

ESSAYS IN ORDER: NO. 5

✓THE NECESSITY
OF POLITICS

AN ESSAY ON THE REPRESENTATIVE
IDEA IN THE CHURCH
AND MODERN EUROPE

BY

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the University of Berlin*

With an Introduction

BY

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
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INTRODUCTION *

BY CHRISTOPHER DAWSON

DR. CARL SCHMITT, the author of the present Essay, though still a comparatively young man, has gained a wide reputation, not only in Germany, during the last twelve years by his works on political philosophy and constitutional law. He represents a point of view which is too little regarded in this country—that of the scientific jurist. Owing to the domination of Common Law in England, legal studies have played a much smaller part in our universities than in those of the Continent, and our whole attitude to legal questions has been predominantly practical and professional. No doubt there are advantages in the English tradition, but for all that it has undoubtedly involved a certain loss of balance in our intellectual life. We have our philosophers and we have our men of action, but, apart from a few gifted amateurs, like Bentham and Austen, or a Scotsman like Sir Henry Maine, we have had no class of scientific jurists, and consequently there has been

* A part of this essay originally appeared in the *English Review*, and thanks are due to the Editor for allowing a reprint here.

a loss of contact between scientific thought and social life. This affects our attitude not only to politics, but also to religion. To the English mind religion is essentially a private matter, a question of personal opinion. Not only has it no business to interfere in political life, but it has no public character : there is no objective relation between the inner life of the individual and the public life of society.

Against this attitude Professor Schmitt, writing as a Catholic and a jurist, defends the public and representative conception. From the subjectivist point of view the Catholic claim to social authority and its tendency to legal formalism appear as monstrous perversions of the religious ideal. But to a Catholic and a jurist like Professor Schmitt, the public and representative character of Catholicism is a proof of its truth and its universality. For religion is not to be identified with a particular element in life. It is the ordering of life as a whole—the moulding of social and historical reality into a living spiritual unity. Hence, the great paradox of Catholicism ; its union of authoritative exclusiveness with spiritual catholicity—its power to embrace the most diverse and apparently contradictory elements—is not, as its adversaries believe, a sign of unbounded ambition or

unscrupulous opportunism but a manifestation of the creative power of its organic life. The power that arose among the most irreconcilable of the Oriental subject peoples, the power that defied all the traditions of the ancient world and stood for all that Rome was not, was also the power that took to itself the Roman name and incorporated everything that was living in the tradition of ancient culture. As Péguy has written :

*“ Il allait hériter de la terre et de Rome
Et de la mer violette et de l’âpre Sion.*

*Et du Tibre latin et du pouvoir suprême
Et des peuples couchés sous la nécessité.*

*Il allait hériter du monde occidental,
De celui qui commence où finissait le monde
Il allait hériter de la vague profonde
Et des refoulements du monde orientale.*

*C’était lui qui marchait derrière le Romain,
Derrière le préfet, derrière la cohorte.
C’était lui qui passait par cette haute porte.
Il était le seigneur de hier et de demain.”*

And if this was the case in the ancient world, it is still more so to-day, since Christianity has entered so deeply into the life of Europe that it cannot be separated from it without inflicting a mortal wound on Western civilisation. It is true that European culture has undergone a process of secularisation that has destroyed the old formal relation between

Church and State, but for all that it has continued to depend on Christianity for its spiritual vitality even though it is no longer conscious of its dependence. Europe is no longer Christendom, and Christendom itself is no longer the Catholic Church, but the true foundation of the European community is nevertheless a spiritual one and it finds its centre in Catholicism, for the Catholic Church is the living heart of the Christian tradition as Christianity is the spiritual basis of the European tradition. Consequently today, when the process of secularisation has reached a climax and the Christian element in our civilisation is more seriously threatened than ever before, we must realise that our civilisation itself is being threatened and by the same forces. This is the central fact in the present situation. Ever since the war Europe has been fighting a losing battle with the forces of dissolution. The world supremacy that European civilisation possessed in the last century is a thing of the past and to-day its very existence is in danger.

It is not merely that Western industry and finance have lost their old monopoly in the world market, or that the political supremacy of Europe is being challenged by the insurrection of Oriental nationalism. Far more serious is the disappearance of the moral prestige of

Western civilisation and the denial of its spiritual and intellectual standards of value. The superiority of European culture has come to be regarded as a Victorian prejudice, and we are no longer convinced that our civilisation is worth saving, even if it is still possible to save it. Faced by a situation that demands vigorous action and heroic remedies, the average European intellectual seems prepared only to lie down and die.

Actually, although the material situation of Europe is difficult enough, it is far from hopeless. If Western Europe is considered as a unity, it is still the strongest, the most civilised, the richest and (with the exception of China) the most numerous society in the world. It still leads the world in science and thought and material culture. Even the United States for all their wealth and prosperity are in a very real sense dependent on the civilisation of Western Europe, and if the latter were to disappear it is at least highly doubtful whether American civilisation would be able to carry on.

Unfortunately, Europe is neither spiritually nor materially united. Apart from the external feuds that divide the Western nations and the class conflict that destroys the inner unity of every European state, there is a still more profound disunity of spirit that divides the European

mind against itself. The greatest enemies of Europe are the leaders of European public opinion. Whenever a fresh attack is made by the external enemies of Europe, it is sure to find apologists and sympathisers within the camp. And these are not necessarily traitors, they are more often well-meaning enthusiasts who have no clear conception of what is at stake.

The present situation in Spain is typical. The minority of atheists and social revolutionaries, whose activities are so much in evidence, would not be formidable if they were not able to take advantage of the passive complicity of the leaders of public opinion, who are more intent on the building of democratic castles in Spain than on preserving the foundations of social order. In the same way, if the British Empire falls, it will be due not so much to the efforts of Russian Bolshevists and Oriental Nationalists or to the competition of our economic rivals, as to the misguided idealism of our own political and intellectual leaders.

The latter in so far as they are imbued with the current liberal-socialist ideology pay very little attention to the concrete dangers that threaten Western civilisation. Their energies are absorbed in denouncing Capitalism and class privilege, Imperialism and Militarism, religious obscurantism and traditional morality ;

and these abstractions tend in practice to be identified with the whole existing order of European society. Hence, they look with tolerance on all the forces that are in revolt against it. To them Bolshevism is a great social experiment, not perhaps wholly suited to English conditions, but nevertheless deserving of our general appreciation and sympathy. Oriental nationalism stands for the same ideals of liberty and social progress as Western democracy. Our economic difficulties are due not to external causes but to the exploitation of our own capitalists. There is no need to worry about the dangers of war and revolution. All we have to do is to disarm and meet our enemies with a generous gesture of renunciation and all will be well.

To the traditionalist this alliance of liberal humanitarianism with the forces of destruction appears so insane that he is tempted to see in it the influence of political corruption or the sinister action of some hidden hand. It must, however, be recognised that it is no new phenomenon ; in fact, it has formed part of the liberal tradition from the beginning. The movement which created the ideals of liberal humanitarianism was also the starting point of the modern revolutionary propaganda which is equally directed against social order

and traditional morality and the Christian faith.

Even the anti-imperialist propaganda of the modern Oriental nationalist which represents the history of European colonial expansion as a series of crimes against humanity can trace its pedigree back to the Abbé Raynal ; and the religious policy of Russian communism is but the practical application of Voltaire's famous maxim—*écrasez l'Infâme*.

No doubt the worthy who looked forward to the day when " the last King should be strangled in the bowels of the last priest " would no more approve of the present order of things in Russia than did the late M. Clemenceau ; but it was he and his like who first started the conflagration that is now spreading from one end of the world to the other.

But though this subversive element forms part of the original deposit of the faith of liberalism it has never been predominant save in the first delirious years of the French Revolution. Throughout the nineteenth century the extremists were in exile in Swiss pensions and Bloomsbury boarding-houses, and the ideals of English parliamentary liberalism were in the ascendant. Under the leadership of men like Bentham and the two Mills, Guizot and de Tocqueville, Cobden and Gladstone,

liberalism shed its revolutionary associations and became almost aggressively respectable. Far from being anti-religious or antinomian, it allied itself with the strictest sect of Protestant Evangelicalism. Indeed, the great social and humanitarian reforms of the nineteenth century, at least in this country, owe even more to the influence of religion than to that of political liberalism. As M. Halévy has pointed out, the political idealism of the French liberals was powerless to free the slaves of the Antilles, it was the religious inspiration of Wilberforce and his friends that carried the day.

No doubt these nineteenth century philanthropists, with their moral solemnity, their religious prejudices and their personal mannerisms, appear highly ridiculous in the light of the modern Stracheyan intelligence. But for all that they did more to reduce the sum of human suffering than any body of men before or since.

They abolished the slave trade and reformed the incredible injustices of the penal code. They brought light into the dark places of the earth—the prisons and mad-houses and slave barracoons. They freed the children from the mines and the factories and inaugurated the social control of the conditions of industry in an age when organised labour was still powerless to help itself.

The success of the humanitarian movement was primarily due to a working alliance between the forces of political reform and religious idealism. But it was not confined to any single group or party ; it was essentially the common achievement of Western society. It appealed to every element of European culture, not only to liberal freethinkers like Bentham and Godwin, but to orthodox conservatives like Shaftesbury and Michael Sadler, to Wordsworth and Southey no less than to Shelley and Lamartine, to Catholic prelates, such as Ketteler and Manning, as well as to visionary enthusiasts like St. Simon and Pierre Leroux. Indeed, so universal was the acceptance of the humanitarian ideal that the average Englishman takes it for granted as something inevitable and fails to realise how recent and exceptional a phenomenon it is. After all, it is hardly more than a century since an English king abolished the use of judicial torture in Hanover, it is less than a century since Parliament abolished slavery and introduced the first Factory Act, while the emancipation of the Russian serfs and the slaves of the American plantations only dates from the 'sixties of the last century.

