difficult to draw, or rather, he sees it

[1] Cf. for example, Paul Häberlin, *Der Mensch: Eine Philosophische Anthropologie*, "Vorwort" (Zürich: Schweizer Spiegel, 1941), 7-8.
[2] *Ibid*., *passim*.
[3] Cf. K. Schneider, *Fortschritte der Neurologie. Psychiatrie und ihrer Grenzgebiete* (Stuttgart/Leipzig: Thieme). I. 145.

ceaselessly crossed by a concrete existence in which the real limit of *Menschsein* and *Dasein* is manifested. Hence, nothing could be more mistaken than to see in Binswanger's analyses an "application" of the concept and methods of the philosophy of existence to the "data" of clinical experience. It is a matter, for him, of bringing to light, by returning to the concrete individual, the place where the forms and conditions of existence articulate. Just as anthropology resists any attempt to divide it into philosophy and psychology, so the existential analysis of Binswanger avoids any *a priori* distinction between ontology and anthropology. One avoids this distinction without eliminating it or rendering it impossible: it is relocated at the terminus of an inquiry whose point of departure is characterised not by a line of division, but by an encounter with concrete existence.

To be sure, this encounter, and no less surely, the status that is finally to be assigned to the ontological conditions, pose problems. *But we leave that issue to another time*. We only want to show that one can enter straightway into the analyses of Binswanger and get to what they signify by an approach no less primordial, no less basic, than that by which he himself reaches the concrete existence of his patients. Detouring through a more or less Heideggerian philosophy is not some initiatory rite which might open a door to the esotericism of the analysis of *Dasein*. The philosophical problems are there; but they are not preconditions.

Therefore, we may dispense with an introduction that summarises *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*) in numbered paragraphs, and we are free to proceed less rigorously. Our proposal is only to write in the margins of "Dream and Existence."

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The theme of this 1930 essay[4] — the first of the texts of Binswanger which belong strictly to the analysis of Dasein[5] — is less dream *and* existence than existence as it appears to itself and can be deciphered in the dream: existence in that mode of being of the dream in which it announces itself in a meaningful fashion. Is it not a gamble, however, to want to circumscribe the positive content of *Existenz* by reference to a mode in which it is least engaged in the world? If *Menschsein* does contain meanings that are peculiar to it, will they reveal themselves in a privileged way in that dream moment when the network of meanings seems to condense, where the evidence clouds over, and where the forms of presence are most blurred?

This paradox constitutes, in our opinion, the major interest of "Dream and Existence." The privilege of meaning accorded by Binswanger to the oneiric is doubly important. It defines the concrete progression of the analysis toward the fundamental forms of existence: dream analysis does not stop at the level of a hermeneutic of symbols. Rather, starting from an external interpretation which is still only a kind of deciphering, it is able, without slipping into a philosophy, to arrive at a comprehension of existential structures. The meaning of the dream continually deploys itself from the cipher of the appearance to the modalities of existence. On the other hand, this privileged status of dream experience silently encompasses, in this text, a whole anthropology of the imagination that requires a new definition of the relations between meaning and symbol, between image and expression — in short, a new way of conceiving how meanings are manifested.

These two aspects of the problem will occupy us in the next pages. All the more so to the degree that Binswanger has left them unclarified. We are not trying to pass out credit to be sure, but rather trying to express in this way what it is to "recognise" a line of thought that brings us even more than it says, while still hoping to remain properly modest toward its history.

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[4] In *Neue Schweizer Rundschau* (Zürich: Fretz u. Wasmuth), IX, 1930; reprinted in Ludwig Binswanger, *Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Bern: A. Francke, 1947), 74-97. English translation by Jacob Needleman, "Dream and Existence," in Needleman, *Being-in-the-World* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 222-248.

[5] "*Über Ideenflucht*" (*Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, XXX, 1931-1933) was the first study of psychopathology in the mode of *Dasein*-analysis.

II

A coincidence of dates is worth underscoring: 1899, Husserl's *Logical Investigations*; 1900, Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*. Twofold attempt by man to recapture his meanings and to recapture himself in his significance.

With *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the dream makes its entry into the field of human meanings. In the dream experience the meaning of behaviour seems to blur. As waking consciousness darkens and flickers out, the dream seems to loosen, and finally to unite, the knot of meanings. Dream had been taken as if it were the nonsense of consciousness. We know how Freud turned this proposition around, making the dream the meaning of the unconscious. This shift from the meaninglessness of the dream to the disclosure of its hidden meaning, and the whole hermeneutic labour involved, have frequently been emphasised. Much importance has also been assigned to the reification of the unconscious, as psychic authority and latent content. Much, and even too much: to the point of neglecting another aspect of the problem which, insofar as it puts into question the relations of meaning and image, is our concern here.

The imaginary forms of the dream carry the implicit meanings of the unconscious; in the penumbra of dream life, they lend these meanings a quasi-presence. Yet, precisely the presence of meaning in the dream is not meaning making itself fully evident. The dream betrays the meaning even as it effects it, offering it only while ephemeralising it. The fire that means sexual fire — shall we say that it is there only to point to that meaning, or to attenuate the meaning, to hide it and obscure it by a new glow? There are two ways to answer this question.

One way is along functional lines. The meaning is assigned as much "counter-meaning" as necessary to cover the whole surface of the dream realm. The dream is a fulfilment of desire, but if it is dream and not fulfilled desire, that is precisely because the dream also answers to all the "counter desires" which oppose the desire itself. The dream fire is the burning satisfaction of sexual desire, but what makes the desire take shape in the subtle substance of fire is everything that denies the desire and ceaselessly tries to extinguish it. The dream is a functional composite, and if the meaning is invested in images, this is by way of a surplus, a multiplication of meanings which override and contradict each other. The imaginative plasticity of the dream is, for the meaning which comes to light in it, but the form of its contradictoriness.

Nothing more. The image is exhausted in the multiplicity of meanings. Its morphological structure, the space in which it deploys itself, its temporal rhythm of development, in short, the world which it bears with it, all these count for nothing if they are not allusions to these meanings. In other words, the language of the dream is analysed only in its semantic function. Freudian analysis leaves its morphological and syntactic structure in the dark. The distance between meaning and image is closed, in the analytical interpretation, only by an excess of meaning; the image in its fullness is determined by over-determination. The peculiarly imaginative dimension of the meaningful expression is completely omitted.

And yet, it is not a matter of indifference that such and such an image embodies such and such a meaning — that sexuality be water or fire, that the father be a subterranean demon or a solar force. It is important that the image possesses its own dynamic powers, that there is a different morphology of space when it is free, luminous space and when the space put into play is imprisoning, dark, and stifling. The imaginary world has its own laws, its specific structures, and the image is somewhat more than the immediate fulfilment of meaning. It has its own destiny, and the laws which govern it are not solely significant propositions, just as the laws of the world are not simply decrees of will, even a divine will. Freud caused the world of the imaginary to be inhabited by Desire as classical metaphysics caused the world of physics to be inhabited by Divine Will and Understanding: a theology of meanings, in which the truth anticipates its own formulations and completely constitutes them. The meanings exhaust the reality of the world which displays that reality.

One might say that psychoanalysis gave the dream no status beyond that of speech, and failed to see it in its reality as language. But that was both risky and paradoxical: if the word seems to lose itself in the meaning that it wants to bring to light, if it seems to exist only by and for the signification, the word is nevertheless possible only by way of a language that exists in rigid syntactic rules and in the solid impress of morphological shapes. The word, to say something, implies a world of expression which precedes it, sustains it, and allows it to give body to what it means. By failing to acknowledge this structure of language, which dream experience, like every expressive fact, necessarily envelops, Freudian psychoanalysis of dreams never gets a comprehensive grasp of meaning. Meaning does not appear, for psychoanalysis, through recognition of a linguistic structure, but must be extracted, deduced, gleaned from a word taken by itself. And dream

interpretation, naturally, becomes a method designed to discover the meanings of words in a language whose grammar one does not understand: it becomes a method of cross-referencing of the sort used by the archaeologist for lost languages, a method of probabilistic confirmation, as in the deciphering of secret codes, a method of meaningful coincidings as in the most traditional arts of divination. The boldness of such methods and the risks do not invalidate their results. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of the starting point is never entirely dispelled by the constantly increasing probability that develops within the analysis itself, not entirely eliminated by the number of cases that come to sanction a kind of interindividual lexicon of the most frequent symbolisations. Freudian analysis retrieves only one meaning among the many possible meanings by the shortcut of divination or the longer route of probability. The expressive act itself is never reconstituted in its necessity.

Psychoanalysis gets only to the hypothetical, thus generating one of the most fundamental paradoxes of the Freudian conception of the image. Whenever analysis tries to exhaust the whole content of the image in the meaning it may secrete, the link uniting image to meaning is always defined as a possible, eventual, contingent one. Why does the psychological meaning take shape in an image, instead of remaining implicit or dissolving into the limpidity of a verbal formulation? By what means does the meaning insert itself within the malleable destiny of an image?

Freud gives a twofold answer to this question. As a result of repression, the meaning cannot acquire a clear formulation. In the density of the image, meaning finds the wherewithal to express itself allusively. The image is a language which expresses without formulating, an utterance less transparent for meaning than the word itself. And, on the other hand, Freud presupposes the primitively imaginative character of the satisfaction of desire. In the primitive consciousness, archaic or infantile, desire first finds satisfaction in the narcissistic and irreal mode of fantasy, and in the regression of the dream this original mode of fulfilment is revealed. One sees how Freud was lead to rediscover in his theoretical mythology the themes that had been excluded in the hermeneutic stage of this interpretation of dreams.

He thus reinstates the notion of some necessary and original link between image and meaning, and admits that the structure of the image has a syntax and a morphology irreducible to the meaning: for the meaning, precisely, manages to hide itself in the expressive forms of the image. Yet despite the presence of these two themes, because of the purely abstract form in which Freud leaves them, one looks in vain in his work for a grammar of the imaginary modality, and for an analysis of the expressive act in its necessity.

An inadequate elaboration of the notion of symbol is doubtless at the origin of these defects of Freudian theory. Freud takes the symbol as merely the tangential point where, for an instant, the limpid meaning joins with the material of the image taken as a transformed and transformable residue of perception. The symbol is that surface of contact, that film, which separates, as it joins, an inner world and an external world; the instantiation of an unconscious impulse and of a perceptual consciousness; the factor of implicit language and the factor of sensible image.

Nowhere more than in his analysis of Senate President Schreber did Freud try to examine this place of contact. The privileged case of a crime exhibited in effect the constant presence of meaning at work in an imaginary world, and showed the structure belonging to this world through its reference to the meaning. But in the course of the analysis Freud finally abandoned this attempt, and located his reflections on two different levels. On one level, he established symbolic correlations which enable one to detect beneath the image of the solar god, the Father figure, and beneath the Ahriman image, the person of the patient himself. And on another level, he analysed meanings, while this fantasy world remains no more than one possible expression of them. Reducing meanings to their most transparent verbal expression, he thus purifies them, proffering an extraordinary emotional declension, the magical framework of paranoid delirium: “I don’t love him, I hate him,” “It isn’t he whom I love, it’s she whom I love, because she loves me,” “It isn’t I who loves the man, it’s she who loves him” — declensions whose first form and simplest semantic character amount to: “I love her,” and whose ultimate form, reached through all the contradictory inflections, emerges quite to the contrary as: “I don’t love anyone at all, I love only myself.”[6]

If the analysis of the Schreber case is so important in Freud’s work, it is just to the extent that the distance has never been so shortened between a psychology of meaning transcribed into a psychology of language, and a psychology of image expanded into a psychology of fantasy. At the same time, nowhere in

[6] James Strachey (ed), *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth, 1953), XII (1911-1913), 36, 36n., 63-64.

psychoanalysis has the possibility of finding a connection between these two orders of analysis been more decisively precluded. Or, if you like, the impossibility of a serious treatment of a psychology of the Imago — to the extent that one can term "Imago" an imaginary structure taken in all its meaningful implications.

The history of psychoanalysis seems to bear out our contention, since to this day the gap has not been reduced. We see these two tendencies, which at one time where seeking each other out, moving further and further apart. There are analyses along the lines of Melanie Klein, which turn on the genesis, development, and crystallisation of fantasies, recognised as in some way the primary material of the psychological experience. And there are analyses along the lines of Jacques Lacan, which seek in language the dialectical element where the ensemble of existential meanings are constituted and find their destiny, just insofar as the word, remaining outside all dialogue, fails to negotiate, through an *Aufhebung*, the deliverance and transmutation of the meanings. Melanie Klein has doubtless done the most to retrace the genesis of meaning from the movement of fantasy alone. Lacan for his part has done everything possible to show in the Imago the point at which the meaningful dialogue of language seizes up and becomes spellbound by the interlocutor it constituted. But for the former the meaning is basically nothing but the mobility of the image and the path, as it were, of its trajectory; and for the latter the Imago is but a muffled world, a moment of silence. In the realm of psychoanalytic investigation, therefore, the unity between a psychology of the image which demarcates the field of presence, and a psychology of meaning which defines the field of linguistic potentialities, has not been found.

Psychoanalysis has never succeeded in making images speak.