Consequently, it is still too early to judge whether the humanitarian movement of the nineteenth century represents a permanent

gain or whether it is a temporary achievement like that of Greek democracy. Certainly since the war there are ominous signs of an anti-humanitarian reaction. We have seen the revival of political terrorism and religious persecution, the massacre and intimidation of minorities and the emergence of the gunman and the professional assassin. Torture seems to have become an accepted part of police methods alike in Eastern Europe and in America, while in Russia a large section of the population has been reduced to a condition hardly distinguishable from serfdom.

No doubt it may be said that this reaction is mainly confined to the outer lands which had never really assimilated the ideals of Western humanitarianism. But even in so far as this is true (for it is only partially true), it does not go to the root of the matter. The significant fact in the present situation is not that certain countries have failed to reach the higher standards of Western Europe, but that Western Europe has lost the prestige by which it was once able to impose these standards on the rest of the world.

To the modern Russian, Indian and Chinese, Western Europe stands not for liberal ideas and humane institutions but for tyranny and cruelty.

The fantastic Russian posters and films which depict Frenchmen burning negroes at the stake and Englishmen driving coolies to work under the lash, are but the most extreme instances of the anti-Western propaganda that has convinced the more backward peoples of their own moral superiority and has taught them to regard the humanitarian standards of European civilisation as a mere sham.

Hence, the disadvantage under which Western Europe and, most of all, Great Britain labours in their dealings with Oriental peoples. The Englishman's hands are tied by his own principles, so that he cannot in good conscience suppress Oriental unrest by Oriental methods. But the Russian and the Oriental are fettered by no such inhibitions. They can act with all the ruthlessness of their own pre-humanitarian tradition and yet feel that they are morally superior to the Western peoples. This is strikingly exemplified in the attitude of the Russian Government in its dealings with the Kulaks. When Western critics protest against the atrocity in the wholesale "liquidation" of millions of peasants, they reply with an air of injured innocence that their behaviour is at least more humane than that of capitalist societies, which in similar circumstances would not merely "liquidate" but would "physically

annihilate" their disloyal minorities. And it is quite possible that they believe what they say, since they have entirely lost sight of the real conditions of Western society in their concentration on the iniquities of that mythological Mumbo Jumbo—the capitalist system. Actually, it is impossible to conceive of any Western government dealing with its unemployed as the Bolsheviki have dealt with the Kulaks, and were they to do so there would be such a universal outburst of indignation as would inevitably lead to international action and perhaps to foreign intervention.

But in the case of the Kulaks there has been no such outburst. The socialists and the liberal intelligentsia have shut their eyes to the vast tragedy of human suffering that is involved in the policy of "liquidation." They regard it as a necessary step towards the creation of a new order which will put an end to the exploitation of man by man.* Their foremost repre-

* It is of course necessary to understand the term "exploitation" in a Socialist or Pickwickian sense. A Western artisan who earns high wages under good conditions of work is always a wage slave and a victim of exploitation. But the Kulak, who is deported from his village, together with his wife and children, and sent to compulsory labour in the peat bogs and forests of the far North is not being exploited; he is merely a reformed exploiter.

sentative, Mr. Bernard Shaw,* sees in the Soviet system nothing but the apotheosis of Fabian Socialism and in Lenin merely a consistent disciple of Lord Passfield. He entirely ignores the vital moral issue that is involved in the treatment of the disenfranchised classes. The Russian system is efficient and it is equalitarian, and that is all that matters.

No doubt their attitude can be justified by the principle which Prince Mirsky, one of the latest converts to communism, has laid down in his recent book on Lenin, namely, that "the one standard of human behaviour is whether it contributes to or hinders the cause of socialism." But what then is left of the humanitarian principles to which socialism formerly appealed? If humanity can be outraged in one class simply because its existence is an obstacle to the Five Year Plan, the majority can also be treated in the same ruthless fashion when the needs of the economic system require it. We are back again in the world of Oriental ideas in which human suffering and the sacrifice of the individual personality are of no account before the impersonal and inhuman forces that govern the state and the world.

These ideals, whether represented by the old autocracy of a god-king, or the new absolutism

* In *The Times*, August 13th, 1931.

of a mass dictatorship, are in absolute contradiction to the characteristically Western ideal of a society based on moral principles and on the rights of the human personality. And however confident we may be of the intrinsic superiority of this ideal, we cannot be as certain of its power to prevail, as were the men of the last century. Its future is bound up with the future of Western civilisation, and to-day there can be little doubt that civilisation is in very grave danger. Another European war on the scale of the last one—above all a war in which Russia and Germany and Italy were ranged against France and Poland and Yugo-Slavia—would almost undoubtedly consummate the ruin of Europe. And even if we avoid this catastrophe, there is no less danger of a gradual collapse under the increasing pressure of economic strain, anti-European propaganda and social disaffection.

What is the position of the Catholic Church in this conflict? It is obvious that she cannot look with indifference on the issue, for there is far more at stake than political and economic interests. The enemies of Western civilisation see in the Church the most formidable obstacle to the success of their plans, and it is against her, as we see once more in Spain to-day, that their most intense hostility is directed. The victory of the forces of revolution would almost inevit-

ably result in a deliberate attempt to de-Christianise European society, to destroy the influence and liberty of the Church and to replace traditional moral standards by a new code that is fundamentally irreconcilable with the Christian view of life.

Yet, on the other hand, the Church cannot identify her cause with the cause of Western civilisation and proclaim a new crusade against the enemies of Europe and of the Faith. Europe has long ceased to be Christendom in the mediæval sense and to-day it can be described as a Christian society only in the vague sense in which we speak of England as a Protestant state or Italy as a Catholic one.

For centuries the dominant forces in Western culture have rejected all allegiance to the Church and any definite relation to Christianity.

This is particularly true in the economic and political spheres. Although Bolshevik propaganda delights to dwell on the alliance of religion and capitalism and represents the Church as the tool of the cosmopolitan financier, it is perfectly obvious that the spirit of modern capitalist industrialism is profoundly alien from that of Catholicism and has a far closer affinity to the spirit of communism. Marxian socialism is the illegitimate offspring of a surreptitious union between Ricardian economics and revolu-

tionary liberalism, and the whole family is outside the pale of the Church.

If to-day the Church prefers capitalism to socialism as the lesser of two evils, she has never ceased to protest against the injustices it has entailed or to assert the need for reform. But her criticisms of the capitalist system are just the reverse of those of the socialist. She does not reject either private property or the existence of economic inequality ; what she condemns is precisely that denial of the primacy of the spiritual and that subordination of moral values to material interests which attain a still more complete and conscious development in the communist state.

So, too, with regard to politics ; the two main forces that have governed the political development of modern Europe—liberalism and nationalism—have both tended to be hostile to the Church and indifferent to Christianity. The absolutism of the National State is irreconcilable with the Christian ideals of peace and international justice, while that of the liberals has tended to the denial of the principle of authority and the complete secularisation of social and political life. All through the nineteenth century the Church was fighting a defensive battle against the forces of revolution as represented by the national Risorgimento in

Italy and the anti-clerical liberalism of France. And it might well seem that the effect of the victory of these forces would be to banish the Church from the public life of Europe and to destroy all possibilities of co-operation between Catholicism and modern European civilisation.

Actually, however, this has not been the case. As the dust of conflict subsides the true issues for which men fought appear in their true proportions. The fact that the French Republican tradition was associated with anti-clerical principles did not prevent Leo XIII. from calling on French Catholics to rally to the Republic, and Pius XI. has recognised the rights of Italian nationality although the Italian Risorgimento had disregarded the rights of the Church.

As Professor Schmitt has said, the Church has the power to embrace all the vital elements of human civilisation, and she is the heir of those who knew her not. And this is especially evident in the history of the liberal tradition, which we have been considering.

Although it began in the eighteenth century in open hostility to the Christian tradition, the humanitarian movement, which was its greatest positive achievement, is entirely in harmony with that tradition and owes its success to its co-operation with it. Not only has the Church

no quarrel with the humanitarian policy of social reform and the principle of the moral responsibility of the State for the conditions of life of the working classes ; she has made them her own and has shown by the encyclicals of Leo XIII. and Pius XI. that they find their essential basis in Christian morals.

In the same way, in spite of the conflict of the Church with the revolutionary liberalism of the last century, she has no quarrel with the democratic political ideals. Indeed, those ideas of natural rights and of the community as the source of political authority which are often regarded as the creation of modern liberalism find their origin, as Dr. Carlyle has so abundantly shown, in the ancient tradition of Christian political thought.

In short, everything that is vital and permanent in Western culture has its place in the Catholic tradition, and however secularised modern European society has become, it cannot altogether lose contact with that tradition without ceasing to be itself.

And this is the real issue before us to-day. If we attempt to cut ourselves loose from our spiritual moorings, to disavow the moral foundations of social life, and to construct a new civilisation founded on economic materialism and the technological efficiency, it means the

suicide of Western culture. For, as Pius X. once said, "Civilisation has no longer to be discovered, nor the new city to be built in the clouds. It has existed and it exists ; it is the Christian civilisation—the Catholic city. It is only necessary to keep on founding and rebuilding it on its natural and divine foundations."

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

THE NECESSITY OF POLITICS

I. APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN CATHOLIC POLICY

THERE is an anti-Roman "complex." With a colossal mustering of religious and political energies this "complex" fosters that war against popery, jesuitry and clericalism which has agitated European history for centuries past. Not only fanatical sectarians, but whole generations of devout Protestants and Greek orthodox Christians have seen in Rome Antichrist or the Babylonian Woman of the Apocalypse. This mental image has had more profound and far-reaching effects than any economic calculation, and its consequences are still with us. As late as Gladstone or, for instance, in Bismarck's *Musings and Memories*, a nervous uneasiness may be sensed the moment intriguing Jesuits or exalted ecclesiastics appear on the scene.