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The *Logical Investigations* are curiously contemporaneous with the hermeneutic of the *Interpretation of Dreams*. Within the rigour of the analyses conducted the length of the First and Sixth of these investigations, can one find a theory of symbol and sign which reinstates in its necessity the immanence of the meaning to the image?

Psychoanalysis has taken the term "symbol" as immediately valid, without trying to develop or even to delimit it. By "symbolic value of the dream image" Freud really had two quite distinct things in mind. On the one hand, he had the set of objective indices which betoken in the image implicit structures, earlier events, experiences that remained silent. Morphological similarities, dynamic analogies, syllabic identities, and all sorts of word games, these constitute so many objective indices in the image, so many allusions to that which the image does not manifest in its colourful fullness.

On the other hand, there is the global and significant link which founds the meaning of the dream material and constitutes it as a dream of incestuous desire, of infantile regression, or of return and narcissistic envelopment. The set of indices can multiply indefinitely as the meaning progresses and unifies, and cannot therefore be confounded with the meaning. They arise along the path of inductive probabilities and are never more than the method of reconstituting the latent content or the original meaning. As for the meaning itself, it can only be brought to light in a comprehensive grasp, for it is by its own movement that it founds the symbolic value of the dream image. The confusing of these two things has inclined psychoanalysis to describe the mechanisms of the formation of dreams as the reverse and the correlative of the methods of reconstitution, confounding the achievement of meanings with the induction of indices.

In the first of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl rightly distinguished between the index and the signification.[7] No doubt in phenomena of expression these are intermingled to the point that one tends to confound them. When someone speaks, we understand what he says not only by a meaningful grasp of the words he uses and the sentence structures he puts into play, but we also let ourselves be guided by the vocal melody, which now modulates and trembles, now assumes the hardness and glow by which we recognise anger. In this global comprehension these two attitudes, however mingled, are not identical. They are inverse and complementary, since it is above all when the words begin to elude me, distorted by distance, by noise, or by the stridency of the voice, that induction of indices becomes more prominent than the comprehension of meaning: the tone of voice, the volume of words, the silences, even the verbal slips, will guide me and cause me to presume that my interlocutor is choking with rage.

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[7] See Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1922), v.II, Pt. 1, "*Untersuchung I*," "*Ausdruck und Bedeutung*," Ch. 1, sec. 5, pp. 30-31. — *Logical Investigations* (New York: Humanities Press, 1970: trans J.N. Findlay), 1, "Investigation I," Ch. 1, sec. 5, p. 275.

By itself the index has no signification, and only in a secondary way can it acquire one, by the oblique route of a consciousness which uses it as a marker, a reference, or a token.

I see some holes in the snow, some regularly shaped stars, some crystalline shadows. A hunter would see the fresh tracks of a hare. We have here two lived situations. It would be idle to say that one contains more truth than the other. However, the essence of indication is exhibited in the latter, not the former. Only for the hunter is the little star *pressed down* into the snow, i.e., a sign. This does not mean that the hunter has more associative material than I do, that to his perception is associated an image of the hare which, in the same situation, I lacked. The associating is derivative in relation to the structure of indication. Association only goes over with full strokes the dotted lines of a structure already given in the essence of indicator and indicated. "Association recalls contents to consciousness while leaving it to them to attach themselves to given contents according to the law of their respective essences."[8]

But this essential structure, on which the psychological moment rests — on what does it, in turn, rest? On an actual situation that exists, or will exist, or has existed. The traces on the snow refer to the real hare who has just bounded away. The trembling voice is, according to its modulation, an index of exploding anger, or of mounting anger, or of anger which, with great difficulty, is containing and calming itself. Whereas the authentic sign, to be significant, does not need to rest on any objective situation: when I utter the word "hare," I may be referring to the one that raced the tortoise; when I mentioned my rage, I was speaking of a surge of passion which I have never experienced except in pretence or in a play. The words "hare" or "rage" are meaningful, the strident voice, the trace impressed in the snow, are indices.

A phenomenology of the dream, to be rigorous, must not fail to distinguish between indicative elements, which may designate for the analyst an objective situation they betoken, and significant contents which constitute, from within, the dream experience.

But what is a significant content, and what relation does it bear to an imaginary content? Here, too, certain analyses of the *Logical Investigations* can serve as a point of departure. It is not legitimate to allow, as psychoanalysis does, an immediate identity between meaning and image, united in the unique notion of symbol. The essence of the act of signification must be sought beyond, and even before, the verbal expression or the image structure in which it may be embodied.

> The acts of formulation, of imagination, of perception, are too diverse for signification to exhaust itself now in these, now in those. We must opt for a conception which attributes this function of signification to a single act which is everywhere identical, to an act which is free of the limits of perception that may so often be lacking.[9]

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[8] Translator's note: The passage in the French text reads: "L'association rappelle à la conscience des contenues en leur lassant le soin de se rattacher aux contenus donnés suivant la loi de leurs essences respectives." The original German text by Edmund Husserl reads: "Die Assoziation ruft die Inhalte nicht bloss ins Bewusstsein zurück und überlässt es ihnen, sich mit den gegebenen Inhalten zu verknüpfen, wie es das Wesen der einen und Anderen (ihre Gattungsbestimmtheit) gesetzlich vorschreibt." (*Logische Untersuchungen*, *op. cit*., p.29.) The English translation by J.N. Findlay reads: "Association does not merely restore contents to consciousness, and then leave it to them to combine with the contents there present, as the essence or generic nature of either may necessarily prescribe." (*Logical Investigations*, *op. cit*., pp. 273-274.) (F.W.)

[9] Translator's note: The passage in the French text reads: "Les actes de formulation, d'imagination, de perception, sont trop différents pour que la signification s'épuise tantôt en ceux-ci tantôt en ceux-là: nous devons préférer une conception qui attribue cette fonction de signification à un seul acte partout identique, à un acte qui soit délivré des limites des cette perception qui nous fait si souvent défaut." The original German text by Edmund Husserl reads: "Die Akte, welche mit dem Wortlaut geeinigt sind, je nachdem dieser rein symbolisch oder intuitiv, auf Grund blosser Phantasie oder realisender Wahrnehmung, bedeutsam ist, sin phänomenologische zu sehr different, als dass wir glauben könnten, das Bedeuten spiele sich bald in jenem, welche diese Funktion des Bedeuten einem überall gleichartigen Akten zuweist, der von den Schranken der uns so oft versagten Wahrnehmung und selbst Phantasie frei ist und sich, wo der Ausdruck im eigentliche Sinne 'ausdrückt, 'mit dem ausgedrückten Akte nur vereint." (*Logistische Untersuchungen*, *op. cit*., v.II, Pt. 2, "*Untersuchung VI*," sec. 4, pp. 15-16.) The English translation by J.N. Findlay reads: "The acts which are united with the sound of our words are phenomenologically quite different according as these words have a purely symbolic, or an intuitively fulfilled significance, or according as they have a merely fancied or a perceptually realising basis: we cannot believe that signification is now achieved in *this* sort of act, now in *that*. We shall rather have to conceive that the function of meaning pertains in all cases to one and the same sort of act, a type of act free from the limitations of the perception or the imagination which so often fails us, and which in all cases

What are the characteristics of this fundamental act? Negatively speaking, one sees at once that it cannot consist in relating one or more images. As Husserl notes, if we think of a chiliagon, we imagine, no matter what, a polygon with a lot of sides.[10] More positively, an act of signification, even the most thwarted, the most elementary, the most bound-up in some perceptual content, opens onto a new horizon. Even when I say this spot is red, or even in the exclamation, "This spot," even when I lack the words and I point my finger at something before me, an act of aiming is constituted which breaks with the immediate horizon of perception and discloses the signifying essence of the lived perception: the act of meaning this (*der Akt des Diesmeinens*).

This act is not definable (as our example suffices to demonstrate) by some "judgemental activity," but by the ideal unity of what is aimed at in the meaningful designation. This unity is the same each time the meaning act is renewed, whatever words are used, whatever voice utters it, whatever ink puts it on paper. What the symbol means is not some individual trait of our lived-through experience, not some recurring quality, not some property, as Husserl puts it, "of reappearing identically to itself," for we are in the presence of an ideal content presenting itself through the symbol as a unity of meaning.

But one must go further, if one is not to reduce the act of meaning to a mere intentional aiming. How conceive this passing of the aim over into a significant fullness, where it becomes embodied? Should we follow the Husserlian analyses to the letter and concede a supplementary act of meaning, that which the Sixth of the *Logical Investigations* calls an "act of fulfilment"? That is at bottom merely to baptise the problem, to give it a status within the activity of consciousness, but not to find a foundation.

No doubt this is what Husserl sensed in the revision (*Umarbeitung*) of the Sixth Logical Investigation which he prepared in 1914.[11] Through this text one can glimpse what a phenomenology of meaning might be. One and the same feature characterises a symbol (such as a mathematical sign), a word, or an image, whether the word or the symbol be uttered or written, whether we abandon ourselves to the train of discourse or to the imagination's dreaming; something new arises outside us, a little different from what we expected, by virtue of the resistance offered by imaginary material, verbal or symbolic, and also by virtue of the implications offered by the thing now constituted as significant: by fulfilling itself in the actuality of the signifying, the intentionally virtual opens upon new virtualities. This actuality in effect is located in a spatio-temporal context, the words are inscribed in our surrounding world and point to speakers at the horizon of the verbal implications. Here is where we grasp the meaning act itself in its paradoxical nature; a taking-up of an objective theme presents itself, like a word, as a cultural object; or like an image, it presents itself as a quasi-perception. The meaning act operates as a thematic activity in which the "I speak" or the "I imagine" are brought to light. Word and image are conjugated in the first person at the very moment that they achieve objective form. No doubt this is what Husserl meant when he wrote about language:

> One thing is certain . . . The signified takes part in the accomplishing of the deed. He who speaks engenders not only the word, but the expression in its totality.[12]

It is finally the expressive act itself that a phenomenological analysis brings to light beneath the multiplicity of structures of signification.

This seems to us essential in a number of ways. Contrary to the traditional interpretation, the theory of signification does not seem to us to be the last word of the Husserlian eidetic of consciousness. In fact, it culminates in a theory of expression which remains cloaked, but for which the need is nonetheless present the whole length of the analyses. One might be surprised that phenomenology never developed in the direction of a theory of expression, which it left in the shadows, while bringing into full light a theory of signification. But a philosophy of expression is no doubt possible only by going beyond phenomenology.

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where an expression authentically 'expresses, 'merely becomes one with the act expressed." (*Logical Investigations*, *op. cit*., v.II, "*Investigation VI*," Ch. 1, sec. 4, p. 681.) (F.W.)

[10] Translator's note: The passage in the French text reads: "Comme le remarque encore Husserl, si nous pensons un chiliagone, nous imaginons n'importe quel polygone ayant beaucoup de côtés." — The original German text by Edmund Husserl reads: "Ebenso denken wir ein Tausendeck und imaginieren irgendein Polygon von 'Vielen 'Seite." (*Logische Untersuchungen*, *op. cit.*, v.II, Pt. 2,"*Untersuchung I*," Ch. 2. sec. 18. p. 65.) — The English translation by J.N. Findlay reads: "... we think of a chiliagon, while we imagine any polygon with 'many 'sides." (*Logical Investigations*, *op. cit*., v.I, "*Investigation I*," Ch. 2, sec. 18, p. 302.) (F.W.)

[11] Edmund Husserl, *Umarbeitung* of the "Sixth Logical Investigation." Manuscript M III, 2 II 8a.

[12] *Ibid*., p.37.

At the moment, one thing should be noticed. This entire phenomenological analysis which we have sketched, following Husserl, calls for a completely different parsing of psychoanalysis with regard to the fact of symbolism. It would establish in effect an essential distinction between the structure of objective indication and that of signifying acts; between what pertains to symptomatology and what pertains to semantics.

Psychoanalysis, by contrast, has always confounded the two structures, defining meaning by cross-referencing of objective signs and coincidences within the deciphering process. As a result, Freudian analysis could see only an artificial connection between meaning and expression, namely, the hallucinatory nature of the satisfaction of desire. Phenomenology, on the contrary, enables one to recapture the meaning in the context of the expressive act which founds it. To that extent, a phenomenological description can make manifest the presence of meaning in an imaginary context.

Thus reinstated in its expressive base, however, the act of meaning is cut off from any form of objective indication. No external content can restore it to its truth. The time and space it bears are but a furrow which immediately disappears; and others are implicated at the horizon of the expressive act only in an ideal manner, with no possibility of real encounter. To understand something or someone is thus definable in phenomenology only as a new grasp in the mode of interiority, a new way of inhabiting the expressive act, a method for reinstating oneself within it, never an attempt to situate it in its own right. This cognitive problem becomes central in any psychology of meaning and lies at the heart of any psychopathology. Along the lines of pure phenomenology, there is no principle for solving it. Jaspers, more than anyone, was troubled by this impossibility. Just to the extent that he opposed significational (*sinnhaft*) forms to sensible (*sinnlich*) forms,[13] attributing to the former alone the possibility of valid comprehension, he managed to justify the doctor-patient relationship only by a mystique of communication.[14]

Phenomenology has succeeded in making images speak; but it has given no one the possibility of understanding their language.

Phenomenology has indeed thrown light on the expressive foundation of all meanings; but the need to justify comprehension implies a reintegration of the moment of objective indication on which Freudian analysis had dwelt.