And yet the emotional, or rather the mythological, battery of the German *Kulturkampf*,

indeed the entire modern campaign against the Vatican, including the machinations responsible for the French separation of Church and State, are all harmless compared with the demonic hate of a Cromwell. From the eighteenth century onward, the controversy has grown more and more rationalistic, or humanitarian, utilitarian, and shallow. It is only in a Russian Orthodox—Dostoievsky—that the anti-Roman bugbear rises once again to epic heights, as may be seen in his portrait of the Grand Inquisitor.

In a variety of subtle *nuances* and gradations, the ancient dread of the intangible political power of Roman Catholicism still lingers on. It is not difficult to understand that a Protestant Anglo-Saxon face to face with the "Papal Machine" finds all his pet antipathies aroused; he realises that here is a tremendous hierarchal administrative power, bent on controlling religious life, and in the hands of men who on principle decline to have a family. In other words, a Celibate Bureaucracy! A phenomenon of this nature cannot but arouse alarm in the breast of one possessing the Anglo-Saxon domestic instincts and the Anglo-Saxon repugnance for any form of bureaucratic control.

Nevertheless, the feeling of alarm is more or

less inarticulate. There remains a reproach, commonly voiced in the history of parliamentary and democratic thought during the nineteenth century, that Catholic policy is nothing more or less than a boundless opportunism.

The policy's elasticity is indeed amazing. It concludes alliances with conflicting movements and groups ; times without number its adherents have given evidence of the diversity of governments and parties with which it has entered into a coalition. According to the political star in the ascendant, it has sided with absolutists or anti-monarchists ; in the Holy Alliance subsequent to 1815, it proved a stronghold of reaction and the enemy of all liberal freedom, and yet claimed for itself in other countries, in the teeth of frenzied opposition, that very freedom which it denounced, more particularly liberty of education and the freedom of the Press ; in European monarchies it preaches the alliance of the Altar and the Throne, whilst in the peasant democracies of the Swiss Cantons or in North America it contrives to be a wholehearted supporter of a thoroughgoing Democracy. Men of such eminence as Montalembert, de Tocqueville and Lacordaire were already representative of a liberal Catholicism at a time when many of their co-religionists still saw in liberalism

Antichrist or at least his forerunner. Catholic Royalists and Catholic Legitimists appear no less in evidence than Catholic champions of Republicanism. Some Catholics are tactical allies of a socialism which other Catholics consider to be of the Devil, and some Catholics were actually trafficking with Bolshevists at a time when the latter were regarded by the *bourgeois* champions of the sanctity of private property as a gang of robbers and outlaws. With every change in the political situation, every principle would seem to change, with the exception of one—that of the sovereign power of Catholicism.

“The Church demands every liberty from her opponents in the light of their principles, and denies them those liberties in the light of her own.”

How often have pacifists of *bourgeois*, socialistic or anarchistic persuasion put forward the spectacle of dignitaries of the Church blessing the guns of all the nations at war ! Or that of those “Neo-Catholic” men of letters who blend monarchism with communism. Or, to cite a sociological instance of an altogether different type, that of the French Abbé, the favourite of court ladies, in contrast with the Irish Franciscan encouraging strikers to make a firm stand ! Apparently incongruous types and alliances such

as these are trotted out for our benefit again and again.

A great deal of this many-sidedness and ambiguity—the double face, the Janus head, the “hermaphroditic” attitude (to use Byron’s expression)—can easily be explained by political or sociological analogies. In accordance with the tactics of political warfare, any party which possesses a consistent philosophy is at liberty to form alliances with the most divergent groups. This applies no less to earnest socialism, if based on a radical principle, than to Catholicism.

The national movement, according to the geographical position of a particular country, has allied itself in some cases with a legitimate monarchy, in others with a democratic republic. From the standpoint of a universal philosophy, all political forms and potentialities are merely tools of the idea to be realised. Moreover, much that at first sight appears inconsistent is but the outcome and concomitant of a political universalism.

That the Roman Church, as an historical complex and administrative organ, perpetuates the universalism of the Roman Imperium is conceded with a truly remarkable unanimity by all parties. Nationalistic Frenchmen, to cite Charles Maurras as a characteristic representative, Teutonic racial theorists such as Houston

Stewart Chamberlain, German professors of liberal origins such as Max Weber, a Pan-Slavonic poet and visionary like Dostoievsky, all take this continuity of the Catholic Church and the Roman Empire as the basis of their arguments.

Every world-empire is involved in a certain relationship with a variegated assortment of views and opinions, hence also a standpoint which is, while uncompromisingly above local idiosyncrasies, at the same time imbued with a tolerant spirit of opportunism in matters of no vital importance. In this respect the world-empire of ancient Rome and that of Great Britain have many points of resemblance. Every form of imperialism that is something more than jingoism pure and simple, embraces seeming contradictories, conservatism and liberalism, tradition and progress, and even militarism and pacifism. This is abundantly exemplified throughout the political history of England, from the contrast between Burke and Warren Hastings to that between Lloyd George and Churchill or Lord Curzon.

The political idea of Catholicism, however, is not by any means defined by this allusion to the characteristic features of every universal system. Other systems must be taken into account only because the feeling of alarm inspired by a

universal administrative machine frequently has its origin in a natural reaction of national or local susceptibilities. Particularly in the strongly centralised organisation of Rome, many a patriot must feel himself cold-shouldered and deceived in his hopes. It was an Irishman who, in the bitterness of his national pride, opined that Ireland was just "a pinch of snuff in the Roman snuff-box." Or, as he might have preferred to express it, "a chicken that a prelate could drop into the pot he was boiling for the cosmopolitan restaurant."

On the other hand, it is precisely from their Catholicism that peoples so Catholic as the Tyrolese, the Poles and the Irish derive much of their power to resist a foreign oppressor, and not only, be it observed, when that oppressor is also a foe of the Church. Cardinal Mercier of Malines, as well as Bishop Korum of Treves, represented national dignity and consciousness on a far more magnificent and impressive scale than commerce and industry ever did; and, moreover, at a time when each seemed confronted by an antagonist who, far from being an adversary of the Church, was anxious to ally his interests with hers.

Such phenomena can no more be explained by mere political or sociological deductions from the nature of universalism than the anti-Roman

“ complex ” can be explained by national or local reactions against universalism and centralisation, even though nearly every world-empire in history has evoked such reactions.

The anti-Roman “ complex ” would be more profoundly understood if it were realised to what extent the Catholic Church is a *complexio oppositorum*. There would seem to be no contrast which her comprehensiveness does not embrace. For ages she has been able to boast that she unites in herself every form of government and executive power, that she is an autocratic monarchy, the supreme head of which is elected from the aristocracy of the College of Cardinals, and yet in which there is such democracy that, in the words of Dupanloup, the humblest shepherd-lad of the Abruzzi, regardless of birth and station, stands a chance of eventually becoming this autocrat. The Church’s history furnishes instances of amazing adaptability and of rigid intransigence, of a capacity for manly resistance and for womanly yielding, of pride and humility strangely intermingled. It is difficult to realise that a rigid philosophic exponent of the authoritarian principle of dictatorship, such as the Spanish diplomatist, Donoso Cortes, and a rebel like Padraic Pearse, devoting himself in the spirit of Franciscan charity to the unfortunate Irish

people and allying himself with syndicalists, were both devout Catholics.

In the realm of theology also, the *complexio oppositorum* everywhere holds sway. Old and New Testament are alike canonical scripture. Marcion's alternative "Either . . . Or" receives the consistent answer "Both." In the doctrine of the Trinity so many elements of a Divine Immanence have been added to Jewish Monotheism and its absolute Transcendence, that here, too, there are many possibilities of mediation between diverse schools of thought. For her veneration of the saints the Church was commended by the French atheists and the German metaphysicians who rediscovered polytheism in the nineteenth century, and for whom it represented a healthy manifestation of the pagan spirit. On the fundamental thesis on which all the doctrines of consistently anarchistic political philosophy and sociology are founded—that man is "naturally good," not "naturally bad"—the definitions of Trent make no categorical decision. Rather, in contradistinction to the Protestant doctrine of an absolute corruption of man's nature, Trent speaks only of a wounding, weakening or clouding of human nature, thus admitting in its practical application a host of qualifications and adaptations.

This combination of contrasts extends to the

profoundest social and psychological roots of human motives and ideas. The Pope, as his name indicates, is the Father, and the Church the Mother of the Faithful and the Bride of Christ—an admirable combination of the patriarchal and matriarchal principles, which directs Romewards in a united stream two of the most elemental human complexes and instincts, namely, the respect due to a father and the love due to a mother. Who can find it in his heart to revolt against his mother?

Finally, and this is the most important point of all, this boundless adaptability is, in its turn, allied to a most exact and rigid dogmatic system, and to a capacity for reaching momentous decisions such as culminated in the doctrine of Papal Infallibility.

II. THE "COMPLEX OF OPPOSITES" AND A FALSE DUALISM

REGARDED as a political principle, the Catholic *complexio oppositorum* essentially consists in a formal transcendence of the material aspects of human life, such as up to the present no other form of imperialism has known. A substantial moulding of historical and social reality has here been achieved, which, despite its formal

character, is yet a concrete living fact, though it is rational in the highest degree.

This formal and distinctive aspect of Catholicism is based on a rigorous application of the principle of representation. The fact is very clearly demonstrated by the contrast it presents with the economic-technological school of thought so prevalent to-day. But we must first remove a possible misunderstanding.

The spiritual eclecticism which seeks to establish, as with so many other systems, a romantic or Hegelian kinship with Catholicism, might tempt us to treat the Catholic *complexio* as one of numerous other syntheses and rashly to imagine that we had thus construed the essence of Catholicism. Metaphysicians of the speculative post-Kantian school of philosophy have been accustomed to regard organic and historic life as a series of eternal antitheses and syntheses. The various *rôles* in the drama can, of course, be allotted *ad libitum*. When Catholicism represents for Görres the masculine and Protestantism the feminine principle, he reduces the former to a mere antithetical member of a complete synthesis, which will consist in some "higher third."

Catholicism can, of course, equally be made to represent the feminine and Protestantism the masculine principle. Moreover, as we should

expect, these speculative system-builders have sometimes found in Catholicism itself their "higher third." For writers of the romantic school with Catholic sympathies, this idea has a particularly strong appeal, though they, too, cannot refrain from exhorting the Church to emancipate herself from jesuitry and mediæval scholasticism in order to evolve, from the external fabric of her formal dogma and the invisible interiority represented by Protestantism, an organism superior to both. Such is the foundation on which an apparently typical misunderstanding is based.

All the same, such speculations must be considered as decidedly more than idle fancies. They are, indeed, though it may seem a paradox, in harmony with the spirit of our age, for their intellectual structure corresponds with an actual situation. Their point of departure is, in fact, a real cleavage and dissension, antitheses that call for a synthesis, or a polarity having its "neutral zone," a state of distracted questioning and profound indecision, from which the only hope of advance lies in self-negation, in order, by that negation, to arrive at some positive mental attitude.

A fundamental dualism is undoubtedly predominant everywhere to-day, and in the course of this essay there will be frequent occasion to

refer to its various manifestations. Their common ground is a conception of Nature which has been developed in a modern world revolutionised by mechanical and industrial achievements. To-day Nature is presented as the contrary pole of the mechanised world of the great cities, which, like some cubist nightmare, encumber the earth with their geometrical figures of metal, plate glass and concrete. The antithesis in this realm of technical efficiency is Nature, wild, untamed, untouched by the hand of civilisation, a reservation "into which man may not bring his tormented spirit."

To the Catholic conception of Nature such a division of the universe into a rationalistic mechanised world of human toil and a natural world, romantic and inviolate, is absolutely foreign. Catholic nations, it would seem, have a relationship to the soil that differs radically from that of Protestant races, possibly because they are, in contrast to Protestant nations, mainly agricultural peoples, strangers to large-scale industrialism. Certainly, the main fact is undeniable. Why is there no Catholic emigration, at least not on the grand scale of the Huguenots or even of the Puritans? There have been plenty of Catholic emigrants, among them Irish, Poles, Italians and Croats, in fact, the majority of emigrants have been of necessity

Catholics, for the Catholic nations have usually been poorer than the Protestant. Poverty, distress and persecution have been responsible for this emigration, but the emigrants have never lost their longing for home.

Compared with such unfortunate exiles, the Huguenot or the Puritan displays an energy and a pride which are frequently almost super-human. He seems to be able to make himself at home on any soil. On the other hand, it would be untrue to say that he ever becomes rooted in any soil. He knows how to build up and develop his own form of industrialism wherever he may happen to settle, to convert any bit of earth into a field for his work—his “this-worldly asceticism”—and, finally, to make a comfortable home for himself anywhere; all this by mastering Nature and by harnessing her forces for his own needs.

This type of domination will remain eternally alien to the Catholic conception of Nature. Catholic nations seem to love the soil, their own Mother Earth, very differently; all have their *terrisme*. To them, Nature does not stand for the opposite of art and human enterprise, nor is she the antithesis of mind, heart and soul; but human toil and organic development, Nature and reason are one. The cultivation of the vine is the loveliest symbol of this unity.

Cities, too, that have been built and developed in this same spirit seem natural growths of the soil, adapted to the landscape and remaining in close kinship with their parent earth. They are true cities in their very essence and spring from a warm humanity which the robot machinery of a modern industrial city will never resemble.

As little as the Tridentine dogma recognises Protestantism's forcible divorce of Nature and Grace, does Catholicism reckon of such types of dualism as Nature and Spirit, Nature and Mind, Nature and Art, Nature and Machine, with the emotional implications which each antithesis implies. A synthesis of such antitheses is as remote from Catholicism as the opposition between empty form and formless matter, and the Catholic Church is emphatically something more than that "higher third" principle of German natural and historical philosophy, a principle which, incidentally, still remains to be discovered.

A Catholic would consequently be bound to consider as a doubtful compliment any attempt to present his Church as the opposite pole of a mechanised age. It is a striking paradox (again reminding us of that curious *complexio oppositorum*) that one of the most deeply rooted Protestant prejudices regards Catholicism as a

perversion and abuse of true Christianity because, from the Protestant point of view, it makes religion into a mechanical routine of empty forms, when precisely Protestants, in romantic flight from their environment, are returning to the Catholic Church, because in her they hope to find a haven of refuge from the soullessness of a rationalistic and mechanised age.

Were the Church to rest content with being nothing more than the soulful opposite of soullessness, she would be forgetful of her great mission. She would then have become the desired complement of capitalism, a sanatorium for casualties in the fierce warfare of competition, a week-end or summer resort for denizens of the great cities. The Church does, of course, possess the power of healing, but the essence of such an institution must consist in something more than this.

Rousseauism and Romanticism find in Catholicism, as in a variety of other things, a certain artistic pleasure, such as they would receive from the contemplation of a magnificent ruin or a duly authenticated antique, and, "from the easy-chair of the achievements of 1789," feel themselves in a position to utilise this exotic object also as fodder for a relativist-minded *bourgeoisie*.

Many Catholics, more especially German Catholics, seem rather proud of being "discovered" by historians of art. Their delight, of little account in itself, need not have been mentioned, had not Georges Sorel, a prolific and original political thinker, tried to discover in this new alliance of the Church with Non-Rationalism the crisis of Catholic thought. Whereas, he thinks, the Church's apologetics until the eighteenth century strove to demonstrate her tenets on the basis of reason, in the nineteenth century, it is the non-rational tendencies that were exploited to the Church's advantage. In point of fact, it is perfectly true that, in the nineteenth century, every possible form of revolt against the Enlightenment and Rationalism infused Catholicism with fresh blood, and that traditionalistic, mystical and romantic movements brought many converts into the fold. To-day, too, as far as I am in a position to judge, there are Catholics who feel profoundly dissatisfied with traditional apologetics, which they feel to be specious sophistry, a verbal construction devoid of solid content. This attitude, however, misses the essential point, since it identifies rationalism and scientific thought and overlooks the fact that Catholic apologetic is based on a speculative method of a distinctive kind which is concerned

with the laws regulating the conduct of man's social life and establishes its findings by a specifically juristic logic.

III. *THE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE IDEA OF POLITICS*

TO-DAY practically any casual conversation will show how completely the scientific and technical method dominates the modern mentality. For instance, in the traditional theistic proofs, the God who rules the world like the king his state has unconsciously assumed the form of a dynamo driving the cosmic machine. The imagination of the modern town-dweller teems with mental images relating to the sphere of industrialism and mechanics and projects these images into his view of cosmic and metaphysical reality. In this artless mythology, based on mathematics and mechanics, the universe assumes the form of a colossal dynamo.

From this point of view, class distinctions no longer exist. The world as it appears to the modern captain of industry differs nowise from that of the industrial proletarian. Consequently, like twins, they are able, with full mutual comprehension, to unite in defending

an economic philosophy. Socialism, in so far as it has become the religion of the proletariat of the great cities, opposes to the gigantic machine of capitalism a fabulous counter-machine, and the class-conscious proletariat considers itself as the legitimate (in fact, only the logical) master of this machinery and the private property of the capitalist owner as an illogical survival of a technically undeveloped age.

The big industrialist's ideal is really none other than that of Lenin, "an electrified earth." In reality capitalists and workers differ only as to the proper method of electrification. American financiers and Russian Bolshevists find themselves side by side in the battle for the economic outlook, in the battle against lawyers and politicians. Georges Sorel is also a member of this alliance, and it is in the *economic philosophy of life* that we must find the radical opposition of modernity to Catholicism as a political idea.

Everything that to modern economics is synonymous with objectivity, honesty, and rationality is at variance with that political idea. The rationalism of the Catholic Church embraces ethically the psychological and sociological nature of man, and has no interest, as is the case with industry and mechanics, in the

control and exploitation of lifeless matter. The Church has a rationality all her own. Renan's dictum is now famous : "*Toute victoire de Rome est une victoire de la raison.*"

In the conflict against sectarian fanaticism, Rome has ever been the champion of sound common sense. Throughout the Middle Ages, as Duhem has finely demonstrated, she did her utmost to stamp out sorcery and superstition. Even Max Weber affirms that in her the rationalism of Ancient Rome survives and that she succeeded magnificently in prevailing over intoxicating cults of the Dionysian type, uncontrolled ecstasies and Oriental self-hypnosis.

This rationalism has its foundations in the institutional character of the Church and is essentially legal. Its great achievement is the establishing of the priesthood as an office, though an office of a distinctive type. The Pope is not a prophet, but the Vicar of Christ. Such a function precludes all the fanatical excesses of unbridled prophetism. By the fact that the office is not accompanied by a *charisma*, a dignity is conferred on the priest which is evidently something quite apart from his human personality. At the same time, he is not the mere functionary and deputy of Republicanism, nor yet is his dignity of an impersonal nature, as is the case with the modern

official, but his office goes back in an unbroken chain to the Person of Christ and Christ's personal commission. This is possibly the most amazing *complexio oppositorum* of all. It has the marks of a rational creative power and of the full humanity of Catholicism. It ignores neither rational nor human needs. It guides without depending on illuminations beyond consciousness and beyond the reach of reason. But it does not, like the rationalism of economics and mechanics, simply prescribe rules for the manipulation of lifeless matter.