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To find the foundation common to objective structures of indication, significant ensembles, and acts of expression, such is the problem posed by the twofold tradition of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. From the confrontation between Husserl and Freud has emerged a double problematic: a method of interpretation is needed that reinstates acts of expression in their fullness. The hermeneutic journey should not stop at the verbal sequences which have preoccupied psychoanalysis. It should continue to the decisive moment in which expression objectifies itself in the essential structures of indication. Much more than verification was needed: a foundation was required.

This fundamental moment in which meanings are knit together is what Binswanger tried to bring to light in “Dream and Existence.”

We will be reproached for having not only gone beyond the letter of the Husserlian and Freudian texts in this presentation, but for having constructed from whole cloth a problematic that Binswanger never formulated, one whose themes are not even implicit in his texts. To our thinking, this charge carries little weight, because we are fallible enough to believe in history even when it is a question of *Existenz*. We are not concerned to present an exegesis, but to disengage an objective meaning. We believe that the work of Binswanger is important enough to bear such a meaning. That is why only its real problematic has occupied our attention. In his texts will be found the problem which he set for himself; for our part, we wanted to specify the problem to which he was responding.

[13] Karl Jaspers, *Psychopathologie générale* (Paris, Alcan, 1933; tr. A. Kastler), p.230.

[14] Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970; tr. E.B. Ashton), v.2, pp. 47ff.

III

Nihil magnum somnianti — Cicero

By bringing to light a dynamic as fundamental as dreaming and expression, Binswanger rejoined a tradition left unclarified by a 19th-century psychology that Freud did not always succeed in transcending. Psychoanalysis had inaugurated a psychology of dreams or, at least, had restored to the dream its psychological rights. And yet this was undoubtedly not to recognise its full range of validity. In Freud, the dream is the element common to the expressive forms of motivation and the method of psychological deciphering: it is at once the symbolic code of psychology and its grammar. Freud thus restored a psychological dimension to the dream, but he did not succeed in understanding it as a specific form of experience. He reconstituted the dream in its original mode with fragments of revived thoughts, symbolic translations, and implicit verbalisations. The logical analysis of the whole is a logic of discourse, the motivations and structures uncovered are woven on the same psychological warp as the forms of waking consciousness. Freud psychologised the dream — and the privilege it thus acquired in the realm of psychology deprived it of any privilege as a specific form of experience.

Freud did not succeed in going beyond a solidly established postulate of 19th-century psychology: that a dream is a rhapsody of images. If it really were no more than that, a dream would be exhausted by a psychological analysis, whether in the mechanistic mode of a psychophysiology or in the manner of an investigation of significations. But a dream is without doubt quite other than a rhapsody of images, for the simple reason that a dream is an imaginary experience; and if it cannot be exhausted — as we saw earlier — by a psychological analysis, this is because it relates also to a theory of knowledge.

Until the 19th century, the theory of knowledge had indeed been posed in epistemological terms. The dream had been described as an absolutely specific form of experience. If a psychology of dreams could be set forth, this had been possible only in a secondary and derivative way, on the basis of a theory of knowledge which located it as a type of experience. In "Dream and Existence," Binswanger links up again with this forgotten tradition.

He rediscovered the notion that the signifying value of the dream tends to be tailored to the psychological analyses that can be effected. The dream experience, by contrast, has a content all the richer to the degree that it is irreducible to the psychological determinations to which one tries to adapt it. It is the old idea, so constant in the literary and mystical tradition, that only "morning dreams" have a valid meaning. "The dreams of the hale and hearty man are the morning dreams," said Schelling.[15] The idea goes back to a Greco-Roman tradition. The justification may be found in Jamblichas of Calchis: a dream cannot be deemed divine if it occurs among digestive vapours. It has value only before the meal or else after digestion, at dusk or in the morning. De Mirbel wrote in *Le prince du sommeil*: "And one must maintain the most cleansed time of night is toward morning, '*inter somnum et vigilicum.*'"[16] Théophile had one of his characters say to his Pyramus:

> The hour in which our bodies, filled with heavy vapours,
> Arouse in our senses deceitful motions
> Had already passed, and my quieted brain
> Was feeding on the poppies of sleep distilled,
> At the moment the night is about to end
> And the chariot of Dawn is yet to arrive.[17]

Consequently, the dream is not meaningful only to the extent that psychological motivations and physiological determinations intersect and cross-index in a thousand ways; on the contrary, it is rich by reason of the poverty of its objective content. It is all the more valid in that it has the less reason for being. Hence the strange privilege of morning dreams. Like the dawn they proclaim a new day, with a depth to their charity that the wakefulness of high noon will never know.

Between the sleeping mind and the waking mind, the dreaming mind enjoys an experience which borrows from nowhere its light and its genius. Baader spoke in this sense of this "sleeping wakefulness" and

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[15] F.W.J. Schelling, *Werke* (ed. Otto Weiss; Munich: Biederstein, 1946), v.I, 657.

[16] De Mirbel, *Le Palais du Prince de Soimmeil, ou est enseignée l'oniromancie autrement l'art de deviner par les songes*. (Lyons: L. Pavlhe, 1670).

[17] Théophile de Viau (1590-1626), *Les amours tragiques de Pyrame et Thisbe* (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1967; ed. Guido Saba), Act IV, sc. ii, 11. 852-853, p. 115.

this "wakeful sleep" which is tantamount to clairvoyance, and which is an immediate return to objects without passing through the mediation of the organs.[18]

But the theme of the original dimensions to dream experience is not only inscribed in a literary, mystical, or popular tradition. It can easily be discerned as well in Cartesian and post-Cartesian texts.

At the point of convergence of a mystical tradition and a rationalistic method the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* posed the problem of the prophetic dream. "Not only true things, but also trifles and fancies may be useful," Spinoza wrote to Boxel.[19] And in another letter, addressed to Pierre Balling,[20] on the subject of dreams, premonitions, and warnings, he distinguished two sorts of imaginings: those which depend solely on the body, its complexion and the motions of its humours, and those which give sensory body to ideas of the understanding, in which one can find at once track and sign, a tracing of truth. The one form of imagination can be found in delirium, and makes up the physiological warp of the dream. But the other makes of the imagination a specific form of knowledge. This is what the *Ethics* refers to when it shows the imagination in essential connection with the idea and with the makeup of the mind.[21] The analysis of prophetic dreams in the *Tractatus* moves at these two levels. There is the imagination tied to the motions of the body which give their individual colouring to the dreams of the prophets. Each prophet dreamed the dreams appropriate to his temperament. The affliction of Jeremiah or the anger of Elias can only be explained externally, they pertain to an examination of their bodies and the motions of their humours. But each of these dreams had its meaning, which exegesis now has the task of bringing to light. The meaning which exhibits the link of imagination to truth is the language of God to men, to show them his commandments and his truth. Men of imagination, the Hebrews understood only the Word of images. Men of passion, they could be made to submit only by the emotions conveyed in frightening and angry dreams. The prophetic dream is like an oblique path of philosophy, another experience of the same truth, "for the truth cannot contradict itself." It is God revealing himself to men by images and figures.[22] Dream, like imagination, is the concrete form of revelation. "The prophets only perceived God's revelation by the aid of the imagination."[23]

Spinoza thereby rejoined the great classical theme of the relations between imagination and transcendence. Like Malebranche, he discovered the notion that the imagination, in its mysterious ciphers, in the imperfection of its understanding, in its half-light, in the presence which it always shows forth only elusively, points beyond the content of human experience, beyond even the discursive knowledge we can master, to the existence of a truth which surpasses man on all sides, yet bends towards him and offers itself to his mind in concrete species of images. The dream, like every imaginary experience, is thus a specific form of experience which cannot be wholly reconstituted by psychological analysis, one whose content points to man as transcended being. The imaginary, sign of transcendence; the dream, experience of this transcendence under the sign of the imaginary.

This is the lesson of classical psychology which Binswanger implicitly reaffirmed in his analysis of the dream.

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But he also rejoined another tradition, implied in the classical one. In the dream, as in the experience of a transcendent truth, Christian theology found shortcuts taken by divine will, a quicker way in which God may distribute His proofs, His decrees, and His warnings. It is as if a dream were an expression of that human freedom which can be inclined without being determined, which is illuminated without being constrained, and which receives warnings with something less than full evidence. In the classical literature on dreams one can detect the whole theological dispute concerning Grace, the dream standing, so to speak, to the imagination as Grace does to the heart or the will. In classical tragedy the dream is a kind of figuring forth of Grace. The tragic significance of the dream poses for the Christian consciousness of the 18th century the same problems as the theological significance of Grace. After an ominous dream, Tristan has Herod say:

What Destiny writes cannot be erased,

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[18] Franz von Baader (1765-1841), *Werke* (Leipzig: H. Bentham, 1850-1860), I, 475.

[19] See A. Wolf (ed. & tr.), *The Correspondence of Spinoza* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), "Letter 52," p. 272. (Translation by F.W.)

[20] *Ibid*., "Letter 17," p. 140.

[21] R.H.M. Elwes (tr.), *Chief Works of Benedict Spinoza*, v.II, (Dover), "Ethics," Pt. II, Ax. 3.

[22] *Ibid*., v.I, Ch. 1, p. 15.

[23] *Ibid*., pp. 24-25.

And its secret shares cannot be escaped,
We run the more toward them
When we think to escape them.[24]

After a dream, a character in Ferrier's *Adraste* declares:

No, my lord, in the skies is our death inscribed,
Man cannot cross that limit ordained,
And measures only plunge him down
Into the misfortune he tries to avoid.
Thus does the sovereign grandeur of the gods,
Choose to play with our human weaknesses.[25]

Thus, the tragic dream for Jansenism. As for Molinism, the dream is no longer predestination, but warning or signal, more to prevent predetermination than to declare it. In Benserade's drama, Briseis says:

Achilles, those things that mar your joy
Are so many counsels from Heaven.[26]

In *Osman*, the lesson is even clearer:

But heaven yet may, during our sleep,
Turn our minds to lend us counsel,
The outcome of our destiny
Is not always decided by its views,
The morning thunder does not always strike as lightning,
A movement of the heart may deflect its course.[27]

But we should not be deceived. Beneath this doubtless most literary quarrel, in which from one tragedy to another the characters answer each other and throw out arguments borrowed from theological treatises, lies hidden the problem, more genuinely tragic, of destiny.

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Man has known, since antiquity, that in dreams he encounters what he is and what he will be, what he has done and what he is going to do, discovering there the knot that ties his freedom to the necessity of the world. In the dream and its individual significance Chrysippus saw the universal concatenation of the world and the effect of *sympatheia* which conspires to form the unity of the world and which animates each fragment with the same spiritual fire. Much later the Renaissance will take up the idea again. For Campanella, it is the soul of the world — principle of universal cohesion — that inspires human instincts, desires, and dreams together. And to mark the last stage of this great mythology of the dream, this fantastic cosmogony of the dream where the whole universe seems to conspire at a momentary and vacillating image, there were also Novalis and Schelling: "The world becomes dream, the dream becomes world, and the outcome in which one believes can be seen coming from afar."[28]

What has changed from one epoch to another has not been this reading of destiny in dreams, nor even the deciphering procedures, but rather the justification of this relation of dream to world, and the way of conceiving how the truth of the world can anticipate itself and gather together its future in an image capable only of reconstituting it in a murky form.

These justifications, to be sure, are still more imaginary than philosophical, exalting myth at the boundaries between poetry and abstract reflection. In Aristotle, the value of the dream is connected with the calm of the soul, with the nocturnal dream in which the soul is removed from the agitation of the body.[29] In that silence it becomes sensitive to the most pervasive movements of the world, to the most distant agitations, and like the surface of water is all the more disturbed by the agitation at its shores as its centre is more calm and quiet; similarly, the sleeping soul is more sensitive than the waking soul to the motions of the

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[24] Francois Tristan l'Hermite (1601-1655), *La Mariane*. See Claude K. Abraham et. al. (eds.), *Le théâtre complet de Tristan l'Hermite* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1975), p. 40.

[25] Louis Ferrier de la Martiniere (1652-1721), *Adraste, tragédie*, in *Theatre Francois* (Paris, 1737).

[26] Isaac de Benserade, *La mort d'Achille, et la dispute de ses armes, tragédie* (Paris: A. de Sammaville, 1637).

[27] Tristan l'Hermite, *Osman*, Act II, sc. i, 11. 327-332. See Claude K. Abraham, *op. cit.*, p. 785.

[28] F.W.J. Schelling, *Werke* (*op. cit.*), IV, 217.

[29] Aristotle, *The Parva Naturalia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908; ed. J.A. Beare), "De Divinatione per Somnum," Ch. II, 464a.

distant world. The ripples get larger as they move and soon take on enough magnitude to make the whole surface tremble; similarly, in a dream, the weakest excitations end by distorting the whole mirror of the soul. A noise scarcely perceptible to the waking ear turns in dream into a roll of thunder, the least warmth becomes a conflagration. In the dream, the soul, freed of its body, plunges into the *kosmos*, becomes immersed in it, and mingles with its motions in a sort of aquatic union.