Economic rationalism is so far removed from Catholic rationalism that it easily arouses an apprehension which is specifically Catholic. The technical achievement of modern industry is quite indifferent to the real nature of the demands it serves. Our economic organisation represents a thoroughly non-rational consumption hand in hand with a highly rationalised production. A mechanism which is a marvel of technical achievement caters indifferently and with equal thoroughness and exactitude for any and every demand whether it be for silk blouses or poison gas. Economic rationalism has accustomed itself to reckon with certain demands and to take only into consideration such as it is able to meet. In the modern city it has erected an edifice in which everything

runs strictly according to plan. In its callous and infallible inhumanity such a system as this is capable of striking terror to the heart of a good Catholic, and precisely because he is a believer in reason.

It might be said with truth to-day that with Catholics, more perhaps than with anyone else, Antichrist is still a living idea. Protestants of the sixteenth or seventeenth century saw Rome as Antichrist; the economic and technical system which prevails to-day inspires a large number of Catholics with much the same horror and loathing.

This alarm felt by the genuine Catholic arises from the knowledge that the notion of rationality has been distorted in an utterly fantastic manner; a mechanical system of production purporting to cater for any and every material requirement is described as "rational," though at the same time the rationality of the purpose served by this supremely rational machine (which purpose is the only essential point) is left wholly out of account.

The economic philosophy of life is quite blind to this Catholic apprehension. It is perfectly satisfied as long as its technical resources keep it well supplied with its machine-made output. Economic theory has no concern with an anti-Roman complex nor with Antichrist and the

Apocalypse. From the standpoint of economics, the Church is indeed a queer phenomenon, but not more so than other "non-rational" things. The economic philosophy may even take care to cater for what it takes to be the requirements of Catholicism. After all, it is no more unreasonable to do this than to serve, as it does, the foolish foibles of Fashion. When the sanctuary lamps burning before our Catholic altars are supplied by the same power-stations as furnish the current for the local theatres and dance-halls, Catholicism, to the economic mentality, will have become something really comprehensible, something to be instinctively accepted as a matter of course. This way of thinking has a reality and rectitude of its own, inasmuch as it remains absolutely objective, in other words, keeps to hard facts. It classifies politics as unreal, since politics presuppose values other than economic.

Catholicism, however, differs from this economic objectivity in being political in the highest sense of the word. By calling Catholicism political we do not mean that it manipulates and controls certain social and international forces, as politics were understood by Machiavelli, who treats them as a mere matter of technique—thus isolating a single external factor of political life from its context.

The machinery of politics has its own laws, and Catholicism, like any other historic power drawn into the political orbit, is subject to them.

That the "machinery" of the Church since the sixteenth century has become more rigid, that (despite Romanticism, or possibly to counteract its effects) it is—more than ever it was in the Middle Ages—a centralised bureaucracy and organisation, practises in short what is sociologically classified as "Jesuitism," may be seen not only as an outcome of the warfare waged against Protestantism but also as a result of its reaction against the mechanical spirit of the age.

The autocratic sovereign and his policy of "mercantilism" were the forerunners of modern economics and of a political situation which might well be described as something midway between dictatorship and anarchy. Concurrently with the mechanised conception of the world in the seventeenth century, the political machinery of power came into being, together with that progressive reduction of all social relationships to mere interactions of lifeless objects which have so frequently been described. In this milieu the organisation of the Church in its turn became more rigid and more closely knit, like a coat of mail. This in itself is no evidence of political weakness and advancing age. The

only question which arises is whether beneath it there is still a living being. No skill in manipulating the weapons of power will enable a political system to survive even a single generation. The idea is indispensable to the very essence of politics, because without authority politics has no being, and without an ethical support for conviction, there is no authority.

By claiming to be something more than economics, politics is obliged to invoke standards other than those of supply and demand. It is, we repeat, not strange that capitalist owners and socialistic proletarians agree in repudiating this claim of politics as sheer arrogance, and from their economic standpoint regard the authority exercised by politicians as devoid of objective foundation.

Viewed consistently from the political standpoint this repudiation of politicians can only mean that in reality certain powerful social organisations—individual owners or organised groups of workers attached to certain trades or branches of industry—are exploiting their status in the work of production to get political power into their own hands. When they attack politicians and politics as such, they have in mind a concrete political power which for the moment they regard as an obstacle in their path.

If they succeed in sweeping it away they will have no more interest in working up an opposition between the political and economic standpoints, and a new form of politics will arise to correspond with the new power established on an economic basis.

Politics, nevertheless, it remains, and that implies the necessity of values and authority of a definite kind. The new *régime* will justify itself on the score of its social indispensability and the public weal, and in so doing has tacitly subscribed to the Political Idea. No problem involving great social contrasts admits of a purely economic solution. When the employer informs his workers, "You are indebted to me for your daily bread," the workers promptly retort, "You are indebted to us for yours." This is no dispute about supply and demand ; it is not an economic question, but arises from a profound divergence of conviction as to what is right or just. It involves the moral or juridical question as to who is the producer, the creator, and consequently the owner of modern wealth. As soon as production becomes an exclusively anonymous affair, when a blind-wall of joint-stock companies makes it impossible to assign activities to concrete individuals, the private property of the capitalist pure and simple must needs be ruthlessly swept away as an irrational

excrement. This will, indeed, come to pass, though for the present, at least, there are some owners who are still capable of holding their own on the score of their personal indispensability.

Catholicism might almost be excluded from a conflict such as this, so long as the parties think in terms of economics. The authority of the Church is not based on economic standards, though she may have landed property and a variety of "financial interests." Such things are innocuous and idyllic compared with big industrial interests in raw products and markets. It is not impossible that the possession of the world's oil-wells may eventually prove the deciding factor in the battle for world-supremacy, but in this battle Christ's Vicar on earth will most certainly have no part.

IV. *THE CHURCH AND THE IDEA OF REPRESENTATION*

THE Pope insists on his rights as sovereign of the Papal State, but what does this signify amidst the Babel of international markets and world-empires? The political power of Catholicism does not rest on economic or military power. Independent of these, the Church embodies the

sublime conception of authority in its complete purity.

The Church is a juridical person, though not in the same sense as a joint-stock company. The latter, a typical fruit of an age of production, is a system of accountancy, whilst the Church is a concrete personal representation of concrete personality. That she embodies in a supreme degree the spirit of the law and faithfully carries on the traditions of Roman jurisprudence has been conceded hitherto by all who have known her. That she possesses the power of thinking and acting in a juridical capacity is one of her sociological secrets. But she has the power to assume this or any other form only because she possesses a representative capacity. She represents the *civitas humana* and constitutes throughout the ages the historic bond with Christ's Incarnation and the Sacrifice of the Cross. She personally represents Christ Himself, the God Who in historic reality became Man. It is in her representative character that she rises superior to an age of economic thought.

Of the mediæval capacity of such representative figures—for example, the Pope, the Emperor, the Monk, the Knight, and the Merchant—the Church is the sole surviving representative. Even of those institutions that were once described as the last four pillars of

the representative principle—the House of Lords, the Prussian General Staff, the Académie Française and the Vatican—she will certainly be the last, so isolated that whoever sees nothing in her but her external form must needs mock her with the epigram that all she represents is the idea of representation.

The eighteenth century still had many a classic type, such as the *legislateur*. Even the Goddess of Reason seems representative to us, when the unproductiveness of the nineteenth century is borne in mind. To realise to what extent the capacity for representation has become extinct one has only to recall the attempt to set up in opposition to the Catholic Church a rival which should represent the modern mind. Auguste Comte attempted to found a Positivist Church. The result of his efforts was a pitiful imitation painful to contemplate.

All the same, one cannot but admire the noble disposition of the man himself, and, imitation though it was, his achievement may rank as magnificent compared with other experiments along similar lines. That master sociologist understood the Cleric and the Knight, those old representative types of mediæval times, and as such compared them with the typical figures of contemporary society the Savant and the Industrialist.

It was, however, a mistake to consider the modern Savant and the Business Man as genuinely representative types. The Savant was representative only during the transitional period of conflict with the Church, and the Merchant was an intellectual force only as a Puritan individualist. Since the wheels of modern economics first began to revolve, both types have become increasingly enslaved to the great machine, and it would be difficult to say of what they are representative now.

Classes are a thing of the past. The French *bourgeoisie* of the eighteenth century, "the third estate," proclaimed itself "the nation." The famous pronouncement "*le tiers état c'est la nation*" was more profoundly revolutionary than was suspected at the time, for when an individual class identifies itself with the entire nation, it tacitly abolishes the very principle of Class, which postulates a social order that embraces a plurality of classes. The *bourgeoisie* consequently was no longer capable of acting in a representative capacity and succumbed to the fatal dualism prevalent at that period; that is to say, it developed "polarities," with the Merchant as one extreme and the Bohemian (representative of nothing, unless himself) as the other. The logical outcome was the conception of caste cherished by the proletariat.

The proletariat classifies society from a purely objective standpoint according to the position of the various units in the work of production, therefore strictly in accordance with an economic mode of thought, and proves thereby that it is part of its intellectual attitude to dispense with any form of representation. The Savant and the Merchant have been transformed into contractors or departmental chiefs. The Merchant sits in his office, the Savant in his study or laboratory. Both, if they are really up to date, are salaried servants of some big business concern. Both are anonymities. It would be futile to inquire whether they are representative of anything. They are either private individuals or exponents, not representatives.

The economic order recognises but one norm, namely, that of technical efficiency ; nothing could be further removed from the idea of representation. In its association with technology (the intrinsic distinction between the two will be dealt with later on), economics demands a "real presence" of things. Its associated conceptions, for example, "reflex," "radiation," "reflection," are terms designating some kind of material connection—different aggregations of the same material substance. By means of such images economic

philosophers try to make something mental clear to themselves, that is to say, to incorporate it into their own materialistic outlook. For instance, according to the famous "economic" interpretation of history, political and religious opinions are the ideological "reflex" of the conditions of economic production; which really means, if this doctrine is to be consistent with itself, that in its social hierarchy the economic producer should rank higher than the "intellectual." In psychological discussions, a word like "projection" sounds well; but metaphors like "projection," "reflex," "reflection," "radiation" and "transmission" demand an immanent objective basis.

The principle of representation, on the other hand, depends so entirely on the conception of personal authority, that both the representative and the party represented must possess and assert a personal dignity. Representation is no materialistic concept. Only a *person* can represent in the highest sense of the term, and moreover (if there is to be more than mere deputising) he must represent some person in authority or some ideas, which latter, directly it is represented, also becomes personified. God or The People of democratic ideology or such abstract ideas as Liberty and Equality are conceivable subjects for representation, but not

so Production and Consumption. Representation invests the person of the representative with a peculiar dignity, since he who represents something of great worth cannot himself be worthless.

Not only, however, must the representative and the represented possess personal value but so, too, must the third party to whom they address themselves. You cannot represent something or somebody to automatons and machines, neither can they in their turn be representative of anything nor be represented. As soon as the State becomes a Leviathan it vanishes from the sphere of representation.

That sphere possesses its hierarchy of values and its humanity. The political idea of Catholicism finds its home there, with its capacity to express itself in the three great forms of Art—its æsthetic form, the Law—its juridical form, and the splendid form of world-wide dominion. The form which first strikes an age bent on artistic enjoyment is that which in natural and historical evolution is the final and crowning achievement, namely, æsthetic beauty. Form, expression and symbol arise of themselves from representation on the grand scale. Modern industry with its lack of plastic and representative values harks back for its symbols to a bygone age ; for the Machine has no

traditions and is so unpicturesque that even the Russian Soviet found no better emblem for its coat-of-arms than the sickle and the hammer, which, though symbolical enough of the technique of a thousand years ago, can hardly be said to express the world of an industrial proletariat. Viewed sardonically, this coat-of-arms might seem an indication that the private property of the economically reactionary peasant has triumphed over the communism of the industrial worker, and the agrarian small-holding over machine-run industrialism despite the latter's higher standard of technical efficiency.

There is undoubtedly something in this primitive symbolism that is lacking in the highest forms of mechanical achievement, something human—in other words, a living speech. It is not surprising that our economic age is so keenly susceptible to the charm of beautiful externals, for it is in such things that our age is most deficient. Nevertheless, even in the domain of æsthetics, it contents itself with mere surface values. For the capacity to create form, which is fundamental for æsthetics, has its origin in a capacity to utter the noblest rhetoric. It is this, the underlying idea, that really matters ; it is this idea that is lost on the æsthetic dilettante, who in Cardinals sees noth-

ing more than the scarlet robes and sees but the outward pomp and circumstances of a procession with the poetic glamour of such things.

Neither are the mighty achievements of architecture, ecclesiastical art and music, or great poetry criteria of that capacity to create form of which we are speaking. Undeniably to-day the ancient bond no longer exists between the Church and the creative arts. Francis Thompson, one of the few great Catholic poets of the last generation, observes in his wonderful essay on Shelley that the Church, once the Mother of Poets no less than of Saints, of Dante no less than of St. Dominic, now reserves for herself only the glories of holiness, relinquishing to aliens the glories of art. "The separation has been ill for poetry ; it has not been well for religion." This is true and could not have been better or more aptly expressed. The present state of affairs is not good for religion, but so far as the Church is concerned, it does not connote a mortal sickness.

It is the art of speech and discourse, rhetoric in its finest sense, which is a sign of strong human life. To-day this is perhaps a dangerous affirmation. The lack of understanding of the art of rhetoric is one of the manifestations of that paradoxical antithetic dualism of our age which here expresses itself by the cult of a super-

sensuous type of music on the one hand, a dumb practicality on the other, and by the attempt to transform "true" art into a species of romantic-musical irrationalism.

As is well known, there is a close connection between the art of rhetoric and the *esprit classique*. Great credit is due to Taine for recognising and working out this truth; but he killed the vital idea of classicism by contrasting it with romanticism, and, without really believing in his own theory, he sought to identify classicism with rhetoric, which, in his mind, was tantamount to artificiality, and he tended to present classicism as studied impassivity and its form as a symmetry devoid of content—in short, a game with antitheses for counters. In this opposition of rationalism to something irrational the classical is classed as rationalist, the romantic as irrational and rhetoric becomes an expression of classic rationalism.

And yet the essential type of oratory is not the argumentative nor the controversial; it is what we may term the *representative*. It moves in antitheses, not set in opposition to one another but merely different elements moulded to form the *complexio* that makes a discourse live.

Is it possible to docket Bossuet under Taine's various headings? He has more intellect than

many rationalists and more intuitive power than any romanticist. His type of eloquence is however only possible against a background of an imposing authority. Never lapsing into discursiveness, dogmatism, or dialectic, its structure resembles some noble work of architecture. The sublime diction is something more than music. It is human dignity made manifest in an eloquence fashioned by reason.

All this presupposes a hierarchy, for the spiritual resonance of great oratory emanates from a belief in the representative function claimed by the speaker. He is a proof that in universal history the priest ranks with the soldier and the statesman. He can take his place beside them as a representative type since they too are such types ; but he cannot do so beside the industrialist and the technologist who think in terms of economics, and who dismiss him with a charitable gift, confusing his representative office with a player's part.

V. *THE REPRESENTATIVE IDEA IN CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIALISM*

AN alliance of the Catholic Church with industrialism as it exists to-day is frankly impossible. The ancient alliance between the

Throne and the Altar will not be succeeded by an alliance between the Office and the Altar or the Factory and the Altar. Should a time ever come when the Catholic clergy of Europe is no longer recruited from the peasant classes and the bulk of the priesthood is supplied by the cities, the consequences are incalculable. But an alliance between the Church and industrialism will be always impossible. Catholicism will no doubt continue to adapt itself to every social and political form, even to one dominated by capitalist industrialists or by trade unions and workers' councils. That adaptation however will be possible only when the power based on the economic situation has assumed a political character, that is to say, not until the capitalists or workers who have climbed to power recognise the principle of political representation with its attendant responsibilities. The new party in power will then find itself compelled to recognise claims which exceed purely economic interests and individual rights. The new order, if it is real, cannot be confined to the business of ensuring supply and demand, because any true order must necessarily have a juridical character. Every form of order is a juridical order and every form of government is based on law.

As soon as this step has been taken, the Church

will be in a position to ally herself with the new order, as she has done with every form of order. She is by no means obliged to rely on states in which the landed nobility or the peasantry is the ruling class. A political system of government is indispensable to her because without it she finds nothing to correspond with her own intrinsically representative character. The power exercised behind the scenes by Capital is as yet without definite shape, though it may be successful in undermining a political system already in existence and in reducing its edifice to an empty façade. Should it succeed, it will have stripped the State entirely of its political character. And should the economic order eventually realise its Utopian ideal and establish society on an absolutely non-political basis, the Church would then remain the sole representative of political thought and political form. She would possess a colossal monopoly, and her hierarchy would be within closer reach of political world-dominion than it ever was even in mediæval times. In view of her own principles and her ideal structure, such an eventuality is not likely to appeal to her, for she postulates the co-existence of a political state, a *societas perfecta*, not of an industrial concern. It is her desire to enter into partnership with the State as one representative body with another.

As the thought of the age becomes more and more exclusively economic, the understanding of any kind of representation disappears. And yet the Parliamentary system of to-day, at least as regards its ideal and theoretical basis, embodies the idea of representation. It is even based on what is technically termed the representative principle. As long as the term implies simply representation of the electorate, it connotes nothing really distinctive. In the constitutional and political literature of the past century, the term stands for the representation of the people as contrasted with another representative, namely, the King. Both together—or, in the case of a republic, Parliament alone—represent the “nation.”

From this standpoint the Church, we are told, “has no representative institutions,” since she has no Parliament and her representatives do not receive their authority from the people. Her representation is strictly “from above.”

In the course of the nineteenth century, during the conflict with the monarchy of the people’s representatives, jurisprudence lost the sense and the specific concept of representation. German political science in particular evolved an academic mythology at once monstrous and bizarre.

According to this, Parliament, as a secondary

political organ, represents another primary organ, the People ; but this primary organ has no will apart from the secondary one, unless by some "special proviso." The two juridical persons are but one person and constitute two organs but one person—and so forth. Witness the amazing chapter in Georg Jellinek's *General Political Science* entitled "Representation and Representative Organs." The plain meaning of the representative principle is this: the Parliamentary deputies are representative of the nation at large and are thereby invested with authority independent of the electors, while at the same time they derive that authority from the nation at large and not from the individual electors.

"The deputy is not bound by the commission and commands of his electors, but is answerable to his conscience alone."

In view of the personification of the nation and the unity of Parliament as the nation's representative, this implies, theoretically at least, a *complexio oppositorum*, the constitution of a unity by a plurality of interests and parties, and is a representative, not an economic, conception.

The proletarian system of workers' councils seeks to abolish this survival of an age of non-economic thought and insists that its delegates

are mere emissaries and agents, deputies of the producers and liable to be recalled at any time and charged with a *mandat impératif*, that is to say, they are to be administrative employees of industry. The "whole people" is an empty phrase, the "whole" constituted by the economic system a reality.

There is something very impressive in that intellectual consistency of anti-intellectualism which, in the springtide of Socialism, inspired young Bolsheviks to make the battle for economic technological thought a war against the Idea and, indeed, against ideas in any shape or form. For so long as even the ghost of an idea lingers on, the conception is admitted that, prior to the acknowledged reality of material things, something else was already in existence, something transcendental, and that recognition necessarily implies an authority from above. To a philosophy purporting to derive its standards from the immanence of economic-technological facts, this seems to be an interference from an outside source, a hitch in the smooth working of the automatic machine. An intelligent man of political instincts who is at war with politicians immediately scents in any recourse to an ideal principle a claim to representation and consequently to authority, a form of arrogance which will not be content with

proletarian formlessness and which breaks away from that compact mass of "corporeal" reality in which men have no use for governments, and in which, moreover, "things govern themselves."