For others, the mythic element through which the dream joins the world is not water, but fire. In the dream, the subtle body of the soul catches fire from the secret flame of the world and thereby penetrates to the intimacy of things. This is the Stoic theme of the cohesion of the world ensured by the *pneuma* and sustained by that heat which culminates in a universal fire. It is the esoteric theme, which reached from medieval alchemy to the "prescientific" spirit of the 18th century, of an "oneiromancy," a sort of phlogiston of the soul. Finally, it is the Romantic theme in which the precise image of fire begins to attenuate, keeping only the spiritual qualities and dynamic values; subtlety, lightness, flickering light casting shadows, ardour which transforms, consumes, and destroys, leaving only ashes where once had been brightness and joy. Novalis writes that "the dream teaches us in a remarkable fashion the subtlety with which our soul insinuates itself among objects and at the same time transforms itself into each of them."[30]

The complementary myths of water and fire maintain the philosophic theme of the substantial unity of the soul and the world in the dreaming imagination. But one can also find other ways, in the history of dream, to justify its transcendent character. The dream may be the shadowy apperception of those things one senses all around oneself at night — or contrariwise, the instantaneous flash of light, the utter brightness of intuition, which completes itself in its very occurrence.

It was above all Baader who defined the dream by the luminosity of intuition. The dream, for him, was the lightning flash of inner vision which, beyond all sensory and discursive mediations, attains the truth in a single movement. He spoke of that "inner and objective vision" which "is not mediated by the external senses" which "we experience in our common dreams." At first, inner sensibility stands in opposition to outer sensibility, but finally, in the full grip of sleep, the former overwhelms the latter, and the mind emerges into a subjective world much more profound than the world of objects, and laden with a far weightier meaning.[31] The privilege that tradition accords to waking consciousness and its knowledge is "but uncertainty and prejudice." In the darkest night the glow of the dream is more luminous than the light of day, and the intuition borne with it is the most elevated form of knowledge.

We meet with the same idea in Carus: the dream reaches well beyond itself towards objective knowledge. It is that movement of the mind which, of its own accord, goes unto the world and finds its unity with the world. It explains in effect that waking knowledge of the world is opposition, for the receptivity of the senses and the possibility of being affected by objects are nothing but opposition to the world, "*Gegenwirken gegen eine Welt*." The dream, by contrast, breaks down this opposition and goes beyond it — not in a luminous instant of clarity, but by the slow immersion of the mind in the night of the unconscious.

> By this plunge deep into the unconscious, far more than in a state of conscious freedom, the soul will play its part in the universal intertwinings and will allow itself to be penetrated by everything spatial and temporal, as produced in the Unconscious.[32]

To that extent, the dream would be a *Fernsehen* like that "farsighted vision" which is limited only by the horizons of the world, an obscure exploration of that unconscious which from Leibniz and Hartmann has been conceived as the muted echo, in man, of the world in which he has been placed.

All these conceptions constitute a double polarity in the imaginary philosophy of the dream: the water-fire polarity and the darkness-light polarity. We will see later that Binswanger discovers them, empirically as it were, in the dreams of his patients. The analysis of Ellen West transcribes fantasies of soaring toward the world of light and burrowing into the cold, dark earth.[33]

It is curious indeed to see each of these themes branch out and take its place in the history of reflection on dreams, a history that seems to have exploited all the potentialities of an imaginary

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[30] No citation provided (ed).

[31] Franz von Baader, *op*. *cit*., IV, 135.

[32] Cf. Eduard von Hartmann, *Ausgewählte Werke, Bd. 13: Die Moderne Psychologie* (Leipzig: Haacke, 1901), pp. 32-36.

[33] Ludwig Binswanger, "Der Fall Ellen West," in *Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, v. 53 (1944), 225-227; v. 54 (1944), 69-117, 330-360; v. 55 (1945), 16-40; "The Case of Ellen West," in Rollo May (ed.) *Existence* (New York: Basic Books, 1958), 237-364.

constellation — or perhaps imagination takes, by crystallising them, themes constituted and brought to light by the cultural process.

Let us fasten for the moment on a single point: the dream, like every imaginary experience, is an anthropological index of transcendence; and in this transcendence it announces the world to man by making itself into a world, and by giving itself the species of light, fire, water, and darkness. In its anthropological significance, the history of the dream teaches us that it both reveals the world in its transcendence and modulates the world in its substance, playing on its material character.

We have purposely left aside until now one of the best-known aspects of the history of the dream, one of the themes most commonly exploited by its historians. There hardly exists a study of dreams, since Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, that does not feel obliged to cite the Tenth book of the *Republic*. One squares accounts with history thanks to Plato, and this erudite reference ensures a good conscience, as citing Quintilian does for child psychology.[34] One never fails to underline the pre-Freudian — and post-Oedipal — resonances of this famous text.

> "But what sort of desires do you mean?"
>
> "The sort that emerges in our dreams, when the reasonable and humane part of us is asleep and its control relaxed, and our bestial nature, full of food and drink, wakes and has its fling and tries to secure its own kind of satisfaction. As you know, there's nothing too bad for it and it's completely lost to all sense and shame. It doesn't shrink at the thought of intercourse with a mother or anyone else, man, beast, or god, or from murder or sacrilege. There is in fact no folly or shamelessness it will not commit."[35]

The manifesting of desire by dreams remained until the 19th century one of the most frequently used themes of medicine, literature, and philosophy. In 1613, seeking out "all the causes of dreams," André de Laurent, Physician to the King, found there movements of the humours and traits of temperament: "He who is angry dreams only of jousts, battles, fires; the phlegmatic always thinks he is in water."[36] Literature adopts authoritatively the pronouncements of the scholars. In *Mariane*, Tristan has Phérore say,

> Thus does each perceive in sleep
> The secret signs of his temperament...,

and, proceeding from the principle to examples, describes the soul of the thief who

> ...anticipating his destiny
> Encounters militia, or makes off with his loot,
> Just as the usurer in sleep runs his eyes
> And his hands over the heaps of money,
> And the lover beset already by fears or desires,
> Experiences the trials or enjoys the pleasure.[37]

Romanticism takes up the same theme and diversifies it in a thousand forms. For Novalis the dream is "the secret path" which leads to "the depths of our mind."[38] Schleiermacher discerns, in dream images, desires so vast and so deep that they cannot belong to the individual. And Bovet recalls the passage in Hugo's *Les Misérables*:

> If it were given to our bodily eyes to see into the mind of another, we would judge a man far more often by what he dreams than by what he thinks... The dream, which is all spontaneity, takes up and keeps the impress of our mind. Nothing emerges more directly and with more sincerity from the very depths of our soul than our unreflective and unconfined aspirations... Our chimeras are what resemble us the most.[39]

But the closeness of these analogies should not lead us into the sin of anachronism. What is Freudian in Plato or Victor Hugo, what suggests Jung in Schleiermacher, is not of the nature of scientific anticipation. The functioning of such intuitions, and their justification, are not to be found in some unrecognised

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[34] Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory* Book I.

[35] Plato, *Republic* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1958; tr. H.D.P. Lee), pp. 344-345 (Steph. 371 C-D).

[36] "Discours sur les maladies melancoliques," Ch. VI.

[37] Francois Tristan l'Hermite, *La Mariane* (loc. cit.), Act I, sc. ii, 11. 61-62, 69-79.

[38] Friedrich von Hardenburg (1772-1801; pseud. Novalis), *Werke*, II, 114.

[39] Quoted by Bovet, *Intern. Zeitschrift Psychanalyse*, VI. 354.

psychoanalysis. Rather, one finds, at the origin of the theme of the dream as manifestation of the soul in its inwardness, the Heraclitean principle:

> We share a world when we are awake; each sleeper is in a world of his own.[40]

Elsewhere than in "Dream and Existence," Binswanger returned several times to this principle to gauge its conceptual bearing and to bring out its anthropological significance.[41] The phrase can easily be taken in a trivial sense: the pathways of perception are closed to the dreamer, who is isolated by the internal multiplication of his images. So understood, the aphorism of Heraclitus would flatly contradict the theme, just set out, of a transcendence in dream experience, and would overlook all the sensory wealth of dream imagery, all that heat and sensible colouration which caused Landermann to say, "when we abandon ourselves to our senses, then we are in a dream."[42] What constitutes the *idios kosmos* of the dreamer is not the absence of perceptual contents but their elaboration into an isolated universe. The dream world is a world of its own, not in the sense of subjective experience defying the norms of objectivity, but in the sense that it is constituted in the original mode of a world which belongs to me, while at the same time exhibiting my solitude.

One cannot apply to the dream the classical dichotomies of immanence and transcendence, of subjectivity and objectivity. The transcendence of the dream world of which we spoke earlier cannot be defined in terms of objectivity, and it would be futile to reduce it, in the name of its "subjectivity," to a mystified form of immanence. In and by its transcendence the dream discloses the original movement by which existence, in its irreducible solitude, projects itself toward a world which constitutes itself as the setting of its history. The dream unveils, in its very principle, that ambiguity of the world which at one and the same time designates the existence projected into it and outlines itself objectively in experience. By breaking with the objectivity which fascinates waking consciousness and by reinstating the human subject in its radical freedom, the dream discloses paradoxically the movement of freedom toward the world, the point of origin from which freedom makes itself world. The cosmogony of the dream is the origination itself of existence. This movement of solitude and of originative responsibility is no doubt what Heraclitus meant by his famous phrase, "*idios kosmos*."

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This Heraclitean theme runs through the whole of literature and the whole of philosophy. It reappears in the various texts we have cited, which seem so close, at first glance, to psychoanalysis. But what is indicated, in reality, by this depth of the spirit, these "abysses of the soul" whose emergence is described in the dream, is not the biological equipment of the libidinal instinct; it is the originative movement of freedom, the birth of the world in the very movement of existence. Novalis, more than anyone, was close to this theme and tried ceaselessly to capture it in a mythic expression. He recognised, in the world of the dream, the reference to the existence which sustains it:

> We dream of voyages over the whole world, yet is not this whole world in us? It is in oneself and nowhere else that Eternity lies with its worlds, the past and recollections. The external world is a world of shadows and it casts its shadows on the empire of light.[43]

But the moment of the dream does not remain the equivocal instant of an ironic reduction to subjectivity. Novalis took from Herder the idea that the dream is the original moment of genesis: the dream is the primary image of poetry, and poetry, the primitive form of language, the "maternal language of man."[44] The dream is thus at the very centre of becoming and objectivity. And Novalis added:

> Nature is an infinite animal, an infinite plant, an infinite mineral; and these three domains are the images of its dream.[45]

To that extent the dream experience cannot be isolated from its content. Not because it may uncover secret inclinations, inadmissible desires, nor because it may release the whole flock of instincts, nor because it might, like Kant's God, "sound our hearts"; but because it restores the movement of freedom in its authentic

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[40] See Guy Davenport (tr.) *Herakleitos and Diogenes* (San Francisco: Grey Fox Press, 1979), Fragment No. 15, p. 13.
[41] Ludwig Binswanger, "Heraklits Auffassung der Menschen," *Die Antike*, v. XI, 1935. Also in Binswanger, *Ausgewählte Vorträge*, *op. cit.*, v. I.
[42] Landermann, *Die Transcendenz des Erkennes*.
[43] Friedrich von Hardenburg, *op. cit.*, II, 114.
[44] Johann G. von Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Berlin: Deutscher Bibliotek, 1915).
[45] Friedrich von Hardenburg, *op. cit.*, III, 253.

meaning, showing how it establishes itself or alienates itself, how it constitutes itself as radical responsibility in the world, or how it forgets and abandons itself to its plunge into causality. The dream is that absolute exposure of the ethical content, the heart shown naked. This is the meaning referred to by Plato in Book Ten of the *Republic*, and not, in some pre-Freudian fashion, secret manifestations of instinct. Indeed, the wise man does not have the same dreams as the man of violence, the "tyrannical" man, governed by the tyranny of his desires and open to the political tyranny of the first Thrasymachus on the scene, the man of desire who dreams of impudence and folly. But when

> "a man of sound and disciplined character, before he goes to sleep, has awakened his reason..., has neither starved nor indulged his desires, so that they sink to rest and don't plague the higher part of him..., has calmed... his spirited element so that he goes to sleep without anger at anyone, thus going to rest with appetite and spirit quieted, while his reasoning part is stimulated, *then he is better than ever* in a state to grasp the truth in visions in his dreams undid turned by wrong doing."[46]

Cultural history has carefully preserved this theme of the ethical value of the dream, while its premonitional import remains secondary. What the dream declares for the future of the dreamer derives only from what it discloses of the involvements and ties of his freedom. Jezebel is not there to predict imminent misfortune to Athalea: though she is told summarily that "the cruel God of the Jews has overwhelmed you," she is shown only her freedom chained down by a succession of crimes and bound over beyond appeal to the vengeance that restores justice. Two sorts of dreams are considered particularly significant: the dream of the hardened sinner who at the moment of teetering into despair sees opening before his eyes the path of salvation (sometimes the dream is transferred to someone less blind and more disposed to grasp its meaning, viz., the famous dream of St. Cecilia who can read in the dream that her son is turning to God); and the murderous dreamer who meets in the dream both the death he deals out and the death which stalks him, and who discovers the horror of an existence which has bound itself to death by a bloody pact. Linking the past to the present in the rehearsing of remorse, and knitting it into the unity of a destiny, this is the dream that fills the nights of Macbeth, and that is so frequently found in other classical tragedies.