In the logic of economic philosophy, political and juridical systems are at once non-essential and inconvenient; but it is only when the paradox is realised—that such a philosophy can possess its fanatical adherents, a paradox surely possible only in Russia—it is only then that its hostility to the Idea and to all non-economic and non-technological intelligence is realised in its full extent. Sociologically this reveals the true revolutionary instinct. Intelligence and rationalism in themselves are not revolutionary, but the single-track technological mind is, for it is alien to all social traditions. The machine has no traditions. A realisation of the truth that technology is the true revolutionary principle, and that in comparison all forms of revolution based on natural rights are obsolete and childish, is one of the notable sociological discoveries of Karl Marx. A society so exclusively based on progressive technology must thereby be entirely revolutionary. In a short time, however, it must destroy both itself and its technology.

Economic thought is not so exclusively

radical, and, despite its present partnership, may adopt a standpoint opposed to that of absolute technology. For the economic order comprises certain juridical concepts, such as property and contract. However, it confines them to a minimum and, moreover, as a fundamental principle, to the sphere of private law.

The glaring contradiction between the object in view, which is to identify society with the economic system, and the endeavour at the same time to maintain private rights, and particularly private property, can only be remarked in passing. It is interesting to note in this connection that the individualistic tendency of economics sets a limit to the juridical organisation of society. Public life is expected to govern itself. It is to be controlled by public opinion, that is to say, by the opinion of private individuals ; and public opinion, in its turn, is to be controlled by a Press in the hands of private owners. Nothing in this system is representative ; everything is a private matter.

Historically, this cult of privacy takes its rise in religion. The primary right of the individual in the organisation of *bourgeois* society was religious freedom. In the historic evolution of the schedule of liberties—religious liberty, freedom of conscience, the right to form unions and assemblies, freedom of the Press, free trade and

commerce—religious freedom is the fountain-head and first principle.

Whatever status may be assigned to religion, it manifests in every direction its power to absorb that to which it attaches itself and to invest it with an absolute value. If religion is a private matter, the converse becomes true; what is private acquires a religious consecration. The two are inseparable. Private property, therefore, is sacred precisely because it is private. This connection, hitherto hardly realised, explains the sociological evolution of modern European society. The latter, too, has its religion, namely, that of the private individual, and without it the social edifice would crash into ruin. The fact that religion is a private matter gives to what is private a religious sanction; indeed, the guarantee of an absolute right of private ownership secure from all risk of violation exists in the strict sense only where religion is a private matter. There, however, it is universal. The oft-quoted passage concerning the private character of religion to be found in the Erfurt Programme of German Social Democracy is an interesting lapse into Liberalism. Hence (in his work on the Catholic Church and Christendom, 1906) Karl Kautzky, the theologian of this Programme, makes, as an *obiter dictum*, the emendation so symptomatic in its

unassuming tone, that religion is really not so much a private affair as purely a matter of sentiment.

Whereas Liberalism is based on the private individual, the Church, in virtue of her juridical constitution, expresses the social principle. This, moreover, is involved in her representative character and enables her to give religion so thorough-going a legal formulation. Hence, a Protestant, Rudolf Sohm, could define the Catholic Church as essentially juridical, whilst regarding primitive Christianity as essentially non-juridical.

This permeation of religion with juridical elements goes in fact very deep, and much of the seemingly paradoxical political tactics of Catholicism, so frequently singled out for adverse comment, finds its explanation in its formal and legal character. The secular law also discovers in society, as it actually exists, a *complexio* of conflicting interests and tendencies. Like Catholicism, it is characterised by a peculiar mingling of traditional conservatism and revolutionary resistance based on the dictates of natural law. Every revolutionary movement regards the lawyers, "the theologians of the existing order," as its sworn enemies, whilst lawyers, on the other hand, will always be found supporting the revolution and investing

it with the appeal of Justice outraged and oppressed. Thanks to its formal pre-eminence, it is easy for the law to adopt, in its leadings with changing political forms, a standpoint similar to that of Catholicism by recognising the most various forms of actual power, provided only a minimum of social form is guaranteed by "the establishment of order." As soon as the new state of affairs produces an authority that can be recognised, it furnishes the basis for law, the solid foundation of a substantial form.

However, despite all this formal affinity, Catholicism goes further, for the simple reason that it represents something different, something more than secular jurisprudence ; it represents not only the idea of justice, but also the Person of Christ. It is for that reason that it claims a unique authority and dignity. It is in a position to treat with the state on terms of equality and thus to create new forms of law, whereas the legal corporation simply administers laws already in existence. In the state, the nation as a corporate body assigns the law to the judge, whose duty it is to administer it ; consequently a more or less fixed standard intervenes between the idea of justice and the individual case.

An international court of justice, which was entirely independent, that is to say, not bound

by rules prescribed by politicians, but guided solely by the principles of equity, would depend immediately upon the idea of justice. By the fact that it would not be dependent on any particular state, it would, unlike a state-controlled tribunal, assert, even against the state, its claim to represent something as a free agent, namely, the idea of justice independent of the judgment and good pleasure of individual governments. Its authority would therefore be based on a direct representation of this principle, not on delegated authority from various states, even though it might owe its existence to an agreement between the states in question. It would have consistently to assert its rights as a primary and therefore universal tribunal. This would be the natural development of a consistent line of thought, and the psychological consequence of a primary authority founded on an independent legal basis.

The misgivings voiced by the publicists of the great powers on the subject of such a tribunal are not difficult to understand. They all have their origin in the notion of sovereignty. The power to decide who is endowed with sovereign powers would connote a new species of sovereignty, and a tribunal vested with such powers would be a super-state and a super-potentate in a position to create an entirely new

order of things, if, for instance, it had to decide upon the recognition of a new state. A League of Nations, not a tribunal of justice, may claim such prerogatives. By so doing, however, it becomes an independent agent, which implies that, in addition to its function of dispensing justice, carrying out executive functions, and so forth (which involves the possibility of financial independence, the right to make its own budget and other external apparatus of government), it would also stand in itself for something. Its activities would not be confined to the administration of laws already existing, as is the case with a court of justice, which is a body of subordinate officials. Again, it would be something more than a mere arbiter, since it would have an interest in asserting its own authority in all decisive conflicts of opinion. It would therefore cease exclusively to administer justice, or, in political language, "to maintain the *status quo*." It must needs decide, on its own authority, if it takes as its guiding principles the constantly changing aspects of the political situation, what new order and what new state is to be recognised or not recognised. Such a question could not be decided by rights already recognised by public law, for most new states have come into being against the will of their late rulers. This factor of self-assertion is

involved in the possibility of conflict with the principle of justice, and a tribunal judging this would, in addition to representing the idea of impersonal justice, also represent a distinct and powerful personality of its own.

In the great history of the Catholic Church, the assertion of ecclesiastical authority goes hand in hand with the maintenance of justice. The Church has indeed gone further in this direction by steadily seeking to promote her own prestige, glory, and honour. She wishes her status to be such as befits Christ's royal Bride. She represents Christ regnant and victorious. Her claim to prestige and honour is based pre-eminently on the principle of representation. It engenders the unceasing conflict between Justice and Ambition. Actually, this antagonism has its roots in human nature, though devout Christians frequently seem to regard it as something peculiarly wicked.

That the Church refuses to regard Christ merely as a private individual and Christianity as a private matter and something purely inward, that she has given it shape as a visible organisation, is the great betrayal with which Rome is charged.

Rudolf Sohm believed this fall from grace consisted in the Church's juridical organisation.

Others conceived it as something grander and more profound, namely, the will to universal power.

Like every world-embracing form of imperialism that has attained its goal, the Church will bring peace to the world, but the alarm of the anti-formalist sees therein a triumph of the powers of darkness. Dostoievsky's Grand Inquisitor confesses that he succumbed to Satan's wiles fully conscious of what he was doing, because he knew that man by nature is base and vile, a craven rebel who needs a master, and because only a priest of the Church of Rome possesses the courage to take upon himself the penalty of damnation attached to such power. In this passage, Dostoievsky forcibly projects his own potential atheism into the Church of Rome. To his fundamentally anarchical (which invariably means atheistic) instinct, every form of power was something evil and inhuman. In the temporal sphere, the temptation to abuse is no doubt always latent in every form of power, and only in God Himself is the opposition between power and goodness completely overcome. But the attempt to get rid of the opposition by rejecting all earthly power would be an unpardonable crime against human nature. A vague and widespread prejudice feels Rome's cold institutionalism as something evil, and

hails Dostoievsky's nebulous breadth as true Christianity. This point of view is as superficial as everything must be that never gets beyond moods and feelings, and even fails to realise how un-Christian is the idea that, between the time of His earthly pilgrimage and His glorious Second Coming on the Last Day, Christ might appear now and again in our midst, as it were, by way of experiment.

More concisely than Dostoievsky, and yet with far greater breadth of vision, the mind of a French Catholic devised a scene embracing the whole tension between the two seemingly irreconcilable principles ; by formulating an appeal against Divine Justice, he pressed Justice to its logical extreme, such was this astounding scene from the Last Judgment, which Ernest Hello was bold enough to depict.

When the Judge of the World has pronounced sentence, a lost soul, steeped in iniquity, stands before Him and, to the horror of all creation, hurls at the Judge the challenge : "*J'en appelle !*"

"At these words, the light of the stars was extinguished."

As the nature of the Last Judgment requires, sentence once passed is, of course, absolutely and eternally irrevocable—" *effroyablement sans appel.*"

“To whom dost thou appeal against My Sentence?” asks Christ the Judge.

And amidst a terrible silence, the lost soul replies: “*J'en appelle de ta justice à ta gloire.*”

VI. THE OUTCOME

IN each of the three great forms of representation—art, law and rule—the *complexio* of life's contrasts is moulded to the unity of personal representation. It is therefore possible for each of the three forms to arouse a distinctive uneasiness and bewilderment, and to give the anti-Roman “complex” a new lease of life. Sectarians and heretics have all refused to recognise how human, in the profoundest sense of the word, is the idea of representation in its implication of the person as such.

The old hostility assumed a new and special character when the Catholic Church found herself in the eighteenth century confronting an opponent who challenged her in the name of humanity. Its enthusiasm was of noble mettle. But when it rose to historic significance, it succumbed in its turn to that antagonism which had already aroused so many energies against the Church. As long as the idea of humanity preserved its original force, its

representatives had the courage to impose it on a grandly inhuman scale. The humanitarian philosophers of the eighteenth century preached "enlightened" despotism and the dictatorship of reason. They were haughty aristocrats. On their claim to represent the idea of humanity they based their authority and their secret societies, strictly esoteric associations. An inhuman implication of superiority over the non-initiated, over average men and women and the democracy of the masses, lurks in this as in every form of esotericism. Who has the courage for such things to-day?

It is highly instructive to note what has been the fate of a specifically German monument of lofty humanitarian idealism, a work of the calibre of Mozart's *Magic Flute*. Is there anyone nowadays who regards it as anything more than exquisite German music, an idyllic precursor of the Viennese operetta? It is also a pæan of "enlightened" culture, of the battle of the Sun against the powers of Night, of Light against Darkness.

Everything up to this point would seem, of course, perfectly correct, even to the susceptibilities of a democratic age. It is a more dubious feature that the Queen of Night, against whom the Masonic Priest is at War, is pre-eminently the mother. But how infinitely more disturbing

to the men of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the virile dignity and authoritative self-confidence of these priests, and what diabolical satire is vented on the average human being in the person of Papageno the pater-familias, solely intent on the satisfaction of his economic needs ; and this satire shows the average human being contemptuously disposed of by a gratifying of his wishes and a supplying of his requirements.

There is nothing more terrible than this opera, if one takes the trouble to study it in its wider bearing on the history of thought. One has only to compare it with Shakespeare's *Tempest* to realise that Prospero has undergone the transformation into a Masonic Priest and that Caliban has become a Papageno.

The eighteenth century still had the courage for self-confidence and for the aristocratic principle of secrecy. In a society that no longer possesses that courage there will be no more *arcana*, no hierarchy, no secret diplomacy, and no more politics of any description ; the *arcantum* is essential to any form of politics on the grand scale. Everything will be enacted upon an open stage and before an audience of Papagenos.

Will trade and business secrets still be permissible ? The economic-technological mind

appears to possess a special understanding for secrets of this type, and it is possible that here may lurk the beginnings of a new uncontrolled power. As yet it remains entirely within the economic sphere, which is not in the least representative, and hitherto it has occurred only to the proletarian delegates of workers' committees to revolt against such secrecy. The people will continue to hear nothing but talk about humanity, and will fail to see that the idea of humanity, as soon as it is realised, will in turn be subject to the logic immanent in its every realisation and must needs cease, for the sake of humanity, to be exclusively humane.

The Catholic Church in the Europe of our day has no adversary who openly challenges her with such fervour as did that eighteenth century spirit. Humanitarian pacifism is incapable of enmity, since its ideal is exhausted by justice and peace. Many pacifists, however, though not of the best type, are inspired solely by the plausible calculation that War is mostly synonymous with bad business—a calculation that reveals the typical rationalistic attitude which is unable to view with equanimity the vast wastage of energy and material which War involves. The League of Nations, as it exists to-day, may prove to be a serviceable institution, but it does not enter the lists as an adversary

of the Universal Church nor indeed as a leader of humanity in the sphere of ideas.

The Church's last enemy in Europe was Freemasonry. Whether the fire of the latter's heroic age still burns I am not in a position to judge. But, whatever ideals it may claim to possess, a consistent economic philosophy must regard it with the same indifference as it does Catholicism and the League of Nations. To the economic mentality all these things are mere shadows; one, perhaps, a shadow of the future, Catholicism a shadow of the past; and, as has been remarked, "whether one shadow extends its hand to the other is of as little consequence as if they came to blows."

Humanity is an idea so abstract that Catholicism, in comparison, seems quite comprehensible, since it can be taken as an article of æsthetic interest. In so taking it the objectivity of capitalists, who think in terms of economics, shows itself very closely akin to the mentality of a thorough-going Communism. Neither human beings nor things really need "government" if the machinery of the economic-technological system is left to its own immanent conformity to mechanical laws. If by such reasoning all systems of political authority are rejected, Bakunin, the greatest anarchist of the nineteenth century, must appear in the light

of an ingenious berserker hastening in advance of his generation to wage war against Idea and Intellect, and to clear away all metaphysical and ideological obstacles, trouncing in a Scythian frenzy religion and politics, theology and law.

Bakunin's controversy with the Italian Mazzini is, as it were, a symbolic skirmish preceding a colossal revolutionary world-upheaval on an even more gigantic scale than the Migration of Nations. The belief of Mazzini the Freemason in God was to Bakunin, like every theistic belief, merely a badge of slavery, the true source of every evil and of all forms of constitutional and political authority ; it stood for metaphysical centralisation. Marx and Engels, too, were atheists, but for them the final criterion was a cultural one. The unconquerable aversion inspired in these two West Germans by Lassalle, who hailed from Silesia, was something more than a mere prejudice. That their hatred of the Russian had its origin in their most deeply rooted instincts is seen in the fury of their attack within the First International.

On the other hand, everything in the anarchistic Russian revolted against Engels and the "German Jew." Their "intellectualism" was a constant thorn in the anarchist's side.

They had too much to do with "ideas," too much "brain." The word *cervelle* only issues from Bakunin's lips as a veritable hiss of venom; he suspects, and rightly, too, that it stands for the claim to authority, discipline, and hierarchy. To him any form of intellectualism is hostile to life. With unerring sureness his barbaric, untamed instinct here hit upon a seemingly casual catchword, which was, in reality, full of import, and which the German revolutionaries, when they created the "proletariat," the fighting class, stamped with a peculiar ethical significance: the "ragged proletariat."

This designation (*à la fois méprisant et pittoresque*) can, in truth, be regarded as a symbol, since for all time it is indissolubly bound up with a host of valuations.

For every aspect of sociology has some relation to that strange and motley crowd the "ragged proletariat." Though a "proletariat," it nevertheless embraces in addition to the bohemian of a *bourgeois* age, the Christian beggar, and, indeed, all the oppressed and injured. In every revolution and rebellion to this day, it has played a somewhat hazy yet essential part, and Bolshevist writers of recent years have frequently accorded it the tribute of an *amende honorable*.

When Marx and Engels, therefore, were at

pains to make a distinction between their own *bonâ fide* proletariat and this "rotten rabble," they betrayed in so doing how much they were still influenced by the traditions of ethics and of Western European culture. They are anxious to invest their proletariat with some sort of social dignity, which is only possible on an ethical basis.

Bakunin, however, had the colossal audacity to hail in that same "ragged proletariat" the harbinger of the future, and to appeal to the *canaille*.

And in what a torrent of thundering rhetoric!

"The Flower of the Proletariat, as I conceive it, is none other than the Great Masses, the Uncivilised, Disinherited, Wretched, Unlettered Millions, whom Marx and Engels would consign to the paternal mercies of a Firm Government. The Flower of the Proletariat, as I conceive it, is none other than that eternal cannon fodder of Governments, that Great Canaille, as yet practically untouched by *bourgeois* civilisation, and which bears in its soul, in its passions and instincts, all the seeds of the Socialism of the Future."

Never has the crucial contrast of culture been so powerfully displayed as in these words, which ring up the curtain on vital realities and intimate on what side Catholicism as a political power ranges itself to-day.

Since the nineteenth century we have had two great masses to whom the traditions and culture of Western Europe are absolutely foreign, two mighty torrents lashing against their embankments—the proletariat of the great cities with their class antagonism, and the Russian element turning its back more and more on Europe. From the standpoint of traditional Western civilisation, both are barbarian, and where they display a self-conscious sense of power they even pride themselves on being barbarian. That they met on Russian soil in the Russian Soviet has its profound justification in the history of ideas. Their alliance is no mere incident in universal history, however dissimilar, not to say opposed, the two elements—the Russians and the industrial workers of the great cities—may be, and however unaccountable the entire incident will remain, despite all theories—those of Marxism included—which may be advanced on the subject.

I am well aware that in the Russian hatred of Western culture there may be more Christianity than in Liberalism and in German Marxism, that great Catholics have deemed Liberalism a more dangerous enemy than avowed socialistic atheism, and that, finally, it is not impossible that in this formlessness a

potentiality may slumber that will engender some new form to shape in its turn the destinies of an economic-technological age.

In her abidingness that outlives all else, the Catholic Church has no need to decide these questions. In this instance, too, she will be the *complexio* of all that survives. The inheritance will be hers.

Nevertheless, there is an inevitable decision to be made in every generation concerning the present day, the situation actually existing. Even if she cannot declare herself for any of the conflicting parties, the Church, nevertheless, must in fact side with one, as, for example, in the early nineteenth century she stood on the side of the opponents of the revolution.

And it is my belief that in that skirmish of Bakunin's, the Catholic Church and the Catholic conception of humanity were on the side of Thought and Western European civilisation—were more akin to Mazzini than to the atheistic Socialism of the Russian Anarchist.

THE END

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