> Pale body, immobile corpse, cold heap of bones,
> That troubleth the savour of my delights,
> Object full of horror, frightful figure
> Mingling the horrors of all Nature,
> O, come not near![47]

And Cyrano wrote in his *Aggripina*:

> The cause of my mourning
> Is the moaning sound of a fertile casket,
> A desolate shade, a speaking image,
> That tugs my garb with trembling hand,
> That sobs by the head of my bed.[48]

If the dream is the bearer of the deepest human meanings, this is not insofar as it betrays their hidden mechanisms or shows their inhuman cogs and wheels, but on the contrary, insofar as it brings to light the freedom of man in its most original form. And when, in ceaseless repetition, it declares some destiny, it is bewailing a freedom which has lost itself, an ineradicable past, and an existence fallen of its own motion into a definite determination. We will see later how Binswanger gives a new reality to this theme, ceaselessly present in literary expression, and how, in taking up again the lesson of the tragic poets, he restores, thanks to the trajectory of the dream, the whole Odyssey of human freedom.

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Such is no doubt the meaning one must give to the *idios kosmos* of Heraclitus. The dream world is not the inner garden of fantasy. If the dreamer meets there a world of his own, this is because he can recognise there the fact of his own destiny: he finds there the original movement of his existence and his freedom, in its achievement or in its alienation.

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[46] Plato, *Republic*, *op. cit.*, p. 345 (Steph. 571D-572A). (English translation adapted to reflect French text. F.W.)
[47] Arnauld, *Agamemnon*, 1.1.
[48] Frédéric Lachevre (ed.), *Les œuvres libertines de Cyrano de Bergerac* (Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1921), p. 136.

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But does not the dream thus reflect a contradiction just where one might succeed in discerning the cipher of existence? Does it not designate at one and the same time the content of a transcendent world and the original movement of a freedom? The dream is deployed, we saw earlier, in a world which secretes its opaque contents and the forms of a necessity which cannot be deciphered. Yet at the same time it is free genesis, self-accomplishment, emergence of what is most individual in the individual. This contradiction is manifest in the content of the dream when it is deployed and offered to discursive interpretation. It even bursts forth as the ultimate meaning in all those dreams that are haunted by the anguish of death. Death is experienced as the supreme moment of that contradiction, which death constitutes as destiny. Hence the meaningfulness of all those dreams of violent death, of savage death, of horrified death, in which one must indeed recognise, in the final analysis, a freedom up against a world. If consciousness sleeps during sleep, existence awakens in the dream. Sleep, itself, goes toward the life that it is preparing, that it is spelling out, that it favours. If it is a seeming death, this is by a ruse of life, which does not want to die; it "plays dead," but "from fear of death." It remains of the order of life.

The dream is no accomplice of sleep. It ascends again the slope that sleep descends, towards life, it goes towards existence, and there, in full light, it sees death as the destiny of freedom. For the dream, as such, and by virtue of the meanings of existence it bears with it, kills sleep and life that falls asleep. Say not that sleep makes dreaming possible, for it is the dream that makes sleep impossible by waking it to the life of death. The dream, as with Macbeth, murders sleep.

> Sleep that knits up the ravell'd sleave of care,
> The death of each day's life, sore labour's bath,
> Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
> Chief nourisher in life's feast. . .[49]

In the depth of his dream, what man encounters is his death, a death which in its most inauthentic form is but the brutal and bloody interruption of life, yet in its authentic form, is his very existence being accomplished.

It is doubtless no accident that Freud was halted, in his dream interpretation, by the recounting of dreams of death. They marked, in effect, an absolute limit to the biological principle of the satisfaction of desire; they showed, Freud sensed only too keenly, the need for a dialectic. But it was not in fact a matter of a rudimentary opposition of the organic and the inorganic at the heart of the dream. Freud set two external principles one against the other, one of which carried by itself all the powers of death. But death is quite another thing than one term in an opposition. It is that contradiction in which freedom, in the world and against the world, at once realises itself and denies itself as destiny. This contradiction and this struggle may be seen in Calpurnia's dream, which foretells the death of Caesar: a dream which speaks no less of the entire power and freedom of the *imperator* who shakes the world — in the interpretation of Decius — than of the risks he runs and his imminent assassination, in Calpurnia's own interpretation.

The death glimpsed here is that which comes from behind, like a thief, to take life and tie a freedom forever to the necessity of a world. "The things that threatened me / Ne'er looked but on my back. . .[50]

But death can also appear in dreams with another face: no longer that of contradiction between freedom and the world, but that in which their original unity and their new alliance is woven. Death then carries the meaning of reconciliation, and the dream in which this death figures is then the most fundamental of all: it no longer speaks of life interrupted, but of the fulfilment of existence, showing forth the moment in which life reaches its fullness in a world about to close in. Hence, in all the legends, death as reward of the wise man, as happy declaration that henceforth the perfection of his existence no longer requires the movement of his life; in announcing death, the dream exhibits the fullness of being which existence has now attained.

In this latter form, as in the former one, the dream of death appears as what existence can learn that is most fundamental about itself. In this death, anguished or serene, the dream fulfils its ultimate vocation. Nothing could be more mistaken, therefore, than the naturalistic tradition according to which sleep would be a seeming death. It is rather a matter of a dialectic of the dream itself insofar as it is a kind of explosion of life toward existence, which discovers in this light its destiny of death. The recurrence of dreams of death,

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[49] Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, II. ii. 36-40.

[50] Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, II. ii. 10-11.

which for a moment caused Freudian psychoanalysis to hesitate, the anguish which accompanies them, exhibit a death encountered, refused, cursed as a punishment, or as a contradiction. But in the serene dreams of fulfilment, there, too, is death: whether with the new visage of resurrection, for the healed man, or as the calming, at last, of life. But in every case death is the absolute meaning of the dream.

> Banquo and Donalbain! Malcolm! awake
> Shake off this downy sleep, death's counterfeit,
> And look on death itself!
> (*Macbeth*, II, iii, 79-81.)

IV

Ce qui pèse en l'homme, c'est le rêve. — Bernanos

In the filigree of the dream experience solely as transcribed in literature, philosophy, and mysticism, one can discern already an anthropological significance of the dream. This is the very significance that Binswanger tried to retrieve from another angle, in a completely different style of analysis, in "Dream and Existence." We do not claim either to summarise it or to gloss it, but only to show to what extent his work can contribute to an anthropology of the imagination. The anthropological analysis of a dream uncovers more layers of significance than the Freudian method implies. Psychoanalysis explores only one dimension of the dream universe, that of its symbolic vocabulary, which from beginning to end transmutes a determining past into a present that symbolises it. The polysemantic character of the symbol defined by Freud as "overdetermination" doubtless complicates this scheme and gives it a wealth that reduces the element of arbitrariness. All the same, this plurality of symbolic significations does not generate a new axis of independent meanings. Freud sensed the limits of his analysis and perceived the need to go further. Often he came upon signs of the dreamer situated within the oneiric drama, as if it did not stop at symbolising and telling in images a history of earlier experiences, as if the dream circled about the whole existence of the subject to restore its dramatic essence in theatrical form. Such was the case with the second dream of Dora, whose full meaning Freud had subsequently to admit he had not grasped.[51] Dora's dream referred not only to her attachment to Mr. K., nor even to the actual transfer of her feelings upon the psychoanalyst, but by way of all the signs of lesbian fixation on Mrs. K., expressed her disgust for the virility of men, her refusal to assume her feminine sexuality, and already exhibited murkily her decision to put an end to this psychoanalysis which was for her only one more sign of the grand complicity of men. Like her aphonia and her hysterical fits of coughing, Dora's dream referred not only to the history of her life, but to a mode of existence of which this history was, strictly speaking, only a chronicle: an existence for which the alien sexuality of men appeared only under the sign of hostility, constraint, irruption culminating in rape; an existence which does not even succeed in finding itself in the sexuality so near and so parallel of a woman, but which instead embeds its most profound meanings in rejective behaviour, the most decisive of which was to stop psychoanalysis. One could say that Dora got better, not despite the interruption of the psychoanalysis, but because, by deciding to break it off, she went the whole distance to that solitude toward which until then her existence had been only an indecisive movement. All the elements of the dream point to this resolution of hers as an active break no less than as an acceptance of solitude. Indeed, she saw herself in her dream as "going out without her parents' knowledge"; she learns of the death of her father; then she is in a forest where she meets a man but refuses to go with him; back home, she learns from the chambermaid that her mother and the others are already at the cemetery; she does not feel sad at all, goes up to her bedroom, and proceeds to read a big book.[52] Freud glimpsed this choice of solitude: beneath the explicit discourse and the dream did not Freud note the formula: "I am abandoning you and continuing my journey alone"?[53] If one cared to implicate the psychoanalyst in the psychoanalysis, surely one could not help charging Freud's failure, or at least the limitation of his understanding, to his refusal to see that this discourse was addressed to him, no less than to Mr. K.

But this is secondary. For us, the real defect of the Freudian analysis was to have discerned there one of the possible meanings of the dream, and yet to have wanted to analyse it, among others, as simply one of many semantic potentials. A method of this sort presupposes a radical objectification of the dreaming subject, which comes to play its role among other personages in a setting where it takes on a symbolic character. The subject of the dream, in Freud's sense, is always a lesser subjectivity, a delegate, so to speak, projected into an intermediate status, suspended somewhere in the play of the other, somewhere between the dreamer and what he dreams. The proof is that for Freud this dreamplay may actually represent someone else by an alienating identification; or another personage may, by a sort of heautoscopy, represent the dreamer himself.

However, it is not this quasi-subject that in fact bears the radical subjectivity of the dream experience. This is only a constituted subjectivity. The analysis of the dream ought to bring into full light the constituting feature of dream subjectivity. This is where the Freudian method becomes inadequate, for the

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[51] James Strachey (ed.), *op. cit.*, v. 7 (1901-1905), pp. 118-119.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110 & note.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 120, n. 1.

one-dimensional meanings it extracts through the symbolic relation cannot reach this radical subjectivity. Perhaps Young understood it, he who spoke of those dreams in which the subject lives his own destiny as a dream. But it is thanks to the writings of Binswanger that one can best grasp what the dream-subject might be. This subject is not characterised as one of the possible meanings of one of the personages of the dream, but as the foundation of all its eventual meanings. To that extent, the dream-subject is not a later edition of a previous form, or an archaic stage of personality. It manifests itself as the coming-to-be and the totality of the existence itself.

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Here is a dream analysis by Binswanger done well before the time of "Dream and Existence."[54] It concerned a young woman, age 33, who was under treatment for severe depression, with outbursts of rage and sexual inhibition. At the age of 5, she had undergone a sexual trauma. A boy had made advances; she had reacted at first with a good deal of interest and curiosity, then became defensive and violently angry. Throughout the psychotherapy she had numerous dreams. She had been in treatment for about a year when she had the following dream: she is crossing the frontier, a customs agent makes her open her luggage; "I take out all my things, the official takes them one by one, finally I take out a silver goblet, wrapped in tissue paper; then he says, 'Why do you bring me the most important thing last?'"

At the time of the dream the psychotherapy had not yet succeeded in discovering the primary trauma. When the doctor had asked the patient to associate regarding the silver goblet, she had felt a sensation of discomfort; she became agitated, her heart pounded, she felt anxious, and finally she stated that her grandmother had silver objects of this sort. She was unable to say any more, but all day she experienced a feeling of anguish which she pronounced "meaningless." Finally, that night, just as she fell asleep, the traumatic scene returned. It is her grandmother's house, she is trying to take an apple from the larder, which she had been explicitly forbidden to do. At that moment a young boy pushes the window open, enters the room, and approaches. The next day, describing this scene to her physician, she suddenly remembers that in that room, on an old harmonium no longer in use, stood a silver teapot wrapped in silver foil, and she cries: "There's the silver in the tissue paper, there's the goblet!"

At the symbolic level, granted, the dream puts the ill patient on stage. The customs inspection signifies the analytic situation in which the ill person must open her luggage and show everything she is carrying. The silver goblet relocates her in an earlier phase of her history, and shows her as in a lesser existence which scarcely belongs to her. But the essential point of the dream lies not so much in what it revives of the past as in what it declares about the future. It anticipates and announces that moment in which the patient will finally deliver to the analyst that secret which she does not yet know and which is nonetheless the heaviest burden of her present. The dream points to this secret already, down to its content, with the precision of a detailed image. The dream anticipates the moment of liberation. It is a prefiguring of history even more than an obligatory repetition of the traumatic past.

But as the subject of the dream cannot be the quasi-objectified subject of that past history, its constituting moment can only be that existence which makes itself through time, that existence in its movement toward the future. The dream is already this future making itself, the first moment of freedom freeing itself, the still secret jarring of an existence which is taking hold of itself again in the whole of its becoming.

The dream means repetition only to the extent that the repetition is precisely the experience of a temporality which opens upon the future and constitutes itself as freedom. This is the sense in which repetition may be authentic, and not by reason of its exactness. The historical correctness of a detail in the dream is only the chronicle of its authenticity. The one links together the horizontal meanings of the symbolism; the other brings to light the profound significance of the repetition. The one is oriented toward anecdotal situations, the other touches the constitutive movement of the individual's history at its source, and displays the mode of an existence as it takes shape through its temporal moments.

I do not, *I think*, distort the thought of Binswanger by interpreting in this same way the Hegelian dialectic of a dream which he sets forth in "Dream and Existence." He analysed a dream which was dreamed by the very patient just discussed. The threefold movement of a sea, first agitated, then caught and as if fixed in a deathlike immobility, and finally, let loose in joyous freedom, is the very movement of an existence

[54] Ludwig Binswanger, *Wandlungen der Auffassung und Deutung des Traumes von den Griechen bis zum Gegenwart* (Berlin: Springer, 1928).

(*Existenz*) abandoned first to the chaos of a subjectivity which knows only itself, a freedom of incoherence, fantasy, and disorder; then, of a freedom invested in an objectivity which binds it to the point of overcoming it and alienating it in the silence of things dead; and finally, of a freedom rediscovered as resurrection and deliverance — but, having traversed the painful moment of objectivity in which it loses itself, a freedom that is no longer distress, cacophony, "sound and fury"; the joy of a freedom that can recognise itself in the movement of objectivity. But then we see that, if this interpretation is correct, the subject of the dream is not so much the personage who says "I" (in this case, a stroller who follows the endless shores of a beach) as the whole dream in the entirety of its dream content. The patient who is dreaming is indeed the anguished personage, but is also the sea, is also the troubling man who casts his mortal net, and is also and above all that world, first a din, then struck with immobility and death, which finally returns to the happy movement of life. The subject of the dream, the first person of the dream, is the dream itself, the whole dream. In the dream, everything says, "I", even the things and the animals, even the empty space, even objects distant and strange which populate the phantasmagoria. The dream is an existence carving itself out in barren space, shattering chaotically, exploding noisily, netting itself, a scarcely breathing animal, in the webs of death. It is the world at the dawn of its first explosion when the world is still existence itself and is not yet the universe of objectivity. To dream is not another way of experiencing another world, it is for the dreaming subject the radical way of experiencing its own world. This way of experiencing is so radical, because existence does not pronounce itself world. The dream is situated in that ultimate movement in which existence still is its world; once beyond, at the dawn of wakefulness, already it is no longer its world.

That is why the analysis of dreams is decisive for bringing to light the fundamental meanings of existence. What, then, are the most essential of these meanings?

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They are to be found in the first movements of freedom and in its original directness. If dreams are so weighty for determining existential meanings, it is because they trace in their fundamental coordinates the trajectory of existence itself. Much has been said about the temporal pulsations of the dream, its particular rhythms, the contradictions or paradoxes of its duration. Much less about dream space.

Yet the forms of spatiality disclose in the dream the very "meaning and direction" of existence. Did not Stefan George note that "space and being-there abide only in the image" ("*Raum und Dasein bleiben nur im Bilde*")? In lived experience, at its original level, space is not presented as the geometric structure of simultaneity. This type of space, within which the natural sciences deploy objective phenomena in their coherence, is only constituted by way of a genesis whose moments have been analysed by Oscar Becker in their psychological aspect,[55] and by Husserl in their historical aspect.[56] Before being geometric or even geographic, space presents itself first and foremost as scène or landscape:[57] it gives itself originally as the distance of coloured plenitudes or of reaches lost in the horizon, enveloped in the gathering distance; or, it is the space of things there, resistant to my touch; it is to my right or my left, behind me, opaque or transparent to my gaze. In contrast to the space of geographical reference, totally elucidated in the form of a general diagram, the scene is paradoxically closed by the infinite openness of the horizon. Everything that this horizon implies in the way of an eventual beyond delimits the familiarity of the hither and of all the pathways staked out by habit. It refers thus to the absolute of a situation which gathers in all the affective powers of the hearth, the native land, the *Heimat*. And each of these lines, which vanish into the horizon, is already like a road of return, a familiar bearing for rediscovering *ten hodou oikade*, the homeward road. In geographic space, motion is nothing but displacement: a concerted change of position from one point to another according to a previously established trajectory. The path is thus no more than the indispensable intermediary, reduced as far as possible, the lower limit of time which is indispensable for going from one point to another. In lived space, the displacement preserves an original spatial character; it does not cross, it travels along; until the very moment it stops, it remains a proffered trajectory of which only its point of

[55] Oskar Becker, "Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendung," in *Jahrbüch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1923; ed. Edmund Husserl), 383-560. See Sec. 7, pp. 446-459.

[56] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). tr. David Carr; Appendix VI, "The Origin of Geometry," pp. 353-378.

[57] Erwin W. Strauss, *Vom Sinn der Sinne* (Berlin: Springer, 1935). *The Primary World of the Sense* (tr. Jacob Needleman; New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 318 *et*. *seq*.

departure is known for certain; its future is not prearranged by the geography of the setting, but is awaited in its authentic historicity. Finally it is the space of encounters; not merely the intersection of lines which trace the shortest distance between two points, but overlapping of journeys, paths crossing, roads which converge to the same place on the horizon, or which, like Guermantes Way, suddenly arrive, after the widest turn, at a birthplace. The dream deploys itself in this original spatiality of the scene and finds there its principal affective meanings.

"*L'espace signe de ma puissance*" ("Space, sign of my power"). This is true of lived space only to the extent that the values of this space are reciprocally ordered. The security that space provides, the solid support that it lends to my powers, rests on the articulation of near space and far space: the latter, by which one withdraws and eludes, or which one sets out to explore or conquer; the former, that of rest, of familiarity, that which is right at hand. But this relation is disturbed in some experiences: then, far space may press upon near space, permeating it on all sides with a massive presence, with a kind of grip that one cannot loosen. Now the distant may slowly enter into the porous presence of near space, mingling with it, to the complete elimination of perspective, as in those catatonics who are "in attendance" before what is going on "around them," indifferent, as if everything were far off, yet concerned, as if everything were close, confounding the objective displacement of things at the horizon and their own bodily movement. Now, far space may permeate the immediate sphere of the subject like a meteor — witness the patient reported by Binswanger:[58] he is properly oriented in space, but lying in bed he has the sensation that a piece of the railroad track, over there, below the window, separates from the horizon, penetrates the bedroom, traverses it, bores through his skull and lodges in his brain. In all these metatheses of the near and the far, space loses its secure character, becomes filled with stifling threats and sudden dangers, is furrowed by irruptive forces. Space, sign of my weakness.

The polarity of light and dark is not identical with that of near and far, even though they are not always distinct. Minkowski has described that dark space where hallucinatory voices cross and mingle, at once far and near.[59] In that dark world, spatial implication does not reflect the laws of juxtaposition, but the special modalities of envelopment or fusion. Space then ceases to function as a divider, no longer dissociates; it is no more than moving of shapes and sounds, coming and going according to the flux and reflux of their apparition. Over against this nocturnal spatiality one can, like Minkowski, analyse the clear space which takes shape before the subject, a levelled and socialised space where I experience in the mode of action all my potentials of movement, and where everything has its particular place, according to its function and its use. In fact, even more radically opposed to the space of darkness is a space of pure luminosity, where all dimensions seem both to be realised and to be eliminated, where all things seem to find unity, not in a fusion of fleeting appearances but in the clarity of a presence completely open to our gaze. Experiences of this sort have been described by Rümke.[60] One of his patients feels something in her so vast, so peaceful, an immense expanse of water, and feels herself dispersed in this luminous transparency. Another patient said,

> at certain times everything I saw took on enormous proportions, men seemed to be giants, all objects and all distances appeared to me as if through a magnifying lens, it would be as if I were looking through a pair of gloves, with more perspective, more depth, and more clarity to everything.

Finally, Binswanger himself analysed the vertical axis of space in its existential meaning: the theme of the slow, raw power of enthusiasm, of joy; the theme of the glittering peak where the light mingled with shadow is purified into an absolute brightness, whose movement is fulfilled and comes to rest in the serenity of the movement. But upward movement does not imply only an existence transcending itself in enthusiasm. It is not only the direction of that selfsurpassing by which man, torn from himself, accedes, according to Fink, to "the greatest being," to the "*theion*."[61] The vertical axis can also be the vector of an existence that has lost its place on earth and, like Solness the Builder, is going to resume, up above, its dialogue with God. Then it indicates flight into excess, and from the start is marked by the vertigo of a fall ("he dare not, he cannot, climb as high as he builds"). And yet he is summoned from above, by the one who has burned down his house

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[58] Ludwig Binswanger, "Das Raumproblem in der Psychopathologie," in *Zeitschrift für die Neurologie*, Zürich, 1933.

[59] Eugene Minkowski, "Esquisses Phénoménologiques," in *Recherches Philosophique* (Paris: Boivin), v. IV (1934-1935), pp. 295-313.

[60] Rümke, *Zur Phänomenologie und Klinik des Glückgefühls* (Springer: 1924).

[61] Eugen Fink, *Vom Wesen des Enthusiasmus* (Freiburg i. Breisgau: Verlag Dr. Hans V. Chamier, 1947), 12.

and stolen his children, by the one who wanted him "to attach himself to nothing but Him." It was toward Him that he wanted to ascend, to show Him that he would go down again, at last, to the love of man. But from such summits, one returns only in a vertiginous fall.

This set of oppositions defines the essential dimensions of existence. They form the primitive coordinates of the dream and, as it were, the mythic space of its cosmogony. In the analyses of dreams, fantasies, and deliriums, one sees them all combining and symbolising each other to constitute a universe.

In his study of a schizophrenic, the case of Ellen West,[62] Binswanger brought out these great imaginary ensembles, whose phenomenological meanings are the precursors of the concrete, singular images that give them an expressive content. The world of Ellen West is divided between two cosmic powers that know no possible reconciliation. There is the underground world of burial, symbolised by the cold dark of the tomb, which the patient resists with all her might by refusing to gain weight, grow old, or be trapped in the crudely materialistic life of her family. And there is the ethereal, luminous world, where in a single moment a totally free existence could arise, an existence without the weight of living, that would know only that transparency of love totalised in the eternity of an instant. Life has become possible for her only in the form of a flight toward that distant and lofty space of light, and the earth, in its dark closeness, holds only the imminence of death. For Ellen West, the solid space of real movement, the space where things come to be, has progressively, bit by bit, disappeared. It has become wholly reabsorbed into limits of its own, it has become its own suppression, it is exiled into the two contradictories of which it had been the unifying moment. It exists only beyond itself, both as if it did not yet exist and as if already it no longer existed. The existential space of Ellen West is that of life suppressed, at once in the desire for death and in the myth of a second birth. It already wears the sign of the suicide by which Ellen West was to attain the culmination of her existence.

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A phenomenological analysis, however, cannot stand by itself. It must be completed and grounded. It must complete itself by elucidating the expressive act which gives a concrete shape to these original dimensions of existence. It must ground itself by elucidating that movement in which the directions of the trajectory of existence are constituted.

We shall put aside, for the moment, the analysis of expression, leaving that for another inquiry. Let us simply note a few elements that are easily specified.

Every act of expression is to be understood on the basis of its primary directions. It does not produce these *ex nihilo*, but locates itself on their trajectory, which makes it possible, as from the points of a curve, to rediscover the whole, completed movement. To this extent, there can be an anthropology of art which would in no way become psychological reductionism. One would not refer expressive structures back to unconscious motivations, but reinstate them the whole length of that line along which human freedom moves.

On this line from near space to far space we will encounter a specific form of expression: there, existence knows the dawn of triumphal departures, voyages and circumnavigations, dazzling discoveries, the siege of towns, the mesh of exile, the stubborn return, the bitterness of coming back to things unchanged and aged, the whole course of that Odyssey of existence; on those "great cloths woven of the dreamed and the real," epic expression takes shape as a basic structure of the expressive act.

Lyric expression, by contrast, is possible only in the alternation of light and darkness where existence plays itself out. By its nature — quite apart from the topic chosen or the metaphor adopted, even though either may often be significant — the lyrical is seasonal or a "*nyct hemeral*," day-blinded with night vision, night-blinded with day vision. It is at once solar and nocturnal, and in its essence, takes on the values of dawn and dusk. The lyrical does not traverse distances, it is always the others who depart. There is no return from exile, because its own land is already exile. If the lyrical can survey all the changes of the world, all its motions, if it can, itself immobile, search out in every direction, this is because it seizes everything in a play of light and shadow, in the pulsations of day and night, which tell, upon the shifting surface of things, the unchangeable truth.

Finally, the axis of tragic expression is located along the vertical axis of existence. The tragic movement is always of the order of ascent and fall. Its special mark is that privileged moment in which it completes its rise, and balances imperceptibly, still, yet oscillating, before faltering. That is why tragedy

[62] See n. 33, *supra*.

hardly needs time and space in which to extend itself, nor foreign lands, not even the surcease of the night, for it sets itself the task of manifesting the vertical transcendence of destiny.[63]

Thus, there is an anthropological basis for the characteristic structures of epic, lyric, and tragic expression. An analysis would be needed to show both the nature of the expressive act and the anthropological necessities that dominate and govern it; one could study the expressive forms of exile, of a descent into an Inferno, of the mountain, of the prison.

Let us return to the only question that can occupy us here: how are the essential directions of *Existenz*, which form the anthropological structures of its entire history, constituted?

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The first thing to note is that the three polarities we have described do not have equal universality and the same anthropological depth. And even though each has its independent status, one at least appears more fundamental, more originative. Hence, no doubt, the fact that Binswanger, without broaching the problem of various expressive forms, has scarcely emphasised anything but the oppositions of ascent and fall. What is the anthropological privilege of this vertical dimension?

First of all, it brings out, almost nakedly, the structures of temporality. Horizontal opposition of the near and the far exhibits time only in the chronology of spatial progression. Time unfolds only between a point of departure and a point of arrival, and is wholly exhausted in the journeying; and when it renews itself, it does so in the form of repetition, return, another departure. In this existential direction, time is in its essence nostalgic. It tries to close around itself, to recommence by linking up again to its beginning. The time of the epic is circular or reiterative. In the opposition of the light and the dark, too, time is not authentic temporality, but a rhythmic time marked by oscillations, a seasonal time where absence is always a pledge of return, and death, the pledge of resurrection.

With the movement of ascent and fall, on the contrary, one can grasp temporality in its primitive meaning.

Let us return to the case of Ellen West. The whole movement of her existence channels into a phobic fear of a fall into the grave and in the delirious desire to soar into the ether, finding its gratification in the immobility of pure movement. But this orientation and its affective polarity designate the very form according to which existence temporalises itself. The patient does not take on the future as disclosure of a fullness and anticipation of death. She already experiences death, there, inscribed in her ageing body which is more burdened each day. Death for her is only the actual weight of her flesh, is but one and the same thing as the presence of her body. During the thirteen years of her illness, Ellen West lived only to flee the imminence of this death attached to her flesh. She refused to eat or to give life in any form at all to this body, which would transform into the menace of death. Whatever gives substance, continuity, and weight to this presence of the body multiplies the deadly powers that envelop it. She rejects all food, and by the same token rejects her past. She does not take up her past in the authentic form of repetition, but suppresses it by the myth of a new birth which is to erase everything she had been. However, by virtue of this making-present of death in the guise of imminent menace, the future is emptied of its fullness. It is no longer a future by which existence anticipates its own death, taking upon itself its solitude and its facticity, but a future by which existence tears itself away from everything that grounds it as finite existence. The future into which existence projects itself is not that of an existence in the world, but that of an existence above the world, an overflight, where the limits which enclose its fullness are abolished in order to accede to the pure existence of eternity. An empty eternity, to be sure, without content, a "bad eternity," as is "bad" the subjective infinity of which Hegel spoke. This temporalisation of existence in Ellen West is an inauthentic one.

Indeed, it is along this vertical direction of existence, and according to the structures of temporality, that the authentic and inauthentic forms of existence can best be allocated. This self-transcendence of the

[63] Cf. Friedrich Hebbel (1813-1863): "A strange dream: A night in which my seething imagination went to its extreme in a dream so monstrous and so overwhelming that it occurred seven more times. I had the impression that God had stretched a rope between sky and earth, placed me on it, and proceeded to swing me. I flew up and down vertiginously. Now I was among the clouds, my hair streaming in the wind, I held on, shutting my eyes; now I was hurled so close to the ground that I could make out the yellow sand, and the little white and red pebbles, and I felt as if I could touch it with my foot. I would want to get off at that moment, but before I could do so, I felt myself propelled once again into the air, and I could only hang onto the rope to keep from falling and crashing to the ground." (Gerhard Fricke, ed., *Hebbels Tagebücher* (Leipzig: Phillipp Reclam, 1936.)

existent in its temporal movement, this transcendence designated by the vertical axis of the imaginary, can be lived as a wrenching away from the bases of the existence itself. Then we see crystallising all those themes of immortality, of survival, of pure love, of unmediated communication between minds. Or it can be lived, on the contrary, as "transcendence," as an imminent plunge from the dangerous pinnacle of the present. Then the imaginary elaborates itself into a fantastic world of disaster. The universe is but the moment of its own annihilation: this is the constitutive moment of those deliriums of "the end of the world." Temporality's movement of transcendence can likewise be covered over and hidden by a pseudo-transcendence of space. Then the vertical axis is wholly absorbed into the horizontal trajectory of existence. The future lies in the spatially distant. Existence defends itself against the menacings of death by all those obsessional rites which block the free pathways of the world with magical obstacles. One could describe a transcendence which acknowledges itself solely in the discontinuity of the moment and which declares itself only in a rupture of itself with itself: this is the sense in which Binswanger speaks of "manic existence."[64]

These varying structures of the authentic and the inauthentic enable us to see the forms of historicity of existence. When lived in the inauthentic mode, it does not become in an historical fashion. It is absorbed into the inner history of its delirium, or its duration is wholly exhausted in the becoming of things. It gives itself up entirely to an objective determinism where its original freedom is completely alienated. And in the one case, as in the other, quite of its own impetus and of itself, existence comes to inscribe itself in this determinism of its illness. The psychiatrist then sees in this state of affairs a verification of his own diagnosis, which justifies him in considering the illness as an "objective process," and the patient as an inert thing where the process is running its course according to an inner determinism. The psychiatrist forgets that it is existence itself which constitutes the natural history of the illness as an inauthentic form of its historicity, and that what he characterises as the reality in itself of the illness is but an instantaneous snapshot of that movement of existence which grounds its historicity at the same moment in which it temporalises itself.

One must therefore grant an absolute privilege, among all the signifying dimensions of existence, to that of ascent and fall, where alone can be discerned the temporality, the authenticity, and the historicity of existence. If one remains at the level of the other existential directions, one can never grasp existence in any but it's constituted forms. One could identify situations, define structures and modes of being, one could explore the modalities of its *Menschsein*: but one must turn to the vertical dimension to grasp existence making itself, turn to the vertical dimension in that form of absolutely original presence in which *Dasein* is defined. On thereby abandons the anthropological level of reflection which analyses man as man within his human world, and accedes to an ontological reflection which concerns the mode of being of an existence as presence to the world. Thus is the transition effected from anthropology to ontology, confirming that this is not an a priori division, but a concrete movement of reflection. It is existence itself indicating, in the fundamental direction of the imagination, its own ontological foundation.[65]

[64] See n. 5, *supra*.

[65] To the extent to which tragic expression is located on this vertical direction of existence, it has an ontological root that gives it an absolute privilege over other modes of expression; the latter are rather anthropological modulations.

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Le poète est aux ordres de sa nuit. — Jean Cocteau

We must reverse our familiar perspective. Strictly speaking, the dream does not point to an archaic image, a phantasm, or a hereditary myth as its constituting elements; these are not its prime matter, and they do not constitute its ultimate significance. On the contrary, every act of imagination points implicitly to the dream. The dream is not a modality of the imagination, the dream is the first condition of its possibility.

Classically, the image is always defined by reference to the real: thus locating its origin and its positivistic truth in a traditional conception of images as residues of perception. Or else, it defines the essence of the image negatively, as in the Sartrean conception of an "imaging consciousness" that posits its object as irreal. On the one definition, as on the other, the image bears in itself, and by a natural necessity, an allusion to reality, or at least to an eventual content of perception. No doubt Sartre has amply shown that this content "is not there"; that, indeed, I aim at it insofar as it is absent; that it offers itself, from the start, as irreal; that it remains porous and docile to my magical incantations. The image of Peter is the perception of Peter invoked, but it takes place in, confines itself to, and exhausts itself in, the irreality where Peter presents himself as absent.

> At first I only want to see Peter. But my desire becomes a desire for a certain smile, for certain features. Thus it limits itself and exasperates itself at one and the same time, and the irreal object is precisely. . . the limitation and the exasperation of this desire. And it is but a mirage: the desire, in the imaging act, feeds on itself.[66]

In fact, we must ask whether the image does indeed, as Sartre would have it, designate — even negatively and in the mode of unreality — the real itself.

I am trying to imagine today what Peter will do when he gets such and such news. Agreed, Peter's absence surrounds and circumscribes the movement of my imagination. But that absence was already there, before I imagined; and not in some implicit way, but in the keen mode of my regret at not having seen him for a year. That absence was already present, in the very things, the familiar things which today still bear the mark of his departure. Absence precedes and colours my imagination, but it is neither the condition of its possibility nor its eidetic index. If I had seen Peter just yesterday, my imagination today would bring him too close and would burden me with too immediate a presence. To imagine Peter after a year's absence is not to confront him in a mode of unreality (that does not require imagination, the least feeling of bitterness would suffice), it is first of all to derealise myself, it is to absent myself from that world where it is no longer possible to encounter Peter. Which is not to say that I "escape to another world," nor even that I frequent the possible margins of the real world. The lines of necessity that exclude Peter are smudged, and my presence, as presence to this world, fades. I undertake to adopt once more that mode of presence in which the movement of my freedom was not yet caught up in this world toward which it moves, where everything still denoted the constitutive possession of the world of my existence. To imagine what Peter is doing today in some circumstance that concerns us both is not to invoke a perception or a reality; it is primarily to try to recapture that world where everything is still conjugated in the first person.

When in imagination I see him in his room, I do not imagine myself peering at him through the keyhole, or watching him from the outside. Nor is it quite right to say that I transport myself magically into his room, where I remain invisible. To imagine is not to actualise the fable of the little mouse, it is not to transport oneself into the world of Peter. It is to become the world where he is: I am the letter he is reading; I conjure myself from that look of attentive reader; I see the walls of his room that watch him from all sides and hence do not "see" him. But I am also his gaze and his attentiveness, his dissatisfaction or his surprise before the letter. I am not only absolute master of what he is doing, I am what he is doing, I am what he is. That is why imagination adds nothing new to what I already know. Yet it would be incorrect to say that it brings nothing and teaches me nothing. The imaginary is not to be confused with immanence, and is not even exhausted in that formal transcendence of whatever delineates itself as irreal. The imaginary is transcendent. Not with an "objective" transcendence (as in W. Szilasi's sense of the term), since the moment I imagine Peter, he obeys me; each of his gestures fulfils my expectations, and finally he even comes to see me because I want him to do so. But the imaginary gives itself as a transcendence where, without learning anything unknown to me, I can "recognise" my destiny. Even in imagination, or rather, especially in imagination, I do

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[66] Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'îmaginaire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), p. 163. (My translation — F.W.) Cf. J.-P. Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination* (New York: Washington Square, 1966), p. 161.

not obey myself, I am not my own master, for the sole reason that I prey upon myself. In Peter's imagined return, I am not there, before him, because I am everywhere, around him, and in him; I do not talk with him, I hold forth; I am not with him, I "stage" him. And it is because I rediscover and recognise myself everywhere that I can decipher in this imagining the law of my heart, and read my destiny there: these feelings, this desire, this drive to spoil the simplest things, necessarily means my solitariness, at the very instant in which I try, in imagination, to dispel it. Consequently, to imagine is not so much a behaviour towards others which intends them as quasi-presences on an essential ground of absence; it is rather to intend oneself as a movement of freedom which makes itself world and finally anchors itself in this world as its destiny. Through what it imagines, therefore, consciousness aims at the original movement which discloses itself in dreams. Thus, dreaming is not a singularly powerful and vivid way of imagining. On the contrary, imagining is to take aim at oneself in the moment of dreaming; it is to dream oneself dreaming.

And just as dreams of death appeared to us to disclose the ultimate meaning of the dream, no doubt there are certain forms of imagination which, linked to death, show with the greatest clarity what, at bottom, imagination is. In the movement of imagination it is always myself that I derealise as presence to this very world; and I experience this world (not another one, this very one) as entirely new to my presence, as penetrated by my presence, as belonging to me as mine. Through this world, which is only the cosmogony of my existence, I can rediscover the entire trajectory of my freedom, fathom its every direction, and totalise it as the curve of a destiny. When I imagine the return of Peter, to have an image of Peter crossing the threshold is not essential; what is essential is that my presence, inclining to dreamlike ubiquity, spread itself out on this side and on that side of the doorway: find itself wholly in the thoughts of the arriving Peter and in my own thoughts as I wait, in his smile and in my pleasure, aiming at this meeting as a fulfilment. The imagination does not tend to halt the movement of existence, but to totalise it. One always imagines the decisive, the definitive, that which is thenceforward going to be closed. What we imagine is of the order of a solution, not a task. Happiness and unhappiness are inscribed in the imagination's register, not duty and virtue. This is why the major forms of imagination are aligned with suicide. Or rather, suicide appears as the absolute of imaginary behaviours: every suicidal desire is filled by that world in which I would no longer be present here, or there, but everywhere, in every sector: a world transparent to me and signifying its indebtedness to my absolute presence. Suicide is not a way of cancelling the world or myself, or the two together, but a way of rediscovering the original moment in which I make myself world, in which space is still no more than directedness of existence, and time the movement of its history.[67] To commit suicide is the ultimate mode of imagining; to try to characterise suicide in the realistic terms of suppression is to doom oneself to misunderstanding it. Only an anthropology of the imagination can ground psychology and an ethics of suicide.

Let us hold on for the moment only to the notion that suicide is the ultimate myth, the "Last Judgement" of the imagination, as the dream is its genesis, its absolute origin.

Hence, one cannot define the imaginary as the inverse function, the negative index, of reality. No doubt it develops readily on the ground of absence, and the gaps and denials by which it opposes my desires are above all what refer the world back to its basis. Yet it is also through the imaginary that the original meaning of reality is disclosed. Therefore, it cannot exclude reality. At the very heart of perception it can throw into bright light the secret and hidden power at work in the most manifest forms of presence. To be sure, Peter's absence and my dismay prompt me to dream that dream in which my existence goes forth to meet Peter. But in his presence, too, before that face which today I am reduced to imagining, I can already summon up Peter in imagination, not as elsewhere or as different, but as there, where he was, just as he was. This Peter who is seated there before me is not imaginary in that his actuality might have duplicated itself and might have assigned me another, virtual Peter (the Peter I hypothesise, desire, anticipate), but is imaginary in that, at this privileged moment, he is, for me, precisely himself, Peter. He it is, toward whom I go, whose encounter promises me certain satisfactions. His friendship for me is located there, somewhere, on that trajectory of my existence I am already tracing out. His friendship marks the moment in which directions will change, or where, perhaps, they will regain their initial orientation and simply run their course. To imagine Peter when I am perceiving him thus is not to have, alongside him, an image of him as older, or as in some other place and time, but to grasp once more that original movement of our existences whose precocious concurrence can make up a single world more fundamental than that system of actuality which today defines our common presence in this room. Then my perception itself, while remaining perception,

[67] In certain schizophrenics, the theme of suicide is linked to the myth of rebirth.

becomes imaginary by the sole fact that it finds its coordinates in the directions of existence itself. Imaginary, too, my words and feelings, this conversation I am now having with Peter, this friendship. Yet not false, for all that, nor illusory. The imaginary is not a mode of unreality, but indeed a mode of actuality, a way of approaching presence obliquely to bring out its primordial dimensions.

Gaston Bachelard is absolutely right when he shows the imagination at work in the intimate recesses of perception, and the secret labour which transforms the object one is perceiving into an object of contemplation. "One understands forms by their transformation"; then, beyond the norms of objective truth, "the realism of unreality holds sway."[68] No one has better understood the dynamic work of the imagination and the incessantly vectorial nature of its movement. But should we also follow Bachelard when he shows this movement culminating in the image, and the thrust of the image installing itself of its own accord within the dynamism of the imagination?

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On the contrary, the image does not seem to be made of the same stuff as the imagination. The image which takes shape as a crystallised form and which almost always borrows its vivacity from memory, does indeed play the part of a substitute for the reality, functioning as the *analogon* which we earlier denied to imagination. When I imagine Peter's return, or what we shall first say to each other, I do not, strictly speaking, have an image, and what bears me along is solely the movement signifying this eventual meeting — whatever it may bring, that is, in excitement or bitterness, exultation or dismay. But here is Peter, all of a sudden, "in image," in that somber attire and that lurking smile I know him by. Did this image serve to complete the movement of my imagination and fill it with what it was still lacking? Absolutely not: for I soon cease imagining. Even if it should persist for a while, this image does not fail to refer me, sooner or later, to my actual perception, to those white walls around me that exclude the presence of Peter. The image is not given at the culminating moment of imagination, but at the moment of its alteration. The image mimes the presence of Peter, the imagination goes forth to encounter him. To have an image is therefore to leave off imagining.

The image is impure, therefore, and precarious. Impure, because always of the order of the "as if." To a certain extent, it will shape itself within that movement of the imagination which reinstates the very directions of existence, but it will feign an identification of these directions with the dimensions of perceived space, and of this movement, with the mobility of the perceived object. By presenting my meeting with Peter in this very room, and a conversation of such and such words, the image enables me to elude the real task of imagination: to bring to light the significance of this encounter and the movement of my existence which bears me toward it with such invincible freedom. That is why the "as if" of the image turns the authentic freedom of the imagination into the fantasy of desire. Just as it mimes perception by way of quasi-presence, so the image mimes freedom by a quasi-satisfaction of the desire.

And by the same token the image is precarious. It completely exhausts itself in its contradictory status. On the one hand, it takes the place of imagination and of that movement which refers me back toward the origin of the constituted world; at the same time, it points to this world, constituted in the perceptual mode, as its target. That is why reflection kills the image, as perception also does, whereas the one and the other reinforce and nourish imagination. When I am perceiving this doorway, I cannot have an image of Peter passing through it; and yet this room in which I find myself, with all that is familiar about it, with all the traces it bears of my past life and my projects, may ceaselessly assist me, by its very perceptual content, in imagining what the return of Peter and his reappearance in my life would mean. The image as fixation upon a quasi-presence is but the vertigo of imagination as it turns back toward the primordial meaning of presence. The image constitutes a ruse of consciousness in order to cease imagining, the moment of discouragement in the hard labour of imagining.

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Poetic expression is the manifest proof. It does not, indeed, find its greatest expansion where it finds the greatest number of substitutes for reality, where it invents the most duplications and metaphors, but, on the contrary, where it best restores presence to itself — where the proliferation of analogies well up, and where the metaphors, by neutralising each other, restore the depth to immediacy. The inventors of images discover similarities and hunt down metaphors. The imagination, in its true poetic function, meditates on identity. If it is true that the imagination circulates through a universe of images, it does not move to the

[68] Gaston Bachelard, *L'air et les songes* (Paris: Corti, 1943), p. 13.

extent that it promotes or reunites images, but to the extent that it destroys and consumes them. The imagination is in essence iconoclastic. Metaphor is the metaphysics of the image, in the sense that metaphysics is the destruction of physics. The true poet denies himself the accomplishment of desire in the image, because the freedom of imagination imposes itself on him as a task of refusal:

> While carrying out the poetic task among the freshly cleared fields of the Word in its universality, the poet — integral, avid, impressionable, and plucky — will never welcome any enterprise which might alienate that marvel which freedom in poetry is.[69]

The value of a poetic imagination is to be measured by the inner destructive power of the image.

Exactly opposite stands the morbid fantasy, and perhaps even certain crude forms of hallucination. Here, the imagination is completely enmeshed in the image. Phantasms emerge when the subject finds the free movements of its existence crushed in the presence of a quasi-perception which envelops and immobilises it. The slightest effort of the imagination stops, and is sucked into the image as if falling into its direct contradictory. The dimension of the imaginary has collapsed. The patient is left only with the capacity to have images, images all the more forceful, all the more tightly knit as the iconoclastic imagination is alienated in them. Phantasms cannot be understood, therefore, in terms of imagination deploying itself, but only in terms of imagination disenfranchised. The aim of psychotherapy should be to free the imaginary that is trapped in the image.

Yet a difficulty arises, one which is all the more important for us since it touches upon our main theme: is the dream a rhapsody of images? If it is true that images are but the imagination alienated, deflected in its undertaking, alienated in its essence, our whole analysis of the dreaming imagination is threatened by this very fact.

But are we in fact justified in speaking of dream "images"? No doubt we become conscious of a dream only by way of images, and starting from them. Yet in themselves they are given only fragmentarily and choppily: "First I was in a forest. . . , then I was at home. . . ," etc. To be sure, as everyone knows, a suddenly interrupted dream always ends on a thoroughly crystallised image.

Far from proving that the image makes up the weave of the dream, these facts show only that the image is a view-point on dream-imagination, a way for waking consciousness to retrieve its dream features. In other words, during the dream, the movement of imagination is directed toward the primary moment of existence where the original constitution of the world is achieved. Now, when trying to grasp this movement within the constituted world, waking consciousness provides it with the lines of an almost-perceived space as coordinates, and presses it towards a quasi-presence of the image. In short, the authentic current of the imagination is reversed and, against the dream itself, images are put in its place.

For the rest, the genius of Freud bears witness to this state of affairs, since he sensed clearly that the meaning of a dream was not to be sought at the level of image content. Better than anyone, he understood that the phantasmagoria of the dream hid more than it revealed, and that it was but a compromise permeated by contradictions. But the compromise is not in fact between the repressed and the censor, between the instinctive impulses and the perceptual material. It is between the authentic movement of the imaginative and its adulteration in the image. If the meaning of the dream is always beyond the images gleaned upon waking, this is not because they veil hidden forces, but because wakefulness can reach the dream only mediately, and because between waking image and dream imagination, the distance is as great as between quasi-presence in a constituted world and original presence to a world being constituted.

Analysis of a dream starting from the images supplied by waking consciousness must precisely have the goal of bridging that distance between image and imagination, or, if you will, of effecting the transcendental reduction of the imaginary.

This is the step that, in our view, Binswanger took concretely in "Dream and Existence." And it is essential that this transcendental reduction of the imaginary ultimately be one and the same thing as the passage from an anthropological analysis of dreams to an ontological analysis of the imagination. Thus is the passage from anthropology to ontology, which seems to us from the outset the major problem of the analysis of Dasein, actually accomplished.

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[69] René Char, *Fureur et Mystère* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948: 2nd ed.), p. 86 ("Partage Formel, XXXIII"). Translator's note: The passage in the French text reads: "Au cours de son action parmi les essarts de l'universitalité du Verbe, le poète intègre, avide, impressionable et téméraire se gardera de sympathiser avec les entreprises qui alièneront le prodige de la liberté en poésie." (English translation in text supplied by Mary Ann Caws.)

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We have not, of course, followed the imagination along the whole course of its movement. We have only retraced that line that connects it to the dream as to its origin and its truth. We have only followed it in its reference back to the dream by way of which it breaks away from images, in which it always risks alienation. But the moment of the dream is not the definitive form in which imagination takes shape. No doubt, the dream restores the imagination to its truth and gives it back the absolute meaning of its freedom. All imagination, to be authentic, must once more learn to dream, and "*ars poetica*" has no meaning unless it teaches us to break with the fascination of images and to reopen, for imagination, its path of freedom toward the dream that offers it, as its absolute truth, the "unshatterable kernel of night." But on the other side of the dream, the movement of imagination continues. Then imagination is taken up in the work of expression that gives a new meaning to truth and freedom:

> Then the poet can see how the contraries, — these punctual yet tumultuous mirages — turn out, how their immanent heritage becomes personified, poetry and truth being, as we know, synonymous.[70]

The image can then come forward again, no longer as imagination renounced, but on the contrary as its fulfilment. Purified in the fire of the dream, what in the dream was only alienation of the imaginative, becomes ashes, but the fire itself finds its fulfilment in the flame. The image is no longer image *of* something, totally projected toward an absence which it replaces; rather, it is gathered into itself and is given as the fullness of a presence, it is addressed to someone. Now, the image appears as a modality of expression, and achieves its meaning in a "style," if one may understand by that term the originative movement of the imagination when it becomes "the Visage willing to exchange."[71] But here we are already speaking in the register of history. Expression is language, work of art, the ethical; here lurk all problems of style, all historical moments whose objective becoming is constitutive of that world whose directional meanings for our existence are exhibited by the dream. Not that the dream is the truth of history. But in bringing forth that which in *Existenz* is most irreducible to history, the dream shows best the meaning it can take for a freedom that has not yet really achieved its universal moment in an objective expression. This is why the dream has absolute primacy for an anthropological understanding of concrete man. The surpassing of this primacy, however, is the task that lies ahead for the real man — an ethical task and an historical necessity:

> It is doubtless the property of this man so utterly at grips with Evil, whose voracious and medullary face he knows, to transform the fabricated fact into an historical one. Our restless conviction should not denigrate it, but interrogate it, we the fervent slayers of real beings in the successive person of our chimera. . . Escape into one's counterpart, with all the immense promises of poetry, will perhaps one day be possible.[72]

But all this has to do with an anthropology of expression which would be more fundamental, in our view, than an anthropology of the imagination. We do not propose to outline it at this time. We only wanted to show all that Binswanger's text could bring to an anthropological study of the imaginary. What he brought to light regarding dreams is the fundamental moment where the movement of existence discovers the decisive point of bifurcation between those images in which it becomes alienated in a pathological subjectivity, and expressions in which it fulfils itself in an objective history. The imaginary is the milieu, the "element," of this choice. Therefore, by placing at the heart of imagination the meaning of the dream, one can restore the fundamental forms of existence, and one can reveal its freedom. And one can also designate

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[70] René Char, *ibid*., "Partage Formel, XVII," p. 81. Translator's note: The passage in the French text reads: "Le poète peut alors voir les contraires, — ces mirages ponctuels et tumultueux, — aboutir, leur lignée immanente se personnifier poésie et vérité, étant, come nous savons, synonymes." (English translation in text supplied by Mary Ann Caws.)

[71] René Char, *ibid*., "Partage Formel, XXXVII," p. 87. Translator's note: The passage in the French text reads: "Il ne dépend que de la nécessité et de votre volupté qui me créditent que j'aie ou non le Visage de l'échange." (English translation in text supplied by Mary Ann Caws.)

[72] René Char, *ibid*., "Partage Formel, LV," p. 92. Translator's note: The passage in the French text reads: "Sans doute appartient-il à cet homme de fond en comble aux prises avec le mal dont il connait le visage vorace et médullaire, de transformer le fait fabuleux en fait historique. Notre conviction inquiète ne doit le dénigrer, mais l'interroger, nous fervents tueurs d'êtres réels dans la personne successive de notre chimère. . . L'évasion dans son semblable avec d'immenses promesses de poésie sera peut-être un jour possible." (English translation in text supplied by Mary Ann Caws.)

its happiness and its unhappiness, since the unhappiness of existence is always writ in alienation, and happiness, in the empirical order, can only be the happiness of expression.